From the book
Charmides
Plato · Diotimos Editions · November 2026
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At a Glance
- The wordTo be of sound mind; to be temperate, self-controlled, moderate; the verb of σώφρων, “temperate”.
- In the CharmidesTwenty times, besides the god’s imperative at 164e. It carries the argument about doing (161d–164c), the definition by knowing (164d–170d), and the last exchange, Critias’ “it will be proof to me that you are temperate: if you let Socrates charm you” (176b).
- In this edition“Be temperate”, “being temperate”, with the adjective’s English; the Key Words give the verb as “to be temperate”.
- A place to read163e–164d and 170d.
- English renderings
- σωφρονεῖν, sōphronein, “being temperate”, “is temperate”, “be temperate”; σωφρονεῖ, sōphronei, “is temperate”, “Temperate (indeed)”; σωφρονοῦσιν, sōphronousin, “are (they) temperate”, “are temperate”; σωφρονοῦντας, sōphronountas, “people who are temperate”; ἐσωφρονεῖτε, esōphroneite, “(and not) temperate”; σωφρονεῖς, sōphroneis, “you are temperate”
Meaning
Σωφρονέω is to have a sound mind, σῶς and φρήν, and so to be in one’s senses, to be prudent, to behave with restraint. Of a boy it is to be modest and well behaved; of a man, to keep within his limits; of a madman restored, to come to his senses. The verb puts temperance into a sentence as something a person is doing or being, and the Charmides uses it wherever the question is whether this person, now, is temperate.
Use in the book
The verb first enters the argument as a test case. If doing one’s own business is temperance, were the schoolboys who wrote their enemies’ names “being busybodies, and not temperate”? (161d–e; see πολυπραγμονέω). Critias, taking the argument over, allows that craftsmen who make other people’s things may still be temperate (163a; see οἱ τὰ τῶν ἄλλων πράττοντες), and gives his own rule: the man who makes bad things “is not temperate”, and the one who makes good things “is” (163e; see πρᾶξις τῶν ἀγαθῶν; τὰ κακά). The verb so far belongs to what a man does.
Socrates then asks a question of another kind, “whether you think that people who are temperate do not know that they are temperate”, and builds the case of the doctor, who does what he ought and so is temperate, and yet may not know that he is (164a–c; see ἀγνοεῖν ἑαυτὸν ὅτι σωφρονεῖ; οὐ γιγνώσκει ἑαυτόν; σωφρόνως; τὰ δέοντα). The verb has split in two: to be temperate, and to know that one is. Critias refuses the split and makes the second the definition of the first, “this very thing is temperance, knowing oneself” (164d; see γιγνώσκειν ἑαυτόν).
From there the verb is defined by knowing. “And this is being temperate, and temperance, and knowing oneself: knowing what one knows and what one does not know” (167a; see ἃ οἶδεν καὶ ἃ μὴ οἶδεν), and at 169d Socrates asks for that knowledge, “For this, surely, is what we said knowing oneself and being temperate is, isn’t it?” The argument then shows that knowledge of knowledge would yield only that a man knows, not what, and draws the verb’s conclusion: “Then being temperate, and temperance, would not be this, knowing what one knows and what one does not know, but, it seems, only that one knows and that one does not know” (170d; see ὅτι οἶδεν καὶ ὅτι οὐκ οἶδεν). The pairing of verb and noun, “being temperate, and temperance”, marks both points, the definition and its failure.
The last use takes the verb out of the argument. Charmides says he does not know whether he has temperance and will be charmed every day, and Critias makes his obedience the test, “proof to me that you are temperate” (176b; see ἐπᾴδω; τεκμήριον). The question Socrates could not settle by inquiry is answered by the guardian’s test, and the proof of being temperate becomes doing what one is told. Read beside what the guardian and the ward later became (notes at 153c and 176c; see βιάζομαι; σώφρων), the verb’s last use can be read as the dialogue’s last irony.
Places to read
Every passage in which the verb occurs; the imperative of 164e has its own entry (see Σωφρόνει).
- 161d–eWere the schoolboys being busybodies, and not temperate, when they wrote others’ names?
- 163aCraftsmen who make other people’s things may be temperate; Critias denies that those who do other people’s business are.
- 163eThe man who does bad things is not temperate; the one who makes good things is.
- 164aDo those who are temperate not know that they are temperate? Craftsmen may be temperate even when they make other people’s things.
- 164bThe man who does what he ought is temperate.
- 164cThe doctor acts temperately and is temperate, but does not know himself, that he is temperate.
- 164dCritias would never concede that a man who does not know himself is temperate.
- 164eThe god’s greeting: not “Rejoice”, but “Be temperate”.
- 167aBeing temperate, temperance and knowing oneself are knowing what one knows and what one does not know.
- 169dThis is what they said knowing oneself and being temperate is.
- 170dBeing temperate would be knowing only that one knows, not what.
- 176bIt will be proof that the boy is temperate if he lets Socrates charm him.
Translation in this edition
The English keeps the verb in the family of “temperate”, “one English word for one Greek word”, as the Glossary says of the noun, adjective and verb together: “be temperate”, “being temperate”, “is temperate”, “are temperate”. At 161d–e it is the second half of a pair, “being busybodies, and not temperate”; at 164b Critias’ answer Σωφρονεῖ μὲν οὖν is “Temperate indeed”. At 163a11 the words “just because I agreed” rest on Heindorf’s conjecture εἰ, where B has ἦ, T ἣ and W ᾗ (apparatus); the readings at 176b5–6 are told elsewhere (see τεκμήριον).
Elsewhere in Plato
In the Protagoras the verb is examined directly. Socrates asks whether anyone seems to be temperate in doing injustice, and Protagoras answers that he would be ashamed to agree, though many people say so. Socrates asks whether he should argue against the many or against Protagoras; Protagoras would have him take the many’s view first, and Socrates says it makes no difference to him whether it is Protagoras’ own view, so long as he answers: it is the argument he is examining most of all, though perhaps the questioner and the answerer are examined too. Protagoras grants that some seem to be temperate though unjust; that being temperate is thinking well, εὖ φρονεῖν; and that thinking well is planning well in their injustice, if they fare well by it (333b–d). The Protagoras hears in the verb its root, sound thinking; the Charmides tries it as knowing, and at the end gives it to obedience.
Other ancient sources
Stobaeus’ anthology preserves under the name of Heraclitus a saying that joins the verb to self-knowledge: “It belongs to all men to know themselves and to be temperate”, γινώσκειν ἑωυτοὺς καὶ σωφρονεῖν.1 Critias’ claim that “Know thyself” and “Be temperate” are the same (164e–165a) has a companion here.
Xenophon applies the verb to Critias himself. Answering the charge that Socrates’ companions Critias and Alcibiades did the city great harm, he grants that Socrates should perhaps have taught them to be temperate before politics, and says that both of them were temperate as long as they were with Socrates, not from fear of punishment but because they then thought it best. Many who claim to philosophize, he goes on, would say that the just man can never become unjust nor the temperate man insolent; he disagrees, for as those who do not train their bodies cannot do the body’s work, so those who do not train the soul cannot do the soul’s, neither doing what they ought nor keeping from what they ought not.2 Xenophon’s Critias is temperate while he keeps company with Socrates, and this can be read as the condition the Charmides’ last page sets for his ward.
Source note
1. Heraclitus, fragment 116 Diels–Kranz (Stobaeus, Anthology 3.5.6).
2. Xenophon, Memorabilia 1.2.17–19.