From the book
Charmides
Plato · Diotimos Editions · November 2026
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At a Glance
- The wordThe definition of temperance as Critias states it when asked to say it again: the one knowledge whose objects are itself and the other knowledges.
- In the CharmidesThree times: in Critias’ restatement (166e), in Socrates’ summary before the procession of powers (167b–c), and in the conclusion of the procession, “knowledge of no subject of learning, but knowledge of itself and of the other kinds of knowledge” (168a).
- In this edition“Knowledge both of itself and of the other kinds of knowledge”.
- A place to read166e–168b.
- English renderings
- αὐτή τε αὑτῆς ἐστιν καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἐπιστημῶν ἐπιστήμη, autē te hautēs estin kai tōn allōn epistēmōn epistēmē, “it is knowledge both of itself and of the other kinds of knowledge”; ἑαυτῆς τε καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἐπιστημῶν ἐπιστήμη, heautēs te kai tōn allōn epistēmōn epistēmē, “knowledge of … itself and the other kinds of knowledge”; αὑτῆς δὲ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἐπιστημῶν ἐπιστήμη, hautēs de kai tōn allōn epistēmōn epistēmē, “knowledge of itself and of the other kinds of knowledge”
Meaning
The formula has three parts: temperance is a knowledge of itself, of the other knowledges, and “alone of all the kinds of knowledge” (166e). Socrates adds a fourth at once, that it “would also be knowledge of the lack of knowledge” (166e; see ἐπιστήμη ἀνεπιστημοσύνης), and in restating the whole a fifth, a restriction: “one single knowledge which is knowledge of nothing else but itself and the other kinds of knowledge” (167b–c; see ἄλλου δὲ οὐδενός; μία τις ἐπιστήμη). The two halves of the formula are examined apart (see ἐπιστήμη ἄλλων ἐπιστημῶν; ἐπιστήμη ἑαυτῆς).
Use in the book
Critias has already given the formula once, in the other order, the other kinds of knowledge first and itself last (166c; see ἐπιστήμη ἑαυτῆς). When, after the exchange about refutation, Socrates asks him to say again what he says temperance is, he answers: “I say … that alone of all the kinds of knowledge it is knowledge both of itself and of the other kinds of knowledge” (166e). Now “itself” comes first. The change can be read as Critias’ answer to the charge he made at 166c, that Socrates was looking for a likeness between temperance and the other crafts: what makes temperance unlike them is that it is of itself, and he leads with it.
The formula then becomes a pattern. Socrates calls it strange, since in other cases the same thing would seem impossible (167c; see ἄτοπος), and builds a series of cases on its model: a sight of itself and of the other sights, a hearing, a sense, a desire, a wish, a love, a fear, an opinion, each of itself and of its fellows and of none of the things its kind is of (167c–168a; see αἴσθησις αἰσθήσεων καὶ ἑαυτῆς; ἐπιθυμία αὑτῆς καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἐπιθυμιῶν). Critias denies them all. Then the formula comes back, with the proper object of knowledge removed in the same way: “But knowledge, it seems, we are saying there is of this kind: knowledge of no subject of learning, but knowledge of itself and of the other kinds of knowledge?” “We are” (168a; see μάθημα). Socrates calls this strange too, if there is such a thing (see ἄτοπος).
The formula can be read as unstable in its own wording. Its genitives make knowledge an object, its own and the others’, while the rest of the dialogue treats every knowledge as known by what it is of. The procession shows the cost: every other power, given itself as object, loses the thing that made it what it is. The argument after 168b tests whether knowledge is the one exception, and the dialogue leaves the test to a great man (169a; see δύναμις πρὸς ἑαυτό; μέγας ἀνήρ).
Places to read
Every passage in which the full formula occurs.
- 166eCritias: temperance alone of all the kinds of knowledge is knowledge both of itself and of the other kinds of knowledge.
- 167b–c2Socrates: one single knowledge, of nothing else but itself and the other kinds of knowledge, and also of the lack of knowledge.
- 168aAfter the procession: knowledge of no subject of learning, but of itself and of the other kinds of knowledge.
Translation in this edition
“Knowledge both of itself and of the other kinds of knowledge” renders αὐτή τε αὑτῆς … καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἐπιστημῶν ἐπιστήμη (166e6), the English “both … and” for τε … καί. At 166e6 Burnet prints αὐτή, “it itself”, with T; B has αὕτη, “this one”. At 167c1 the same words follow ἢ, “but”, after “of nothing else”, and at 168a7–8 they follow “of no subject of learning”, μαθήματος μὲν οὐδενός, in the μέν … δέ balance of the procession.