From the book
Meditations
Marcus Aurelius · Diotimos Editions · 2026
Browse this book’s lexicon →Orientation
At a Glance
- The wordἉμαρτάνειν is to miss the mark, and so to go wrong in act or judgement; ἄγνοια is not knowing, and ἄκων unwilling. Μέμφεσθαι is to blame, and αἰτιᾶσθαι to hold a man answerable, to accuse.
- In the MeditationsThe men Marcus expects to meet each morning are what they are "through ignorance of good and bad" (2.1); men "do wrong through ignorance and unwillingly" (7.22). Whoever does wrong "misses the mark set before him" (9.42.2), and the harm stays with him: "If he did wrong, the bad is there" (9.38). Whether he did wrong at all is not always known (12.16), and blame is ruled out: "So one must blame no one" (12.12).
- In this editionἉμαρτάνειν is "do wrong" at every place, kept apart from ἀδικεῖν (adikein), "act unjustly"; its nouns are "wrong" and "wrongdoing". Ἄγνοια is "ignorance", ἄκων "unwillingly" (once "unwilling"), πταίειν "stumble", μέμφεσθαι "blame", and αἰτιᾶσθαι "accuse", at 1.13 "complaint".
- A place to read9.42.1–3, where Marcus finds that wrongdoers must exist and that the man gone astray can be taught better, and asks himself whether he ought not rather to accuse himself.
Meaning
Ἁμαρτάνειν (hamartanein) is first to miss what one aims at: "You missed, and did not hit," the Greek hero Diomedes tells the Trojan archer Pandarus, who has thrown his spear at him, in Homer's Iliad.1 From that it is to fail of one's purpose, to err, to do wrong, and ἁμάρτημα (hamartēma) and ἁμαρτία (hamartia) are the wrong done. Marcus keeps that sense when he says that everyone who does wrong ἀφαμαρτάνει τοῦ προκειμένου (aphamartanei tou prokeimenou), "misses the mark set before him" (9.42.2). The word is wider than ἀδικεῖν (see Justice); the two stand side by side at 9.4. Πταίειν (ptaiein) is to stumble. Ἄγνοια (agnoia) is not knowing, and the ignorance that matters to Marcus is "ignorance of good and bad" (2.1, 2.13), of what is worth having. Ἄκων (akōn) and ἑκών (hekōn) are the common words for unwilling and willing. Of the words of blame, μέμφεσθαι (memphesthai) is to find fault with, αἰτιᾶσθαι (aitiasthai) to hold answerable, from αἰτία (aitia), a charge or a cause (see Cause and matter), and ἐγκαλεῖν (enkalein) to bring a charge.
Use in the book
Book II opens with a diagnosis: "At dawn, say to yourself in advance: I shall meet the meddling, the ungrateful, the insolent, the treacherous, the envious, the unsocial. All these things have come upon them through ignorance of good and bad." Against it Marcus sets his own knowledge of "the nature of the good, that it is honourable, and of the bad, that it is shameful", and so none of them can harm him, "for no one will involve me in what is shameful" (2.1; see Kinship and cooperation). The neighbour "does not know, however, what is according to nature for him. But I know" (3.11.3; see Good, bad and indifference).
Ignorance goes with unwillingness. Among the verdicts Marcus reckons up against resentment is "that they do wrong unwillingly" (4.3.2; see Justice). "It is peculiar to man to love even those who stumble", and this comes about if it occurs to him that they are kin, "and that they do wrong through ignorance and unwillingly", that both will soon be dead, and above all that the man "has not harmed you" (7.22). If he looks into the springs of opinion and impulse in those whose testimony he wants, he "will neither blame those who stumble unwillingly nor need testimony" (7.62).
Unwilling does not mean innocent. The man who lies unwillingly is impious as well as the man who lies willingly, for he fights against the nature of the universe, carried "through his own doing" towards what is contrary to the truth: "he had received resources beforehand from nature, and by neglecting them he is now unable to distinguish what is false from what is true" (9.1.2; see Justice). His ignorance is the fruit of neglect, and Marcus turns the reproach on himself: "you even had resources from reason for considering that this man would probably do this wrong, and yet, having forgotten, you are astonished that he has done wrong" (9.42.3). Nor does he take ignorance for granted. At another man's ruling centre he is "to attend whether it is ignorance or design" (9.22), and the wrong itself may be in doubt: "If he did wrong, the bad is there. But perhaps he did not do wrong" (9.38); "But how do I know whether this is a wrong?" (12.16; compare 11.18.3, see Anger).
Where there is a wrong, it stays where it was done. "Does someone do wrong? He does wrong to himself" (4.26; see Justice). "Another does wrong to me? He will see to it" (5.25). "Another's wrong one must leave there" (9.20; compare 7.29, see Impression). If he did indeed do wrong, "he has condemned himself, and so this is like tearing his own face" (12.16).
Wrongdoers must exist. Of shameless men Marcus asks whether there can be none in the universe, and answers, "There cannot. Do not, then, demand the impossible"; so too with "everyone who does wrong in any way whatever" (9.42.1). Whoever does not want the base man to do wrong "is like one who does not want the fig tree to carry juice in the figs …"; "If, then, you are vehement, cure this" (12.16). At 9.42.2 "it is open to you to teach better the man who has gone astray". "And what new or strange thing has happened if the uneducated man does what belongs to the uneducated? See whether you ought not rather to accuse yourself for not expecting this man to do this wrong" (9.42.3); "new", in the text of J. H. Leopold, whose Oxford text of 1908 the edition prints, is the correction of A. J. Kronenberg, whose notes on Marcus appeared in the Classical Review in 1905, for the manuscripts' "bad".
Blame has two objects. Whoever counts things outside his choice good or bad must, "on falling into such a bad thing or failing to get such a good", "blame the gods and hate men too" (6.41; see Good, bad and indifference); and if all things happen "from one intelligent spring", "the part must not blame what comes about for the sake of the whole" (9.39; see Providence and atoms). Of men: "when you blame a man as faithless or ungrateful, turn to yourself; for evidently yours is the wrong" (9.42.4; see Beneficence). Of what is in another's power Marcus asks, "whom do you blame? The atoms or the gods? Both are madness. One must blame no one" (8.17; see Providence and atoms). At 12.12 Marcus gives the reason from unwilling wrong: "One must blame neither the gods, for they do no wrong willingly or unwillingly, nor men, for they do none except unwillingly. So one must blame no one." What blame remains Marcus turns on himself, or lets fall: "accuse yourself, or not even yourself" (10.4; see Kindness and correction).
The doctrine can be read as an argument against blame, not against judgement. Marcus still calls the wrong a wrong and the bad bad, still asks whether it came from ignorance or design, and still means to teach. What he gives up is the charge laid against another, since the wrong is the wrongdoer's own loss, and he counts himself among those who "do much wrong" (11.18.2; compare 10.30, see Anger).
Places to read
Every chapter in which ἁμαρτάνειν or a word of its family, πταίειν, ἄγνοια, ἀγνοεῖν, ἀμαθής (amathēs), ἄκων or ἀκούσιος (akousios) occurs, or a word of blame, αἰτιᾶσθαι, καταιτιᾶσθαι (kataitiasthai), καταιτίασις (kataitiasis), μέμφεσθαι, μέμψις (mempsis) and their compounds, ἐγκαλεῖν or ἔγκλημα (enklēma), in the order of the book, by section where the chapter is divided; with ἑκών where it stands against ἄκων (9.1.2, 12.12). Ἑκών elsewhere (4.34, 5.5, 8.42), ἑκούσιος (hekousios; 10.8.1, 10.28), the idiom "is not unknown" (11.6.2), ἀγνώμων (agnōmōn), "unfair", καταγινώσκειν (kataginōskein), "find fault", and ψέγειν (psegein), "censure", are left out.
- 1.13GreekFrom Cinna Catulus, a Stoic teacher, Marcus learned not to make light of a friend's complaint, even an unreasonable one, but to try to restore him to the usual footing.
- 1.16.3GreekHis adoptive father, Antoninus Pius, guarded what the empire needed, used its funds sparingly, and endured the accusations some brought against him over such things.
- 2.1GreekThe meddling, the ungrateful, the insolent and the rest are such through ignorance of good and bad; the wrongdoer is kin, and Marcus can neither be harmed by him nor be angry with him.
- 2.10GreekTheophrastus, Aristotle's successor, comparing wrongdoings in the ordinary way, judges wrong done with pleasure open to a greater charge than wrong done with distress.
- 2.11.3GreekThe nature of the whole would not have overlooked anything through ignorance, nor done wrong so greatly through want of power or skill, that good and bad should befall good men and bad alike.
- 2.13GreekWhat comes from men deserves love because of kinship, and sometimes pity, because of ignorance of good and bad, a disablement no less than the one that deprives a man of telling white from black.
- 3.5GreekMarcus is not to act unwillingly, or unsocially, or without examination, or pulled two ways.
- 3.11.3GreekWhat comes from a fellow man comes from a kinsman who does not know what is according to nature for him; Marcus knows, and so treats him with goodwill and justice.
- 4.3.2GreekAmong the verdicts against resenting the vice of men is that they do wrong unwillingly.
- 4.26GreekWhoever does wrong does wrong to himself.
- 5.3GreekMarcus is not to let the blame or word of certain people distract him from what is according to nature.
- 5.5GreekNot complaining of one's lot is among the qualities wholly in Marcus' power, and no want of talent compels him to blame the poor body.
- 5.18GreekAnother man stands steady in misfortune because he does not know it has happened, or to show off; it is terrible that ignorance and the wish to please should be stronger than wisdom.
- 5.25GreekIf another does wrong to Marcus, he will see to it; he has his own disposition and his own activity.
- 5.32GreekMarcus asks why unskilled and ignorant souls confound the skilled and knowing.
- 6.16.4GreekWhoever honours many things besides the one thing to be honoured must envy and plot against others, and often blame even the gods.
- 6.21GreekIf anyone can show Marcus that he is not forming opinions or acting rightly, he will gladly shift position; it is the man who persists in his own deception and ignorance who is harmed.
- 6.22GreekThe things that do not distract Marcus from his duty are soulless, or irrational, or gone astray and not knowing the road.
- 6.27GreekTo be indignant that men do wrong is in a way not to allow them an impulse towards what appears to them proper; if what they are carried towards is not so, Marcus is to teach and show.
- 6.30.3GreekAntoninus tolerated those who blamed him unjustly, not blaming them in return.
- 6.41GreekWhoever counts things outside his choice good or bad must, on falling into such a bad thing or failing to get such a good, blame the gods and hate men.
- 6.42GreekEven the man who blames and tries to oppose what comes about works together with the rest, for the universe had need of such a man too.
- 6.50GreekMarcus is to try to persuade men, but to act even when they are unwilling, when the reason of justice leads so.
- 7.14GreekThe things affected by what falls from outside will blame, if they want; Marcus is not harmed if he does not form the opinion that what has happened is bad.
- 7.22GreekIt is peculiar to man to love even those who stumble, and this comes about if it occurs to Marcus that they are kin, do wrong through ignorance and unwillingly, will soon be dead with him, and have not harmed him.
- 7.24GreekMarcus asks what cause there is still for living if even the awareness of doing wrong is going to depart.
- 7.26GreekWhen someone does him wrong, Marcus is to consider at once with what opinion of good or bad he did it, and then he will pity him and be neither astonished nor angry.
- 7.29GreekThe wrong done by another is to be left there where the wrong subsisted.
- 7.58GreekThose who were annoyed at what happened to them, thought it strange and blamed, are now nowhere.
- 7.62GreekIf Marcus looks into the springs of men's opinion and impulse, he will neither blame those who stumble unwillingly nor need their testimony.
- 7.63GreekEvery soul, in a saying that Epictetus, the Stoic teacher of the early second century whose lectures Arrian recorded, gives as that of Plato, the Athenian philosopher, is deprived of truth unwillingly; so too of justice, self-control and kindliness.
- 7.66GreekSocrates, the Athenian philosopher, is to be judged by whether he was neither indignant at random at vice nor a slave to anyone's ignorance.
- 8.9GreekNo one is to hear Marcus blaming life at court any longer, nor is he to hear himself.
- 8.17GreekIf a thing is in another's power, Marcus asks whom he blames, atoms or gods, and answers that both are madness: one must blame no one, but set right what one can.
- 8.48GreekHe who has not seen that the understanding free from passions is a citadel is ignorant.
- 9.1.2GreekThe man who lies willingly and the man who lies unwillingly are both impious, the second because he neglected the resources he had from nature; the pursuer of pleasure must often blame the common nature.
- 9.4GreekHe who does wrong does wrong against himself.
- 9.20GreekAnother's wrong is to be left where it is.
- 9.22GreekAt another man's ruling centre Marcus is to attend whether it is ignorance or design, and to reckon that it is kin.
- 9.38GreekIf a man did wrong, the bad is there; but perhaps he did not.
- 9.39GreekIf all things happen from one intelligent spring, the part must not blame what comes about for the sake of the whole.
- 9.42.1GreekShameless men and wrongdoers of every kind must exist in the universe, and to remember it makes Marcus more kindly to each.
- 9.42.2GreekNature has given mildness against the unfair man, it is open to Marcus to teach better the man who has gone astray, and everyone who does wrong misses the mark set before him.
- 9.42.3GreekMarcus asks what strange thing has happened if the uneducated man does what belongs to the uneducated, and is to see whether he ought not rather to accuse himself for not expecting the wrong.
- 9.42.4GreekWhen Marcus blames a man as faithless or ungrateful, the wrong is his own, whether he trusted such a man to keep faith or did not give the favour conclusively.
- 10.1GreekMarcus asks his soul whether it will ever share citizenship with gods and men so as neither to blame them in anything nor to have fault found with it by them.
- 10.4GreekIf a man errs, Marcus is to teach kindly and show what is overlooked; if he cannot, he is to accuse himself, or not even himself.
- 10.30GreekWhen he takes offence at someone's wrongdoing, Marcus is to take account at once of the like wrong he does himself.
- 11.8GreekA man who separates himself from his neighbour does not know that he has severed himself from the whole polity.
- 11.18.2GreekIf men do not act rightly, they do so unwillingly and in ignorance; and Marcus himself does much wrong.
- 11.18.3GreekMarcus has not firmly grasped whether they do wrong, for many things are done for a practical end; if the shameful were not the only bad thing, he too would necessarily do much wrong.
- 11.18.6GreekTo expect the base not to do wrong is madness, and to allow them to be such towards others while expecting them not to wrong oneself is unfair and tyrannical.
- 11.32GreekIn a line varied from Hesiod, the early Greek poet, men will blame virtue, speaking with hard words.
- 12.12GreekOne must blame no one: the gods do no wrong, willingly or unwillingly, and men do none except unwillingly.
- 12.16GreekOf one who seems to have done wrong, Marcus asks how he knows that it is a wrong; the wrongdoer condemns himself, and he who does not want the base man to do wrong is like one who does not want the fig tree to carry juice.
- 12.24GreekOne must neither blame chance nor bring a charge against providence.
- 12.26GreekWhoever is aggrieved at anything has forgotten, among other things, that the wrong done is alien.
Translation in this edition
Ἁμαρτάνειν is "do wrong" at every place, and the Glossary keeps it apart from ἀδικεῖν, "act unjustly". The participle is "the wrongdoer" (2.1), "the man who does wrong" (2.10), "he who does wrong" (9.4) and "everyone who does wrong" (9.42.1, 9.42.2); the neuter passive participle is "the wrong done" (2.10, 7.29, 12.26), and the infinitive with the article "doing wrong" (7.24). With an object the verb is "does you some wrong" (7.26), "do this wrong" (9.42.3), "what similar wrong you do" (10.30) and "do much wrong" (11.18.2, 11.18.3). Ἁμάρτημα is "wrong" (9.20, 9.42.2, 9.42.4, 12.16), "wrongs" (11.18.2, twice) and "wrongdoings" (2.10); ἁμαρτία is "wrongdoing" (2.10, 10.30) and "the wrong" (7.29); ἁμαρτητικός (hamartētikos) is "given to wrongdoing" (11.18.2), and ἀφαμαρτάνειν (aphamartanein) "misses the mark" (9.42.2). "Wrong" renders no other word but προαδικεῖν (proadikein), "has been wronged first" (2.10; see Justice), and "take wrongly" at 5.6.2, which renders παρεκδέχεσθαι (parekdechesthai), "misunderstand". At 9.42.2 the "for" of "for everyone who does wrong" renders γάρ (gar), which Leopold prints from one of the Laurentian manuscripts of the excerpts; P, the lost manuscript from which the first edition was printed, A, the Vatican manuscript, and the excerpts generally have δέ (de), "and". Πταίειν is "stumble" (7.22, 7.62); ἄπταιστος (aptaistos), with the article, is "the sureness" of the faculty that knows (5.9). Ἄγνοια is "ignorance" at all eight places; ἀγνοεῖν is "not know" (3.11.3, 5.18, 6.22, 11.8), "in ignorance" (11.18.2), "I know" for the negative οὐκ ἀγνοῶ (ouk agnoō; 3.11.3) and "is not unknown" (11.6.2); ἀμαθής is "ignorant" (5.32, 8.48). Ἀγνώμων, "unfair" (5.31, 9.42.2, 11.18.2, 11.18.6), is another word, built on γνώμη (gnōmē), "frame of mind", which is "design" where it is set against ignorance (9.22). Ἄκων is "unwillingly" at every place but 6.50, where ἀκόντων (akontōn) is "even when they are unwilling"; ἀκούσιος, standing for an adverb, and ἀκουσίως (akousiōs) are "unwillingly" (3.5, 7.62). Ἑκών is "willingly" at all five places (4.34, 5.5, 8.42, 9.1.2, 12.12); ἑκούσιος is "willing" (10.8.1), and its adverb ἑκουσίως (hekousiōs) "willingly" (10.28; see Necessity and chance). Μέμφεσθαι and μέμψις are "blame" at every place, the verbal adjective μεμπτέον (mempteon) "one must blame" (8.17, 12.12, 12.24); ἀντιμέμφεσθαι (antimemphesthai) is "blaming them in return" (6.30.3), καταμέμφεσθαι (katamemphesthai) "blaming" (8.9), and ἀμεμψίμοιρος (amempsimoiros) "not complaining of one's lot" (5.5; see Fate and allotment). "Blame" renders καταιτιᾶσθαι as well (5.5), and καταιτίασις is "accusations" (1.16.3). Αἰτιᾶσθαι is "accuse" (10.4), but at 1.13 its participles are rendered by a noun, "a friend's complaint" and "the complaint happens to be unreasonable". Ἐγκαλεῖν is "accuse" (6.41, 9.42.3), its verbal adjective ἐγκλητέον (enklēteon) "bring a charge against" (12.24), and ἔγκλημα "charge" (2.10). The Glossary keeps "blame" apart from "censure", ψέγειν (4.20, 9.27, 9.30, 9.34, 10.13, 10.34), and "find fault", καταγινώσκειν (5.5, 8.50, 10.1, 10.36), with κατάγνωσις (katagnōsis; 1.14.2). Ἀπαίδευτος (apaideutos) is "uneducated" (9.42.3), and ἀντιφάρμακον (antipharmakon), nature's remedy against each wrong, "antidote" (9.42.2); ἐλεεῖν (eleein) is "pity" (7.26) and "be pitied" (9.12), and ἐλεεινός (eleeinos) "deserves … pity" (2.13).
Greek forms and English renderings
Wrongdoing, ignorance and blame · Meditations
ἁμαρτάνειν, hamartanein, "do wrong", "the wrongdoer", "the wrong done", "doing wrong"; ἁμάρτημα, hamartēma, "wrong", "wrongs", "wrongdoings"; ἁμαρτία, hamartia, "wrongdoing", "the wrong"; ἁμαρτητικός, hamartētikos, "given to wrongdoing"; ἀφαμαρτάνειν, aphamartanein, "miss the mark"; πταίειν, ptaiein, "stumble"; ἄγνοια, agnoia, "ignorance"; ἀγνοεῖν, agnoein, "not know", "in ignorance", "is not unknown"; ἀμαθής, amathēs, "ignorant"; ἄκων, akōn, "unwillingly", "unwilling"; ἀκούσιος, akousios, "unwillingly"; ἑκών, hekōn, "willingly"; ἑκούσιος, hekousios, "willing", "willingly"; μέμφεσθαι, memphesthai, "blame"; μέμψις, mempsis, "blame"; ἀντιμέμφεσθαι, antimemphesthai, "blame in return"; καταμέμφεσθαι, katamemphesthai, "blame"; καταιτιᾶσθαι, kataitiasthai, "blame"; καταιτίασις, kataitiasis, "accusations"; αἰτιᾶσθαι, aitiasthai, "accuse", "complaint"; ἐγκαλεῖν, enkalein, "accuse", "bring a charge"; ἔγκλημα, enklēma, "charge"
Epictetus and the Stoics
Diogenes Laertius, the biographer of the philosophers, of the third century AD, reports that the Stoics counted folly, cowardice, injustice and licentiousness among the primary vices, and held the vices to be ignorances of the things of which the virtues are knowledge; wisdom, φρόνησις (phronēsis), first of the primary virtues, is knowledge of what is bad, what is good and what is neither (see Virtue and excellence).2 Marcus' "ignorance of good and bad" (2.1, 2.13) can be read as that doctrine in its plainest words. The same book reports that the Stoics held all wrongs, ἁμαρτήματα (hamartēmata), to be equal, as Chrysippus, the school's third head, says in the fourth book of his Ethical Questions, and Persaeus, Zeno's pupil, and Zeno, its founder: if one truth is not truer than another, neither is one falsehood falser, nor one wrong more a wrong than another; the man a hundred stades from Canopus, the town near Alexandria, and the man one stade away are alike not in Canopus, and so he who does more wrong and he who does less are alike not acting rightly. Heraclides of Tarsus, a pupil of the Stoic Antipater of Tarsus, and Athenodorus, another Stoic, it adds, said that wrongs are unequal.3 When Marcus approves Theophrastus' ranking of wrongs, he says that Theophrastus compares them "as one might compare such things in the ordinary way" (2.10; see Desire and aversion), which can be read as conceding that the school's measure is another. One of the discourses of Epictetus bears the title "What is peculiar to a wrong". Every wrong, he says, contains a conflict: the man who does wrong does not want to do wrong but to act rightly, and so plainly he does not do what he wants; the thief wants what is to his advantage, and if stealing is not to his advantage, he is not doing what he wants. Every rational soul is by nature averse to conflict; so long as it does not see that it is in one, nothing stops it from doing what conflicts, but once it sees, it must stand off from the conflict, as a man who perceives that a thing is false is under hard necessity to renounce it.4 Marcus' wrongdoer who "misses the mark set before him" (9.42.2) can be read as this man, who aims at his own good and does not reach it. In the Handbook Epictetus sets out three stages of blame: to accuse others when one fares ill oneself is the work of the uneducated man, to accuse oneself the work of one who has begun to be educated, and to accuse neither another nor oneself the work of the educated.5 Marcus' uneducated man and "accuse yourself" at 9.42.3, and his "accuse yourself, or not even yourself" at 10.4 (see Kindness and correction), can be read as these stages turned on the wrongs of others.
Other ancient sources
In Plato's Protagoras Socrates, explaining a poem of Simonides of Ceos, the lyric poet of the late sixth and early fifth centuries BC, will not read the poet's "willingly" as if some men did bad things willingly: none of the wise, he thinks, believes that any man goes wrong willingly, ἑκόντα ἐξαμαρτάνειν (hekonta examartanein), or willingly does what is shameful and bad; they know well that all who do such things do them unwillingly (345d–e). Later he gets the company to agree that to be "weaker than oneself", ἥττω αὑτοῦ (hēttō hautou), is nothing but ignorance, ἀμαθία (amathia), which is to hold a false opinion and be deceived about things of great worth, and that no one goes willingly towards what is bad or what he thinks bad (358c–d).6 The account of Aristotle, the philosopher of the fourth century BC, in the Nicomachean Ethics can be read as an answer. Every bad man, he allows, does not know what he must do and what he must keep from, and through a failing of this kind men become unjust and bad generally; but an act is not called involuntary because a man is ignorant of what is advantageous. Ignorance in choice is the cause not of involuntariness but of wickedness, nor does ignorance of the universal make an act involuntary, for men are blamed for it; only ignorance of the particulars of an act makes it involuntary, and only there is there pity and pardon.7 Marcus' pity can be read as given to the very ignorance that Aristotle blames: what comes from men deserves "sometimes, in a way, pity, because of ignorance of good and bad" (2.13; see Daimon). His liar who lies unwillingly, yet is impious, because by neglecting the resources nature gave him he can no longer tell false from true (9.1.2), can be read as Marcus' answer to that objection.
ἀγνοέω
Attested: ἀγνοοῦντος (agnoountos; 3.11.3), ἀγνοῶ (agnoō; 3.11.3), ἀγνοῶν (agnoōn; 5.18), ἀγνοοῦντα (agnoounta; 6.22), ἀγνοεῖται (agnoeitai; 11.6.2), ἀγνοεῖ (agnoei; 11.8), ἀγνοοῦντες (agnoountes; 11.18.2). Not to know, to be ignorant. The fellow man "does not know, however, what is according to nature for him. But I know" (3.11.3); things are "gone astray and not knowing the road" (6.22); the man who hates his neighbour "does not know that he has at the same time severed himself from the whole polity too" (11.8); men who do not act rightly do so "unwillingly and in ignorance" (11.18.2). In the passive with a negative, "is not unknown" (11.6.2). Lemma: ἀγνοέω.
ἄγνοια
Attested: ἄγνοιαν (agnoian; 2.1, 2.11.3, 2.13, 5.18, 7.22), ἀγνοίας (agnoias; 6.21), ἀγνοίᾳ (agnoiāi; 7.66), ἄγνοια (agnoia; 9.22). Ignorance; in Marcus chiefly "ignorance of good and bad" (2.1, 2.13). "All these things have come upon them through ignorance of good and bad" (2.1); "they do wrong through ignorance and unwillingly" (7.22); "he is harmed who persists in his own deception and ignorance" (6.21); Marcus is to attend at another's ruling centre "whether it is ignorance or design" (9.22). The nature of the whole would not have overlooked anything "through ignorance" (2.11.3). Lemma: ἄγνοια.
αἰτιάομαι
Attested: αἰτιωμένου (aitiōmenou; 1.13), αἰτιώμενος (aitiōmenos; 1.13), αἰτιᾶσθαι (aitiasthai; 10.4). To hold answerable, to accuse, to complain of. From Catulus, "not to make light of a friend's complaint, even if the complaint happens to be unreasonable" (1.13); when teaching fails, "accuse yourself, or not even yourself" (10.4). Lemma: αἰτιάομαι.
ἀκούσιος
Attested: ἀκούσιος (akousios; 3.5), ἀκουσίως (akousiōs; 7.62). Unwilling, against one's will; the adjective stands for an adverb at 3.5. "Do not act unwillingly, or unsocially, or without examination …" (3.5); "you will neither blame those who stumble unwillingly nor need testimony" (7.62). Lemma: ἀκούσιος.
ἄκων
Attested: ἄκοντες (akontes; 4.3.2, 7.22, 11.18.2, 12.12 twice), ἀκόντων (akontōn; 6.50), ἄκουσα (akousa; 7.63, 11.18.2), ἄκων (akōn; 9.1.2). Unwilling, against one's will. Men "do wrong unwillingly" (4.3.2); "they do wrong through ignorance and unwillingly" (7.22); "Every soul," Epictetus says as Plato's, "is deprived of truth unwillingly" (7.63); the gods "do no wrong willingly or unwillingly", men "none except unwillingly" (12.12). Of others' resistance, "act even when they are unwilling" (6.50). Lemma: ἄκων.
ἀμαθής
Attested: ἀμαθεῖς (amatheis; 5.32), ἀμαθής (amathēs; 8.48). Unlearned, ignorant. "Why do unskilled and ignorant souls confound the skilled and knowing?" (5.32); he who has not seen that the understanding free from passions is a citadel "is ignorant" (8.48). Lemma: ἀμαθής.
ἁμαρτάνω
Attested: ἁμαρτάνοντος (hamartanontos; 2.1, 9.42.1), ἁμαρτάνων (hamartanōn; 2.10, 9.4, 9.42.2), ἁμαρτανόμενον (hamartanomenon; 2.10, 12.26), ἥμαρτεν (hēmarten; 2.11.3, 9.38 twice, 12.16), ἁμαρτάνουσι (hamartanousi; 4.3.2, 6.27, 7.22, 11.18.3, 12.12), ἁμαρτάνει (hamartanei; 4.26 twice, 5.25, 9.4), ἁμαρτάνειν (hamartanein; 7.24, 11.18.3, 11.18.6 twice, 12.16), ἁμάρτῃ (hamartēi; 7.26), ἥμαρτε (hēmarte; 7.26, 12.16), ἁμαρτηθέν (hamartēthen; 7.29), ἁμαρτήσεσθαι (hamartēsesthai; 9.42.3 twice), ἡμάρτηκε (hēmartēke; 9.42.3), ἁμαρτάνεις (hamartaneis; 10.30, 11.18.2). To miss the mark; to go wrong, to do wrong, in act or judgement. "the nature of the wrongdoer himself, that he is kin to me" (2.1); "Does someone do wrong? He does wrong to himself" (4.26); "If he did wrong, the bad is there. But perhaps he did not do wrong" (9.38); "One must blame neither the gods, for they do no wrong willingly or unwillingly, nor men, for they do none except unwillingly" (12.12). Even the nature of the whole is said not to have "done wrong so greatly" (2.11.3). Lemma: ἁμαρτάνω.
ἁμάρτημα
Attested: ἁμαρτημάτων (hamartēmatōn; 2.10, 11.18.2 twice), ἁμάρτημα (hamartēma; 9.20, 9.42.2, 9.42.4, 12.16). A wrong, a fault committed. "Another's wrong one must leave there" (9.20); "what virtue nature has given man against this wrong" (9.42.2); "evidently yours is the wrong" (9.42.4); "But how do I know whether this is a wrong?" (12.16). Theophrastus compared "wrongdoings" (2.10). Lemma: ἁμάρτημα.
ἁμαρτητικός
Attested: ἁμαρτητικοί (hamartētikoi; 11.18.2). Given to doing wrong. Men are annoyed at being called "unjust and unfair and grasping and, in a word, given to wrongdoing towards neighbours" (11.18.2). Lemma: ἁμαρτητικός.
ἁμαρτία
Attested: ἁμαρτίαις (hamartiais; 2.10), ἁμαρτία (hamartia; 7.29), ἁμαρτίᾳ (hamartiāi; 10.30). Wrongdoing, the wrong. The man who does wrong through craving "is seen to be somehow more licentious and more womanish in his wrongdoing" (2.10); "Leave the wrong done by that man there where the wrong subsisted" (7.29); "When you take offence at someone's wrongdoing …" (10.30). Lemma: ἁμαρτία.
ἀντιμέμφομαι
Attested: ἀντιμεμφόμενος (antimemphomenos; 6.30.3). To blame in return. Antoninus "tolerated those who blamed him unjustly, not blaming them in return" (6.30.3). Lemma: ἀντιμέμφομαι.
ἀφαμαρτάνω
Attested: ἀφαμαρτάνει (aphamartanei; 9.42.2). To miss, to fail of, with the genitive. "Everyone who does wrong misses the mark set before him and has gone astray" (9.42.2). Lemma: ἀφαμαρτάνω.
ἐγκαλέω
Attested: ἐγκαλέσαι (enkalesai; 6.41), ἐγκαλεῖν (enkalein; 9.42.3), ἐγκλητέον (enklēteon; 12.24). To bring a charge against, to accuse. If only what is in our power is judged good and bad, "no cause is left either to accuse God or to take an enemy's stand against a man" (6.41), where "judge" is the correction of Thomas Gataker, the seventeenth-century English editor, which Leopold prints for the manuscripts' "move"; "See whether you ought not rather to accuse yourself for not expecting this man to do this wrong" (9.42.3); "one must neither blame chance nor bring a charge against providence" (12.24). Lemma: ἐγκαλέω.
ἔγκλημα
Attested: ἐγκλήματος (enklēmatos; 2.10). A charge, an accusation. Theophrastus said "that wrong done with pleasure is open to a greater charge than wrong done with distress" (2.10). Lemma: ἔγκλημα.
ἑκούσιος
Attested: ἑκούσιον (hekousion; 10.8.1), ἑκουσίως (hekousiōs; 10.28). Willing, of one's own will; the adverb, willingly; the opposite of ἀκούσιος. The name "consenting" was to signify for Marcus "the willing acceptance of what is allotted by the common nature" (10.8.1; see Self-respect and shame); "to the rational living being alone it is given to follow willingly what happens, while bare following is necessary for all" (10.28; see Necessity and chance). Lemma: ἑκούσιος.
ἑκών
Attested: ἑκών (hekōn; 4.34, 5.5, 8.42, 9.1.2), ἑκόντες (hekontes; 12.12). Willing, of one's own will. Set against ἄκων: "he who lies willingly is impious" (9.1.2), and the gods "do no wrong willingly or unwillingly" (12.12). Elsewhere: "Give yourself up willingly to Clotho …" (4.34); "and yet you still remain below, willingly?" (5.5); "I have never willingly distressed even another" (8.42). Lemma: ἑκών.
καταιτιάομαι
Attested: καταιτιᾶσθαι (kataitiasthai; 5.5). To lay the blame on. Marcus asks whether he is compelled, for want of talent, "to grumble, to be stingy, to flatter, to blame the poor body" (5.5). Lemma: καταιτιάομαι.
καταιτίασις
Attested: καταιτιάσεως (kataitiaseōs; 1.16.3). An accusation. Antoninus showed "endurance of the accusations some brought against him over such things" (1.16.3). Lemma: καταιτίασις.
καταμέμφομαι
Attested: καταμεμφομένου (katamemphomenou; 8.9). To find fault with, to blame. "Let no one hear you any longer blaming life at court, nor you yourself" (8.9). Lemma: καταμέμφομαι.
μέμφομαι
Attested: μέμφεσθαι (memphesthai; 6.16.4, 9.1.2, 9.39, 10.1), μεμφομένους (memphomenous; 6.30.3), μέμψασθαι (mempsasthai; 6.41, 8.17), μεμφόμενος (memphomenos; 6.42), μέμψεται (mempsetai; 7.14), ἐμέμφοντο (ememphonto; 7.58), μέμψῃ (mempsēi; 7.62), μέμφῃ (memphēi; 8.17, 9.42.4), μεμπτέον (mempteon; 8.17, 12.12 twice, 12.24), μέμψονται (mempsontai; 11.32). To find fault with, to blame, mostly with the dative of the person or thing blamed. Of the gods and nature: "and moreover often blame even the gods" (6.16.4); "the part must not blame what comes about for the sake of the whole" (9.39). Of men: "when you blame a man as faithless or ungrateful, turn to yourself" (9.42.4). Of both: "whom do you blame? The atoms or the gods? Both are madness. One must blame no one" (8.17); "So one must blame no one" (12.12). The verbal adjective μεμπτέον is "one must blame" (8.17, 12.12, 12.24). At 11.32 the word stands in a line varied from Hesiod. Lemma: μέμφομαι.
μέμψις
Attested: μέμψις (mempsis; 5.3). Blame, reproach. "do not let the blame or word of certain people that ensues distract you" (5.3). Lemma: μέμψις.
πταίω
Attested: πταίοντας (ptaiontas; 7.22), πταίουσιν (ptaiousin; 7.62). To stumble, to trip; of men, to fall into a fault. "It is peculiar to man to love even those who stumble" (7.22); "you will neither blame those who stumble unwillingly nor need testimony" (7.62). Lemma: πταίω.
Source note
1. Homer, Iliad 5.287.
2. Diogenes Laertius, Lives of the Philosophers 7.92–93.
3. Diogenes Laertius, Lives of the Philosophers 7.120–121.
4. Epictetus, Discourses 2.26 (title) and 2.26.1–3.
5. Epictetus, Handbook 5.
6. Plato, Protagoras 345d–e, 358c–d.
7. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 3.1, 1110b28–1111a2.