From the book
Meditations
Marcus Aurelius · Diotimos Editions · 2026
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At a Glance
- The wordἜμφρων, from φρήν (phrēn), "mind", is one who has his mind within him, sensible; σοφός is wise, the Stoics' word for the sage; διακρίνειν is to tell one thing from another, and διάκρισις is discernment. The man without sense is a fool, μωρός, and at the extreme mad.
- In the Meditations"Sensible" is one of the names Marcus gives himself, meant to signify "attention that discerns each thing, and freedom from disregard" (10.8.1). "Discernment of convincing impressions" is among the things peculiar to a man (8.26), and Marcus is to look at what the wise flee and what they pursue (4.38). Fools are gladdened or distressed by what happens (4.44), and "To pursue the impossible is madness" (5.17).
- In this editionἜμφρων is "sensible", and with the article "good sense" (1.16.7); φρενήρης is "sane", σοφός "wise", διάκρισις "discernment", διακρίνειν "telling … from" and "distinguish", μωρός "fool", and the words of madness "madness", "madman" and "being mad"; φρόνησις is "wisdom".
- A place to read8.26, where the gladness of a man is to do what is peculiar to a man, and discernment of convincing impressions is named among those things.
Meaning
Ἔμφρων (emphrōn), from φρήν, "mind", is one who has his mind within him, sensible. At 10.8.1 it stands with σύμφρων (symphrōn) and ὑπέρφρων (hyperphrōn), "consenting" and "transcending", names that share the root, as the edition's note says: the mind within, with, and above. Φρόνησις (phronēsis), "wisdom", was set by the Stoics first among their primary virtues (see Virtue and excellence). Σοφός (sophos), "wise", was the school's name for the sage; σοφία (sophia) does not occur in the Meditations. Ἐπιστήμη (epistēmē) is knowledge, for the Stoics a grasp that reason cannot shake (see Assent and judgement). Διακρίνειν (diakrinein), from κρίνειν (krinein), "to separate", is to tell one thing from another, and διάκρισις (diakrisis) is discernment. Μωρός (mōros) is dull, foolish; μαίνεσθαι (mainesthai) is to be mad, with its adjectives μανικός (manikos) and μανιώδης (maniōdēs).
Use in the book
Wisdom by name is rare. It is one of the "truly goods" (5.12; see Good, bad and indifference), it is terrible that ignorance and the wish to please should be stronger than it (5.18; see Courage and endurance), and Marcus is not yet "placing wisdom in acting justly alone" (4.37; see Justice); its pleasure lies in the sureness and smooth flow of "the faculty that keeps track and knows" (5.9; see Philosophy). His own word for good sense is ἔμφρων. "Sensible", one of the names he has given himself, "was meant to signify for you attention that discerns each thing, and freedom from disregard" (10.8.1; see Self-respect and shame).
In Antoninus Pius, his adoptive father, Marcus records "good sense and measure in the giving of shows, the building of public works, distributions and the like", and, in the text of J. H. Leopold, whose Oxford text of 1908 the edition prints, with a supplement and correction of Samuel Friedrich Nathanael Morus, the eighteenth-century German scholar who edited the Meditations at Leipzig, "the mark of a man who looks to what must be done, and not to the good repute that comes from what has been done" (1.16.7). Good sense is judged by what a man looks to: the thing to be done, not how it will be seen.
The power behind it is discernment. "The gladness of a man is to do what is peculiar to a man; and peculiar to a man is goodwill towards the kindred stock, disregard of the motions of sense, discernment of convincing impressions, observation of the nature of the whole and of what comes about according to it" (8.26). It can be lost. The man who lies unwillingly, by neglecting the resources nature gave him, can no longer distinguish false from true (9.1.2; see Justice), and ignorance of good and bad is "a disablement no less than the one that deprives a man of telling white from black" (2.13; see Daimon).
The wise are to be watched in their choices: "Look into their ruling centres, and at the wise, what sort of things they flee, and what sort they pursue" (4.38). The skilled and knowing soul is "the one that knows beginning and end, and the reason that pervades all substance" (5.32), and Marcus is to see and do everything so that "the self-assurance that comes from knowledge of each thing is preserved, escaping notice, not concealed" (10.9). Σοφός comes twice, in a saying of unknown source, "look, judging, he says, by the wisest" (8.38), and of a man who "was serious and wise", whose death some will still welcome (10.36; see Death).
The lack of sense has two names. The fool takes what passes as though it mattered: of the kind of the rose in spring are "disease, death, slander, plotting, and all that gladdens or distresses fools" (4.44); "How then is he not a fool who among these things is puffed up, or dragged about, or complains …?" (5.23); and to the excuse that others take such things very seriously the answer is, "Is that why, then, you too should become a fool?" (5.36). Madness is to ask for what cannot be. "To pursue the impossible is madness" (5.17); to expect the base not to do wrong "is madness, for it reaches after the impossible" (11.18.6; see Anger); if a thing is in another's power, to blame the atoms or the gods: "Both are madness" (8.17; see Providence and atoms). In words Marcus takes from Epictetus, the Stoic teacher of the early second century whose lectures Arrian recorded, "To seek a fig in winter is the mark of a madman" (11.33; see Desire and aversion), and "The contest, then, he said, is not about any chance thing, but about being mad or not" (11.38).
Against folly and madness stands the understanding that remains "pure, sane, self-controlled, just" (8.51; see Inner retreat and citadel). Wisdom in the notebook is seldom named and never shown off. It is attention that tells each thing apart and lets nothing slip, proved in what a man flees and pursues; folly is to be moved by what passes, and madness to ask of things what they cannot give.
Places to read
Every chapter in which a word of the sub-entries occurs, in the order of the book, by section where the chapter is divided, with the places of φρόνησις (5.9, 5.12, 5.18), φρόνιμος (4.38) and τὸ φρονεῖν, "wisdom" (4.37). The other places of φρονεῖν are given in its sub-entry (see Virtue and excellence). The other words of the root of φρήν are left out: καταφρονεῖν (kataphronein), "despise", with καταφρόνησις (kataphronēsis) and εὐκαταφρόνητος (eukataphronētos); συμφρονεῖν (symphronein; 8.54) and ὑπερφρονεῖν (hyperphronein; 5.15); μεγαλοφροσύνη (megalophrosynē), μεγαλόφρων (megalophrōn) and μεγαλοφρόνως (megalophronōs; 6.23); εὐφροσύνη (euphrosynē; 8.26); φροντίζειν (phrontizein; 2.5, 10.36); and σωφροσύνη and σώφρων (see Temperance and self-mastery).
- 1.16.7GreekMarcus records in Antoninus Pius good sense and measure in the giving of shows, public works and distributions, looking to what must be done and not to the repute that comes of it.
- 1.16.9GreekIn Antoninus everything was reckoned out point by point, as if at leisure, untroubled, in order, vigorously and consistently with itself.
- 2.13GreekWhat comes from men sometimes deserves pity, because of ignorance of good and bad, a disablement no less than the one that deprives a man of telling white from black.
- 4.27GreekMarcus asks whether there can be order in him and disorder in the totality, when all things are so distinguished and diffused and in sympathy (see Providence and atoms).
- 4.37GreekMarcus will soon be dead, and is not yet simple, untroubled or serene towards all, nor placing wisdom in acting justly alone.
- 4.38GreekMarcus is to look into the ruling centres of others, and at the wise, to see what they flee and what they pursue.
- 4.44GreekEverything that happens is as usual as the rose in spring, and of this kind are disease, death, slander, plotting and all that gladdens or distresses fools.
- 4.49.2GreekMarcus asks whether what has happened prevents him from being just, great-souled, self-controlled, sensible, free from rash assent and the rest.
- 5.9GreekMarcus asks what is more agreeable than wisdom itself, given the sureness and smooth flow of the faculty that keeps track and knows.
- 5.12GreekWhoever has conceived of wisdom, self-control, justice and courage as truly goods could not listen to the comic poet's phrase about the goods.
- 5.17GreekTo pursue the impossible is madness, and it is impossible for base people not to do some such things.
- 5.18GreekIt is a terrible thing that ignorance and the wish to please should be stronger than wisdom.
- 5.23GreekSince substance is like a river and the infinity of past and future a gulf, he is a fool who among these things is puffed up, dragged about or complains.
- 5.32GreekThe skilled and knowing soul is the one that knows beginning and end, and the reason that pervades all substance and manages the whole by appointed periods.
- 5.36GreekMarcus is to help others according to worth when they lose in things indifferent, without forming the impression that it is a harm, and is not to become a fool because others take such things seriously.
- 7.73GreekWhen he has done good and another has received it, Marcus is not to seek a third thing, like the fools: the repute of having done good, or a return.
- 8.17GreekIf a thing is in another's power, to blame the atoms or the gods is in either case madness; one must blame no one.
- 8.26GreekThe gladness of a man is to do what is peculiar to him: goodwill to his kind, disregard of the motions of sense, discernment of convincing impressions and observation of the whole.
- 8.38GreekIf he can see sharply, Marcus is to look, judging, as someone says, by the wisest.
- 8.51GreekMarcus asks what killing and cursing are to the understanding's remaining pure, sane, self-controlled and just.
- 9.1.2GreekHe who lies unwillingly has neglected the resources he had from nature, and is now unable to distinguish what is false from what is true.
- 10.8.1GreekMarcus is to keep the names good, self-respecting, truthful, sensible, consenting, transcending; "sensible" was to signify attention that discerns each thing, and freedom from disregard.
- 10.9GreekMarcus is to see and do everything so that the self-assurance that comes from knowledge of each thing is preserved, escaping notice, not concealed.
- 10.36GreekEven at the death of a serious and wise man someone will ask himself whether they shall ever breathe again, free of this schoolmaster.
- 11.18.6GreekTo expect the base not to do wrong is madness, for it reaches after the impossible.
- 11.33GreekIn words Marcus takes from Epictetus, to seek a fig in winter is the mark of a madman, and such is he who seeks the child when it is no longer given.
- 11.38GreekIn words Marcus gives to Epictetus, the contest is not about any chance thing but about being mad or not.
- 12.4GreekIf a god or a sensible teacher bade a man think nothing within himself that he would not at once bring out, he would not endure it even for one day.
- 12.30GreekThere is one intelligent soul, even if it seems to be divided (see Substance).
Translation in this edition
Ἔμφρων is "sensible" (4.49.2, 10.8.1 twice, 12.4), and with the article, τὸ ἔμφρον, "good sense" (1.16.7). Σύμφρων is "consenting" and ὑπέρφρων "transcending" (10.8.1), each defined in the same sentence as "sensible". Φρενήρης is "sane" (8.51). Φρόνησις is "wisdom" (5.9, 5.12, 5.18), and so is τὸ φρονεῖν at 4.37; φρόνιμος is "the wise" (4.38); their sub-entries, with the other places of φρονεῖν, are under Virtue and excellence. At 4.38 τοὺς φρονίμους is the reading of P, the lost manuscript from which the first edition was printed, which Leopold prints; A, the Vatican manuscript, has the misspelling φρονήμους (phronēmous), and Thomas Gataker, the seventeenth-century English editor, proposed τὰς φροντίδας (tas phrontidas), "their cares". Σοφός is "wise" (10.36), and its superlative "the wisest" (8.38); σοφία does not occur, and σοφιστής (sophistēs), "sophist", the man of words set against the philosopher, has its sub-entry elsewhere (see Philosophy). Ἐπιστήμη is "knowledge" (10.9), ἐπιστήμων "knowing" (5.32, twice, beside ἔντεχνος (entechnos), "skilled"), and ἐπιστημονικός "knows", in "the faculty that keeps track and knows" (5.9), where "keeps track" renders παρακολουθητικός (parakolouthētikos; see Attention and self-examination). Διακρίνειν is "telling … from" (2.13) and "distinguish" (9.1.2), and in the perfect passive "distinguished" (4.27) and "be divided" (12.30); διάκρισις is "discernment" (8.26), and διαληπτικός "that discerns" (10.8.1), in "attention that discerns each thing", where ἐπίστασις (epistasis) is "attention"; διαλαμβάνειν is "point by point" (1.16.9). Κρίνειν, "judge", has its sub-entry under Assent and judgement. Μωρός is "fool" (5.23, 5.36), "fools" (4.44) and "the fools" (7.73); μανικός (5.17, 11.18.6) and μανιώδης (8.17) are "madness", and μαίνεσθαι "madman", in "the mark of a madman" (11.33), and "being mad" (11.38). Μεγαλοφροσύνη is "greatness of mind" (3.11.2, 5.18, 10.11), μεγαλοφρόνως "with greatness of mind" (6.23), μεγαλόφρων "great-minded" (6.47), εὐφροσύνη "gladness" (8.26), συμφρονεῖν "think together" (8.54), and καταφρονεῖν, ὑπερφρονεῖν and their family "despise", "contempt" and the like; these are of the root of φρήν but are not words of sense.
Greek forms and English renderings
Good sense, discernment and their lack · Meditations
ἔμφρων, emphrōn, "sensible", "good sense"; σύμφρων, symphrōn, "consenting"; ὑπέρφρων, hyperphrōn, "transcending"; φρενήρης, phrenērēs, "sane"; σοφός, sophos, "wise", "the wisest"; ἐπιστήμη, epistēmē, "knowledge"; ἐπιστήμων, epistēmōn, "knowing"; ἐπιστημονικός, epistēmonikos, "that … knows"; διακρίνειν, diakrinein, "telling … from", "distinguish", "distinguished", "be divided"; διάκρισις, diakrisis, "discernment"; διαληπτικός, dialēptikos, "that discerns"; διαλαμβάνειν, dialambanein, "point by point"; μωρός, mōros, "fool"; μανικός, manikos, "madness"; μανιώδης, maniōdēs, "madness"; μαίνεσθαι, mainesthai, "madman", "being mad"; φρόνησις, phronēsis, "wisdom"; φρόνιμος, phronimos, "the wise"; φρονεῖν, phronein, "wisdom", "thought", "thinking", "is proud", "view they will take"
Epictetus and the Stoics
Diogenes Laertius, whose Lives of the Philosophers, of the third century AD, sets out the Stoic doctrines in its seventh book, ranks among the virtues placed under the primary ones quick-wittedness, ἀγχίνοια (anchinoia), "a state that finds out what is fitting on the spot", and good counsel, εὐβουλία (euboulia), "knowledge of considering what we are to do, and how, so as to act to our advantage"; folly, ἀφροσύνη (aphrosynē), is named first among the primary vices (see Fault and ignorance).1 Marcus uses neither ἀφροσύνη nor ἄφρων (aphrōn), "senseless"; he uses the school's harder word. "All the senseless are mad," Diogenes reports them as saying, "for they are not wise, but do everything in a madness equal to their folly."2 Marcus' madness of pursuing the impossible (5.17) and of blaming atoms or gods (8.17) can be read as that doctrine brought down to single acts. Epictetus makes discernment the philosopher's first work. Wisdom, he argues, studies goods, bads and what is neither; being itself a good, as folly is a bad, it must study itself and its contrary; "this is why the philosopher's greatest and first task is to put the impressions to the test and discern them, and to admit none untested". Where something seems to matter to them, as with money, men have even found an art: the coin-tester tries a coin by sight, touch and smell and at last by its ring, and listens so long that he becomes a musician; where men believe that being misled matters, they spend great care in telling apart what might mislead them, yet over their own poor ruling centre they sit open-mouthed and drowsy and let every impression in.3 To one who said that, though senseless, he loved his child, Epictetus puts the question what he lacks: does he not use his senses, does he not discern impressions? He owns himself senseless, Epictetus answers, because he is often driven out of himself by impressions, and their plausibilities, πιθανότητες (pithanotētes), overcome him.4 Marcus' "discernment of convincing impressions" (8.26), διάκρισις τῶν πιθανῶν φαντασιῶν (diakrisis tōn pithanōn phantasiōn), can be read as the remedy for that defeat. Epictetus describes the wrongdoer, too, as a man blinded "not in the sight that discerns white and black, but in the judgement that discerns goods and bads";5 Marcus' disablement of 2.13 can be read beside it.
διακρίνω
Attested: διακρίνειν (diakrinein; 2.13, 9.1.2), διακεκριμένων (diakekrimenōn; 4.27), διακεκρίσθαι (diakekristhai; 12.30). To separate, to tell one thing from another, to distinguish; in the perfect passive, to be distinguished or divided. Ignorance of good and bad is "a disablement no less than the one that deprives a man of telling white from black" (2.13); the man who lies unwillingly, having neglected the resources he had from nature, "is now unable to distinguish what is false from what is true" (9.1.2). Of the universe, all things are "so distinguished and diffused and in sympathy" (4.27); "One intelligent soul, even if it seems to be divided" (12.30). At 2.13 Leopold reports τὸ διακρίνειν (to diakrinein) in A and D, the Darmstadt manuscript, for τοῦ (tou); at 9.1.2 X, the books of excerpts, has διακρίνων (diakrinōn). Lemma: διακρίνω.
διάκρισις
Attested: διάκρισις (diakrisis; 8.26). Separation, discernment. Peculiar to a man is "discernment of convincing impressions" (8.26), with goodwill towards the kindred stock, disregard of the motions of sense and observation of the nature of the whole. Lemma: διάκρισις.
διαλαμβάνω
Attested: διειλημμένα (dieilēmmena; 1.16.9). To take apart, to distinguish. In Antoninus there was "everything reckoned out point by point, as if at leisure, untroubled, in order, vigorously, consistently with itself" (1.16.9), where "point by point" renders the perfect participle. Lemma: διαλαμβάνω.
διαληπτικός
Attested: διαληπτικήν (dialēptikēn; 10.8.1). Able to distinguish, discerning. "Sensible" was to signify "attention that discerns each thing, and freedom from disregard" (10.8.1). Lemma: διαληπτικός.
ἔμφρων
Attested: ἔμφρον (emphron; 1.16.7), ἔμφρονα (emphrona; 4.49.2), ἔμφρων (emphrōn; 10.8.1 twice, 12.4). Having one's mind within, sensible; with the article, good sense. In Antoninus, "good sense and measure in the giving of shows, the building of public works, distributions and the like" (1.16.7); "sensible" is among the names Marcus gives himself, and was "meant to signify for you attention that discerns each thing, and freedom from disregard" (10.8.1); "a sensible teacher" (12.4). At 1.16.7 "⟨which is⟩ the mark of a man" renders ⟨ὅ ἐστιν⟩ ἀνθρώπου (ho estin anthrōpou), the supplement and correction of Morus, which Leopold prints, for the manuscripts' ἀνθρώποις (anthrōpois), "for men". At 10.8.1 P has the neuter ἔμφρον (emphron) in the second sentence, and so with the other two names. Lemma: ἔμφρων.
ἐπιστήμη
Attested: ἐπιστήμης (epistēmēs; 10.9). Knowledge. Marcus is to see and do everything so that "the self-assurance that comes from knowledge of each thing is preserved, escaping notice, not concealed" (10.9). Lemma: ἐπιστήμη.
ἐπιστημονικός
Attested: ἐπιστημονικῆς (epistēmonikēs; 5.9). Able to know, having knowledge. "For what is more agreeable than wisdom itself, when you consider the sureness and the smooth flow, in everything, of the faculty that keeps track and knows?" (5.9). Lemma: ἐπιστημονικός.
ἐπιστήμων
Attested: ἐπιστήμονα (epistēmona; 5.32), ἐπιστήμων (epistēmōn; 5.32). Knowing, having knowledge. "Why do unskilled and ignorant souls confound the skilled and knowing? Which soul, then, is skilled and knowing? The one that knows beginning and end" (5.32). Lemma: ἐπιστήμων.
μαίνομαι
Attested: μαινομένου (mainomenou; 11.33), μαίνεσθαι (mainesthai; 11.38). To rage, to be mad. In words Marcus takes from Epictetus, "To seek a fig in winter is the mark of a madman" (11.33), and "The contest, then, he said, is not about any chance thing, but about being mad or not" (11.38). At 11.38 Leopold reports εἰ μή (ei mē) in P for ἢ μή (ē mē). Lemma: μαίνομαι.
μανικός
Attested: μανικόν (manikon; 5.17, 11.18.6). Mad, of madness. "To pursue the impossible is madness" (5.17); "to expect the base not to do wrong is madness, for it reaches after the impossible" (11.18.6). Lemma: μανικός.
μανιώδης
Attested: μανιώδη (maniōdē; 8.17). Like madness, mad. "If in another's, whom do you blame? The atoms or the gods? Both are madness" (8.17). Lemma: μανιώδης.
μωρός
Attested: μωρούς (mōrous; 4.44), μωρός (mōros; 5.23, 5.36), μωροί (mōroi; 7.73). Dull, foolish; a fool. Of the kind of the rose in spring is "all that gladdens or distresses fools" (4.44); "How then is he not a fool who among these things is puffed up, or dragged about, or complains …?" (5.23); "Is that why, then, you too should become a fool?" (5.36); "why do you seek a third thing besides these, like the fools" (7.73), where "seek" is the correction ἐπιζητεῖς (epizēteis) of August Nauck, the nineteenth-century German scholar, which Leopold prints for the manuscripts' ἔτι ζητεῖς (eti zēteis), "still seek", and where Leopold reports that Nauck would delete "like the fools". Lemma: μωρός.
σοφός
Attested: σοφωτάτοις (sophōtatois; 8.38), σοφός (sophos; 10.36). Wise; for the Stoics, the sage. "If you can see sharply, look, judging, he says, by the wisest" (8.38), a saying for which Leopold names no source and whose last word, the edition's note says, does not construe; A has σοφωτάτης δικαιοσύνης (sophōtatēs dikaiosynēs), "the wisest justice", and begins the next chapter after it. "He was serious and wise", and yet at his death someone will say to himself, "Shall we ever breathe again, free of this schoolmaster?" (10.36). Lemma: σοφός.
σύμφρων
Attested: σύμφρων (symphrōn; 10.8.1 twice). Of one mind with, consenting. Among the names Marcus gives himself, "consenting" is to signify "the willing acceptance of what is allotted by the common nature" (10.8.1). Lemma: σύμφρων.
ὑπέρφρων
Attested: ὑπέρφρων (hyperphrōn; 10.8.1 twice). With the mind above, transcending. "Transcending" is to signify "the raising of the thinking part above smooth or rough motion of the flesh, and little fame, and death, and all such things" (10.8.1). Lemma: ὑπέρφρων.
φρενήρης
Attested: φρενήρη (phrenērē; 8.51). Sound of mind, sane. "What, then, is this to the understanding's remaining pure, sane, self-controlled, just?" (8.51). Lemma: φρενήρης.
Source note
1. Diogenes Laertius, Lives of the Philosophers 7.92–93.
2. Diogenes Laertius, Lives of the Philosophers 7.124.
3. Epictetus, Discourses 1.20.6–11.
4. Epictetus, Discourses 2.22.4–6.
5. Epictetus, Discourses 1.18.6.