Shame

Use in the book

The dramatic instance precedes the abstract noun. Asked whether he is temperate, Charmides blushes; Socrates remarks that his bashfulness suits his age and makes him more beautiful (158c). The boy's reply is socially careful: he would avoid both praising himself and contradicting his guardian. Thus modest behaviour is attractive and intelligible before it is examined as a definition.

At 160e Charmides says temperance makes a person feel shame and be bashful, and is precisely aidōs. Socrates tests the identity through goodness rather than through appearance. If temperance makes its possessors good, it is itself good. Yet Homer says aidōs is no good for a man in need (161a). Charmides accepts the authority, allowing the conclusion that shame can be either good or bad, whereas temperance is being treated as good. A quality whose benefit depends on the situation cannot, on those premises, simply be the virtue.

The quotation's context sharpens the limitation: the disguised Odysseus is to overcome a beggar's reluctance and seek food. It does not prove that all modesty is bad, nor does Socrates claim this. Conversely, one may question whether a situational inhibition of begging captures everything Charmides intends by the respectful bearing of a well-raised youth. The argument is effective against an unrestricted identity; its treatment of the full social virtue remains debatable.

Shame returns with Critias in two revealingly different circumstances. At 164c–d he says he would not be ashamed to retract a mistaken earlier statement rather than admit temperance without self-knowledge. Later he is ashamed before the audience to admit that he cannot answer Socrates' challenge and therefore conceals his perplexity (169c–d). The contrast provides concrete evidence for the definition's difficulty. Shame need not protect truth or self-knowledge; concern for one's appearance can prevent acknowledging ignorance. The narrative does not tell us that all concern for others' judgment should disappear. It shows why that concern alone cannot ensure the intellectual and ethical quality being sought.

Places to read

1. 158c–d2Charmides’ blush and reluctance to praise himself portray age-appropriate bashfulness
2. 160eThe second definition identifies temperance with aidōs and its bashful effects
3. 161a–bThe Homeric needy man supplies a case in which shame is not good
4. 164c–dCritias professes that he would not be ashamed to retract error
5. 169c–dShame before an admiring audience prevents Critias from admitting perplexity

Translation in this edition

The edition uses “modesty” for αἰδώς and “bashfulness” for τὸ αἰσχυντηλόν at 158c. These are connected but not the same Greek form: the Key Words' shorthand must not be mistaken for an occurrence of αἰδώς at the blush. The Homeric line quoted in Plato ends παρεῖναι, “to be present,” whereas the standard Odyssey text has προσαιτεῖ, “beggar”; Plato's wording supports the subsequent language of virtue's presence.

αἰδώς

Attested: αἰδὼς / αἰδώς (aidōs / aidōs). Modesty or a restraining sense of shame; Charmides proposes it as temperance, but Socrates cites Homer’s needy man to show that it is not invariably good. References: 160e, 161a, 161b. Lexical identification: lemma: αἰδώς. See Modesty and shame.

αἰσχύνομαι

Attested: αἰσχύνεσθαι / αἰσχυνθείην / ᾐσχύνετο (aischynesthai / aischyntheiēn / ēischyneto). To feel shame: the effect attributed to temperance by Charmides, the embarrassment Critias denies about retracting an error, and the embarrassment that later keeps him from admitting perplexity. References: 160e, 164d, 169c. Lexical identification: lemma: αἰσχύνομαι. See Modesty and shame.

αἰσχυντηλός

Attested: αἰσχυντηλὸν (aischyntēlon). Bashful or disposed to feel shame; describes Charmides’ becoming blush and then the disposition he says temperance produces. References: 158c, 160e. Lexical identification: lemma: αἰσχυντηλός. See Modesty and shame.

ἀνερυθριάω

Attested: ἀνερυθριάσας (anerythriasas). Blush or redden; Charmides’ visible bashfulness becomes evidence in Socrates’ playful appraisal of him. References: 158c. Lexical identification: lemma: ἀνερυθριάω. See Modesty and shame.

ἔξαρνος

Attested: ἐξάρνῳ (exarnōi). In denial, refusing to acknowledge; Charmides is reluctant either to affirm or to deny his temperance. References: 158c. Lexical identification: lemma: ἔξαρνος. See Modesty and shame.

ἐπαχθής

Attested: ἐπαχθὲς (epachthes). Burdensome or offensive to others; self-praise might sound presumptuous. References: 158d. Lexical identification: lemma: ἐπαχθής. See Modesty and shame.

Use in the book

Socrates first presses shame as an educational lever at 108e–109a. Alcibiades could identify healthier food as better despite not claiming medicine, but cannot state the standard in the political field where he intends to claim expertise. Asked whether that failure is shameful and whether he feels ashamed, he agrees. The challenge targets a mismatch between public profession and actual understanding.

At 115a–116a23 the shameful is the contrary of the fine within the argument about good action. Alcibiades initially allows shameful conduct to be good, thinking of people who avoid the dangers of rescuing comrades. Socrates' analysis distinguishes respects: nothing shameful is good insofar as it is shameful. The lexical opposition should therefore not be flattened into an assertion that every shameful act has no attractive consequence.

The royal comparison uses shame more socially. Alcibiades would feel ashamed by comparison with Persian luxury (122c), while Socrates calls it shameful that enemy women understand the necessary preparation better than the young men themselves (124a). These provocations exploit his existing ambitions and sensitivities; they do not make luxury the final criterion of virtue.

At 127d Alcibiades recognizes that he may long have been in a most shameful state without noticing. Socrates answers with encouragement: his present age is an appropriate time to recognize the problem and care for himself. Shame is useful insofar as it makes correction possible, rather than as an end of humiliation. The later warning that public corruption would make Alcibiades uglier (132a) again uses a word shared with bodily appearance to name ethical deterioration.

Places to read

1. 108e–109aShame exposes the mismatch between claimed political knowledge and inability to state its standard
2. 115a–116a23The shameful is tested against goodness and distinguished by evaluative respect
3. 122c–124a23Royal comparison provokes shame about insufficient preparation
4. 127d–127eRecognition of a shameful state becomes an occasion for hopeful care
5. 132aThe young man could grow uglier through civic corruption

Translation in this edition

The English divides “ugly” from “shameful,” though Greek uses one adjective. The “disgraceful stupidity” at 118a employs ἐπονείδιστος, a different term of reproach, alongside the statement that such ignorance is most shameful; it is not another inflection of αἰσχρός.

αἰσχρός / αἰσχύνω

Attested: αἰσχρόν (aischron; 108e); αἰσχύνῃ (aischynēi; 109a); αἴσχιστα (aischista; 127d). At 108e: Shameful inability to name the better in one’s professed sphere of expertise. At 109a: Being ashamed when one cannot explain the subject on which one claims to advise. At 127d: In a most shameful condition, which Alcibiades now fears he has long failed to perceive. Lexical identification: family label: αἰσχρός / αἰσχύνω. See Shame and the shameful.

Use in the book

The rebuke of an otherwise wise reader’s bad reasoning makes lack of shame a fault in historical judgment. The influence of novels is then assigned more to the century’s shame than to the books’ honor. In the analogy between a wise person’s mind and conscience, shame joins examinations, afflictions and firm resolutions. Here it belongs to correction, not merely to exposure before a public audience.

Places to read

1. I, p. 68, entry 1, ¶1Bad reasoning can be a cause for shame.
2. II, p. 549, entry 5, ¶1Literary influence can indict its age rather than glorify a book.
3. II, p. 750, entry 10, ¶4Shame participates in intellectual and moral self-examination.

Translation in this edition

The English translation preserves the century/books contrast and the parallel list belonging to mind and conscience. It does not automatically translate honte as guilt, since the cited sentences do not all concern wrongdoing in the same sense. The unnamed critic in the first witness remains unnamed.