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come to be in

ἐγγίγνομαι

How temperance comes to be in souls · Charmides

From the book

Charmides

Plato · Diotimos Editions · November 2026

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Orientation

At a Glance

  • The wordἘγγίγνομαι, to be born in, to arise in, to come about within; of a quality, to be engendered in someone.
  • In the CharmidesTwice in the Thracian’s teaching that temperance comes to be in souls from beautiful words (157a), and once in Socrates’ question whether any of the young “had turned out to be outstanding” (153d).
  • In this edition“Comes to be in”, “once it has come to be”, “had turned out to be”.
  • A place to read156d–157c.
English renderings
ἐγγίγνεσθαι, engignesthai, “comes to be in”; ἐγγενομένης, engenomenēs, “once it has come to be”; ἐγγεγονότες, engegonotes, “had turned out to be”

Meaning

The verb joins ἐν, “in”, to γίγνεσθαι, “to come to be”. It is the verb for what is produced inside something else: a quality in a person, a disease in a body, a virtue in a soul. Unlike εἶναι, “to be”, it names the coming and so asks how the thing came.

Use in the book

The Thracian’s account of the charm turns on it. The soul, he said, is treated with certain charms, and these charms are beautiful words. “From words like these, temperance comes to be in souls; and once it has come to be and is present, it is easy then to provide health for the head and for the rest of the body too” (157a–b; see λόγοι καλοί; πάρειμι). The sentence has three stages: the words act, temperance comes to be in the soul, and, once it has come and is present, health follows. The edition’s note at 157a suggests that the charm is conversation, perhaps the conversation about to begin (see διαλέγομαι), and on that reading the verb names what the dialogue is meant to do to the boy.

The question Socrates then puts to Charmides is whether the second stage has already happened, whether temperance is already present in him, in which case he would need no charms (158b; see δοτέος). Presence, πάρεστιν, is the verb of the test; coming to be, ἐγγίγνεσθαι, the verb of the cure. The dialogue never settles the first, and at the end the boy, not knowing whether he has temperance, asks for the charm “every day” (176b).

The prologue had used the verb of the young. Socrates asked whether any of them “had turned out to be” outstanding in wisdom or in beauty or in both (153d; see διαφέρω; σοφία ἢ κάλλος). There the verb is used of persons, not of qualities: Socrates asks whether any young men outstanding in wisdom or beauty have come up among them, as at 157a temperance comes to be in souls; Critias answers about beauty (154a), and the charm Socrates goes on to offer is for temperance, which the question did not name.

Places to read

Every passage in which the verb occurs.

  1. 153dWhether any of the young had turned out to be outstanding in wisdom, or beauty, or both.
  2. 157aFrom beautiful words temperance comes to be in souls; once it has come to be and is present, health is easy to provide.

Translation in this edition

Ἐν ταῖς ψυχαῖς σωφροσύνην ἐγγίγνεσθαι (157a5–6), an infinitive in the Thracian’s reported speech, is “temperance comes to be in souls”; the genitive absolute ἧς ἐγγενομένης καὶ παρούσης (157a6) is “once it has come to be and is present”. At 153d5 ἐγγεγονότες εἶεν is “had turned out to be”.

Elsewhere in Plato

In the Gorgias Socrates describes the good orator, the man of art, as one who speaks and acts with a single aim: how justice may come to be in the citizens’ souls and injustice be removed, temperance be engendered, ἐγγίγνηται, and licentiousness removed, and the rest of virtue be engendered and vice depart (504d–e). The Thracian’s charm of beautiful words and the Gorgias’ true rhetoric do the same work with the same verb. In the First Alcibiades the verb marks the place in the eye where its excellence, sight, comes to be, and the place in the soul where wisdom does (133b; see δύναμις πρὸς ἑαυτό). Whether virtue can be taught, or comes by practice, or comes to men by nature or in some other way is the question Meno puts at the opening of the Meno, where the verb is παραγίγνεται (70a; see ἀρετή).

Other ancient sources

Aristotle can be read as answering that question, and with the headword’s verb. None of the virtues of character, he says, arises in us by nature, since nothing that is by nature is changed by habit: a stone that moves downward by nature cannot be trained to move upward, though one throw it up ten thousand times. The virtues arise in us neither by nature nor against nature; we are by nature able to receive them, and are brought to completion by habit.1 The Thracian’s temperance comes to be in souls from words, Aristotle’s from habit.

Source note

1. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 2.1, 1103a18–26.