Understanding and practical wisdom

Use in the book

At 125a Socrates unpacks Alcibiades' reference to the fine and good. Are these the intelligent or unintelligent? Once intelligence is accepted, it is specified by domain: the shoemaker is intelligent in shoes but not in cloaks. The same person is therefore good in one respect and bad in another. “Intelligent” here is not an all-purpose commendation that establishes fitness to rule. It is the ability to understand the activity at issue.

At 133c the knowing region of soul is characterized by knowing and intelligent thinking; the next sentence names god and intelligence in its description of the divine. The context is now the soul's best activity, toward which self-knowledge is directed. It would nevertheless overstate the text to turn φρόνησις into the name of a distinct independently existing entity. The sentence's theological and psychological relations remain compressed, and the apparatus reports relevant variation.

The final cases use νοῦς in an equally practical way. A sick person without medical sense will misuse his license; a would-be helmsman without the corresponding sense and excellence endangers all aboard. These applications confirm that power requires understanding directed to its proper object. They do not infer that the political ruler must personally possess every specialist skill. Earlier, recognizing one's ignorance rightly permits delegation.

The movement across the dialogue is from competence within a domain to the understanding needed to order one's life and authority. A lexicon must preserve that development and the distinct Greek families, rather than translating all of them indiscriminately as wisdom.

Places to read

1. 125a–125bIntelligence is relative to the task, as in shoes and cloaks
2. 133c1–6Knowing and intelligent thinking mark the divine region of soul
3. 134e–135a2Medical and nautical sense constrain the safe exercise of license

Translation in this edition

The edition uses “intelligence” for φρόνησις, “wise” for σοφός, and “sense” for νοῦς in the final examples. At 133c5 the words θεόν τε καὶ φρόνησιν are printed, while their omission in Olympiodorus is recorded. B's “more intellectual” at 133c1 is an alternative to, not the printed equivalent of, “more divine.”

ἄφρων

Attested: ἄφρων (aphrōn; 125a). At 125a: Lacking understanding in a specified field, as a shoemaker does in making cloaks despite competence in shoes. Lexical identification: lemma: ἄφρων. See Intelligence.

νοῦς

Attested: νοῦν ἰατρικὸν (noun iatrikon; 135a). At 135a: Medical sense lacking in the sick person who insists on unrestricted license; its absence makes bodily ruin likely. Lexical identification: lemma: νοῦς. See Intelligence.

φρονέω

Attested: φρονεῖν (phronein; 133c). At 133c: Intelligent thinking, coupled with knowing to characterize the soul's most divine region. Lexical identification: lemma: φρονέω. See Intelligence.

φρόνησις

Attested: φρόνησιν (phronēsin; 133c). At 133c: Intelligence named with god in the compressed description of the divine object relevant to self-knowledge. Lexical identification: lemma: φρόνησις. See Intelligence.

φρόνιμος

Attested: φρονίμους (phronimous; 125a). At 125a: Understanding a relevant matter; Socrates unpacks the label fine and good by asking whether it denotes the intelligent. Lexical identification: lemma: φρόνιμος. See Intelligence.

Use in the book

At 138c Alcibiades tries to quarantine the problem of destructive prayer by calling Oedipus mad. Socrates initially explores the relation between being mad and being intelligent, but the resulting identification of all unintelligence with madness is abandoned at 139d. The revised account at 140c–d places madness within a wider field of unintelligence. That correction matters: ordinary people can lack judgment without displaying the behaviour used to make the first conclusion look absurd.

The positive test arrives at 140e: the intelligent know what they must do and say. It is a practical and normative qualification, not simply an ability to execute whatever they choose. The orator, soldier, horseman and boxer can possess genuine knowledge yet fail the test, because knowing how does not settle whether, when, for how long or toward whom the activity should be undertaken. At 145c intelligence requires the accompanying knowledge of the best, identified there with knowledge of the beneficial.

The final return at 150a–b associates intelligence with justice and applies the original formula to relations with both gods and human beings. The dialogue therefore brings its apparent excursion through classification back to prayer. Alcibiades’ problem is not insufficient cleverness in constructing a request: it is his inability to judge the good of what he requests. Socrates’ teasing reference to his greatness of soul at 150c shows that an impressive self-image can coexist with this deficiency.

Places to read

1. 138c–139c23An initial opposition produces the provisional identification of unintelligence with madness.
2. 140c–eThe wider classification is followed by the test of knowing what to do and say.
3. 145b–e2Technical accomplishment is distinguished from practical intelligence.
4. 150a–c2Intelligence and justice govern conduct toward gods and people; Alcibiades’ grand ambition remains suspect.

Translation in this edition

The edition consistently uses “intelligent”, “intelligence”, “unintelligent” and “unintelligence” to keep the family visible. “Wisdom” belongs to sophia, and “sense” to nous. Reading “intelligent” as mere cleverness would erase precisely the distinction argued at 145b–e2.

Use in the book

At 225a ignorance that one’s prospective source of gain is worthless leads Socrates to say that the companion is calling lovers of gain senseless. The companion rejects this: he intends people who understand what they are doing yet are unscrupulous and base. His accusation requires enough intelligence to make their conduct culpable in the way he has in mind. The contrast is between error and deliberate misconduct, not between the clever and the conventionally educated.

At the end of the craft sequence, Socrates gathers craftsmen together with “the other intelligent men”. The wording does not make everyone a craftsman; it treats practitioners as part of a wider class of sensible agents. They are expected to recognise that worthless means do not deliver successful ends. The resulting exclusion of knowing pursuit works only as long as the same end and beneficiary are kept in view. A shrewd person may identify one action as harmful in a respect without ceasing to calculate some other advantage.

The second definition, excessive craving for small or worthless things, is again driven toward ignorance of worth. But at 227b Socrates jokes that lovers of gain are at least not madmen, since they love gain and gain has been declared good. The compliment is pointed: the group first introduced as morally contemptible now looks ordinary and reasonable. It is also limited. Loving something good does not settle whether one loves it excessively, at another person’s expense, or without proportion to other goods.

The historical interlude supplies an adjacent but different intellectual reproach: the familiar story of Hipparchus’ death is dismissed as simple-minded. That disparagement belongs to Socrates’ rival account of cultural authority, not to a demonstrated psychological diagnosis. Throughout the dialogue, labels of intelligence can do rhetorical work before their warrant has been established. The companion’s inability to state Socrates’ alleged trick finally shows why lack of a diagnosis is not equivalent to lack of a problem.

Places to read

1. 225aἀνοήτους λέγεις τοὺς φιλοκερδεῖς — Socrates identifies the ignorant branch with senselessness.
2. 225aἈλλ’ οὐκ ἀνοήτους λέγω — The companion expressly rejects that intended meaning.
3. 226cτῶν ἄλλων τῶν ἐμφρόνων ἀνδρῶν — Intelligent people extend the practical examples beyond named crafts.
4. 227bΟὐ μανικούς γε — Socrates’ denial of madness accompanies the reclassification of gain as good.

Translation in this edition

The edition distinguishes “senseless”, “intelligent” and “madmen”, allowing the changes of register to be heard. There is no reason to replace all three with “irrational”, which would obscure the companion’s refusal and Socrates’ later joking reassurance. Header forms are nominative lexical forms; the cited dialogue has accusative and genitive inflections.

Use in the book

The opening aim is a human state in the finest condition with regard to intelligence, as much as a human can possess (973a). This is not yet the assertion that human intelligence and divine intelligence have identical scope. Nor does it follow that phronēsis and sophia are unrelated: the question about becoming wise immediately specifies the inquiry's educational target. Distinguishing the words lets their relation remain a problem rather than settling it by translation.

At 974b “some intelligence,” the crafts, and plural “intelligences” occur among the places where the sought wisdom runs away. The plural makes visible the fragmented or specialized understandings that can claim the name. The Athenian does not deny that people exercise any intelligence before possessing complete wisdom; he himself speaks of people capable of examining themselves and others intelligently at 974c. At 976c “the intelligent” become the competent judges who would refuse to call memory and quickness genuine wisdom.

The positive account makes number the condition of intelligence. Heaven is credited with the greatest good, intelligence, at 977a, and the removal of number would prevent human beings from becoming intelligent in anything at 977c. The statement is stronger than the claim that arithmetic improves one useful skill. Its argument reaches the ability to give an account rather than possess perceptions and memories alone. Nevertheless, the passage expressly leaves room for courage and temperance without complete wisdom; the reader should not silently replace all distinctions of virtue with a single yes-or-no measure of intelligence.

The later astronomy extends the criterion beyond human accomplishments. Ordered motion is offered as evidence that stars are intelligent (982b), while the many mistake unchanging regularity for lack of soul. The same family thus names a human educational goal and a property attributed to divine living beings. The extension depends on the Athenian's argument about order, deliberation, and soul. It is not a lexical proof that every regular process thinks. The middle beings of ether and air share wonderful intelligence, and the highest god knows in every respect (985a); these differences of degree prevent the family from naming one undifferentiated mental condition throughout the cosmic hierarchy.

Places to read

1. 973aπρὸς φρόνησιν ὅσην δυνατὸν ἀνθρώπῳ σχεῖν — Intelligence is sought within the stated human capacity
2. 974bτεχνῶν ἢ φρονήσεων — Crafts and “intelligences” appear among the unsatisfactory candidates
3. 974cφρονίμως αὑτοὺς ἄλλους τε ἐξετάσαι — Intelligent examination concerns oneself and others
4. 976cοὐδεὶς τῶν ἐμφρόνων — The intelligent withhold the title wise from mere quickness
5. 976dἀνοητότατον ἂν καὶ ἀφρονέστατον — Number's removal yields both senselessness and unintelligence
6. 977cοὐκ ἄν ποτέ τι φρόνιμοι γενοίμεθα — The dependence on number is stated broadly
7. 982bμέγα τεκμήριον … τοῦ φρόνιμον εἶναι — Ordered celestial motion becomes evidence of intelligence

Translation in this edition

The rendering “intelligence” is a deliberate distinction, not a denial of the ordinary overlap between Greek words for understanding. Both phronimos and emphrōn become “intelligent”; the Greek should be consulted when the exact adjective matters. The superlative ἀφρονέστατον at 976d is actually attested, whereas the lemma ἄφρων supplies its organizing headword.

Human limit — ἀνθρώπινος (anthrōpinos)

ἀνθρώπινος (anthrōpinos)

Human limit. The adjective distinguishes the condition under inquiry as human, anticipating the limits imposed by mortality and the later comparison with divine intelligence. Attested: ἀνθρωπίνην (973a). Intelligence and its human and divine measures.

Attainable human intelligence — φρόνησις (phronēsis)

φρόνησις (phronēsis)

Attainable human intelligence. The cognitive excellence sought only as far as a human being can possess it; the phrase sets a mortal limit without defining the subject of learning. Attested: φρόνησιν (973a). Intelligence and its human and divine measures.

Specialized intelligences — φρόνησις (phronēsis)

φρόνησις (phronēsis)

Specialized intelligences. The plural groups putative understandings with crafts among the fields where the sought wisdom eludes inquiry. Attested: φρονήσεων (974b). Intelligence and its human and divine measures.

Greatest divine benefit — φρόνησις (phronēsis)

φρόνησις (phronēsis)

Greatest divine benefit. Intelligence is named the greatest of Heaven’s benefits, in the inference that the giver of other goods also gives this one. Attested: φρονήσεως (977a). Intelligence and its human and divine measures.

Number as necessary condition — φρόνιμος (phronimos)

φρόνιμος (phronimos)

Number as necessary condition. The plural adjective states what humans could never become in anything if number were removed from human nature. Attested: φρόνιμοι (977c). Intelligence and its human and divine measures.

Competent refusal of a title — ἔμφρων (emphrōn)

ἔμφρων (emphrōn)

Competent refusal of a title. The intelligent are those who will not call anyone genuinely wise merely for natural quickness and memory. Attested: ἐμφρόνων (976c). Intelligence and its human and divine measures.

Examining oneself and others — φρονίμως (phronimōs)

φρονίμως (phronimōs)

Examining oneself and others. The adverb qualifies the conduct of examination through arguments, showing that some intelligence is exercised before complete wisdom is established. Attested: φρονίμως (974c). Intelligence and its human and divine measures.

Loss of numerical understanding — ἄφρων (aphrōn)

ἄφρων (aphrōn)

Loss of numerical understanding. The superlative characterizes the human living being deprived of the knowledge that gives number; it remains distinct from senseless. Attested: ἀφρονέστατον (976d). Intelligence and its human and divine measures.

As much intelligence as a human can have (contextual phrase)

πρὸς φρόνησιν ὅσην δυνατὸν ἀνθρώπῳ σχεῖν (973a)

The relative ὅσην limits the intelligence under inquiry to what is possible for a human to possess. This limit is part of the initial aspiration, not a later retreat after failure. It allows the dialogue to advocate learning about divine things without identifying mortal knowledge with everything a god knows. Intelligence and its human and divine measures.

Use in the book

Socrates calls Lysis still ἄφρων because he still needs a teacher. The word is set against μεγαλόφρων, proud, and the preceding play on μέγα φρονεῖν, thinking highly of oneself, and φρονεῖν, understanding.

The local argument removes a reason for self-importance rather than diagnosing general irrationality or permanent stupidity. The word ἔτι, “still,” leaves room for education to change the boy’s situation. Translate with the shared language of understanding intact, since the force of the exchange depends on the verbal connection between knowledge and pride.

Places to read

1. 210dεἴπερ ἄφρων ἔτι — if you are still without understanding.

Use in the book

The questioning of Lysis connects understanding with freedom to act and with being entrusted with things (209c–210c2). Age alone is not the decisive criterion: others yield authority when they believe he understands better.

The examples concern specific activities such as cooking and medicine. At 210d, μέγα φρονεῖν, “think highly of oneself”, is played against μήπω φρονεῖ, “does not yet understand”; μεγαλόφρων, “proud”, against ἄφρων, “without understanding”. Lysis’ need for a teacher becomes a reason for humility. The wordplay continues the practical argument without introducing a fully articulated theory of practical wisdom.

Places to read

1. 209cβέλτιον αὑτοῦ φρονεῖν — understand better than [his father] does.
2. 209c–210d23

Use in the book

In the Phaedo, the soul’s stable contemplation of what is pure and unchanging is called phronēsis. In the account attributed to Aesara, the corresponding Doric form accompanies judgment among the intellect’s functions. These contexts require attention to cognition before importing a particular ethical classification.

Places to read

1. I.49.9.6The soul’s stable relation to intelligible reality is called understanding.
2. I.49.27.1Judgment and prudence are assigned to intellect in a tripartite soul.

Translation in this edition

“Understanding” suits the Phaedo passage; “prudence” can express intelligent practical judgment where the context supports it.