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temperance and health

σωφροσύνη καὶ ὑγίεια

The pair the Thracian joins as cause and effect, and the argument separates · Charmides

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Charmides

Plato · Diotimos Editions · November 2026

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Orientation

At a Glance

  • The phraseTemperance and health, the good condition of the soul and the good condition of the body.
  • In the CharmidesOnce as a pair, at 157b: “some try to be doctors of the two separately, of temperance and of health”; and as cause and effect a few lines before: once temperance is present in the soul, “it is easy then to provide health for the head and for the rest of the body too” (157a–b).
  • In this edition“Of temperance and of health”.
  • A place to read157a–c and 174e–175a.
English renderings
σωφροσύνης τε καὶ ὑγιείας, sōphrosynēs te kai hygieias, “of temperance and of health”

Meaning

Health, ὑγίεια, is the body’s good condition; temperance, in the Thracian’s teaching, is the soul’s. The Thracian puts the two under one doctor, and the phrase names the mistake of parting them. Plato elsewhere calls virtue a kind of health of the soul (Republic 4.444c–e; see εὖ ἔχω), and the Thracian goes further: the soul’s health is the cause of the body’s.

Use in the book

The Thracian’s order of treatment makes the pair a sequence. The soul must be treated first and foremost, with charms that are beautiful words, and “From words like these, temperance comes to be in souls; and once it has come to be and is present, it is easy then to provide health for the head and for the rest of the body too” (157a–b; see ἐγγίγνομαι; λόγοι καλοί; πορίζω). Then the warning: no one is to persuade Socrates to treat anyone’s head who has not first handed over his soul, “For that … is the mistake made nowadays in treating human beings: some try to be doctors of the two separately, of temperance and of health” (157b; see ἁμάρτημα; χωρὶς ἑκατέρου). The pair is the whole man, and to treat one half is to fail with both.

The argument takes the pair apart. When Critias defines temperance as self-knowledge, Socrates asks for its work on the model of medicine: medicine, the knowledge of the healthy, produces health, “a fine work for us”, and temperance must produce something too (165c–d; see ἀπεργάζομαι; καλὸν ἔργον). Health is now not temperance’s effect but medicine’s, the product of another knowledge. In the dream of temperance ruling, “we would be healthier in body than we are now” (173b; see σῶμα), but only because the doctors would be genuine. And at the end the separation is explicit. Socrates asks, “Then it will not be the craftsman of health?”, and Critias answers “Certainly not”, since health, he agrees, belonged “to another craft” (174e–175a; see δημιουργὸς ὑγιείας).

The Thracian warned against doctors “of the two separately”, and the argument ends with exactly that division: health is medicine’s, and temperance, defined as knowledge of knowledge, has no work at all. The dialogue can be read as testing the Thracian’s pair and finding that Critias’ temperance cannot be the cause the Thracian promised. Whether the charm’s temperance, which is not Critias’, could be, is the question the ending leaves open: Socrates still thinks temperance a great good, and the boy still asks for the charm (175e–176b).

Places to read

The pair’s place, with the Thracian’s sentence of cause and effect a few lines before it.

  1. 157aOnce temperance has come to be in the soul, health is easy to provide for the head and the body.
  2. 157bSome try to be doctors of the two separately, of temperance and of health.

Translation in this edition

“Of temperance and of health” at 157b6, with the English repeating “of” to keep the two objects of “doctors” apart. The words are missing in one Florentine manuscript, Laurentianus lxxxv. 6 (apparatus, b6).

Elsewhere in Plato

The Republic ranks the pair. A soul set in its best nature, gaining temperance and justice with wisdom, takes on a condition more honourable than a body gaining strength and beauty with health, as much as soul is more honourable than body. So the man of sense will live with this as his aim: he will tend his body, but not with an eye to health, nor making much of it, nor caring whether he will be strong or healthy or beautiful, unless he is also going to become temperate by it; he will keep the body in tune for the sake of the soul’s concord (9.591b–d). The Thracian’s temperance makes health easy; the Republic’s health is worth having only if it serves temperance. The Gorgias’ naming of the body’s order as health and strength, and of the soul’s as lawfulness and law, that is, justice and temperance, is told elsewhere (504b–d; see ἔχειν καλῶς).