From the book
Charmides
Plato · Diotimos Editions · November 2026
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- μεγάλου … τινος … ἀνδρὸς δεῖ, megalou … tinos … andros dei, “It needs a great man”
Meaning
Attested: μεγάλου … ἀνδρός (megalou … andros; 169a). After the catalogue of capacities that might or might not relate to themselves, Socrates gives up the general question: “It needs a great man, my friend, to determine this adequately for all cases: whether none of the things that are is by nature able to have its own power in relation to itself, but only in relation to something else; or whether some are and some are not” (169a; see δεῖ; διαιρέω; δύναμις πρὸς ἑαυτό; ἱκανός). He does not claim to be the man: “I, for my part, don’t trust myself to be capable of making these distinctions” (169a; see πιστεύω). The phrase lays the large question aside so that the argument can turn to the smaller one, whether such a knowledge would benefit (169b; see ὠφέλιμος). In the Phaedrus Socrates declines another large task in the same form. Explaining away the myths, he says, is the work of a very clever and laborious and not very fortunate man (229d–e); he has no leisure for it, because he cannot yet know himself, as the Delphic inscription bids (229e–230a; see Γνῶθι σαυτόν). In both places Socrates sets the great man’s work aside, in the Phaedrus to know himself first, in the Charmides because he does not trust himself with it, though there the work postponed is the question on which the definition of temperance depends.