Self-control and temperance

Use in the book

The virtue enters before the definition. In Socrates' account of Thracian healing, beautiful words engender temperance in the soul, enabling bodily treatment to succeed (157a–b). Critias promptly claims that Charmides already possesses it in exceptional measure. Socrates then makes possession a practical issue: if the boy has enough temperance, he needs no preliminary charm; otherwise the soul must be treated first. What began as a compliment becomes a question whose answer matters for what to do.

Charmides cannot comfortably declare himself either temperate or intemperate: one answer is self-praise, the other contradicts his admirers. Socrates therefore asks for his opinion of what temperance is, assuming that its presence would give him some awareness of it (158c–159a2). This is an investigative proposal, not a demonstrated rule that anyone who has a virtue can define it. The boy's answers test familiar outward manifestations. Quietness fails to distinguish temperate conduct from admirable quickness (159b–160d234); modesty fails because shame can obstruct a needy person's good (160e–161b2). Neither argument establishes that a temperate person must be noisy, hasty or shameless. What fails is the attempted identification of the whole virtue with a feature whose value varies with the circumstances.

The third answer, doing one's own business, shifts from manner to the sphere of action. Taken to demand that people produce only what belongs to themselves, it would destroy sensible cooperation (161b–162b23). Critias rescues the phrase by making “one's own” mean good and by reserving “doing” for beneficial production. Temperance then becomes doing good things (163b–e2). Yet a craftsman might produce a beneficial result without knowing that he has done so. Critias refuses to admit temperance without self-knowledge and abandons the earlier account (164a–165b23). This is a change of proposal, not an established inference from good action to a completed theory of virtue.

The long second half examines the new account. Critias' knowing oneself becomes knowledge of itself and of the other knowledges, then knowledge also of lack of knowledge (166c–167a2). Its ambitious promise is that the temperate person can identify what he and others know or do not know. Socrates distinguishes two burdens of proof: whether such a knowledge is possible and whether it benefits its possessor (167b). The possibility question remains unresolved; existence is subsequently granted for the argument. The benefit question exposes a restriction: recognition that knowledge is present does not by itself identify its subject or certify a doctor's competence (170a–171c23).

Even an ideal regime in which everyone acts with expertise does not automatically establish happiness. At 174b–d Critias identifies knowledge of good and bad as the knowledge that makes life beneficial. Under the definitions now in force this is distinct from knowledge of knowledge. Critias' attempt to make temperance beneficial by supervising it is answered by assigning each expertise its own work (174d–175a2). This answer raises, rather than finally settles, the problem of how supervisory and subordinate knowledge contribute to benefit.

The closing verdict must therefore be read at two levels. The inquiry has failed to discover what temperance is; it has even relied on concessions the argument did not justify (175b–d2). But Socrates explicitly continues to regard temperance as a great good and attributes failure to his own inquiry (175e–176a). The dialogue does not conclude that virtue is useless. Nor does it formally replace the failed account with “knowledge of good and bad,” although that knowledge supplies an important positive direction for interpretation. Charmides' willingness to continue with the charm keeps education open. Critias' claim that obedience will prove his ward's temperance, followed by joking threats of force, leaves the relation between genuine virtue, reputation and submission to authority dramatically unsettled.

Places to read

1. 157a–158c23Temperance is the promised effect of the charm and the excellence Critias attributes to Charmides
2. 158c–159a2Possession is investigated through the boy’s own account
3. 159b–161b2345Quietness and modesty are proposed and tested
4. 161b–165b234567Doing one’s own business becomes doing good, then gives way to knowing oneself
5. 166c–169d23456Critias defines reflexive knowledge; possibility and benefit are separated
6. 170a–172d2345Its proposed powers of identification and supervision are restricted
7. 173a–175a234The dream and knowledge of good and bad test the proposed virtue’s benefit
8. 175b–176d23Aporia, renewed affirmation of value, and an unresolved dramatic conclusion

Translation in this edition

The edition consistently uses “temperance,” “temperate” and “be temperate,” enabling the changing proposals to remain proposals about one Greek family. Its rendering “Be temperate!” at 164e should be read as Critias' interpretation of the Delphic maxim, not a second inscription quoted from the sanctuary. At 157d Burnet prints σωφρονέστατος from T and a variant in W; B's alternative πολυφρενέστατος concerns sagacity. The text's repeated conditionals and concessions are as important as its consistent terminology.

σωφρονέω

Attested: σωφρονεῖν / σωφρονεῖς / Σωφρόνει (sōphronein / sōphroneis / sōphronei). Be or behave temperately; Critias reinterprets the Delphic greeting as the imperative ‘be temperate’. References: 163a, 164a, 164e, 170d, 176b. Lexical identification: lemma: σωφρονέω. See Temperance.

σωφρόνως

Attested: σωφρόνως (sōphronōs). Temperately; qualifies a city’s administration or a person’s manner of acting, rather than naming another virtue. References: 162a, 164c. Lexical identification: lemma: σωφρόνως. See Temperance.

σωφροσύνη

Attested: σωφροσύνη / σωφροσύνης (sōphrosynē / sōphrosynēs). Temperance or sound-minded self-restraint, the virtue whose proposed definitions the dialogue examines. References: 158b, 158e, 159a, 159d, 160c, 161a, 167a, 170d, 172e, 157b, 157d, 171d, 172c. Lexical identification: lemma: σωφροσύνη. See Temperance.

σώφρων

Attested: σώφρων / σώφρονας (sōphrōn / sōphronas). Temperate or sound-minded; describes the possessor of the virtue under investigation. References: 158b, 167a, 159b. Lexical identification: lemma: σώφρων. See Temperance.

Use in the book

The virtue first appears in the idealized account of Persian royal education. One of the four selected tutors is “the most temperate.” He teaches the prince not to be ruled by any pleasure, so that the future ruler becomes genuinely free and kingly, ruling what is within himself rather than being enslaved by it. This is an account of training and self-government delivered by Socrates as part of the comparison meant to shame Alcibiades into preparation. It is not yet a formal definition of temperance. The Spartan catalogue at 122c lists temperance among several admired qualities, again before its philosophical identification is tested.

At 131b Socrates introduces a conditional: if temperance is knowing oneself, then the medical, gymnastic, and productive crafts do not make their practitioners temperate simply in virtue of their specialist knowledge. The qualification matters. He does not say that a doctor cannot also be temperate, only that bodily expertise as such does not amount to knowing the self. Nor does the sentence establish that all skill is worthless. It marks the limit of specialist competence in relation to the person who uses it.

The identification is recalled after the eye analogy. At 133c Socrates asks whether they agreed that knowing oneself is temperance, and Alcibiades assents. The dialogue now treats that identification as a premise for consequences concerning one's own good. Without self-knowledge and temperance one cannot know what belongs to oneself as one's own, and therefore cannot competently discern other people's or cities' affairs. The earlier concession of separate specialist knowledge is corrected at 133d–e. This qualification prevents a simple opposition between an inward virtue and entirely self-sufficient external crafts.

At 134a–b temperance becomes a necessary condition of happiness. The argument runs through ignorance, mistakes, bad action and bad fortune, and wretchedness. Wealth cannot remove the relevant wretchedness; becoming temperate can. The conclusion is not that an ascetic disposition guarantees every desired external outcome. It is that the good management of life cannot be secured merely by resources in the absence of the understanding that directs them.

The political conclusion at 134c pairs temperance with justice. Alcibiades must procure these virtues for himself and the city, rather than unrestricted license to do whatever he wishes. Just and temperate action looks toward what is divine and bright and thereby permits knowledge of oneself and one's own good. The earlier royal ideal of freedom from subjection to pleasure and the later requirement of self-knowledge thus converge in an account of responsible rule: command over others without knowledgeable self-government is dangerous.

The dialogue does not undertake an independent argument that every ordinary use of σωφροσύνη means self-knowledge. It progressively makes that identification within this conversation. Nor should the account be replaced with the different proposals and problems examined in the Charmides. That dialogue can supply a useful comparison, but this one's particular movement is from self-care and the soul to knowledge of one's own good and the conditions of political action.

Places to read

1. 121e–122aThe temperate tutor teaches freedom from rule by pleasure
2. 122cTemperance appears among the Spartan virtues
3. 131bA conditional identification with self-knowledge limits the claims of specialist crafts
4. 133c–134b23The identification is recalled and made necessary for knowing one’s good and escaping wretchedness
5. 134c–134d2Justice and temperance replace unrestricted power as the proper political aim

Translation in this edition

“Temperance” is used consistently for the noun, with “temperate” and “temperately” for its adjective and adverb. The conditional εἰ at 131b and the retrospective question at 133c should both be preserved: the former introduces the identification, the latter treats it as an agreement, rather than providing a fresh proof.

σωφρονέω

Attested: ὁ σωφρονήσας (ho sōphronēsas; 134b). At 134b: The person who has become temperate, contrasted with the person who has become rich as escaping the relevant wretchedness. Lexical identification: lemma: σωφρονέω. See Temperance.

σωφρόνως

Attested: σωφρόνως (sōphronōs; 134d). At 134d: The manner of action paired with justice and directed toward the divine and bright. Lexical identification: lemma: σωφρόνως. See Temperance.

σωφροσύνη

Attested: σωφροσύνη (sōphrosynē; 131b). At 131b: The virtue conditionally equated with self-knowledge, which specialist knowledge alone does not secure. Lexical identification: lemma: σωφροσύνη. See Temperance.

σώφρων

Attested: ὁ σωφρονέστατος (ho sōphronestatos; 121e); σώφρων (sōphrōn; 131b); σωφρονέστατος (sōphronestatos; 121e). At 121e: The most temperate royal tutor, charged with teaching the prince not to be ruled by pleasure. At 131b: Possessing temperance: the adjective occurs in the qualified claim that a craftsman is not temperate simply by his craft. Temperate; the superlative identifies the tutor who teaches freedom from domination by pleasures. Lexical identification: lemma: σώφρων. See Temperance; Four royal tutors.

Use in the book

At 138a Socrates asks whether being ignorant of oneself is being temperate or not. The interlocutor chooses not being temperate. Socrates then identifies knowing oneself with being temperate, receives assent and interprets the Delphic inscription as urging temperance and justice. The transition rests on the preceding argument that evaluative knowledge of humans includes oneself as a human.

The positive identity is stronger than the initial exclusion. From the claim that self-ignorance is not temperance, one might infer that temperance requires self-knowledge; saying self-knowledge is temperance also makes it sufficient. The text does not pause to defend that strengthening. Its brisk question-and-answer structure invites a reader to test the relation rather than supplying a formal analysis of necessary and sufficient conditions.

Temperance is then described as that by which one discriminates oneself and others. This is wider than private inward inspection and more cognitive than a simple ability to restrain appetite. Since the same competence has been assigned the function of right punishment, justice and temperance are declared one. The two virtues are not merely praised together; they are identified through their common knowledge.

The final list places the temperate person alongside king, tyrant, statesman, household manager, master and just person. The corresponding list of capacities culminates in justice and temperance as one craft. This does not establish that every actual officeholder is temperate. The route into the list has stipulated right ordering and knowledgeable judgment, and the identity concerns those roles insofar as they possess the requisite competence.

The philosopher’s responsibility to lead then becomes a demand to possess and exercise this ethical knowledge rather than remain a second-ranked spectator. It would be too strong, however, to present the text as having formally defined philosophy as temperance. The dialogue offers a direction and a cluster of identifications, while its final stated conclusion is negative.

Places to read

1. 138aΤὸ δὲ αὑτὸν ἀγνοεῖν σωφρονεῖν ἐστιν ἢ μὴ σωφρονεῖν — Self-ignorance is tested against the virtue.
2. 138aσωφροσύνην ἀσκεῖν καὶ δικαιοσύνην — The Delphic exhortation is interpreted as a call to practice both virtues.
3. 138cδεσπότης, σώφρων, δίκαιος — The list joins governing roles with temperate and just persons.

Translation in this edition

The edition maintains “temperance” across the noun, verb and adjective, rather than changing to “wisdom” when knowledge becomes prominent. That consistency lets the reader see the intellectual reinterpretation of a familiar ethical term. The comparison with the Charmides is supplied by note 27 and should be identified as a parallel, not a dialogue explicitly cited by Socrates here.

Use in the book

The neuter τὸ σῶφρον is placed opposite τὸ ἀκόλαστον, the intemperate or unrestrained. This pair follows just and unjust in the test of the claim that opposites must be friends.

The example relies on an accepted moral opposition without supplying a full account of temperance. Its function is restrictive: physical pairs such as hot and cold do not authorize the same conclusion about every ethical opposite.

Places to read

1. 216bτὸ σῶφρον τῷ ἀκολάστῳ — The temperate to the intemperate.

Use in the book

The Laws excerpt joins self-restraint with justice and understanding as powers preserving human beings. The Hermetic account explains it more specifically through desire acquiring a settled relation to reasoning. The shared ethical value does not erase the difference between a theological appeal and a psychological explanation.

Places to read

1. I.3.55b.3Self-restraint joins justice and understanding among the saving virtues.
2. I.49.4.1Ordered desire becomes self-control through its relation to reasoning.

Translation in this edition

“Self-restraint” or “self-control” is accessible; “temperance” retains the traditional virtue term.