From the book
Charmides
Plato · Diotimos Editions · November 2026
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At a Glance
- English renderings
- ἡ σκέψις, hē skepsis, “the (best) way of looking into it”
Meaning
A σκέψις is an examination and the manner of conducting it, so that “the best σκέψις” is the best procedure for finding something out. The word names the inquiry as a method, where σκοπεῖν names it as an activity (see σκοπέω).
Use in the book
The noun marks the dialogue’s first decision about method. Asked whether he is temperate, the boy can neither say yes without praising himself nor no without calling Critias a liar (158c–d; see αἰσχυντηλός; ἔξαρνος). Socrates proposes that they look into it together, and the boy lets him choose the way, “look into it in whatever way you think best”, and Socrates chooses: “This, then … seems to me the best way of looking into it. For it is clear that if temperance is present in you, you have some opinion about it” (158e–159a; see κοινῇ σκέπτεσθαι). The chain that follows, from presence to a sense, from a sense to an opinion, and from an opinion to words, is told elsewhere (159a; see αἴσθησις; ἔνειμι).
What the method does is replace a question the boy cannot answer with one he can. He cannot say whether he has temperance without seeming either boastful or rude; he can say what temperance seems to him to be (159a; see κατὰ τὴν σὴν δόξαν). The method spares his modesty, and it sets the shape of the first half of the dialogue, in which the boy offers what he thinks temperance is and Socrates tests it.
The method rests on an assumption, which the edition’s note at 159a finds, on one reading, in Socrates’ “since you know how to speak Greek”: “that whatever a person really has in him he can put into words” (see αἴσθησις; ἑλληνίζω). The assumption can be read as being tested, as well as used, by what follows. The boy’s first answer is one that people commonly give, as Socrates remarks, his second from looking within, his third is borrowed; and at the end, asked again whether he has temperance, he answers that he cannot know (176a; see οὐκ οἶδα οὔτ’ εἰ ἔχω οὔτ’ εἰ μὴ ἔχω). The best way of looking into it has not shown him what is in him.
Places to read
The passage in which the noun occurs, with the dilemma and the proposal that lead to it and the method it introduces.
Translation in this edition
“The best way of looking into it” renders βελτίστη … ἡ σκέψις (158e6), the noun given the verb phrase that the Key Words keep for σκοπεῖν and σκέπτεσθαι (see σκοπέω).
Elsewhere in Plato
In the Meno Socrates turns to another way of looking into a question when the first is barred. He would have looked first into what virtue is, and only then into whether it can be taught; but since Meno, who will not rule himself, rules him, he gives way, and asks leave to look into it from a hypothesis, as geometers often do. Asked whether a given area can be fitted as a triangle into a given circle, a geometer may say that he does not yet know, but has a supposition that will serve: if the area is of one kind, one thing follows, and something else if it is not. So with virtue: since they know neither what it is nor what sort of thing it is, they will look into whether it can be taught from a supposition, asking what sort of thing among those that concern the soul it would have to be; if it is a kind of knowledge, plainly it can be taught, and if it is something other than knowledge, it cannot; the next question is whether it is a knowledge (86d–87c; see ὅτι ἐστὶν καὶ ὁποῖόν τι). The Meno’s method gives up the first question for a conditional; the Charmides’ gives up the boy’s question about himself for his opinion about the virtue.