Virtue and excellence

Use in the book

At 157e–158a2 Socrates recalls the poetic celebration of Charmides' paternal house for beauty, excellence and the remaining reputed elements of happiness. Aretē stands among inherited expectations and public praise. The subsequent inquiry asks what the particular excellence called temperance really is and whether Charmides possesses it; noble ancestry is not allowed to settle the issue.

The noun's relative rarity contrasts with the dialogue's sustained ethical activity. Temperance is praised, proposed as a cause of good character and tested for benefit throughout without repeated invocation of the generic term “virtue.” At 174b the knowledge of good and bad could have implications beyond a single excellence, but the dialogue does not explicitly identify all virtues or supply a catalogue. A full lexical reading consequently separates the general ethical problem from the very limited distribution of aretē itself.

Places to read

1. 157e–158a2Aretē occurs in the encomium of Charmides’ paternal family

Translation in this edition

“Virtue” translates the actual dative ἀρετῇ. Discussion of temperance as a virtue elsewhere in this lexicon is explanatory English, not a claim that Plato repeats ἀρετή at every such passage.

ἀρετή

Attested: ἀρετῇ (aretēi). Excellence or virtue; part of the praise of Charmides’ ancestral house, not a formal taxonomy of virtues. References: 158a. Lexical identification: lemma: ἀρετή. See Virtue and excellence.

Use in the book

Socrates initially speaks of attaining excellence within Alcibiades' own competitive horizon. Good natural endowment together with good upbringing produces completeness in virtue (120e). The royal comparison then presents justice, temperance, courage, and wisdom through the four Persian tutors, and enumerates Spartan qualities. These accounts are part of a speech intended to make Alcibiades recognize the inadequacy of his preparation. They do not yet give a philosophical definition of virtue or a guarantee that the royal models possess it without qualification.

At 124e the question becomes exact: in what virtue do the two speakers want to become best? Alcibiades says the virtue of good men, then of managing affairs. Socrates refuses these formulations until the relevant domain is identified. The ensuing craft comparisons make the broad reach of ἀρετή conspicuous. Piloting has its virtue, as does chorus-training (125c–d). To rule men who make use of other men is not enough to distinguish politics from these activities. Virtue cannot function as an honorific label whose content everyone already knows.

The eye-and-soul analogy adds another relation between excellence and characteristic activity. The eye's virtue is sight, and the region into which a soul should look is where its virtue, wisdom, arises (133b). The text thereby directs the search toward cognitive excellence. This follows an argument identifying the human being with soul, but that argument is expressly accepted as adequate rather than precise at 130c–d. Nothing in this lexical history requires silently supplementing the dialogue with a developed metaphysics of the virtues.

The decisive political claim is that cities require virtue if they are to be happy (134b). Walls, warships, dockyards, population, and size are not sufficient without it. The grammar matters: the claim is about resources without virtue, not a practical order to demolish defenses or abolish material provision. Alcibiades must give citizens a share of virtue to manage their affairs rightly, and must first acquire what he would share. The familiar standard used against purported teachers returns in political form: possessing authority cannot substitute for possessing the quality one intends to impart.

At 134c justice and temperance specify what should be procured instead of license and rule to do whatever one wishes. The final ship and medical examples bring expertise and virtue together without making them identical in every respect. A person lacking the sense and virtue of piloting will endanger everyone if given unrestricted control. Rule deprived of virtue therefore produces bad results. Alcibiades' original aim of acquiring maximal power is subordinated to making himself and the city good.

The conclusion places virtue and vice in a deliberately provocative social vocabulary. Before possessing virtue, an adult as well as a child benefits from being ruled by someone better (135b). What is better is finer and more befitting; vice is then called slave-befitting and virtue free-man-befitting. This is an ethical reversal of Alcibiades' presumed superiority. It is not evidence that the dialogue has established every legal slave vicious or every citizen virtuous. Alcibiades, who possesses the prestigious civic position, is made to recognize an unfree condition in himself.

The final promise remains an undertaking, not a certificate of completion. Alcibiades will care for justice, and Socrates hopes he will persevere. The last fear concerns the city's capacity to overcome them both. Virtue is the necessary orientation of political ambition, but whether that orientation will survive political life is the dramatic question left open.

Places to read

1. 120e–122c23Virtue appears through upbringing and the royal comparison
2. 122dThe same noun describes the excellence of land
3. 124e–125e234The desired virtue must be distinguished from the specific excellences of piloting and chorus-training
4. 133bSight is the eye’s virtue; wisdom is called the soul’s virtue
5. 134b–135c23Virtue is required for civic happiness, imparting good government, and genuine freedom

Translation in this edition

The edition uses “excellence” for land at 122d but “virtue” for crafts and persons, including “the virtue of piloting.” At 133b10 Burnet prints σοφία, “wisdom,” while recording Heusde's proposal to delete it; the printed text should not be paraphrased as if the apposition were absent. The disputed supplement at 133c repeats the soul's virtue but is not the first introduction of it.

ἀρετή

Attested: ἡ ψυχῆς ἀρετή (hē psychēs aretē; 133b); ἀρετῇ (aretēi; 122d); ἀρετή (aretē; 125c, 133b); ἀρετήν (aretēn; 134c). At 133b: The soul's excellence, specified as wisdom in the printed text and matched to sight in the eye. At 122d: The excellence or quality of Spartan land. At 125c: The specific excellence of piloting. At 133b: Excellence of the eye as sight and of the soul as wisdom. At 134c: Virtue the future ruler must acquire before sharing it with citizens. Lexical identification: lemma: ἀρετή. See Soul looking into soul; Virtue and vice.

κακία

Attested: κακία (kakia; 135c). At 135c: The bad ethical condition said to be slave-befitting. Lexical identification: lemma: κακία. See Virtue and vice.

Use in the book

The crafts are assessed under an ethical as well as intellectual demand. Equipment has what suits the people but is not credited with virtue (975c); generalship is given more to courage than wisdom (975e–976a). The sought knowledge must make its possessor a wise and good citizen, justly ruler and ruled, and in tune (976d). Wisdom is required to bear on a person's place in a city, not merely on an isolated technical feat.

At 977c–d the Athenian makes a carefully articulated claim. Number is needed for giving an account and for true reason; without true reason one cannot be wise; wisdom is the greatest part of all virtue; without it one cannot become completely good and happy. But he expressly says that nothing prevents the other virtue, courage and temperance, in the being being considered. The concession is not an accidental exception to be erased in summary. It separates partial virtue from the complete configuration under inquiry.

The enlargement at 978a–b links number to every good and denies it as a cause of evil. The just, good, and fine then become objects that must be known and counted out with true opinion if one is to persuade oneself and another. This is the dialogue's attempt to connect numerical order with ethical understanding. The text does not supply a practical numerical formula that calculates the justice of a verdict or the goodness of a life; the explanatory bridge remains more ambitious than the examples already offered.

At 979b–d2 the Athenian returns to lawgiving. The relative ease of grasping what is advantageous contrasts with the exceptional difficulty of becoming decent. Possessing property or a suitable body does not settle the soul's goodness. People agree that it should be just, temperate, brave, and wise, but do not agree which wisdom would make it so. Agreement on virtues' names is therefore not yet knowledge of their educational content.

This renewed difficulty also qualifies the status of the numerical candidate. The person who has learned the preceding matters may seem wise; whether he is wise and good requires an account. The later elevation of piety as the greatest element for mortals (989b) should be compared with the earlier designation of wisdom as the greatest part. The dialogue is moving toward their integration in astronomy and right worship, rather than simply offering two independent lists that can be interchanged without explanation.

Places to read

1. 975cοὐκ ἐπ’ ἀρετῇ λεγομένη — Equipment's usefulness does not itself establish virtue
2. 976dσοφὸς δὲ καὶ ἀγαθὸς … πολίτης — The sought result is a wise and good citizen
3. 976dἄρχων καὶ ἀρχόμενος ἐνδίκως — The ethical demand concerns ruling and being ruled
4. 977c–dτὴν δὲ ἄλλην ἀρετήν, ἀνδρείαν καὶ σωφροσύνην, οὐδὲν ἀποκωλύει — Courage and temperance are expressly left possible
5. 977dπάσης ἀρετῆς τὸ μέγιστον μέρος — Wisdom is the greatest part, not simply another name for every virtue
6. 979cτὸ δὲ τίνα τρόπον χρὴ γίγνεσθαι χρηστοὺς ἀνθρώπους παγχάλεπον — Becoming decent is exceptionally hard
7. 979c–d2ἥντινα δὲ σοφίαν — The unresolved question concerns which wisdom the good soul needs

Translation in this edition

“Virtue,” “good,” “fine,” and “decent” preserve different Greek families. The corrected translation at 977d puts the entire claim about becoming completely good and happy under the negation. The reader should not infer that the wisdomless person first becomes completely good and then fails only at happiness, nor that the passage excludes courage and temperance altogether.

Practical discernment — συμφέρειν (sympherein)

συμφέρειν (sympherein)

Practical discernment. Knowing what is likely advantageous and disadvantageous makes many ordinary pursuits comparatively easy, unlike the problem of becoming decent. Attested: συμφέρειν (979b). Virtue complete goodness and the unresolved content of wisdom.

Human responsibility — αἰτιᾶσθαι (aitiasthai)

αἰτιᾶσθαι (aitiasthai)

Human responsibility. The Athenian directs blame toward human nature for not distributing its life justly, not toward divine provision. This is not a worked explanation of every individual misfortune. Attested: αἰτιᾶσθαι (979b). Virtue complete goodness and the unresolved content of wisdom.

Object of comparatively easy acquisition — σῶμα (sōma)

σῶμα (sōma)

Object of comparatively easy acquisition. A body of the needed or unneeded sort is contrasted with the harder question of forming the good soul. The passage does not yet give the later soul-body ontology. Attested: σῶμα (979c). Virtue complete goodness and the unresolved content of wisdom.

Agreed quality of soul — ἀνδρεῖος (andreios)

ἀνδρεῖος (andreios)

Agreed quality of soul. Bravery is an agreed desirable quality of the soul, contrasted with the unresolved specification of wisdom. Attested: ἀνδρείαν (979c). Virtue complete goodness and the unresolved content of wisdom.

Civic result of wisdom — πολίτης (politēs)

πολίτης (politēs)

Civic result of wisdom. The correct knowledge must make its possessor a wise and good citizen, both in ruling and in being ruled. Attested: πολίτης (976d). Virtue complete goodness and the unresolved content of wisdom.

Scope of ethical completion — τελέως (teleōs)

τελέως (teleōs)

Scope of ethical completion. The adverb belongs to the denied achievement of complete goodness and happiness without wisdom, preserving the difference from partial virtue. Attested: τελέως (977d). Virtue complete goodness and the unresolved content of wisdom.

Articulated evaluative reckoning — διαριθμεῖσθαι (diarithmeisthai)

διαριθμεῖσθαι (diarithmeisthai)

Articulated evaluative reckoning. The verb concerns counting out the just, good, and fine so as to persuade oneself and another, in a compressed clause requiring knowledge and true opinion. Attested: διαριθμήσεται (978b). Virtue complete goodness and the unresolved content of wisdom.

Permitted partial virtue — ἀνδρεία (andreia)

ἀνδρεία (andreia)

Permitted partial virtue. Courage is one of the virtues expressly left possible despite the absence of the full reason required for wisdom. Attested: ἀνδρείαν (977c–d). Virtue complete goodness and the unresolved content of wisdom.

Human goodness to be formed — χρηστός (chrēstos)

χρηστός (chrēstos)

Human goodness to be formed. Becoming decent people is exceptionally difficult, contrasted with acquiring other decent things such as property and a suitable body. Attested: χρηστοὺς (979c). Virtue complete goodness and the unresolved content of wisdom.

Order a life justly — διανέμειν (dianemein)

διανέμειν (dianemein)

Order a life justly. Human nature fails to distribute its life in justice; the verb connects the calendrical account to the question of right human ordering and lawgiving. Attested: διανέμουσαν (979b). Virtue complete goodness and the unresolved content of wisdom.

Civic result — ἀγαθός (agathos)

ἀγαθός (agathos)

Civic result. The knowledge sought should make its possessor a good citizen and able to rule and be ruled justly. Attested: ἀγαθὸς (976d). Virtue complete goodness and the unresolved content of wisdom.

Complete goodness — ἀγαθός (agathos)

ἀγαθός (agathos)

Complete goodness. The completely good condition cannot be attained without wisdom; the denial does not exclude partial virtues. Attested: ἀγαθὸς (977d). Virtue complete goodness and the unresolved content of wisdom.

Soul’s agreed requirement — ἀγαθός (agathos)

ἀγαθός (agathos)

Soul’s agreed requirement. All agree the soul should be good; how it is to acquire the necessary wisdom remains unsettled. Attested: ἀγαθὴν (979c). Virtue complete goodness and the unresolved content of wisdom.

Fitting civic character — ἐμμελής (emmelēs)

ἐμμελής (emmelēs)

Fitting civic character. The ideal wise citizen is also in tune; the expression adds a fitting or harmonious quality to the account without providing a technical music theory here. Attested: ἐμμελής (976d). Virtue complete goodness and the unresolved content of wisdom.

Object of evaluative knowledge — δίκαιος (dikaios)

δίκαιος (dikaios)

Object of evaluative knowledge. The just is paired with good and fine as something one must know in the argument about counting out and persuading. Attested: δίκαιόν (978b). Virtue complete goodness and the unresolved content of wisdom.

Agreed quality of the soul — δίκαιος (dikaios)

δίκαιος (dikaios)

Agreed quality of the soul. Everyone grants that the soul should be just, temperate, and brave, even while the identity of its required wisdom remains disputed. Attested: δικαίαν (979c). Virtue complete goodness and the unresolved content of wisdom.

Just distribution — δίκη (dikē)

δίκη (dikē)

Just distribution. The dative in the phrase in justice qualifies the proper ordering of human life, whose absence explains the assigned human fault. Attested: δίκῃ (979b). Virtue complete goodness and the unresolved content of wisdom.

Norm of civic roles — ἐνδίκως (endikōs)

ἐνδίκως (endikōs)

Norm of civic roles. The adverb qualifies the person’s ruling and being ruled in the city as effects expected from genuine wisdom. Attested: ἐνδίκως (976d). Virtue complete goodness and the unresolved content of wisdom.

Distribution of human life — βίος (bios)

βίος (bios)

Distribution of human life. Life is something humans order or distribute justly or unjustly; the phrase assigns responsibility for poor results to human ordering. Attested: βίον (979b). Virtue complete goodness and the unresolved content of wisdom.

Human responsibility — φύσις (physis)

φύσις (physis)

Human responsibility. Human nature, rather than divine nature, is blamed for failing to distribute its life justly. Attested: φύσιν (979b). Virtue complete goodness and the unresolved content of wisdom.

True evaluative judgment — δόξα (doxa)

δόξα (doxa)

True evaluative judgment. True opinion appears in the compressed requirement concerning counting out the just, good, and fine so as to persuade oneself and another. Attested: δόξης (978b). Virtue complete goodness and the unresolved content of wisdom.

Self and other convinced — πείθειν (peithein)

πείθειν (peithein)

Self and other convinced. Persuasion concerning the just, good, and fine is directed both to oneself and to another and must be connected with knowledge and true opinion. Attested: πεῖσαι (978b). Virtue complete goodness and the unresolved content of wisdom.

Adverse outcome — φλαῦρος (phlauros)

φλαῦρος (phlauros)

Adverse outcome. What turns out toward the poor or bad contrary to the favorable order is assigned to human rather than divine nature in the argument. Attested: φλαῦρον (979b). Virtue complete goodness and the unresolved content of wisdom.

Acquisition unlike soul formation — οὐσία (ousia)

οὐσία (ousia)

Acquisition unlike soul formation. Property is one of the other things that can be acquired, in necessary or unnecessary amounts; its possession does not answer how the soul becomes good. Attested: οὐσίαν (979c). Virtue complete goodness and the unresolved content of wisdom.

Relative ease of ordinary practices — ἐπιτήδευμα (epitēdeuma)

ἐπιτήδευμα (epitēdeuma)

Relative ease of ordinary practices. The other pursuits are said not to be very hard beside discovering how humans should become decent. Attested: ἐπιτηδεύματα (979b–c). Virtue complete goodness and the unresolved content of wisdom.

Evaluative knowledge — γιγνώσκειν (gignōskein)

γιγνώσκειν (gignōskein)

Evaluative knowledge. Knowing the just, good, and fine is required in the compressed clause about counting out and persuading with true opinion. Attested: γιγνώσκων (978b). Virtue complete goodness and the unresolved content of wisdom.

Ruling and being ruled justly — ἄρχειν (archein)

ἄρχειν (archein)

Ruling and being ruled justly. The active and passive participles describe the civic roles the sought knowledge should fit a person to perform justly. Attested: ἄρχων καὶ ἀρχόμενος (976d). Virtue complete goodness and the unresolved content of wisdom.

Earlier lawgiving inquiry — ζητεῖν (zētein)

ζητεῖν (zētein)

Earlier lawgiving inquiry. The Athenian recalls the speakers’ search concerning laws when contrasting readily understood advantages with the difficulty of becoming decent. Attested: ζητοῦσιν (979b). Virtue complete goodness and the unresolved content of wisdom.

Virtue expressly permitted — σωφροσύνη (sōphrosynē)

σωφροσύνη (sōphrosynē)

Virtue expressly permitted. Temperance, with courage, is not prevented by the deficiency under discussion; the argument denies complete virtue, not every virtue. Attested: σωφροσύνην (977c–d). Virtue complete goodness and the unresolved content of wisdom.

Agreed quality of soul — σώφρων (sōphrōn)

σώφρων (sōphrōn)

Agreed quality of soul. The soul should be temperate, along with just and brave, according to the agreement the Athenian reports. Attested: σώφρονα (979c). Virtue complete goodness and the unresolved content of wisdom.

Practical comprehension — συνιέναι (synienai)

συνιέναι (synienai)

Practical comprehension. The aorist infinitive concerns understanding what is said about ordinary advantages, paired with being able to act on it. The text contrasts this with the harder task of becoming decent. Attested: συνεῖναι (979b). Virtue complete goodness and the unresolved content of wisdom.

Standard beyond usefulness — ἀρετή (aretē)

ἀρετή (aretē)

Standard beyond usefulness. The productive equipment arts suit the people but are not spoken of on account of virtue. Attested: ἀρετῇ (975c). Virtue complete goodness and the unresolved content of wisdom.

Complete virtue — ἀρετή (aretē)

ἀρετή (aretē)

Complete virtue. The soul without reason cannot attain all virtue, with wisdom later named its greatest part. Attested: ἀρετὴν (977c). Virtue complete goodness and the unresolved content of wisdom.

Partial virtue permitted — ἀρετή (aretē)

ἀρετή (aretē)

Partial virtue permitted. Courage and temperance are explicitly not prevented even in the numerical and rational deficiency under consideration. Attested: ἀρετὴν (977c–d). Virtue complete goodness and the unresolved content of wisdom.

Greatest part of virtue — σοφία (sophia)

σοφία (sophia)

Greatest part of virtue. Wisdom is identified as the greatest part of all virtue and a condition for complete goodness and happiness. Attested: σοφία (977d). Virtue complete goodness and the unresolved content of wisdom.

Ruler and ruled justly (contextual phrase)

πολίτης τε καὶ ἄρχων καὶ ἀρχόμενος ἐνδίκως (976d)

The coordinated civic roles make the desired result relevant both to directing the city and to living under direction. Justice qualifies the civic achievement rather than merely efficient command. The knowledge sought must therefore do more than provide a specialist technique applicable to one separate task. Virtue complete goodness and the unresolved content of wisdom.

The express concession of partial virtue (contextual phrase)

τὴν δὲ ἄλλην ἀρετήν, ἀνδρείαν καὶ σωφροσύνην, οὐδὲν ἀποκωλύει (977c–d)

The adversative δέ preserves a real qualification: nothing prevents courage and temperance in the being under discussion. The surrounding argument denies complete virtue, wisdom, and complete happiness without true reason. Reading the passage as denying any virtue whatsoever to an uncounting being directly erases this concession. Virtue complete goodness and the unresolved content of wisdom.

The greatest part of all virtue (contextual phrase)

πάσης ἀρετῆς τὸ μέγιστον μέρος (977d)

The apposition identifies wisdom as virtue’s greatest part. Calling it a part allows the earlier courage-and-temperance concession, while its superlative rank explains why complete goodness cannot be attained without it. The later emphasis on piety must be related to this claim rather than silently substituted for it. Virtue complete goodness and the unresolved content of wisdom.

Do not blame the divine nature (contextual phrase)

οὐ τὴν θείαν ἀλλὰ τὴν ἀνθρωπίνην αἰτιᾶσθαι χρὴ φύσιν (979a–b)

The accusatives give the contrasted objects of blame, with the following clause specifying humans’ unjust distribution of their life. The statement supports the dialogue’s defense of divine provision. It is not a demonstrated allocation of personal blame for every illness, storm, or other bad event. Virtue complete goodness and the unresolved content of wisdom.

Becoming decent is exceptionally hard (contextual phrase)

τὸ δὲ τίνα τρόπον χρὴ γίγνεσθαι χρηστοὺς ἀνθρώπους παγχάλεπον (979c)

The substantivized question concerns the manner of becoming decent people. Its exceptional difficulty is contrasted with the relative ease of knowing ordinary advantages and acquiring other goods. The problem is the formation of persons, not merely the acquisition of useful possessions. Virtue complete goodness and the unresolved content of wisdom.

Use in the book

Homer’s Zeus increases or diminishes human prowess. Simonides joins city and individual in the need for divine help in attaining excellence. In Plato’s discussion of the soul, excellence stands beside goodness and against wickedness; the Phaedo’s afterlife passage urges virtue and understanding.

Places to read

1. I.1.4Aretē is prowess in Homer’s martial setting.
2. I.1.10Simonides speaks of excellence for both a city and a mortal.
3. I.48.2A good soul’s intellect and excellence contrast with folly and wickedness.
4. I.49.58.51Virtue and understanding are connected with the noble prize and great hope.

Translation in this edition

“Prowess,” “excellence,” and “virtue” express the local application. Their variety is deliberate; imposing “virtue” everywhere would make some poetic passages narrower than the Greek.

Images and comparisons

The Phaedo passage calls the reward a prize. Its contest-language gives ethical effort an image of attainment, while the following qualification in the dialogue limits certainty about the narrative of the afterlife.