Wisdom

Use in the book

Alcibiades appeals to Pericles' association with wise men at 118c, defending the possibility that his guardian is an exception to the politicians' ignorance. Socrates tests that claim through transmission: can Pericles make someone else wise as a writing teacher does? The argument does not begin from a list of celebrated associates or a reputation. It asks for evidence in an educated pupil. At 119a the inability to name such a pupil destabilizes Alcibiades' appeal to Pericles without establishing a general impossibility of political education.

Wisdom next figures in the comparative account of preparation. The imagined Persian queen would suppose that care and wisdom must be Alcibiades' resources; Socrates then pairs care with craft at 124b. At 124c Socrates calls his own guardian better and wiser than Pericles, locating his confidence in the god rather than claiming complete independent wisdom.

At 133b wisdom supplies the functional center of the eye analogy. As sight is the eye's virtue, wisdom is the soul's virtue. A soul wishing to know itself must look especially toward the region where that excellence arises. The subsequent knowing and intelligence vocabulary explains why this region is most divine. The word here is not merely another item in the earlier tutor catalogue: it is what makes the relevant self-reflective cognition possible.

The article's different contexts should not be flattened. A person may be called σοφός in one teachable subject without thereby possessing the comprehensive self-knowledge the final argument requires. Conversely, the later language of soul's wisdom does not cancel the genuine skill of the elementary teacher. The dialogue develops from domain-specific knowledge to the question of what makes its human possessor good.

Places to read

1. 118c–119a2Wisdom is tested through the ability to educate another
2. 123d–124c2Care and wisdom counter inherited advantages; Socrates’ divine guardian is wiser
3. 133b–133cWisdom is the soul’s excellence in the eye analogy

Translation in this edition

The edition reserves “wisdom” and “wise” for σοφία and σοφός, distinguishing them from “intelligence” and “intelligent” for the φρον- family. At 133b10 Burnet prints σοφία while reporting Heusde's deletion; an interpretation following the deletion should not be passed off as the text of this edition.

σοφία

Attested: σοφία (sophia; 133b). At 133b: The soul's excellence, corresponding to sight as the eye's excellence in the self-knowledge analogy. Lexical identification: lemma: σοφία. See Wisdom.

σοφός

Attested: σοφὸς (sophos; 118c); σοφώτατος (sophōtatos; 121e). At 118c: Knowledgeable in a subject, as the writing teacher is; the local claim is tested through the ability to make another knowledgeable. Wise; the superlative identifies the tutor responsible for religious lore and royal matters. Lexical identification: lemma: σοφός. See Wisdom; Four royal tutors.

Use in the book

At 143b Socrates imagines a man wiser than both interlocutors who might object to their indiscriminate criticism of ignorance. The comparative does work: neither Socrates nor Alcibiades is allowed to settle the matter by confidence in their present standing. The wiser objector articulates the need for qualification, and the conversation must then show what would make that objection justified.

At 147c poets may hide their wisdom rather than display it, making their riddling speech difficult to interpret. Homer is then named the most divine and wisest poet, a commendation used to exclude the idea that he literally meant an impossibility by “knowing badly”. The claim of wisdom thus supports the proposed reinterpretation, but it also creates a pressure to read the verse so that it agrees with Socrates’ earlier argument.

The dialogue does not demonstrate Homer’s comprehensive knowledge of the best or define poetic wisdom as equivalent to it. Nor does the unnamed hypothetical wiser man become an identified teacher at the end. These invocations show how authority can provoke inquiry and interpretation, while the actual arguments still require assessment. The sparse occurrences should not be expanded into a doctrine in which all forms of intelligence, sense and wisdom are either identical or formally separate sciences.

Places to read

1. 143b–c2A hypothetically wiser man requires more careful judgment of ignorance.
2. 147cPoetic wisdom may be concealed and Homer is called the wisest poet.
3. 147c–d2The authority of Homer supports the grammatical reinterpretation.

Translation in this edition

The edition reserves “wisdom” for sophia and “wise” for the related adjectives. Phronimos is “intelligent” and nous “sense”. This lexical care identifies differences of wording; it does not itself establish a philosophical taxonomy that the short dialogue never supplies.

Use in the book

The early reference to wise sayings concerns men clever at lawsuits. It puts verbal and argumentative resourcefulness within the word’s range without certifying that cleverness is morally good. By 228b wisdom is a title of authority: Socrates obeys a good and wise man, and Hipparchus is named wisest among Pisistratus’ sons. The pairing with goodness is explicit, so wisdom should not silently absorb the separate ethical predicate.

Hipparchus’ wisdom appears through achievements, patronage and the selection of maxims. He chooses both what he has learned and what he has discovered himself, judges certain things wisest, casts them in verse and publicises them as specimens of his wisdom. These stages distinguish having material, selecting it and displaying it. The text leaves the content of most of that wisdom unstated; the reader receives only the two Delphic maxims and two Hipparchan injunctions.

Public recognition is equally prominent. Urban citizens admire Hipparchus for wisdom, country people are offered a taste, and the new sayings are meant to outrank Delphi. Finally, an unnamed young man first admires Harmodius and Aristogeiton as wise, then despises them after association with Hipparchus. In each case wisdom is mediated by someone’s judgment. The narrative repeatedly reports reputation and comparative esteem without independently examining a lesson.

This is pertinent to a dialogue whose own questioner is suspected of manipulative cleverness. Socrates supplies an admired authority, but the companion refuses to mistake admiration for evidence that no deception is occurring. An ironic reading may see the story undermining easy claims to wisdom. A straightforward reading can see genuine wisdom opposed to pretension. Neither should erase the text’s distinction between a wise person, the works attributed to him and the opinions formed about him.

Places to read

1. 228bἀνδρὶ ἀγαθῷ καὶ σοφῷ — Goodness and wisdom are joined as distinct qualifications.
2. 228bἔργα σοφίας — The ruler’s achievements are presented as works of wisdom.
3. 228dἃ ἡγεῖτο σοφώτατα εἶναι — The selection depends on Hipparchus’ own judgment of what is wisest.
4. 229dὡς σοφούς — The young man initially admires the pair as wise.

Translation in this edition

The edition keeps “wise,” “wisdom” and “wisest” across the narrative, allowing its repeated evaluative claims to remain visible. Its Introduction and Key Words place these repetitions beside education and suspicion of argument. No global replacement of “wisdom” by “philosophy,” “learning” or “cunning” would preserve all the uses.

Use in the book

The claim determines Socrates’ initial choice of respondent. He hopes, or says that he hopes, to benefit from the man who professes greater wisdom. This makes the ensuing examination a test appropriate to the speaker’s own standing. The simple question whether philosophizing is fine quickly turns into what philosophizing is, and the speaker answers with certainty. His knowledge of a verse and his readiness to make broad claims create the appearance of ample resources.

What fails is his account of the relevant excellence. First he equates philosophy with accumulating learning. Next, when quantity is challenged, he chooses subjects that bring reputation and imagines a person able to seem most accomplished and wisest before any gathering. Wisdom becomes increasingly entangled with a comparison among spectators. Socrates redirects the question toward actual benefit and the work that must be done.

The final label “the wise one” accompanies his shame and silence, while “the unlearned one” agrees. That ending invites irony, but it does not establish a simple reversal whereby the athlete has become the wise man and the cultured lover knows nothing. He has recognized objections and granted premises. The point is that his claim cannot substitute for a defensible account, and his self-image has been brought under pressure.

Places to read

1. 132dτὸν δὲ σοφώτερον προσποιούμενον εἶναι — The claim to be wiser motivates Socrates’ closer questioning.
2. 135dὥστε δοκεῖν χαριέστατον εἶναι καὶ σοφώτατον — The revised ideal aims at appearing most accomplished and wisest.
3. 139aὁ μὲν σοφὸς αἰσχυνθεὶς — The closing designation “wise” survives into the scene of shame.

Translation in this edition

Burnet prints sophōteron at 132d, with T; the apparatus reports B’s sophōtaton, “wisest.” The edition translates the printed comparative and then preserves “the wiser one” at 135b and “the wise one” at 139a. Its note on the ending explains the shared learning-root of “unlearned” and “much learning.” The glossary’s listing of all three degrees is therefore philosophically useful: comparative superiority, superlative display, and the unqualified label occupy distinct dramatic moments.

Use in the book

Becoming wise is first reported as the son's desire and as the result a paid sophist is expected to produce (121c–d2). Socrates gains agreement that wise people are those who have knowledge, whatever the subject of that knowledge (122e). This supplies a provisional general criterion. It does not identify the desired subject or prove that every recognized expert can teach.

Piloting and charioteering then exemplify wisdoms with distinct names (123b–d). When Theages gives the unqualified name “wisdom” for his own goal, Socrates recalls that charioteering too is wisdom, rather than stupidity. He converts the vague contrast between being wise and not wise into the more discriminating question “wise in what?” The next examples locate fields by what or whom a practitioner knows how to rule.

The political ambition emerges as the wisdom governing everyone in the city (124a–b). Its apparent identification with tyranny makes the word's value unstable: “wise tyrant” can name successful power without establishing moral goodness. The Euripidean line at 125b intensifies the educational issue by saying that tyrants become wise through association with the wise. Repeated substitutions of farmers, cooks, and wrestlers demand the missing specification of what those companions know. Theages cannot name the relevant field (125d).

After he specifies willing subjects, the question becomes whether accomplished statesmen can transmit their wisdom. Theages' objection about their sons (126d) separates possession from transfer. Socrates' later praise of sophists as so wise that wealthy youths pay them (128a) adds commercial persuasiveness to the dialogue's competing evidences of wisdom; it is not an unqualified certification of the content sold.

Finally, Socrates professes almost no knowledge except the things of love, while Theages points to improved companions rather than a curriculum (128b–c2). The resulting account explains conditions of benefit without defining the political wisdom first sought. The dialogue thus progressively tests the desire's objects and proposed sources, rather than closing with an authoritative definition that absorbs every use of sophia.

Places to read

1. 121c–d2σοφὸς γενέσθαι; σοφὸν ποιήσει — Desired attainment and the expected teacher's production of it
2. 122eΣοφοὺς … τοὺς ἐπιστήμονας — The provisional identification of wise people with knowers
3. 123dἡ ἡνιοχεία σοφία ἐστίν; ἢ ἀμαθία — Charioteering counts as wisdom rather than its contrary
4. 124bταύτην … τὴν σοφίαν — The comprehensive governing capacity is called wisdom
5. 125bσοφοὶ τύραννοι τῶν σοφῶν συνουσίᾳ — The poetic line links wisdom and association
6. 126dπαραδοῦναι τὴν αὑτοῦ σοφίαν — Transmission becomes the disputed issue
7. 128aοὕτω σοφοί εἰσιν — Socrates' description of fee-earning sophists

Translation in this edition

The consistent “wise” and “wisdom” permit the reader to hear the breadth and repetition without silently replacing some occurrences with “expertise.” Note 9 renders amathia “stupidity” and reserves “ignorance” for agnoia. That is a translation convention, not evidence that the dialogue develops an explicit theory separating two kinds of ignorance.

Will make — ποιεῖν (poiein)

ποιεῖν (poiein)

Will make. The anticipated teacher is expected to produce the boy's becoming wise, an expectation later tested. Attested: ποιήσει (121d). Wisdom and being wise.

Stupidity — ἀμαθία (amathia)

ἀμαθία (amathia)

Stupidity. The contrary of wisdom offered and rejected for charioteering. Attested: ἀμαθία (123d). Wisdom and being wise.

Wisdom — σοφία (sophia)

σοφία (sophia)

Wisdom. The desired attainment whose particular subject must now be stated. Attested: σοφία (123b). Wisdom and being wise.

Wise — σοφός (sophos)

σοφός (sophos)

Wise. The stated attainment which the son wants and a prospective teacher is expected to produce. Attested: σοφὸς (121d). Wisdom and being wise.

Wise about whatever they know (contextual phrase)

122e: περὶ ὅτου ἂν ἐπιστήμονες ὦσιν. The indefinite relative construction leaves the field of knowledge open: “whatever” they are knowledgeable about. That openness allows pilots and charioteers to count as wise in their domains. It does not establish that a knowledgeable person is wise about everything. The later question τῶν τί σοφῶν at 125b–d2 demands the field that the unqualified adjective leaves unspecified. See Wisdom.

Use in the book

Clinias asks what a mortal must learn to become wise (973b). The wording combines a human limit with an educational demand. Intelligence may be attainable only as far as human beings can possess it, yet the inquiry must identify a subject of learning rather than merely praise wisdom. The Athenian's opening claim about life's unhappiness does not answer the question by declaring learning pointless. It explains why finding a knowledge that changes the quality of life matters.

At 974b the soul confidently divines that it possesses a capacity for wisdom but cannot discover what that capacity is, when it is realized, or how. The subsequent exclusions therefore examine possible answers, not useless activities. Food production is fine and good; the general's craft is useful and highly esteemed; quick learning and memory are impressive natural powers. Their failure is to make the possessor completely wise. The recurring language of naming, seeming, and reputation marks the distance between an established title and a justified one.

The positive demand at 976c–d is unusually strong. The relevant knowledge must make its possessor genuinely wise and a good citizen, whether ruling or ruled. Number is then introduced by considering what human beings would become without it. This establishes its indispensable role; it does not yet establish that elementary arithmetic is the entire wisdom sought. At 979d the Athenian expressly asks for an account of whether the person who knows these things is wise and good. The distinction between seeming wise and being wise survives the first positive proposal.

The restart at 980a permits two forms of answer: one name, if possible, or an enumeration of the kinds of knowledge by which one becomes wise. The eventual name, astronomy (990a), belongs to a demanding educational and theological account, not simply to the ability to identify a constellation. At 992b “most truly wisest” describes someone who has taken up all the studies in the required way. The adverb and superlative together tighten the claim beyond professional reputation. Because authorship is disputed, these are best treated as commitments of the Athenian and the dialogue's argument, not silently presented as an uncontested statement of Plato's own doctrine.

Places to read

1. 973bτί ποτε μαθὼν θνητὸς ἄνθρωπος σοφὸς ἂν εἴη — The question joins learning, mortality, and becoming wise
2. 974b–cἡ περὶ σοφίαν ἀπορία καὶ ζήτησις — Wisdom is the object of perplexity and search
3. 976cσοφὸς ὄντως ὢν καὶ μὴ μόνον δοξαζόμενος — Being really wise is distinguished from being reputed so
4. 977dσοφία … πάσης ἀρετῆς τὸ μέγιστον μέρος — Wisdom is called the greatest part of all virtue
5. 979dεἰ δ’ ἔστιν σοφὸς ὁ ταῦτ’ ἐπιστήμων καὶ ἀγαθός — Whether this knower is wise and good still needs an account
6. 980aἑνὶ λαβεῖν ὀνόματι — The renewed inquiry seeks, if possible, one name
7. 992bτὸν ἀληθέστατα σοφώτατον — The culminating designation combines truth and the superlative

Translation in this edition

“Wisdom,” “wise,” and “wisest” consistently represent the sophia family. The translation keeps it apart from phronēsis, “intelligence,” epistēmē, “knowledge,” and nous, “sense.” The plural “kinds of wisdom” at 979d preserves the possibility of multiple claimants without certifying each as genuine wisdom.

Missing determination — ἐξευρίσκειν (exheuriskein)

ἐξευρίσκειν (exheuriskein)

Missing determination. The soul cannot discover the identity, occasion, and mode of the power it confidently believes it possesses. Attested: ἐξευρίσκειν (974c). Wisdom and the right to be called wise.

Candidate knowledge — εὑρίσκειν (heuriskein)

εὑρίσκειν (heuriskein)

Candidate knowledge. The difficult task is to find a knowledge other than the excluded kinds, one that deserves the name of wisdom. Attested: εὑρεῖν (976c–d). Wisdom and the right to be called wise.

New candidate discovered — ἀνευρίσκειν (aneuriskein)

ἀνευρίσκειν (aneuriskein)

New candidate discovered. The Athenian says they are discovering a nontrivial kind of wisdom beside the earlier candidates, while still asking whether its knower is actually wise and good. Attested: ἀνευρίσκομεν (979d). Wisdom and the right to be called wise.

Elusive wisdom — φεύγειν (pheugein)

φεύγειν (pheugein)

Elusive wisdom. The object sought is personified as fleeing in flight when approached through the familiar crafts and intelligences. Attested: φεύγει (974b). Wisdom and the right to be called wise.

Reputation distinguished from reality — δοξάζειν (doxazein)

δοξάζειν (doxazein)

Reputation distinguished from reality. The passive participle names being reputed wise, explicitly contrasted with actually being wise and having the knowledge that produces this condition. Attested: δοξαζόμενος (976c). Wisdom and the right to be called wise.

Positive object sought — ἐπιστήμη (epistēmē)

ἐπιστήμη (epistēmē)

Positive object sought. The required knowledge must make the possessor really wise and a good citizen, rather than merely reputed wise. Attested: ἐπιστήμην (976c). Wisdom and the right to be called wise.

Mortal learner — θνητός (thnētos)

θνητός (thnētos)

Mortal learner. The person whose education is sought is mortal. The qualification persists when the work promises access to divine matters without making human knowledge unlimited. Attested: θνητὸς (973b). Wisdom and the right to be called wise.

One name or several kinds — ὄνομα (onoma)

ὄνομα (onoma)

One name or several kinds. The renewed inquiry would ideally identify wisdom in one name; if unable, it will enumerate the kinds by which someone becomes wise. Attested: ὀνόματι (980a). Wisdom and the right to be called wise.

The title wisdom — ἐπίκλησις (epiklēsis)

ἐπίκλησις (epiklēsis)

The title wisdom. The familiar kinds of competence do not deserve to receive the designation wisdom about human matters. The naming claim is part of the argument’s test. Attested: ἐπίκλησιν (974b). Wisdom and the right to be called wise.

Presumed capacity for wisdom — φύσις (physis)

φύσις (physis)

Presumed capacity for wisdom. The soul divines that wisdom’s capacity belongs to it by some nature, but cannot yet identify what it is or how it is realized. Attested: φύσιν (974b–c). Wisdom and the right to be called wise.

Perfect-active confidence — πείθειν (peithein)

πείθειν (peithein)

Perfect-active confidence. The perfect-active participle of peithein has the intransitive sense trust or be confident: the soul strongly trusts its capacity, without yet discovering its identity, occasion, and manner. Attested: πεποιθυίας (974b). Wisdom and the right to be called wise.

Capacity sought — δύναμις (dynamis)

δύναμις (dynamis)

Capacity sought. The power for becoming wise is presumed to be present in each, yet eludes discovery among ordinary kinds of expertise. Attested: δυνάμεως (974b). Wisdom and the right to be called wise.

Truth beyond reputation — ὄντως (ontōs)

ὄντως (ontōs)

Truth beyond reputation. The adverb distinguishes being genuinely wise from possessing a reputation based on aptitude. It is an argumentative contrast, not decorative emphasis. Attested: ὄντως (976c). Wisdom and the right to be called wise.

Search for wisdom — ζητεῖν (zētein)

ζητεῖν (zētein)

Search for wisdom. The shared task is to discover how the speakers will become wise, presupposing a capacity whose realization remains elusive. Attested: ζητοῦμεν (974b). Wisdom and the right to be called wise.

Seeming wise still open to test — δοκεῖν (dokein)

δοκεῖν (dokein)

Seeming wise still open to test. The learner of the proposed numerical matters seems wise, but the Athenian immediately requires an account of whether he is wise and good. Attested: δοκεῖν (979d). Wisdom and the right to be called wise.

Confidence without discovery — ψυχή (psychē)

ψυχή (psychē)

Confidence without discovery. The soul is confident and divines that it has wisdom’s capacity, yet cannot determine what it is, when, or how. Attested: ψυχῆς (974b). Wisdom and the right to be called wise.

Nontrivial candidate — φαῦλος (phaulos)

φαῦλος (phaulos)

Nontrivial candidate. The feminine adjective is negated in describing the newly discovered kind of wisdom. It marks importance without yet establishing that its knower is genuinely wise and good. Attested: φαύλην (979d). Wisdom and the right to be called wise.

Denied title — σοφία (sophia)

σοφία (sophia)

Denied title. The surveyed ordinary competences do not deserve the name of wisdom concerning human affairs. Attested: σοφίας (974b). Wisdom and the right to be called wise.

Plural candidates — σοφία (sophia)

σοφία (sophia)

Plural candidates. The former kinds of wisdom are the candidates against which the newly identified one is compared; the plural does not validate all of them. Attested: σοφίας (979d). Wisdom and the right to be called wise.

Educational target — σοφός (sophos)

σοφός (sophos)

Educational target. The mortal would be wise through learning something still to be identified. The adjective describes a person’s achieved condition. Attested: σοφὸς (973b). Wisdom and the right to be called wise.

Not merely reputed — σοφός (sophos)

σοφός (sophos)

Not merely reputed. The truly wise person must possess the appropriate knowledge, as distinct from being called wise by others. Attested: σοφὸς (976c). Wisdom and the right to be called wise.

Unestablished result — σοφός (sophos)

σοφός (sophos)

Unestablished result. Whether the knower of the proposed matters is wise and good is expressly left for a further account. Attested: σοφὸς (979d). Wisdom and the right to be called wise.

What must be learned to become wise? (contextual phrase)

τί ποτε μαθὼν θνητὸς ἄνθρωπος σοφὸς ἂν εἴη (973b)

The aorist participle μαθών makes the question concern what a person has learned as the condition of being wise; the potential optative ἂν εἴη presents the result being sought. The phrase does not ask merely who has a reputation for wisdom or which activity is useful. Wisdom and the right to be called wise.

Wisdom runs away in flight (contextual phrase)

ἡ δὲ φυγῇ φεύγει (974b)

The cognate noun and verb reinforce the image of escape. The object pursued eludes those who approach one of the familiar crafts or intelligences. This rhetorical doubling conveys frustration in inquiry; it does not say that every craft is useless or that no one can ever attain wisdom. Wisdom and the right to be called wise.

Truly wise and not only reputed (contextual phrase)

σοφὸς ὄντως ὢν καὶ μὴ μόνον δοξαζόμενος (976c)

The participles distinguish actual condition from public attribution. The knowledge sought must explain the former; natural aptitude, occupational prestige, or a conventional name supplies only the latter unless the further criterion is met. This distinction continues after number has been proposed. Wisdom and the right to be called wise.

Which wisdom? (contextual phrase)

ἥντινα δὲ σοφίαν (979c)

The interrogative specification is the unresolved issue after agreement that the soul should be wise. It asks for determinate intellectual content rather than another endorsement of wisdom’s value. Number’s importance has narrowed the inquiry but has not yet abolished the need for this question. Wisdom and the right to be called wise.

One name or which and how many (contextual phrase)

ἑνὶ λαβεῖν ὀνόματι … τίνες εἰσίν ποτε καὶ ὁπόσαι τινές (980a)

The preferred answer identifies wisdom in one name; the fallback enumerates the kinds, with feminine plurals that the edition relates to the earlier kinds of wisdom. This articulates a genuine alternative form of answer rather than presupposing that there must be one simple technique. Wisdom and the right to be called wise.

Use in the book

At 212d wisdom is humorously required to return affection if the general demand for reciprocity is to apply to philosophers. The noun makes explicit the object contained in the compound φιλόσοφος: a person can love wisdom without wisdom acting as a responding person.

At 214a the poets are called fathers and guides of wisdom. This is a description of their cultural authority and their place as starting points for inquiry, not a guarantee that each poetic statement is true.

The later account of loving wisdom at 218a–b2 distinguishes already being wise from possessing ignorance while recognizing that one does not know. That distinction concerns the subject’s relation to wisdom; the dialogue does not supply a separate definition of σοφία as a technical body of doctrine.

Places to read

1. 212dἂν μὴ ἡ σοφία αὐτοὺς ἀντιφιλῇ — Unless wisdom loves them back.
2. 214a

Use in the book

The opening can apply wisdom to knowing how to conduct courtship (206a); at 210d becoming wise is linked with usefulness and others’ affection. The “wisest” authors about nature supply a claim that is examined rather than accepted on authority (214b).

At 218a, those already wise, whether gods or humans, do not love wisdom in the sense of seeking what they lack. This does not imply that they despise knowledge. The argument depends on the difference between possessing wisdom and reaching for it. At 222e the “wise men in the law courts” furnish a comparison for recapitulating an argument, not a certification of forensic expertise as philosophy.

Places to read

1. 218aτοὺς ἤδη σοφούς — those already wise.
2. 206a
3. 210d
4. 214b
5. 218a–b2
6. 222e

Use in the book

Iamblichus invokes the celebrated wisdom of Plato, Pythagoras, Aristotle, and other ancient thinkers in support of the account of soul he prefers. The appeal establishes a claimed tradition of agreement. It is evidence for Iamblichus’s interpretation of those predecessors, not independent proof that their doctrines were identical.

Places to read

1. I.49.32.14The wisdom of earlier philosophers is invoked in a harmonizing account of soul.
2. I.49.44.32Wisdom appears among the gifts promised by Hermes.

Translation in this edition

“Wisdom” preserves the evaluative force; it should not be reduced to technical information.

Use in the book

The Platonic report locates wisdom in the ordering of faculties. Joubert’s revision of a saying attributed to Rivarol is more explicit about vocabulary: replace reason/truth with wisdom/philosophy, because wisdom can admit good prejudices and attend to utility. The alteration is his own intervention in another speaker’s formulation. In the Fénelon/Bossuet comparison wisdom acquires voice, authority and a terrain of valleys and heights. Its final effect is a taste or ardent love for wisdom, not merely a stock of propositions.

Places to read

1. I, p. 35–36, entry 1, ¶2Wisdom belongs to ordered conduct in the Platonic account.
2. II, p. 663, entry 3, ¶2A revision distinguishes wisdom’s practical orientation from philosophy.
3. II, p. 885, entry 6, ¶1Writers differ in the way they make wisdom felt and authoritative.

Translation in this edition

The English translation preserves the grammatical term “nominatives” in the proposed revision and the repeated “only truth alone.” The awkward this-one/that-one sequence in the terrain comparison remains unassigned; the final names are explicit.

Use in the book

The study of human nature supplies a starting point. What does a person really need, what are the soul’s powers and desires, and what objects can fulfill them? Wisdom finds a path to happiness by answering these questions together. An account of human beings that ignores their highest capacities would provide the wrong end; an account of lofty ends without a fitting way to reach them would remain ineffective.

Divine wisdom appears in the correspondence between powers, objects, and uses. The world’s parts are so ordered that they sustain bodily life, disclose goodness, and invite communion. Their finite places and differing operations are not embarrassments to infinite power. Fittingness can make a bounded creature better than a vast but useless alternative. Wisdom therefore judges proportion and end, rather than confusing greatness with mere bulk.

Human learning should imitate this intelligent order. The sciences furnish knowledge, but felicity must govern their direction. Traherne protests against the disproportion between energetic study of trades and negligent study of God and the self. If people would dig for a mine of gold, they cannot reasonably despise sustained inquiry into a good that governs every other possession. The labour has value because its object is worth possessing, not because difficulty is holy in itself.

Nor can wisdom remain speculative. The friend’s principle makes holiness and wisdom one in effect: knowledge of excellent actions is incomplete if it does not issue in doing them. The demand does not require that every meditation produce a new external undertaking. Prizing gifts, directing love, praising, forgiving, and enjoying rightly are themselves acts. The contrast is between exercised understanding and an idle claim to possess it.

Finally, wisdom is Christian in its object and exemplar. Christ is the Father’s wisdom, and the knowledge of divine works, human dignity, and the promised communion is presented as a divine philosophy. Traherne does not use wisdom to set a purely secular intelligence against faith. He asks faith to become mature enough to see and live the good it professes. Its fruit is courage, charity, and present participation in felicity, rather than indefinite postponement of all enjoyment to another life.

Places to read

1. III.42Wisdom seeks perfect happiness through knowledge of human wants and desires.
2. II.21Divine wisdom is disclosed in the fitting and serviceable order of creation.
3. IV.4Christ and the truths of Christian life define divine philosophy.
4. IV.7The pursuit of wisdom is compared with labour willingly spent seeking gold.
5. IV.31Wisdom and holiness coincide in the performance of known excellent acts.

In this edition

Wise is not synonymous with clever, learned, or socially successful. The compound “right wise” in II.25 reinforces the convergence of truth and goodness, while the passages selected here explain the practical end of wisdom.