Moderation

Use in the book

Critias cites “Nothing too much” among the Delphic inscriptions set up, in his account, after the original “Know thyself” (165a). His purpose is not to interpret this second maxim in detail. He argues that its dedicators mistook the first inscription for advice rather than the god's greeting and then offered comparable advice of their own. The maxim remains recognisable as a standard expression of restraint while its authority is positioned within Critias' particular story.

At 166e Critias approves Socrates' request that he attend to the argument rather than to which man is being refuted, saying he speaks metria. Here measuredness belongs to the manner and fairness of the proposal. The word is useful evidence for the virtue's ordinary ethical surroundings, but it is not a fresh definition added to the formal sequence.

Places to read

1. 165aThe Delphic maxim appears within Critias’ account of the inscriptions
2. 166eCritias calls Socrates’ proposal reasonable or measured

Translation in this edition

“Nothing too much” preserves the aphorism's breadth. “Talking sense” for μέτρια λέγειν is idiomatic and should not be confused with an occurrence of the separate noun φρόνησις.

ἄτη

Attested: ἄτη (atē). Ruin or disastrous consequence; the warning that accompanies the Delphic maxim about giving a pledge. References: 165a. Lexical identification: lemma: ἄτη. See Moderation and excess.

ἐγγύη

Attested: Ἐγγύη (engyē). A pledge or surety; the maxim warns that giving security brings ruin near. References: 165a. Lexical identification: lemma: ἐγγύη. See Moderation and excess.

μηδὲν ἄγαν

Attested: μηδὲν ἄγαν (mēden agan). “Nothing too much”; the Delphic maxim urging avoidance of excess, which Critias treats as a later piece of advice distinguished from the greeting “Know thyself”. References: 165a. Lexical identification: phrase template: μηδὲν ἄγαν. See Moderation and excess.

Use in the book

The athlete introduces moderation as an alternative to the cultured lover’s inference from insufficiently few exercises to beneficially many. Socrates makes the correction explicit: neither many nor few labors, but moderate ones, produce bodily good condition. The speaker then concedes the same about food, other bodily matters, and what is supplied to the soul. Moderation is doing argumentative work because it distinguishes a pursuit’s amount from its success.

The questions at 134e show why this is not a self-applying slogan. A doctor or trainer can tell what bodily exertions and food are suitable; a farmer can judge the sowing of seeds. Who can tell how many and what kind of learning-subjects should be planted in a soul? The agreement on moderation yields a problem about authority and expertise rather than an easy answer to philosophy’s identity. Saying “do a moderate amount” is inadequate unless one can recognize the relevant measure.

The cultured lover later retrieves the adverb for his generalist ideal: the philosopher has laid hold of all crafts “in moderation.” That use sounds as though the earlier lesson has been learned. But it may shift the issue from a beneficially judged curriculum to deliberately incomplete familiarity with many pursuits. Socrates asks what this person is actually useful for when a specialist is available. The recurrence of the same word thus does not guarantee the same substantive standard.

A careful reading neither turns the passage into an attack on learning nor imports an independently established doctrine of a golden mean. What is secured within the conversation is that indiscriminate quantity does not explain a pursuit’s goodness. What remains contested is the competence needed to determine and act by the right measure.

Places to read

1. 134aἢ ἀπὸ τῶν μετρίων; — The athlete is invited to contrast many labors with moderate ones.
2. 134dτὰ μέτρια ὠφελεῖ ἢ τὰ ἄμετρα — Moderation and immoderation are contrasted for what reaches the soul.
3. 134eὁπόσα καὶ ὁποῖα μέτρια — The right measure includes quantity and kind.
4. 136bἀλλὰ πάντων μετρίως ἐφῆφθαι — The cultured lover later reuses moderation for broad, non-specialist familiarity.

Translation in this edition

The edition’s Key Words explicitly derives metrios from metron and keeps “moderate” across the early argument. It renders metriōs at 136b “in moderation,” noting that another volume in the series uses “adequately” in a different context. That choice keeps the echo audible. The apparatus also records editorial interventions at 134d where the beneficial effect of moderate amounts is stated; the article follows the supplied Burnet text without claiming manuscript unanimity.

Use in the book

Sensitivity proportionate to a loss displays judgment; moderating sorrow once the loss is irreparable displays reason. Both responses are affirmed. The fragment on discourse places moderation beside excellence of taste, while the angelic comparison defines it as being moved as angels are. That image gives moderation an affective ideal rather than specifying a measurable degree of feeling. These uses allow restraint to coexist with responsiveness.

Places to read

1. I, p. 59, entry 1, ¶1Measured sorrow accompanies proportionate sensitivity.
2. II, p. 706, entry 3, ¶2Moderation applies to discourse as well as emotion.
3. II, p. 855, entry 6, ¶1Angelic movement figures a mode of response.

Translation in this edition

The English translation preserves both sides of the loss comparison and leaves “moved” open to the kind of emotion involved. It does not substitute a later variant with different nouns for the cited angelic formula. The discourse continuation retains its dependence on the preceding paragraph.

Intemperance

French: intempérance.

Intempérance can concern writing as well as conduct. Babbling books suggest an excess of production or expression; the political comparison says people dislike seeing their own vices in the great. The English translation preserves that possessive relation and does not turn the people’s judgment into an impartial social law.

Places to read: I, p. 405, entry 4, ¶1; II, p. 807, entry 1, ¶1.