Self-knowledge

Use in the book

Self-directed attention precedes the famous maxim. Charmides is asked to look into himself and consider what temperance makes him like (160d). This continues the initial proposal that possessing the virtue supplies a felt basis for an opinion about it (158e–159a). A person's inward response may begin inquiry without already yielding its correct definition. The dialogue therefore introduces reflective access before Critias turns it into an exclusive kind of knowledge.

The immediate transition at 164b–d is more precise than a general appeal to introspection. A doctor may act beneficially without knowing whether the action will benefit; under Critias' current definition, he thereby acts temperately without recognizing that he does. Socrates formulates this as not knowing himself, how he acted, and not knowing himself, that he is temperate. The person is the direct object followed by a clause specifying what is unknown about him. Critias refuses the possibility of a temperate person ignorant of himself, retracts earlier commitments, and says temperance virtually is knowing oneself.

His Delphic speech supplies an interpretation of an inscription, not a philosophical proof (164d–165b2). The god, he says, greets entrants with “Know thyself”, meaning “Be temperate”, rather than the human greeting “Rejoice”. He contrasts this greeting with the supposedly later counsels “Nothing too much” and “Pledge, and ruin is near”. The implied identity of self-knowledge and temperance is Critias' thesis, explicitly presented as what he and the inscription say. The reader should not turn this dramatic claim into an uncontested meaning of Apollo's maxim.

Socrates begins from the plausible requirement that a knowing be knowledge of something. Critias answers “of oneself” (165c). When asked for a product, he correctly distinguishes mathematical from productive expertise; when asked for a separate object, he introduces the exceptional knowledge of itself and all other knowledge (166c). The object has changed from the person to knowledge. The text provides no independent identification of the entire person with knowledge. Reading this as a straightforward doctrine that the true self is intellect would import an argument the dialogue has not made.

At 167a the personal and epistemic formulations are joined: knowing oneself is knowing what one knows and does not know, with parallel power to examine others. At 169e Critias does attempt a bridge. Possessors of speed are fast, possessors of beauty beautiful, possessors of knowledge knowing; therefore possessors of self-knowing knowledge know themselves. This analogy is not straightforward. “Self” refers to the knowledge in one clause and the person in the conclusion. Moreover, being characterized by what one possesses does not generally transfer every relational property of the possession to its possessor. Socrates says this is not the point he disputes, then challenges the inference to identifying epistemic contents. His tactical concession cannot be treated as an independently demonstrated theory of personal identity.

The later diagnosis sharpens the stakes. To know that one has some knowledge, without knowing what one knows, falls short of the self-assessment initially promised (170b–d2). Conversely, admitting that one cannot answer a question can be an honest epistemic achievement without amounting to the complete second-order science Critias envisages. This is why the resemblance to Socratic examination invites competing interpretations rather than settles them.

The ending returns the issue to Charmides (176a–b2). He cannot say whether he possesses temperance when the adults cannot say what it is; nevertheless, he recognizes a need for further treatment. One may read this as a practical beginning of self-knowledge through acknowledged uncertainty, but Plato does not label it the successful definition. Critias immediately treats obedience to Socrates as evidence of temperance, leaving the relation between understanding oneself and submitting to another unresolved.

Places to read

1. 158e–159aPossession of virtue, awareness, and an opinion
2. 160d–eCharmides asked to look into himself
3. 164b–165b2Unknown quality of an action leads into the Delphic account
4. 165c–166c2Shift from personal self-knowledge to knowledge knowing itself
5. 167aSelf-knowledge identified with knowing epistemic limits
6. 169e–170d2Possession analogy and its restricted result
7. 176a–b2Charmides does not know whether he has the virtue

Translation in this edition

The edition's “does not know himself — how he has acted” at 164c deliberately preserves the person as object. “Does not know of himself” would misleadingly suggest unaided cognition. At 169e both epistēmē and gnōsis appear; the English uses “knowledge” for both, leaving the decisive reflexive contrast to the pronouns.

γιγνώσκω ἑαυτόν

Attested: γιγνώσκει ἑαυτὸν / γιγνώσκειν ἑαυτόν / γιγνώσκειν αὐτὸν ἑαυτόν / ἑαυτὸν αὐτὸν γιγνώσκειν / γιγνώσκειν αὑτὸν (gignōskei heauton / gignōskein heauton / gignōskein auton heauton / heauton auton gignōskein / gignōskein hauton). Knowing oneself; the doctor’s recognition of how he has acted prepares Critias’ definition of temperance. Later its identification with knowledge of knowledge and with knowing what one knows becomes the disputed inference. References: 164c, 164d, 165b, 167a, 169d. Lexical identification: phrase template: γιγνώσκω + personal reflexive; lemma: γιγνώσκω. See Knowing oneself.

γνῶθι σαυτόν

Attested: Γνῶθι σαυτόν (gnōthi sauton). “Know thyself”; the Delphic imperative which Critias interprets as the god’s greeting and as equivalent to “Be temperate,” rather than merely practical advice. References: 164e, 165a. Lexical identification: phrase template: γνῶθι σαυτόν. See Knowing oneself.

ἑαυτοῦ

Attested: ἑαυτοῦ (heautou). Of oneself or one’s own; a masculine/neuter reflexive, distinct from feminine ἑαυτῆς when knowledge itself is the antecedent. References: 163a, 168b. Lexical identification: reflexive pronoun: ἑαυτοῦ, genitive masculine/neuter. See Knowing oneself.

ἐμβλέπω

Attested: ἐμβλέψας (emblepsas). Looking into or at; directed reflexively to oneself before the second definition, rather than constituting a theory of inward vision. References: 160d. Lexical identification: lemma: ἐμβλέπω. See Knowing oneself.

πεπονθότα (peponthota)

Being in the same condition; a perfect participle describes another person with the supposed awareness of knowing and not knowing. References: 171d. Lemma: πάσχω. See Knowing oneself.

Use in the book

The first invocation is deliberately concrete. At 124a–b Socrates tells Alcibiades to listen both to him and to the inscription at Delphi, and to know himself: his real rivals are the Spartan and Persian kings. Self-knowledge here includes a corrected estimate of one's position, preparation, and resources. It is not introduced as detached inward contemplation. Alcibiades has mistaken inherited advantages and local superiority for adequate qualification to govern.

At 129a the inscription becomes the subject of a difficulty. Is knowing oneself easy, so that its dedicator was insignificant, or difficult and not available to everyone? Alcibiades has experienced both impressions. Socrates shifts attention from difficulty to necessity: knowing what one is is required to identify the care that improves oneself. The maxim now leads into an inquiry about the identity of the human being.

The provisional soul argument yields the first interpretive answer. At 130e whoever enjoins self-knowledge bids us come to know soul, because soul rather than body has been identified as the person. That is already a substantial revision of the initial competitive estimate. Yet naming the object is not enough. At 132c–d2 Socrates asks whether they have failed to understand what the inscription says and advises. He presents the eye analogy as what he suspects it means, preserving the exploratory status of the explanation.

If an eye were told to see itself, it would have to look toward something in which both that object and the eye could appear. Mirrors and the reflecting region of another eye supply the model. The soul must likewise attend to soul, especially its excellence of wisdom. Thus the command is unfolded through a relation to another appropriate object rather than by an unexplained inward glance.

The command's authority does not relieve the speakers of inquiry. Socrates invokes the Delphic words, asks what they mean, gives a provisional interpretation, and tests its consequences for conduct. Their ultimate practical significance is knowledge of one's own good and the virtue necessary for governing. The ending also checks personal dependence: Alcibiades' promise that escape will occur if Socrates wishes is corrected to “if god wills.” This does not provide a second definition of the inscription, but it prevents the dialogue's religious framing from being reduced to unconditional confidence in a human teacher.

Places to read

1. 124a–124bThe Delphic command corrects Alcibiades’ estimate of his rivals and resources
2. 129a–129bIts difficulty and relation to care lead to the question of the self
3. 130eThe command is interpreted as requiring knowledge of soul
4. 132c–133b23The hypothetical command to the eye develops the method of self-knowledge

Translation in this edition

Burnet prints γνῶθι σαυτόν at 124a–b without quotation marks, and the edition accordingly makes it Socrates' own command as well as the inscription's. Adding a separate “know” after a quoted motto would obscure that construction. “Thyself” signals the traditional formula; the surrounding prose uses ordinary “oneself.”

γιγνώσκω

Attested: γνῶθι (gnōthi; 124a); τὸ ἑαυτὸν γιγνώσκειν (to heauton gignōskein; 131b); γιγνώσκεις δὲ ὅτι οὐκ ἐπίστασαι (gignōskeis de hoti ouk epistasai; 117c). At 124a: Know: the singular imperative introducing the Delphic command, completed by its reflexive object at 124b. At 131b: Knowing oneself, conditionally identified with temperance rather than bodily or productive expertise. At 117c: Knowing that one does not know a subject, the self-awareness that permits appropriate deference. Lexical identification: lemma: γιγνώσκω. See Know thyself.

συνίημι

Attested: συνίεμεν (syniemen; 132c). To understand or grasp what is meant; Socrates asks whether they failed to understand the Delphic inscription despite its good advice. Lexical identification: lemma: συνίημι. See Know thyself.

ὑποπτεύω

Attested: ὑποπτεύω (hypopteuō; 132d). To suspect or conjecture; Socrates introduces his interpretation of the inscription as what he suspects it means, rather than as a cited divine explanation. Lexical identification: lemma: ὑποπτεύω. See Know thyself.

Use in the book

The first problem is a failure of self-assessment. Alcibiades is convinced that he knows enough to advise Athens, yet cannot account for his knowledge of justice. The diagnosis at 117b–118b23 is already reflexive: he does not know but thinks he knows. Knowing that one does not know would avert reckless action by permitting deference to genuine expertise. This is an important form of accurate self-assessment, but the later inquiry goes beyond it. It asks what the self to be cared for actually is.

At 128e–129a knowledge of the object is made a condition of identifying the craft that improves it. Accordingly one cannot know the proper care of oneself without knowing what one is. The ensuing user argument identifies the human being with soul, explicitly on an adequate rather than fully precise basis. Knowing oneself must therefore concern soul, not merely one's bodily constitution, external possessions, or social distinction.

This result should not be mistaken for completed self-knowledge. Saying “I am soul” does not itself show how soul becomes known. The eye analogy answers that next question. An eye finds a reflected image through looking into another eye's seeing region. Correspondingly soul must look into soul, especially where wisdom arises. At 133c the relevant region is characterized by knowing and intelligence and its likeness to the divine. The inquiry is directed toward the activity that makes soul excellent, not toward an inventory of passing feelings.

There is room for different interpretations of the other soul and of the divine object. The text does not name a particular human interlocutor in the crucial formula, although the dialogue's own soul-to-soul conversation makes an interpersonal interpretation attractive. Nor does the grammar compel a purely solitary exercise. The phrase “and into anything else which this resembles” leaves a wider field, developed by divine likeness and, in the supplied lines, by god as mirror. These alternatives should be kept visible instead of being collapsed into one asserted procedure.

At 131b self-knowledge enters a conditional identification with temperance, and at 133c that identification is recalled as agreed. The resulting knowledge is practical. Without it one cannot know one's own bad and good, because one does not adequately know whose good is in question. At 133d–e Socrates corrects the earlier concession that specialists could know one's belongings while lacking knowledge of oneself. Knowing what is one's own as one's own belongs to the same comprehensive discernment.

The extension to others and cities prevents a narrowly private reading. A person ignorant of his own affairs will be ignorant of others' affairs in the same way and unfit to manage a household or city. Conversely, just and temperate action looks toward the divine and discloses one's own goods. The dialogue links reflexive understanding to responsible action, without supplying a general thesis that every kind of knowledge must know itself. In particular, it does not define a science whose only objects are knowledge and ignorance. Its concern is the person, the good of that person, and the authority needed to act well.

The final promise of care for justice marks the beginning of a response, not certification that Alcibiades now possesses stable self-knowledge. Socrates' fear about the city's influence preserves the difference between recognizing a need and sustaining the inquiry and conduct that meet it.

Places to read

1. 117b–118b23Accurate awareness of ignorance is contrasted with false confidence
2. 128e–130e2345Knowing the object of care leads to the provisional identification of self with soul
3. 131bSelf-knowledge is conditionally identified with temperance
4. 132c–133e234The eye analogy and subsequent correction explain knowledge of self and belongings
5. 134a–135e234Self-knowledge governs practical and political competence; continued care remains at issue

Translation in this edition

The edition translates several knowing verbs by “know”; their contexts, rather than a fixed English division, carry the argument. At 132c7 the printed αὐτό, “it,” is Schleiermacher's correction of manuscript αὐτά, “them”; the neuter points back to the soul under the preceding “this.”

ἐναργής

Attested: ἐναργέστατα (enargestata; 132c). Clear or manifest; the superlative asks how the object of self-knowledge can be understood with the greatest clarity. Lexical identification: lemma: ἐναργής. See Self-knowledge.

παγχάλεπος

Attested: παγχάλεπον (panchalepon; 129a). Extremely difficult; Alcibiades' strong alternative estimate of knowing oneself contrasts with his occasional belief that anyone can do it. Lexical identification: lemma: παγχάλεπος. See Self-knowledge.

ῥᾴδιος

Attested: ῥᾴδιον (rhaidion; 129a). Easy; Alcibiades alternates between finding self-knowledge easy for everyone and extremely difficult, while Socrates insists on its necessity either way. Lexical identification: lemma: ῥᾴδιος. See Self-knowledge.

χαλεπός

Attested: χαλεπόν (chalepon; 129a). At 129a: Difficult, the opposed possibility for knowing oneself, which does not remove the necessity of the task. Lexical identification: lemma: χαλεπός. See Self-knowledge.

Use in the book

Socrates reaches the self through knowledge of others. The same craft that improves and punishes rightly also discriminates decent and worthless subjects. Knowledge of one and many is then treated as interchangeable within that competence. A member of the kind who lacks the relevant evaluative knowledge cannot know what sort of member he himself is. The human case concludes that someone ignorant of decent and worthless people is ignorant of himself, since he too is human.

The animal sequence makes a difficulty visible. The argument first concerns the trainer who knows horses; then it supposes a horse who knows or fails to know horses and itself. Passing from expert knowledge about a class to self-knowledge by a member is a change in the knower. The text gives no separate defense of the move. Edition note 26 explicitly calls attention to it, so a lexicon should not absorb it into a seamless paraphrase.

At 138a self-ignorance is said not to be temperance. Socrates immediately asks whether self-knowledge is therefore being temperate, and the interlocutor assents. As a strict inference, denial of the negative case does not alone establish a complete equivalence without further assumptions. The dialogue presents the equivalence as accepted rather than elaborately proved. It then invokes the Delphic inscription as urging the practice of temperance and justice.

The knowledge remains interpersonal. At 138b temperance is the capacity by which one distinguishes “both oneself and others.” The inward turn does not withdraw the person from social judgment; it includes the self under the same standards applied outwardly. Because the same knowledge has also been linked to right punishment, justice and temperance are declared identical.

The ending puts pressure on the lover’s earlier confidence. He had known that philosophy was fine before giving an adequate account of it and had aimed at seeming accomplished before the audience. The late demand for self-knowledge can be read as an alternative to such untested self-ranking. That is an interpretation of the dramatic pattern, not a separately announced lesson.

The dialogue points philosophy toward this knowledge and the responsibilities connected with it, but never simply completes the definition “philosophy is self-knowledge.” Its final explicit sentence remains a rejection of much learning and occupation with crafts.

Places to read

1. 138aπότερον χρηστός ἐστιν ἢ πονηρός — Self-knowledge concerns what sort of person one is.
2. 138aΤὸ ἑαυτὸν ἄρα γιγνώσκειν ἐστὶ σωφρονεῖν — Knowing oneself is identified with being temperate.
3. 138bκαὶ ἑαυτὸν καὶ ἄλλους — The self is joined with others as an object of discrimination.

Translation in this edition

Edition note 27 explains the Delphic background and compares the reading of “Know thyself” in Charmides 164d–165a. The famous imperative is not quoted verbatim in the Lovers’ Greek. The present text refers to “the inscription at Delphi” and interprets its exhortation; that difference should be preserved in quotations and references.

Use in the book

The command to live inwardly initially promises access both to the soul and to nature’s meaning. Yet inward observation can become an exhausting occupation. Guérin’s fearful, analytical element repeatedly reopens old wounds; the soul later becomes his first horizon, a spectacle from which fascination will not let him turn away. Looking within is therefore neither an uncomplicated cure nor a merely narcissistic failure.

The country sojourn of June 1834 provides a notably careful correction. He had imagined that freedom from social pressure would bring complete rest. When it does not, he acknowledges both society’s injuries and the constitution of his own soul. The passage resists assigning all suffering to one external cause. Similar self-corrections distinguish a genuine natural preference from an objective ranking of sublime sights, and moral deficiency from intellectual disappointment.

The notebook’s most useful self-knowledge often consists in these revisions, not in its most emphatic verdicts. Assertions that experience has finally proved his incapacity coexist with later growth. A reader should therefore attend to the circumstances and purposes of each claim instead of assembling them into a single final portrait.

Places to read

1. 15 March 1833 · ¶1The inward eye is a divinely given instrument of vigilance and deeper perception.
2. 22 March 1833 · ¶1An anxious analytical habit can perpetuate suffering rather than clarify it.
3. 26 June 1834 · ¶1Failure to find complete rural peace corrects an exclusively social explanation of distress.
4. 30 April 1835 · ¶2The soul as first horizon becomes an absorbing spectacle that monopolizes attention.
5. 18 May 1834 · ¶1As inward misery spreads, the writer says he no longer dares look within, reversing the programme of inward attention.

Translation in this edition

“how little I know myself” in 26 June 1834 · ¶1 is a revision of an expectation, not a general claim that knowledge of self is impossible. At 30 April 1835 · ¶2 “My soul was my first horizon” retains the spatial metaphor instead of reducing it to introspection.

Use in the book

The Proem introduces human self-knowledge through Nosce te ipsum, “Know thyself.” Ficino presents Plato as interpreting the oracle to mean that whoever desires knowledge of God must first know himself. Soul is a mirror in which the divine countenance shines; Proem.7 makes the created mind a central mirror through which the Creator's works and mind can be contemplated and honored. This is Ficino's reading of the oracle within his theological project. Human self-examination is a preparatory route through a received divine likeness, distinct from God's underived self-knowledge.

God knows himself first because perfect intelligence must possess the closest possible relation to its object and lack dependence upon something external. Since God's understanding is his essence, an outside object that perfected his knowledge would also perfect his being, contradicting his status as first. This self-directed knowledge does not confine God to ignorance of the world. In knowing himself as the cause of all being, he knows the entire range of his power and every mode in which his goodness can be communicated. Ficino first explains knowledge through an ordered sequence of causes, then explicitly says God need not inspect these causes outside himself. He knows particulars distinctly through his own essence. The same reasoning extends to infinite possibilities: knowing the infinite exemplar is knowing its inexhaustible modes of imitation. The self-knowledge vocabulary therefore unites divine independence with comprehensive awareness. It is comprehensive knowledge without successive psychological introspection or withdrawal from lesser things.

Book III extends the earlier divine self-knowledge discussion to soul’s reflective and formative activity. Soul paints itself in the likeness of higher beings by contemplation, character, and action. Later its unfolding and refolding of powers produces apprehension of itself and its contents; recognizing its own spiritual essence is termed intellection. This concerns a temporal, received, self-forming life, not the divine identity of knowing and being.

Further passage references. Proem.4; Proem.7; II.9.7–1523456789; II.9.20–212; II.10.2–12234567891011

Selected annotated passages.

III.1.31. Self-painting includes ethical character and action.

III.2.28. Self-apprehension is articulated through a sequence of knowing verbs.

Places to read

1. Proem.4 and Proem.7Knowledge of self and created mind’s mirror prepare knowledge and worship of the Creator.
2. II.9.7–1523456789God’s immediate relation to his own essence grounds knowledge without an externally perfecting object.
3. II.9.20–212Knowing things in himself is explicitly distinguished from inspecting their images outside himself.
4. II.10.2–12234567891011Knowledge of the infinite exemplar extends to its inexhaustible possible imitations.

Translation in this edition

“Know thyself” is the oracle as Ficino interprets it in the Proem. The mirror is explicitly introduced as a comparison, and divine self-knowledge should not be translated into successive introspection or ignorance of external effects.

“Character” for moribus keeps the ethical dimension of the painting metaphor. “Recognizes” does not alone imply recollection of a previously learned fact; its object here is soul’s spiritual essence.

adhortor / admoneo

adhortor / admoneo. Printed forms: adhortatur; admonere; commoniti.

To exhort, warn or call something to attention. Plato’s example is paired with exhortation, the oracle admonishes toward self-knowledge, and Platonic reason calls sensory-minded readers beyond shadows. References: Proem.3, Proem.4, Proem.9. See Self knowledge.

certus / plenus

certus / plenus. Printed forms: certa; plenissima; plenus.

Certain or full; completion rather than an unspecified volume. Self-knowledge is described as certain, without need, and complete because knower and object are nearest. References: II.3.9, II.9.8. See Self knowledge.

cognosco / agnosco

cognosco / agnosco. Printed forms: agnoscere; cogniti; cognoscat; cognoscere.

To know or come to recognize. Self-knowledge is made prior to recognizing God; Ficino also hopes mistaken readers will recognize their error, so recognition is not restricted to divine vision. References: Proem.1, Proem.4, Proem.5, Proem.8. See Self knowledge.

mores

mores. Printed forms: moribus.

Character or conduct. Soul’s self-painting includes character and action alongside contemplation; the metaphor has an ethical as well as intellectual role. References: III.1.31. See Self knowledge.

nosce te ipsum

nosce te ipsum. Printed forms: Nosce te ipsum.

“Know yourself,” the oracle as quoted in the Proem. Ficino interprets it chiefly as an injunction to know oneself before seeking knowledge of God; the claimed chief meaning is his reading. References: Proem.4. See Self knowledge.

noscere / cognoscere / dinoscere

noscere / cognoscere / dinoscere. Printed forms: cognoscit; Cognoscit; dinoscit; ignorat; noscens; Noscit; noscit; novit.

To know or discern, with ignorance explicitly denied in divine causation. Knowledge of the first cause includes the proper, intermediate, and nearest causes and their distinct effects. References: II.9.14, II.9.15, II.10.2. See Self knowledge.

oraculum

oraculum. Printed forms: oraculum.

An oracular saying or pronouncement. Ficino calls “Know yourself” an oracle and supplies his preferred theological interpretation, without telling a full history of the inscription. References: Proem.4. See Self knowledge.

speculari

speculari. Printed forms: speculando.

Contemplate. God’s self-contemplation is presented as compatible with external efficacy, rather than withdrawal from governance. References: II.11.15. See Self knowledge.

speculum

speculum. Printed forms: speculo; speculum.

A mirror used as an image of the created soul or mind. The soul reflects the divine countenance; the created mind is a mirror at the centre of things through which the Creator’s works may be contemplated. References: Proem.4, Proem.7. See Image and likeness.

Mirror. Soul is called the mirror of divine things while also life of mortal things; the image highlights cognition within a two-sided mediation. References: III.2.8. See Self knowledge.