From the book
Charmides
Plato · Diotimos Editions · November 2026
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At a Glance
- The phrase“Temperance is something fine”, καλόν, the word for a beautiful body and a noble act.
- In the CharmidesThe premise of 159c, “temperance is one of the fine things, isn’t it?”, granted at once and repeated at 159d, 160b and 160d, and recalled at 160e: “Weren’t you agreeing just now that temperance is fine?”
- In this edition“Fine”, as the Key Words explain: “in the argument it is the premise that temperance is something kalon, rendered ‘fine’ (159c–160d)”.
- A place to read159b–160e.
- English renderings
- τῶν καλῶν … ἡ σωφροσύνη, tōn kalōn … hē sōphrosynē, “temperance is one of the fine things”; ἡ σωφροσύνη καλόν τι (ἦν), hē sōphrosynē kalon ti (ēn), “temperance was something fine”; καλὸν ἡ σωφροσύνη, kalon hē sōphrosynē, “temperance is something fine”; καλὸν … τὴν σωφροσύνην (εἶναι), kalon … tēn sōphrosynēn (einai), “temperance is fine”; κάλλιστον πάντων, kalliston pantōn, “the finest of all things”
Meaning
Καλός is the word for Charmides’ beauty in the prologue and for a fine act in the argument (see καλός). To say that temperance is καλόν τι is to say that it is admirable, something one would praise and be proud to have. The premise is a judgement of value, and the refutation of quietness turns on it.
Use in the book
The boy has said that temperance is a kind of quietness, and the first question Socrates puts to test it is not about quietness at all: “Tell me: temperance is one of the fine things, isn’t it?” “Certainly” (159c). The premise is granted without a pause, as the edition’s note at 159c observes: “The refutation that follows rests on the premise, which Charmides grants at once, that temperance is something kalon.” Everything else in the refutation is a survey of cases, writing and reading, the lyre and wrestling, learning, remembering and deliberating, in which quick acts are finer than quiet ones (159c–160b; see ἡσυχῇ; ὀξέως; τάχος). The premise turns the survey into a proof. “And temperance was something fine?” “Yes.” “Then as far as the body goes, at any rate, it would not be quietness but quickness that was the more temperate, since temperance is something fine” (159d).
The conclusion is stated twice in terms of it. The temperate life would not be quiet, “since, being temperate, it has to be fine” (160b; see βίος; δεῖ), and “in our argument we laid it down that temperance is one of the fine things, and quick things have turned out to be no less fine than quiet ones” (160d; see οὐχ ἧττον). The second definition is refuted by a second premise of the same kind: temperance is not only fine but good, and modesty is not always good (160e–161b; see ἀγαθοὺς ποιεῖ; αἰδώς). The Key Words point to the word’s two senses: “A reader who hears only one sense will miss that the argument begins with the same word as the flirtation.” The boy whose beauty the room has praised grants that temperance is beautiful, and the argument proceeds from his own word.
The premise outlives the inquiry. At the end Socrates says that he was right to fear that he had looked into temperance to no useful purpose, “For surely what is agreed to be the finest of all things would not have turned out to be of no use to us, if I were of any use at inquiring well” (175a–b; see ἀνωφελής; κάλλιστος). Every definition has fallen, and what was granted at 159c is still granted, now in the superlative. The dialogue can be read as holding the value of temperance fixed while its nature is lost, and as ending where it began: sure that temperance is fine, and unable to say what it is.
Places to read
Every passage in which the premise is stated or used.
- 159cTemperance is one of the fine things; the boy agrees.
- 159dTemperance was something fine; so in the body quickness would be more temperate.
- 160bThe temperate life would not be quiet, since, being temperate, it has to be fine.
- 160dThey laid it down that temperance is one of the fine things, and quick things are no less fine.
- 160eThe boy agreed just now that temperance is fine; it is good as well.
- 175a–bWhat is agreed to be the finest of all things would not have turned out of no use, if Socrates were a good inquirer.
Translation in this edition
“Fine” renders καλόν throughout 159c–160e, where the prologue had “beautiful” for the same word; the Key Words explain the division and the note at 159c the pun. At 159c3 Stephanus would read κάλλιον, “finer”, for Burnet’s κάλλιστον, “finest” (apparatus); at 160d2 the readings that bear on the premise are told elsewhere (see καλός).
Elsewhere in Plato
The Laches has the same refutation with courage in temperance’s place. Laches proposes that courage is a kind of endurance of the soul, and Socrates objects: he is nearly sure that Laches counts courage among the very fine things. “Among the finest,” says Laches. Endurance with wisdom is fine and good, but endurance with folly is harmful and malign; and since what is harmful cannot be fine, foolish endurance is not courage, “since it is not fine, and courage is fine” (192c–d). Both refutations can be read as resting on a premise the answerer grants gladly, since to deny it would dishonour the virtue; the Laches uses it to narrow the definition, the Charmides to overturn it. A few lines before, in the same dialogue, Socrates defines quickness, the very quality the Charmides sets against quietness (192a–b; see τάχος).