Knowledgeable living · Lexicon

From the book

Charmides

Plato · Diotimos Editions · 2026

Orientation

At a Glance

The wordEpistēmonōs is the adverb of being knowledgeable: knowingly, knowledgeably or with expertise.
In the CharmidesAt 173c–d2 Socrates grants that the imagined human race, served only by genuine experts and guarded against ignorance, would act and live knowledgeably.
In this edition“Knowledgeably” deliberately keeps epistēmē audible.
A place to readKnowledgeable life conceded while happiness remains unproven.

Meaning

Epistēmonōs is the adverb of being knowledgeable: knowingly, knowledgeably or with expertise. The comparative epistēmonesteron marks a greater degree. The word specifies the epistemic manner of acting or living, not by itself whether the action is good for the agent. At 173d Critias calls knowledgeable action a telos of doing well: a culmination, crowning condition or completion in the local claim. It is not an exposition of an Aristotelian final cause.

Use in the book

At 173c–d2 Socrates grants that the imagined human race, served only by genuine experts and guarded against ignorance, would act and live knowledgeably. He withholds the further inference that it would thereby fare well and be happy. Critias protests that knowledgeable action seems essential to doing well.

Socrates' response is not to praise ignorance. He asks the omitted question: knowledgeable about what? Cutting leather, working bronze, wool and wood are real expert activities, but Critias does not accept that possessing them as such establishes a happy life. The argument therefore shifts from the adverb alone to the field that gives it significance.

Prophetic and then all-encompassing temporal knowledge extend the case (173e–174a). Even for the maximally knowledgeable person, Socrates asks which knowledge makes him happy. Critias answers good and bad (174b). The later concession that other crafts still function without that knowledge proves the distinction's point: epistemic reliability within a field and beneficial use or outcome are not coextensive.

This passage must not be compressed to “knowledge does not make us happy”. Its more exact question is whether knowledge described only generically, or accumulated in many technical fields, accounts for benefit without specifying knowledge of value.

Places to read

173c–d2Knowledgeable life conceded while happiness remains unproven
173d–174aThe question “knowledgeably about what?”
174a–d2Extent of knowledge distinguished from knowledge of good and bad

Translation in this edition

“Knowledgeably” deliberately keeps epistēmē audible. “Wisely” would import the very favorable evaluation the argument asks whether epistemic competence warrants.

βίος

Attested: βίος / βίῳ / βίον (bios / biōi / bion). Life or a course of living: a supposedly temperate quiet life, the imagined error-free life under knowledgeable rule, and the life in which temperance should benefit Charmides. References: 160b, 160c, 171d, 175e. Lexical identification: lemma: βίος. See Knowledgeable living.

τέλος

Attested: τέλος (telos). Completion or crowning condition: Critias presents knowledgeable action as a culminating condition of doing well. References: 173d. Lexical identification: lemma: τέλος. See Knowledgeable living.

διακειμένους (diakeimenous)

Those disposed or situated in this way; refers back to people whose actions supposedly proceed without error under right guidance. References: 172a. Lemma: διάκειμαι. See Knowledgeable living.

διεζῶμεν (diezōmen)

We would live through or lead our lives; part of the conditional picture of an error-free life. References: 171d. Lemma: διαζάω. See Knowledgeable living.

ζῴη (zōiē)

Would live; knowledgeable living is granted provisionally while its sufficiency for happiness remains unproved. References: 173d. Lemma: ζάω. See Knowledgeable living.

ῥᾳδίως (rhaidiōs)

Easily; Critias challenges Socrates to find another completion of doing well besides knowledgeable action. References: 173d. Lemma: ῥᾴδιος. See Knowledgeable living.