Σ Sigma

concede, grant, agree

συγχωρέω

To make room, to give way; in the argument, to let a point pass, and to grant a premise for the sake of looking into it · Charmides

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Charmides

Plato · Diotimos Editions · November 2026

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Orientation

At a Glance

  • The wordTo go together, and so to make room by moving up; to give way, to yield; in argument, to concede a point or grant a premise.
  • In the CharmidesFourteen times. It begins on the bench, where everyone “squeezed up” to make room for the boy (155c), and ends in Socrates’ reckoning: “we have conceded many things that did not follow in the argument” (175b).
  • In this edition“Concede” and “grant”, in the Glossary’s words “of steps allowed for the sake of argument”; “agree” at 162e and 166b; “squeezed up” at 155c.
  • A place to read169c–d and 175b–c.
English renderings
συγχωρῶν, synchōrōn, “squeezed up”; συγχωρεῖς, synchōreis, “you agree”, “do you agree?”; συγχωρῶ, synchōrō, “I agree”; συγχωρήσαιμ’ (ἄν), synchōrēsaim’ (an), “(than ever) concede”; συγχωρῆσαι, synchōrēsai, “to concede”; συγχωρήσωμεν, synchōrēsōmen, “let us grant”; συγχωρήσαντες, synchōrēsantes, “granting”; συγκεχωρήκαμεν, synkechōrēkamen, “we have conceded”; συνεχωρήσαμεν, synechōrēsamen, “we conceded”

Meaning

Συγχωρέω is χωρέω, “make way”, “move”, with σύν, “together”: to come together, to make room for another, and so to give way. In argument it is the answerer’s word for letting a point pass, whether from conviction, for the sake of the argument, or because he cannot hold out. The edition keeps it apart from ὁμολογέω, “agree”, which says the same thing as the other speaker (see ὁμολογέω). To concede is to allow a thing without making it one’s own, and the dialogue’s last pages turn on that difference.

Use in the book

The first use is bodily. When Charmides comes over, Socrates tells us, “every one of us who were sitting there squeezed up and shoved his neighbor hard to make room for Charmides to sit beside him”, until of the two men at the end of the bench one was made to stand up and the other tipped off sideways (155c; see καταβάλλω; σπουδή). Every later use is a concession in the argument, and the first can be read as a figure for the rest: the company made room on the bench for the boy, and the speakers will make room in the argument for his guardian’s definition.

Critias’ agreements come first. Socrates asks him to take the boy’s answer over, “So if you agree that temperance is what this young man says, and take the argument over”, and Critias replies, “I agree entirely, … and I take it over” (162e; see παραδέχομαι). He agrees as readily that all craftsmen make something (162e) and that the heavy and the light are other than weighing (166b; see σταθμός). Then twice he refuses. Faced with a doctor who is temperate without knowing it, he declares, “I would sooner take back some of it, and not be ashamed to say I had spoken wrongly, than ever concede that a man who does not know himself is temperate” (164c–d; see ἀνατίθημι; γιγνώσκειν ἑαυτόν). Faced with Socrates’ perplexity, he catches it, and, as Socrates tells it, being ashamed in front of the company “he was not willing to concede to me that he could not make the distinctions I was challenging him to make” (169c–d; see αἰσχύνομαι; ἀπορία; προκαλέομαι). The two refusals frame his whole defence of self-knowledge, the first can be read as withheld for the sake of his thesis, the second for the sake of his standing.

Socrates’ own uses are of another kind. Three times he grants a premise so that the argument can go on to what would follow from it. The first grant comes at 169d: “let us grant for now that it is possible for there to be knowledge of knowledge; we shall look into it again another time” (169d; see εἰ δυνατόν ἐστιν; πρόειμι). He grants it again, with the definition of 167a beside it, before asking whether temperance so understood would benefit us (172c–d; see ἐπιστήμην ἐπίστασθαι καὶ ἀνεπιστημοσύνην), and in the dream he adds, “if you like, let us grant that prophecy too is knowledge of what is going to be” (173c; see ἐπιστήμη τοῦ μέλλοντος; μαντική). The grants are a method: what is doubtful is allowed, to see what would come of it.

The reckoning counts the grant of 169d first among the “many things that did not follow in the argument” (175b; see πολλὰ συγχωρεῖν; συμβαίνω). It had been made “for now”, with the promise to look into it “another time”, and the other time never came.

Places to read

Every passage in which the verb occurs.

  1. 155cEveryone on the bench squeezed up to make room for the boy.
  2. 162eCritias agrees that temperance is what the boy said, and takes the argument over.
  3. 162eHe agrees that all craftsmen make something.
  4. 164c–dHe would sooner take back some of what he agreed than ever concede that a man who does not know himself is temperate.
  5. 166bHe agrees that the heavy and the light are other than weighing.
  6. 169cAshamed before the company, he will not concede that he cannot make the distinctions.
  7. 169dSocrates grants for now that knowledge of knowledge is possible.
  8. 172cGranting that it is possible to know knowledge, he asks whether temperance would benefit us.
  9. 173cHe grants that prophecy is knowledge of what is going to be.
  10. 175b–c2They have conceded many things that did not follow in the argument, “with the utmost magnificence”.

Translation in this edition

The Glossary sets the verb apart from “agree”, ὁμολογεῖν, except at 162e and 166b, where “agree” renders it: “concede, grant, συγχωρεῖν (synchōrein), of steps allowed for the sake of argument: 164d, 169c–d, 172c, 173c, 175b–c”. The English has “grant” for Socrates’ provisional concessions (169d, 172c, 173c) and “concede” for Critias’ refusals and the final count (164d, 169c, 175b–c). At 155c the participle is rendered by what it describes, “squeezed up”. At 172d “let us … grant it” and “having granted” render another verb, δίδωμι, “give”; there Burnet prints δῶμεν with T and a variant in W, where B and W have ἴδωμεν, “let us see” (apparatus, d1).

Elsewhere in Plato

In the Gorgias the verb names a concession made without conviction. Socrates has called flattery every pursuit that aims at pleasure without regard to the better and the worse, and asks Callicles whether he holds the same opinion or speaks against it. “No, I don’t,” Callicles answers, “I concede it, so that your argument can reach its end, and as a favour to Gorgias here” (501c). Earlier he had complained that Polus conceded out of shame what he did not believe, and the complaint is told elsewhere (482c–e; see αἰσχύνομαι). Critias’ refusals can be read as the other face of the same shame: Polus conceded because he was ashamed to say what he thought, and Critias will not concede because he is ashamed to be seen at a loss.