From the book
Charmides
Plato · Diotimos Editions · November 2026
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At a Glance
- The phraseTemperance by being present: the virtue considered as something in a person, known by what it makes him.
- In the CharmidesAt 160d: “Consider what sort of person temperance makes you by being present, and what sort of thing it would be that could produce such a person”.
- In this edition“By being present”.
- A place to read160d–161b.
- English renderings
- ἡ σωφροσύνη παροῦσα, hē sōphrosynē parousa, “temperance … by being present”
Meaning
Πάρειμι, “be present”, is the Greek for a quality’s being in someone, and Plato made the noun, παρουσία, “presence”, a term for how a thing comes to have a character (Lysis 217b–e; Phaedo 100c–d; see πάρειμι). The participle with temperance turns the question from what temperance is to what it does to the one who has it.
Use in the book
The phrase comes at the start of the boy’s second attempt, and it changes the method. The first method was to ask for an opinion: if temperance is present in him, it must give rise to some sense, and from that he will have an opinion of what it is (158e–159a; see αἴσθησις; σκέψις). That produced quietness, which has just failed. Now Socrates asks for an inference instead: “Then once more, Charmides, … pay closer attention and look within yourself. Consider what sort of person temperance makes you by being present, and what sort of thing it would be that could produce such a person; then put all this together and tell me, properly and like a man, what it seems to you to be” (160d–e; see ἐμβλέπω; προσέχειν τὸν νοῦν; συλλογίζομαι). The boy is to look at himself, see the effect, and reason back to the cause.
He does so, and the answer describes himself: “Well, I think temperance makes a person feel shame and makes him bashful, and that temperance is the same thing as modesty” (160e; see αἰδώς; αἰσχυντηλός). The edition’s note at 160e finds “a self-portrait in the answer”: his word for bashful is the one used of his blush at 158c. The method of presence produces a portrait of the one in whom the virtue is present, and Socrates’ reply turns presence into a premise: temperance makes good those it is present with, while modesty, by Homer’s line, is “no good thing to be present with a man in need” (161a; see ἀγαθοὺς ποιεῖ; αἰδὼς δ’ οὐκ ἀγαθὴ).
The phrase can be read as the dialogue’s first statement of what the later definitions forget. A temperance that is present makes its possessor a certain kind of person, and the question is what kind. Critias’ last definition says what the temperate man could do, examine himself and others (167a), and the argument finds that he could not; and at the end Socrates tells the boy that he is aggrieved if this temperance “is to be of no benefit to you in life by being present in you” (175e; see ὀνίνημι).
Places to read
The phrase’s place, with the presence premise that answers it.
Translation in this edition
“By being present” renders παροῦσα at 160d7, and the same participle at 175e2, “by being present in you”. At 160d6 the participle before it, ἐμβλέψας, “look within”, is Burnet’s own reading (see ἐμβλέπω).
Elsewhere in Plato
The Sophist uses the same language for the virtues of the soul. Even those who hold that only bodies exist, says the visitor from Elea, if they could be made better, would agree that a soul becomes just by the possession and presence, παρουσίᾳ, of justice, and the opposite soul by the opposite; and that what can be present to a thing and absent from it must be something. Asked whether any of these is visible and tangible, they would say almost none is; the soul itself they think has some kind of body, but of wisdom and the other virtues they would be ashamed either to say that they are nothing or to insist that they are bodies (246e–247c). In the Euthydemus the same language is turned into a joke. Socrates has said that beautiful things are other than the beautiful itself, though some beauty is present with each of them, and Dionysodorus, one of the two sophist brothers from Chios whose word-play the dialogue mocks, answers: “So if an ox comes to be present with you, you are an ox, and since I am present with you now, you are Dionysodorus?” (300e–301a). The Charmides asks the boy to know temperance by its presence without raising either puzzle.