Happiness and flourishing

Use in the book

The noun first belongs to family encomium. Charmides' paternal house is celebrated for beauty, excellence and the other things conventionally called happiness (157e–158a2). The phrase “the other so-called happiness” keeps some distance from the inherited package of aristocratic advantages. It need not be read as a wholesale dismissal, but it makes conspicuous that fortunate birth and public admiration are not yet a philosophical account of living well.

The decisive transition occurs at 171d–172a. If temperance could distinguish expertise from its absence, people would refrain from undertakings they did not understand and assign them to experts. Error would disappear, rightness would lead, everyone would act finely and well, and those who did well would be happy. The repeated eu prattein joins performance to condition of life. It is tempting to read this as a straightforward Socratic proof that expertise guarantees happiness. The next stages forbid that shortcut: the very powers assumed have not been secured, and Socrates explicitly questions the agreement that acting only with knowledge must be a great good (172d–e2).

His dream gives the stronger hypothesis a generous trial. Genuine experts would make human beings healthier, keep them alive in dangerous circumstances and supply expertly made possessions; genuine prophets could even provide knowledge of the future. He concedes that such a world would live and act knowledgeably, but says they have not yet established that it would do well and be happy (173c–d2). The issue is no longer mere error avoidance. It is which knowledge gives successful activities their value for life.

Critias rejects leather-cutting, metalworking and the like as sufficient answers. Even the imagined person who knows all past, present and future events owes happiness to a particular knowledge, not indifferently to everything known. Critias identifies knowledge of good and bad (174a–b2). When this is removed, the crafts still achieve their own results, but what is lost is their occurring well and beneficially (174c–d). The happiness question has thereby transformed an inquiry into competent performance into one about evaluative understanding.

The conclusion preserves both desire for happiness and uncertainty about its precise connection with the proposed virtue. Socrates tells Charmides that genuine temperance would make him blessed, and that he should be happier in proportion as he is more temperate, even if Socrates' inquiry has proved inadequate (175e–176a). This is a continuing ethical commitment, not a derived definition of happiness. The boy's inability to say whether he possesses temperance also prevents the exchange from certifying his happiness on the basis of beauty, lineage or reputation.

Places to read

1. 157e–158a2Happiness belongs to the conventional praise of Charmides’ family
2. 171d–172aA proposed chain joins knowledgeable action, doing well and happiness
3. 172d–173d23Socrates withdraws the easy agreement and tests it in his dream
4. 173d–174c2The knowledge relevant to happiness must be specified as knowledge of good and bad
5. 175e–176aSocrates reaffirms the connection between genuine temperance and a happier life

Translation in this edition

The edition's “do well” preserves the double use of εὖ πράττειν instead of resolving it into either moral action or prosperity in every occurrence. “Happy” is therefore to be read alongside the question of an entire life, rather than reduced to mood. The sole noun-form in the family encomium is dative εὐδαιμονίᾳ; the headword's dictionary form εὐδαιμονία is not being quoted as the local inflection.

εὖ

Attested: εὖ (eu). Well; at the decisive turn from technical performance to benefit, it qualifies how the crafts’ results must come about if they are to contribute to a good life. References: 174c. Lexical identification: adverb: εὖ. See Happiness and doing well.

εὖ γε

Attested: εὖ γε (eu ge). Well, with γε emphasizing that qualification; Socrates isolates the crafts’ results coming about well and beneficially, which would be lost without knowledge of good and bad. Here εὖ γε is not the congratulatory formula “well done”. References: 174c. Lexical identification: phrase template: εὖ γε. See Happiness and doing well.

εὖ πράττειν

Attested: εὖ πράττειν / εὖ πράττοντας / εὖ ἂν πράττοιμεν (eu prattein / eu prattontas / eu an prattoimen). To do well and to fare well or prosper; the phrase links successful action to happiness, but Socrates later denies that knowledgeable performance alone secures this outcome. References: 172a, 173d, 174b. Lexical identification: phrase template: εὖ πράττειν. See Happiness and doing well.

εὐδαιμονέω

Attested: εὐδαιμονοῖμεν / εὐδαιμονεῖν (eudaimonoimen / eudaimonein). To be happy or flourish; Socrates distinguishes this desired outcome from merely acting knowledgeably, assigning it to knowledge of good and bad. References: 173d, 174c. Lexical identification: lemma: εὐδαιμονέω. See Happiness and doing well.

εὐδαιμονία

Attested: εὐδαιμονίᾳ (eudaimoniai). Happiness or good fortune; the conventional ensemble of admired advantages celebrated in Charmides’ paternal family, rather than an established philosophical definition of happiness. References: 158a. Lexical identification: lemma: εὐδαιμονία. See Happiness and doing well.

εὐδαίμων

Attested: εὐδαίμονας / εὐδαίμονα / εὐδαίμονες / εὐδαιμονέστερον (eudaimonas / eudaimona / eudaimones / eudaimonesteron). Happy or flourishing; the argument tests whether knowledgeable action guarantees happiness, and the conclusion reaffirms Charmides’ happiness conditionally upon genuine temperance. References: 172a, 173e, 174a, 176a. Lexical identification: lemma: εὐδαίμων. See Happiness and doing well.

προσποθῶ (prospothō)

I still want to know; asks the further question of which knowledge makes the omniscient person happy. References: 174a. Lemma: προσποθέω. See Happiness and doing well.

Use in the book

At 116b Socrates offers a fresh way to connect fine and good after analyzing rescue in battle. Whoever does finely, he asks, also does well; those who do well are happy; happiness is through acquiring good things; and these are acquired through doing well and finely. Doing well is therefore good and fine. The passage takes advantage of the fact that the same expression can speak about the quality of an agent's conduct and the prosperity of that agent's life.

This is not a simple restatement of the rescue analysis. That argument left rescue good in respect of courage and bad in respect of death. The new chain seeks a general relation between fineness and goodness through successful living. A careful reader should notice the work done by the idiom instead of silently translating the first occurrence “act rightly” and the next “prosper,” as if a premise linking them had been separately established. The edition keeps “do well” at both points precisely to let the problem remain audible.

The same verbal family carries the final political inference. At 134a someone who does not know what he is doing will make mistakes, do badly in private and public, and be wretched; those for whom he acts suffer too. At 134d–e just and temperate agents are expected to act rightly and do well, and Socrates offers a conditional guarantee of happiness. At 135a–b incompetent license aboard ship supplies the destructive counterpart: doing badly follows forms of rule that lack virtue.

The dialogue therefore treats quality of action and quality of life as inseparable questions, while its language can make their connection seem easier than a fully explicit proof would. Alcibiades wanted political actions to secure advantage. Socrates directs attention to the competence and character required for such actions genuinely to succeed. Neither the diction nor the closing warning supports a promise that just agents will meet no external setbacks. Socrates himself fears that the city can overpower the educational undertaking. “Doing well” names the ethical success being sought, but its achievement remains conditional on the care and virtue the young man still lacks.

Places to read

1. 116b–116cThe dual sense of doing well links fine action, happiness, and good things
2. 134a–134bIgnorant action leads to doing badly and wretchedness for agent and beneficiaries
3. 134d–134eJust and temperate action grounds Socrates’ conditional guarantee of happiness
4. 135a–135bRule without virtue is said to entail doing badly

Translation in this edition

The English “do well” retains the idiom’s ambiguity instead of silently deciding which sense operates at each step. At 134a–e2 the translation alternates “act” and “do” where English needs it, while the Greek repeatedly uses πράττειν. Εὐπραγία at 116b is also “doing well,” keeping the nominal and verbal forms connected.

εὖ πράττω / εὐπραγία

Attested: εὖ πράττει (eu prattei; 116b); εὐπραγία (eupragia; 116b). At 116b: Acts well and fares well, the dual sense connecting fine conduct to happiness. At 116b: Doing well, the activity or condition said to be fine. Lexical identification: family label: εὖ πράττω / εὐπραγία. See Doing well.

κακῶς πράττω

Attested: κακῶς πράξει (kakōs praxei; 134a); κακῶς πράττειν (kakōs prattein; 135b). At 134a: Will act or fare badly as a consequence of errors in private and public affairs. At 135b: Doing badly as the consequence of rule and license lacking virtue. Lexical identification: phrase label: κακῶς πράττω. See Doing well.

Use in the book

At 116b happiness enters through doing well. Those who do well are happy through acquiring goods, and are said to acquire them by doing well and finely. Happiness links quality of conduct with a successful condition of life. Because “doing well” carries both meanings, the inference deserves scrutiny rather than being presented as a self-evident definition of happiness.

The final political sequence gives the term its broadest scope. Ignorance of oneself prevents proper understanding of one's affairs and those of others; ignorant action leads to errors and doing badly. Both the agent and those for whom he acts become wretched (134a). Temperance and goodness are therefore made necessary to happiness. Becoming wealthy does not by itself remove wretchedness. Cities too seek happiness, and material power without virtue cannot supply it (134b).

Socrates' guarantee at 134e is conditional: if Alcibiades and the city act justly and temperately, looking toward the divine and knowing their own goods, they will do well and be happy. It is not a prophecy of Alcibiades' actual political future. The subsequent examples show why granting wishes without competence would frustrate the desired end: the unchecked patient ruins his body, and the unskilled controller of a ship destroys his companions. Accordingly virtue, rather than tyranny, is what should be procured if they are to be happy (135b).

The final fear that the city may overpower both speakers leaves fulfillment of the condition unestablished. The dialogue distinguishes the proposed requirements of happiness from the question whether Alcibiades will consistently meet them. Its ending should not be read as a completed conversion followed by assured good fortune.

Places to read

1. 116bHappiness through acquiring goods mediates between fine conduct and goodness
2. 134a–134bIgnorance and bad action make agents and those they serve wretched; riches alone do not cure this
3. 134d–135b2Socrates conditionally connects happiness with just, temperate, virtuous government

Translation in this edition

The edition's “happy” means a good condition of life, not merely a mood. At 134b4 it follows ἀθλιότητος, “wretchedness,” in T and W; Burnet records B's ματαιότητος as an alternative. The happiness guarantee concerns both Alcibiades and the city, reflected in the plural address of 134d–e.

ἄθλιος / ἀθλιότης

Attested: ἄθλιος (athlios; 134a); ἀθλιότητος (athliotētos; 134b). At 134a: Wretched as a result of doing badly through ignorance. At 134b: Wretchedness from which merely becoming wealthy does not free one. Lexical identification: family label: ἄθλιος / ἀθλιότης. See Happiness and wretchedness.

εὐδαίμων / εὐδαιμονέω

Attested: εὐδαίμονες (eudaimones; 116b); εὐδαιμονήσειν (eudaimonēsein; 134e). At 116b: Happy or flourishing, said of those who do well through acquiring goods. At 134e: Will be happy, Socrates’ conditional guarantee for just and temperate action. Lexical identification: family label: εὐδαίμων / εὐδαιμονέω. See Happiness and wretchedness.

Use in the book

Socrates begins the parental-love argument by asking whether Lysis’ parents wish him to be as happy as possible. Lysis accepts both their affection and their wish. Socrates then tests happiness against slavery, restrictions, and inability to do what one desires.

The superlative εὐδαιμονέστατον intensifies the parents’ aim; the related verb εὐδαιμονοίης means “you might be happy.” The passage initially treats unrestricted action as a proposed sign of happiness, but moves toward knowledgeable freedom. Do not turn its opening questions into an already established definition of flourishing.

Places to read

1. 207dὡς εὐδαιμονέστατον εἶναι — to be as happy as possible.
2. 207e
3. 208e

Use in the book

Eryximachus credits love fulfilled in good things, with restraint and justice, with producing happiness and friendship among humans and with gods. The term gathers the benefits of rightly ordered relations. It is linked to pleasure only indirectly through this broader account of living well.

Places to read

1. I.9.16.3Orderly love provides happiness and friendship.
2. I.3.50A term for wretchedness forms part of a philosophical rebuke.

Translation in this edition

“Happiness” is natural when its durable scope is clear; “flourishing” can prevent confusion with momentary enjoyment.

The unhappy person

Kakodaimōn means unhappy, unfortunate, or wretched. In I.3.50 it appears in direct address to someone objecting to dependence on others for nourishment. “Poor fellow” conveys the rhetorical rebuke. The word’s daimon element should not be made into a literal claim that a particular hostile spirit possesses the addressee.