From the book
Charmides
Plato · Diotimos Editions · November 2026
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At a Glance
- English renderings
- τὸ ποιεῖν καὶ τὸ πράττειν, to poiein kai to prattein, “making and doing”
Meaning
Ποιεῖν is to bring something about, to make a product; πράττειν is to carry through, to act, and also to fare, as in εὖ πράττειν, “do well”. In ordinary Greek they overlapped, and either could be said of a craftsman at work.
Use in the book
The pair has two moments, and in the first Socrates runs them together. Against the boy’s formula he argues that writing and reading are “doing something”, so that the boys who wrote their enemies’ names as well as their own were not doing their own business, and that “healing, my friend, and building houses and weaving, and producing, by any craft whatever, any of the works of craft, are surely doing something” (161e; see οἰκοδομέω; ὑφαίνω). If producing is doing, a man who does his own business must work at and do everything for himself (162a; see νόμος). With Critias Socrates repeats the step: craftsmen make other people’s things and may be temperate, so those who do other people’s business may be temperate too (162e–163a; see οἱ τὰ τῶν ἄλλων πράττοντες).
In the second moment Critias divides them. Asked, “don’t you call making and doing the same thing?”, he says, “No indeed”, and draws the distinction from Hesiod (163b). The division and the definition that comes from it are told elsewhere (163b–e; see ἐργάζεσθαι καὶ ποιεῖν; πρᾶξις τῶν ἀγαθῶν). What belongs to the pair is the shift it records. Socrates’ argument depended on ordinary usage, in which a man who makes a shoe is doing something; Critias’ defence depends on a technical usage of his own, in which only good things done are doings. The pair can be read as the place where the dialogue moves from what words ordinarily mean to what a speaker decides they mean, and Socrates lets the move stand (163d; see τίθεσθαι τῶν ὀνομάτων).
Places to read
The passage in which the pair is set side by side, with the arguments on either side.
Translation in this edition
“Making and doing” renders τὸ ποιεῖν καὶ τὸ πράττειν (163b1–2), and the edition keeps “make” for ποιεῖν and “do” for πράττειν throughout 161b–164c, as the Key Words explain, so that the distinction is visible in English (see ἐργάζεσθαι καὶ ποιεῖν).
Other ancient sources
Aristotle makes the distinction a principle. Among the things that can be otherwise there is what can be made and what can be done, and production and action are distinct; so the state of acting with reason differs from the state of producing with reason, and neither contains the other, for an action is not a production, nor a production an action.1 Everyone who makes, he says elsewhere, makes for the sake of something, and what is made is an end not without qualification but in relation to something and of something; what is done is an end without qualification, since doing well is the end, and desire is directed at it.2 His account of craft and of prudence that rests on the distinction is told elsewhere (Nicomachean Ethics 6.4–5; see ἐπιστήμη; ἐπιστήμη ἀγαθοῦ καὶ κακοῦ).
Source note
1. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 6.4, 1140a1–6.
2. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 6.2, 1139b1–4.