Ruling and supervision

Use in the book

At 171d–172a Socrates reconstructs an attractive prospect: those possessing temperance and everyone under their rule would live without error. They would attempt only what they knew and entrust other tasks to experts; household, city and any sphere ruled by temperance would therefore go well. This is conditional on powers the preceding argument has failed to establish. Socrates then questions even the further assumption that such knowledgeable management automatically yields a great good (172d–e2).

The dream grants extensive supervision once more. Temperance would prevent impostors from deceiving us and keep lack of knowledge from intruding into our activities (173a–d2). It could preside even over prophecy and distinguish true prophets from pretenders. This is the maximal favourable case, not a power already demonstrated for second-order knowledge.

Critias' last defence makes the supervisory issue explicit. If temperance presides over every knowledge, it must also rule knowledge of good and bad and thereby benefit us (174d–e2). Socrates replies that medicine, not temperance, produces health, and that benefit has similarly been assigned as another knowledge's work (174e–175a). The dispute concerns how benefit is credited. Direct production and supervision are distinguishable; it remains a substantive question whether the latter can contribute indirectly to a work it does not itself perform. The conversation ends without developing a complete account of that relationship.

The epilogue gives an embodied counterpart. Critias orders Charmides to submit to Socrates' charm, and Charmides invokes his guardian's command as grounds for forcing Socrates (176b–d). The right to command and the possession of understanding have not thereby been shown identical. Reading the ending beside the conditional dream makes the difference between knowledgeable guidance and accepted personal authority particularly visible.

Places to read

1. 171d–172aTemperance is imagined ruling persons, household and city without error
2. 172d–173d23Its benefit is questioned even under a generous supervisory hypothesis
3. 174d–175a2Critias appeals to rule over knowledge of good and bad; Socrates denies automatic transfer of its work
4. 176b–dA guardian’s commands shape the final exchange

Translation in this edition

The edition varies “rule,” “preside,” “guide” and “stand guard” with the Greek verbs. They are not all occurrences of ἄρχειν: the guardian image at 173d uses φυλάττουσα. The repetition of ruling at 174e explicitly extends Critias' claim to evaluative knowledge.

ἄρχω

Attested: ἄρχοι / ἤρχομεν / ἄρχουσα (archoi / ērchomen / archousa). Rule or direct; the hypothetical supervisory power assigned to temperance must still be tested for benefit. References: 171e, 173a, 174e. Lexical identification: lemma: ἄρχω. See Ruling and supervision.

ἐπιστατέω

Attested: ἐπιστατοῦσαν / ἐπιστατεῖ (epistatousan / epistatei). Supervise or preside over; the role temperance is imagined to exercise over particular expertises. References: 173c, 174d. Lexical identification: lemma: ἐπιστατέω. See Ruling and supervision.

ἐπιτάσσω

Attested: ἐπιτάττει (epitattei). Give an order; Critias’ command directs Charmides to submit to Socrates’ charming. References: 176c. Lexical identification: lemma: ἐπιτάσσω. See Ruling and supervision.

ἐπιτρέπω

Attested: ἐπετρέπομεν (epetrepomen). Allow or permit; in the imagined community, people under the temperate rulers would be allowed to act only in fields they knew. References: 171e. Lexical identification: lemma: ἐπιτρέπω. See Ruling and supervision.

ἡγέομαι

Attested: ἡγουμένης / ἡγουμένη (hēgoumenēs / hēgoumenē). Lead or guide; rightness or knowledge guides the action of the imagined well-managed community. References: 172a, 172d. Lexical identification: lemma: ἡγέομαι. See Ruling and supervision.

κελεύω

Attested: κελεύεις / κελεύω (keleueis / keleuō). To order or command; Charmides agrees to obey his guardian’s instruction to remain with Socrates for the charm. References: 176c. Lexical identification: lemma: κελεύω. See Ruling and supervision.

παραδίδωμι

Attested: παρεδίδομεν / παραδιδοῖεν (paredidomen / paradidoien). To hand over or entrust; in the imagined well-ordered life people delegate work they do not know how to do to those who possess the relevant expertise. References: 171e, 172d. Lexical identification: lemma: παραδίδωμι. See Ruling and supervision.

παρεδίδομεν (paredidomen)

We would hand over or entrust; tasks would be assigned to the people who know how to do them. References: 171e. Lemma: παραδίδωμι. See Ruling and supervision.

Use in the book

Alcibiades at 125b identifies good men as those able to rule in the city. Socrates asks over whom and in what activity. Horses, sick people, sailors, and harvesters all invite different forms of direction. Even governing men who use other men does not uniquely identify politics: boatswains employ rowers and pipers lead dancers. The rule Alcibiades means concerns citizens sharing political life and dealings. This inquiry demands an intelligible task and competence, not simply the possession of command.

The account of the Persian prince had already introduced a reflexive dimension. He must be free of enslavement to pleasures, a genuine king ruling what is within himself first (122a). In the subsequent analysis of the human being, rule connects the user of the body with soul: the soul uses the body by ruling it (130a). The body is ruled, and a compound of soul and body is rejected as the ruler because one member has no share in ruling. Socrates expressly treats this result as adequate rather than precise at 130c–d. A lexical connection between political rule and bodily agency should not be turned into a complete argument that every city has the structure of a soul.

The end makes rule conditional on education. Someone intending to govern not only himself and his affairs but the city must first acquire virtue, since he cannot share what he lacks (134c). Rule to do whatever one wishes is therefore not the immediate goal. Justice and temperance must be procured instead. This does not abolish the distinction between competent government and mere private self-care: the ruler's responsibility extends to the people affected by his acts.

Shipboard command and the domineering patient show the danger of authority without the right knowledge (134e–135b2). When no one can correct an incompetent controller, desire becomes destructive. Forms of rule and license lacking virtue lead to doing badly. Socrates consequently says it is better for a person without virtue to be ruled by someone better than to rule, explicitly extending the point to adults as well as children.

The qualification “before one has virtue” is important. The argument is educational and directed at Alcibiades' present condition; it does not simply assign a permanent subordinate class by birth. Nonetheless the following movement into slave-befitting language is socially and ethically forceful, and should not be softened away. It attacks the young aristocrat's assumption that high status entitles him to rule now. The prospective ruler must first accept the direction that can make him fit to govern.

Places to read

1. 122aRoyal education presents rule over oneself as a condition of genuine kingship
2. 125b–125e23The activity and subjects of political rule must be distinguished from other coordinated work
3. 130a–130d2Ruling the body figures in the provisional identification of the person with soul
4. 134c–135c23Rule without virtue is dangerous, and the unqualified adult benefits from being ruled by someone better

Translation in this edition

The edition uses “rule” for ἀρχή and “license” for ἐξουσία, preserving the paired terms at 134c and 135a–b. The rule/begin ambiguity should not be manufactured into a doctrine: at 135e Alcibiades simply promises to begin caring for justice. “By one's better” at 135b is comparative and evaluative; the passage does not name a constitutional office.

ἄρχω / ἀρχή

Attested: ἄρχειν (archein; 125b); ἄρχουσα (archousa; 130a); ἄρχεσθαι (archesthai; 135b). At 125b: Rule over people in the city, Alcibiades’ first specification of good men’s capacity. At 130a: Ruling the body, the manner in which soul uses it. At 135b: Being ruled by a better person before one has acquired virtue. Lexical identification: family label: ἄρχω / ἀρχή. See Rule and being ruled.

Use in the book

The final demand for leadership grows out of three settings: one’s own household, an arbitration entrusted by friends and a decision assigned by the city. In each, the philosopher is responsible for practical judgment. The requirement is not a free-floating ambition to outrank everyone or acquire an office. It concerns doing an entrusted task with the competence that its importance requires.

This changes the meaning of the competitive imagery. The earlier pentathlete could be satisfied with second place to specialists because he surpassed everybody else. Now that attractive compromise is insufficient. If the philosopher must himself judge rightly, his inferiority cannot be excused by pointing to his breadth in unrelated crafts. Leadership is the capacity to take the responsible first role in these affairs.

The question at 138d prepares the transition carefully. Socrates asks whether inability to follow and contribute could be unshameful when the speaker is a judge or king, even though it is shameful with other craftsmen. The answer rejects that exemption. Socrates then goes beyond merely following and contributing: in the matters that are one’s responsibility, the standard is to lead. The passage should not be summarized as approving ignorance of judges or as demanding only better conversation about government.

There remains a tension with the practical argument against the generalist. That argument treated second place as useless whenever a specialist exists; the ending now claims the philosopher must have first-place competence in the chosen sphere. The dialogue does not explain in a separate educational program how that competence is acquired. It identifies the failure of the lover’s definition and sketches the ethical knowledge that a more adequate account would need to accommodate.

The final sentence accordingly says philosophy is far from much learning and occupation with crafts. The positive demand for leadership is clear, but it is not followed by an explicit comprehensive definition of philosophy. A responsible reading can emphasize the normative orientation without filling in that missing formulation.

Places to read

1. 138dΠῶς δ’ οὐκ αἰσχρόν — The interlocutor rejects the suggestion that ignorance here is unshameful.
2. 138eἡ πόλις τι προστάττῃ διακρίνειν ἢ δικάζειν — The public role can be a specified commission.
3. 139aδεύτερον φαίνεσθαι ἢ τρίτον καὶ μὴ οὐχ ἡγεῖσθαι — The final contrast is between trailing and leading in the entrusted matter.

Translation in this edition

The edition’s “lead” draws out the active sense of hēgeisthai here, while “think” suits its earlier uses. Its introduction explicitly cautions that the dialogue reaches its alternative by identifications rather than a final definition. That caution guards against turning the closing demand into an unqualified manifesto of philosopher-rule.

Use in the book

The governing sense organizes Socrates' classification of skills. Charioteering rules a horse team, piloting ships, medicine sick people, music choristers, and gymnastics those exercising (123d–e2). Farming and carpentry then direct differentiated groups of workers (124a–b). Repetition of archein allows the inquiry to move across these fields while asking what the boy's proposed wisdom rules.

Theages' answer expands to the whole city. Socrates names people who governed the same broad population and asks what title Hippias and Periander bear because of their rule (124c–e2). The question creates a powerful identification with tyranny, but the common object of rule does not alone prove the same constitutional or ethical character. The boy eventually specifies willing subjects rather than force (126a), introducing a dimension the previous classification omitted.

This qualification is essential for the later description of Demodocus. Socrates says he has already held many great offices for the Athenians (127e), repeating the root in both noun and verb. The father has therefore exercised the kind of public authority that might appear relevant to his son's ambition. Yet he is not called a tyrant. The text's own use of the family warns against treating the earlier tyranny inference as a universal definition of all ruling.

The father's offices also distinguish experienced accomplishment from educational efficacy. Socrates asks why Demodocus cannot better help the boy become a good citizen, but political experience is a proposed qualification, not a demonstrated capacity to transmit wisdom. Theages' objection about statesmen's sons remains relevant.

The nonpolitical sense occurs at important procedural and narrative transitions. Socrates proposes to begin from the boy's desire (122d); the daimonic accompaniment began in his childhood (128d); Charmides begins describing his training plans when the voice comes (128e). These beginnings belong in a lexical register, but should be cross-indexed separately from the article's ruling sense. Shared spelling must not manufacture a political metaphor absent from the context.

Places to read

1. 123dἄρχειν — The pilot and charioteer rule their respective objects
2. 124cἄρχοντα ἐν Κορίνθῳ — Periander is introduced as ruler in Corinth
3. 124eδιὰ τὴν αὐτὴν ἀρχήν — Rule grounds the proposed title
4. 127eπολλὰς ἤδη ἀρχὰς … ἦρξας — Demodocus has ruled in many offices
5. 122dἄρχεσθαι — Beginning the inquiry from Theages himself
6. 128dἐκ παιδὸς ἀρξάμενον — The daimonic accompaniment began in childhood

Translation in this edition

“Ruled in many offices” at 127e preserves the root's recurrence, though ordinary English might simply say “held office.” The Key Words expressly keep the middle's “begin” apart. The reader should also retain the distinction between an archōn as a ruler generally and a specifically named Athenian magistracy; the passage about Periander does not identify an Athenian constitutional office.

Begin — ἄρχεσθαι (archesthai) · ἄρχεσθαι (122d).

ἄρχεσθαι (archesthai)

Begin. Socrates proposes starting from the boy's actual desire; this is not the political sense rule. Attested: ἄρχεσθαι (122d). Rule, rulers, and public office.

Rule — ἄρχειν (archein)

ἄρχειν (archein)

Rule. The shared directing verb applied to ships and a horse team before political extension. Attested: ἄρχειν (123d). Rule, rulers, and public office.

Rule — ἀρχή (archē)

ἀρχή (archē)

Rule. The ruling activity on account of which Hippias and Periander receive their designation. Attested: ἀρχήν (124e). Rule, rulers, and public office.

Ruler — ἄρχων (archōn)

ἄρχων (archōn)

Ruler. The participial designation of Periander governing Corinth, not a specifically Athenian magistracy. Attested: ἄρχοντα (124c). Rule, rulers, and public office.

Use in the book

Socrates carries archein from gardening and cooking into city rule (316e–317a). The repeated question is who knows how. The city is not merely the largest object in a series: its writings concern the just and unjust and how the community should be ordered (317c). This gives political correctness an explicitly ethical subject matter. It prevents the account from being reduced to successful control or efficient organization without regard to justice.

The sequence also changes the place of the city in the definition of law. Earlier the companion had proposed a resolution of the city as the answer (314b–c). At 317a–c2 the city is the subject to be well ordered by a qualified knower. Institutional origin is no longer sufficient. A civic writing must be right about the matters it orders if it is to deserve the name law.

This is a criterion rather than a constitutional blueprint. The dialogue does not explain how a city selects its experts, who judges disputes about expertise, or how an ordinary citizen recognizes a correct rule before possessing the knowledge that would verify it. Those absences matter because the distinction between law and apparent law can be stated more readily than administered.

At 321b Socrates returns to the administration of a city when he praises Minos as having discovered its truth. The historical narrative is therefore offered as an instance of the competence described in the middle argument. The final inquiry shifts attention from the city's administration to the soul's improvement, leaving open how the former achieves the latter in detail.

Places to read

1. 316eκήπων ἄρχειν — The first explicit use in the sequence concerns directing gardens
2. 316e–317aὄψου σκευασίας ἄρχειν — The same verb governs a process of preparation
3. 317aπερὶ πόλεως διοικήσεως — The civic writings concern the city's ordering
4. 317aτῶν ἐπισταμένων πόλεων ἄρχειν — Ruling cities is assigned to those who know how
5. 317cπερὶ πόλεως διακοσμήσεώς τε καὶ περὶ τοῦ ὡς χρὴ πόλιν διοικεῖν — Arrangement is joined to the normative question how a city should be ordered
6. 320bἀφ’ οὗ ἤρξατο τούτοις χρῆσθαι — In a different construction, the middle verb means “began” using the laws
7. 321bπερὶ πόλεως οἰκήσεως — Minos' alleged discovery concerns civic administration

Translation in this edition

“Rule,” “ordering,” “arrangement,” and “administration” preserve the lexical distinctions while keeping the subject coherent. At 321b the edition deliberately renders oikēsis “administration of a city.” It does not turn the passage into a claim about founding, housing, or the physical construction of a settlement.

Administration — οἴκησις (oikēsis)

οἴκησις (oikēsis)

Administration. Civic administration in the claim that Minos discovered its truth. The edition does not render the word here as a physical dwelling. Attested: οἰκήσεως (321b). Rule and the ordering of a city.

Arrangement — διακόσμησις (diakosmēsis)

διακόσμησις (diakosmēsis)

Arrangement. Orderly disposition or arrangement of the city, joined to the question how a city ought to be administered. Attested: διακοσμήσεώς (317c). Rule and the ordering of a city.

Began — ἄρχεσθαι (archesthai)

ἄρχεσθαι (archesthai)

Began. The middle verb means to begin: Lacedaemon is said to have been happy since it began using the Cretan laws. This is distinct from governing a city in 317a. Attested: ἤρξατο (320b). Rule and the ordering of a city.

Beginning — ἄρχεσθαι (archesthai)

ἄρχεσθαι (archesthai)

Beginning. Beginning or originating, of tragedy, whose origin Socrates denies should be assigned to Thespis or Phrynichus. The middle participle has no local sense of ruling. Attested: ἀρξαμένη (321a). Rule and the ordering of a city.

City — πόλις (polis) · πόλεως (317a).

πόλις (polis)

City. The civic community whose ordering forms the subject of political writings; here it is the object of competent government, not simply the institutional source of a decree. Attested: πόλεως (317a). Rule and the ordering of a city.

Order a city — διοικεῖν (dioikein)

διοικεῖν (dioikein)

Order a city. To administer or manage the city; the accompanying “should” makes the question normative rather than merely descriptive. Attested: διοικεῖν (317c). Rule and the ordering of a city.

Ordering — διοίκησις (dioikēsis)

διοίκησις (dioikēsis)

Ordering. Management or administration of a city; the subject to which the political writings and lawful usages belong. Attested: διοικήσεως (317a). Rule and the ordering of a city.

Rule — ἄρχειν (archein)

ἄρχειν (archein)

Rule. To direct or govern, here with gardens as the object. This non-political application prepares for the same verb applied to cities. Attested: ἄρχειν (316e). Rule and the ordering of a city.

Rule cities — ἄρχειν (archein)

ἄρχειν (archein)

Rule cities. To govern cities, made the object of knowing how. The repeated construction connects civic rule with directing gardens and food preparation. Attested: ἄρχειν (317a). Rule and the ordering of a city.

Should — χρή (chrē)

χρή (chrē)

Should. The impersonal expression of what is necessary or ought to be done, in the question how a city should be ordered. Attested: χρὴ (317c). Rule and the ordering of a city.

Use in the book

Socrates asks whether Lysis is allowed to rule himself, then elicits the tutor and teachers who rule him. The free boy’s being ruled by a slave sharpens the paradox. Material ownership likewise fails to guarantee actual control of wealth or body.

At 210b knowledge promises the opposite position: freedom and rule over others in the matters understood. The verb often takes a genitive of the person or thing controlled. Its local meaning is practical authority, not simply “begin,” another possible sense outside these examples.

Places to read

1. 208cσὲ αὐτὸν ἐῶσιν ἄρχειν σεαυτοῦ — do they allow you yourself to rule yourself?
2. 208b–e2
3. 209a
4. 210b