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error

ἁμαρτία

Error, which temperance would remove · Charmides

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Charmides

Plato · Diotimos Editions · November 2026

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Orientation

At a Glance

  • The wordἉμαρτία is a missing of the mark, an error, from ἁμαρτάνειν, “to miss”.
  • In the CharmidesIn the life that temperance, as first supposed, would give. If the temperate knew what they knew and did not, “we would live our lives without error”, and “with error removed and rightness leading”, households and cities would do well and be happy (171d–172a). Socrates then doubts that this would be a great good (172d).
  • In this edition“Error” and “without error”.
  • A place to read171d–172a.
English renderings
ἁμαρτία, hamartia, “error”

Meaning

Ἁμαρτάνειν (hamartanein) is to miss: a target, a road, and so the right thing to do. Ἁμαρτία (hamartia) is the act or state of missing; ἁμάρτημα, a particular mistake (157b; see ἁμάρτημα); ἀναμάρτητος, with the negative prefix, “unerring”. The word has no special sense of sin; in the Charmides, as in the passages below, it is the failure of anyone who acts without knowledge.

Use in the book

Socrates recalls the benefit they had first expected. If the temperate man knew what he knew and did not, and could examine others, it would be “of enormous benefit to us to be temperate. For we would live our lives without error, both we ourselves who had temperance and all the others who were ruled by us. For neither would we ourselves try to do what we did not know; we would find those who did know and hand things over to them. … And so a household run by temperance would be bound to be run well, and a city governed by it too … For with error removed and rightness leading, those so disposed must necessarily do finely and well in every action, and those who do well must be happy” (171d–172a; see ἀναμάρτητος; εὖ πράττειν; ὀρθότης; παραδίδωμι).

The chain runs from knowledge to the absence of error, from the absence of error to rightness, from rightness to doing well, and from doing well to happiness. The last step rides on the double sense of εὖ πράττειν, to act well and to fare well, as the edition’s note at 172a points out. Socrates breaks the chain at the other end. He withdraws the agreement that “it would be a great good for men if each of us did what we knew” (172d), and his dream grants every craft without error, a world of genuine craftsmen, and then asks whether we would be happy (173a–d). We would not, without the knowledge of good and bad (174b–d). Error removed in each craft is not the same as doing well in life.

The edition’s note at 172a remarks on the irony many readers have felt in the picture of “us” ruling a city without error, spoken to Critias, who was later the leading figure among the Thirty, the oligarchy that ruled Athens in 404–403 BC.1

Places to read

The passage in which the word occurs, with its sequel.

  1. 171d–172aIf the temperate knew what they knew and did not, we would live without error; with error removed and rightness leading, households and cities would do well and be happy.
  2. 172c–dSocrates doubts that it would be a great good if each did what he knew and handed the rest to those who know.

Translation in this edition

Ἁμαρτίας γὰρ ἐξῃρημένης (171e–172a) is “with error removed”; B has διῃρημένης, “divided off”, and Burnet prints ἐξῃρημένης with T and W. Ἀναμάρτητοι γὰρ ἂν τὸν βίον διεζῶμεν (171d) is “we would live our lives without error”; Burnet prints T’s διεζῶμεν, “live through”, against ἐζῶμεν, “live”, in B, W and a later hand in T.

Elsewhere in Plato

In the Euthydemus Socrates gets Clinias to agree that wisdom makes men fortunate everywhere, “for wisdom would surely never err, but must act rightly and succeed” (280a). In the first book of the Republic the sophist Thrasymachus argues that no craftsman errs insofar as he is a craftsman: “the one who errs errs when his knowledge fails him” (340d–e). Both make error the absence of knowledge, as the Charmides does at 171d–e; the Charmides adds that knowledge in each craft would still not make us happy.

Other ancient sources

Xenophon reports that Socrates’ accuser charged him with teaching his companions to despise the laws, by saying that it was foolish to appoint the city’s rulers by lot when no one would be willing to use a pilot, a builder or a piper chosen by lot, though their errors do far less harm than errors in the city; and that the same accuser named Critias and Alcibiades among those who had kept company with Socrates and done the city great harm.2 The accuser’s argument can be read as turning the picture of 171d–172a, rule by those who know, against Socrates, with Critias as its proof.

Source note

1. Xenophon, Hellenica 2.3.2 (Critias among the Thirty) and 2.3.15–56 (his quarrel with Theramenes).

2. Xenophon, Memorabilia 1.2.9 (the lot) and 1.2.12 (Critias and Alcibiades).