From the book
Stobaeus, Volume II
John Stobaeus · Diotimos Editions · 2026
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At a Glance
- The wordThe ethical mean is relative to us and constrained by knowledge and reason; it differs from a numerical midpoint, arbitrary compromise or everything described as intermediate elsewhere.
- In StobaeusThe passage explains action along a continuum before distinguishing relations among magnitudes from relations to us, then identifies the latter mean with what knowledge and reason prescribe.
- In this editionKeep mean and intermediate ethical state distinct from merely middle things; the text supplies a rational standard rather than permission for each individual to choose an unexplained personal balance.
- A place to readChapter 7 · Excerpt 20 · Passage 9 Follow the continuum comparison through the two relational senses before reading the conclusion about the mean relative to us; its explanatory direction prevents a purely quantitative interpretation.
- English renderings
- mean; intermediate ethical state
Meaning
Mesotēs is a mean or intermediate relation. The ethical Peripatetic discussion makes it a standard of fitting quality relative to us, rather than a numerical average or indiscriminate compromise.
Use in the book
The account compares excess and deficiency in exercise with the corruption of virtue. It then distinguishes the mean relative to us, determined by knowledge and reason, from the quantitative midpoint. Virtue is a choice-involving state at this mean, determined as the practically wise person would determine it. Examples concern anger, fear, desire, giving and self-assessment. Not every intermediate thing is a virtuous mean: the intermediate life between virtue and vice and the Stoic indifferents use different classifications. The shared English “middle” should not conceal this difference.
The comparison begins with magnitudes, but the conclusion does not simply transfer a measured midpoint to ethical conduct. The paragraph distinguishes excess, deficiency and mean in relation to one another from those in relation to us. It then singles out the latter as best because of what knowledge and reason prescribe. The because clause gives the evaluative constraint; relative to us is not a claim that any privately preferred amount is correct. The next discussion of quality develops a distinction already prepared by this separation of relations.
“what knowledge and reason prescribe” (Chapter 7 · Excerpt 20 · Passage 9).
Places to read
- Chapter 7 · Excerpt 20 · Passage 92The mean relative to us is constrained by knowledge and reason.
- Chapter 7 · Excerpt 20 · Passage 102Quality is distinguished from quantity.
- Chapter 7 · Excerpt 20 · Passage 122Virtue is defined through the mean.
Translation in this edition
“Mean” names the ethical relation; the broader word’s other uses should not be imported into these examples.
μεσότητι
Attested. Chapter 7 · Excerpt 20 · Passage 12; Wachsmuth II, printed p. 140.
Διὸ ἔστιν ἡ ἀρετὴ ἕξις προαιρετική, ἐν μεσότητι οὖσα τῇ πρὸς ἡμᾶς, ὡρισμένη λόγῳ καὶ ὡς ἂν ὁ φρόνιμος ὁρίσειεν·
Source note
Wachsmuth, volume II, printed pp. 139–140. A rationally fitting mean is not simply whatever the individual prefers.