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genuine

ἀληθινός

The genuine craftsman and the true doctor · Charmides

From the book

Charmides

Plato · Diotimos Editions · November 2026

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Orientation

At a Glance

  • The wordἈληθινός is real, genuine, the thing that is what it claims to be; ὡς ἀληθῶς, “as truly”, is “really, truly”.
  • In the CharmidesThe true doctor whom a temperance of knowledge alone could not tell from the pretender (170e–171c); and in Socrates’ dream, the “genuine craftsmen” we would use and the “true prophets” temperance would set up (173c).
  • In this edition“Genuine” for the adjective; “true” and “truly” for ὡς ἀληθῶς.
  • A place to read170e–171c.
English renderings
ἀληθινός, alēthinos, “genuine”; ὡς ἀληθῶς, hōs alēthōs, “truly”, “true”

Meaning

Ἀληθινός (alēthinos) is formed from ἀληθής, “true” (see ἀληθής), but is said of things and persons rather than of statements: not a true report, but a real thing, as against a counterfeit. The phrase ὡς ἀληθῶς, the adverb of ἀληθής with an intensifying ὡς, marks the real as against the apparent: “the one who truly is” a doctor.

Use in the book

The genuine is the other half of the pretended. Knowledge of knowledge, Socrates argues, could tell only that a man has some knowledge, not what; so the temperate man “will be able to distinguish neither the man who pretends to be a doctor, but is not, from the one who truly is, nor anyone else who has knowledge from anyone who does not” (170e; see προσποιέομαι). To “tell the true doctor from the one who is not”, the temperate man “will surely not discuss medicine with him”, for the doctor “understands nothing but the healthy and the diseased”; knowledge of knowledge belongs to temperance alone, so, deadpan, “the medical man doesn’t know about medicine either” (170e–171a; see ἐπαΐω). The examiner must test the doctor “in so far as he is a doctor”, in what is healthy and diseased, and no one can do that without medicine (171b–c; see ᾗ ἰατρικός). So temperance of this kind can tell the genuine from the pretender in no field “except the temperate man’s own fellow craftsman” (171c; see ὁμότεχνος).

The phrase then turns to the speakers. “You’re saying some truly strange things, Socrates,” Critias says, and Socrates agrees, “By the dog … I think so too”: “For truly, even if temperance is entirely of this kind, it does not seem at all clear to me that it does us any good” (172e–173a; see ἄτοπος; νὴ τὸν κύνα).

The dream then grants what the argument denied. If temperance ruled, our goods would be expertly made “because we would be using genuine craftsmen”, and temperance would set up “the true prophets” (173c; see ἀλαζών). The concession is made to ask the next question, whether a world of genuine craftsmen would make us do well and be happy (173d). It would not, without the knowledge of good and bad (174b–d). Genuineness in every craft is not enough; the dialogue asks what the genuine crafts are for.

Places to read

Every passage in which ἀληθινός or ὡς ἀληθῶς occurs.

  1. 170eTemperance of this kind could not tell the pretended doctor from the one who truly is, nor tell the true doctor from the one who is not.
  2. 172eCritias finds Socrates’ words truly strange; truly, even granting the definition, it is not clear that temperance does us good.
  3. 173cIn the dream we would use genuine craftsmen, and temperance would set up the true prophets.

Translation in this edition

Ἀληθινοῖς δημιουργοῖς (173c) is “genuine craftsmen”; B has the singular, ἀληθινὸν δημιουργόν, and Burnet prints the plural with T, W and Stobaeus. Τὸν ὡς ἀληθῶς ὄντα (170e) is “the one who truly is”, τὸν ὡς ἀληθῶς ἰατρόν “the true doctor” (170e), and τοὺς δὲ ὡς ἀληθῶς μάντεις “the true prophets” (173c). In Critias’ ἄτοπα λέγεις ὡς ἀληθῶς and Socrates’ ὡς ἀληθῶς γάρ (172e) the phrase is “truly”.

Elsewhere in Plato

In the Gorgias the genuine doctor loses to his imitation before an ignorant judge. Cookery, Socrates says, has crept in beneath medicine and claims to know which foods are best for the body; set cook and doctor to contend before children, or before grown men with no more sense than children, over which of them understands wholesome and harmful food, and the doctor would die of hunger (464d–e). The Gorgias fears that the many cannot tell the genuine from the counterfeit; the Charmides shows that a temperance of knowledge alone could not either.