Ε Epsilon

knowledge of good and bad

ἐπιστήμη ἀγαθοῦ καὶ κακοῦ

The one knowledge that makes us do well and be happy, which is not temperance · Charmides

From the book

Charmides

Plato · Diotimos Editions · November 2026

Browse this book’s lexicon →

Orientation

At a Glance

  • The wordThe knowledge whose object is what is good and bad: the knowledge by which one knows what benefits and what harms.
  • In the CharmidesNamed by Critias when Socrates asks which knowledge makes the all-knowing man happy (174b), shown by Socrates to be the knowledge without which nothing is done well and beneficially, and therefore not temperance (174c–d), and claimed by Critias for temperance’s rule (174d–e).
  • In this edition“The knowledge of good and bad”; “this knowledge of the good” (174e).
  • A place to read174a–175a.
English renderings
ᾗ τὸ ἀγαθόν … καὶ τὸ κακόν, hēi to agathon … kai to kakon, “by which he knows good … and bad”; τῆς περὶ τὸ ἀγαθόν τε καὶ κακόν, tēs peri to agathon te kai kakon, “the knowledge of good and bad”; ἀγαθοῦ τε καὶ κακοῦ, agathou te kai kakou, “(knowledge … ) of good and bad”; τῆς περὶ τἀγαθὸν ἐπιστήμης, tēs peri tagathon epistēmēs, “this knowledge of the good”

Meaning

The pair ἀγαθός and κακός is the Greek pair for good and bad, beneficial and harmful (see ἀγαθός; κακός), and a knowledge “of” them is a knowledge whose object is not a product, as health is, but the value of products and actions. Plato’s Socrates names it with a phrase, here and in the Laches and the Protagoras, and also calls it φρόνησις, wisdom: in the Protagoras itself, where wisdom is enough to help the man who knows good and bad (352c), and in the Meno, as the knowledge that leads the soul’s other goods (88b–89a; see ἐπιστημόνως ζῆν).

Use in the book

The knowledge is found by elimination. Socrates has taken the happy man, on Critias’ account, to be the one who lives knowledgeably about something, the prophet perhaps, or a man who knew all things past, present and to come (173e–174a; see ἐπιστήμη τοῦ μέλλοντος; ἐπιστημόνως ζῆν). Which of his kinds of knowledge makes him happy? Draughts? Critias is indignant. Calculation? “Not at all.” What is healthy? “More so.” “And the one I mean, the one that does it most of all … is the one by which he knows what?” “By which he knows good … and bad” (174b; see τὸ ἀγαθὸν καὶ τὸ κακόν; τὸ λογιστικόν; τὸ πεττευτικόν). Socrates’ reply is a cry of discovery: “You rascal! … All this time you’ve been dragging me round in a circle, hiding from me that it was not living knowledgeably that made us do well and be happy, not even with all the other kinds of knowledge together, but only this one, the knowledge of good and bad” (174b–c; see ἀποκρύπτομαι; κύκλῳ; μιαρός; περιέλκω).

Then the test, by subtraction. “For, Critias, if you choose to take this knowledge away from the other kinds of knowledge, will medicine make us any less healthy, or cobbling any less well shod, or weaving any less well clothed, or will the pilot’s art any less prevent us from dying at sea, and generalship in war?” “No less.” “But, my dear Critias, each of these things being done well and beneficially: that will be gone from us, if this is absent” (174c–d; see ἀπολείπω; ἐξαιρέω; τὸ εὖ γίγνεσθαι). The crafts keep their products; what goes is their being done well and to our benefit. So the conclusion: “But this, it seems, is not temperance, but the knowledge whose work is to benefit us. For it is knowledge not of kinds of knowledge and lacks of knowledge, but of good and bad. So if this is what benefits us, temperance would be something else for us” (174d; see ἔργον τὸ ὠφελεῖν). Critias tries to bring it under temperance’s rule, and the restriction “of nothing else” defeats him (174d–175a; see ἄλλου δὲ οὐδενός; ἐπιστατέω).

The edition’s note at 174c calls this, “on one widely held reading … the dialogue’s positive hint”, and notes that the pair is the one Critias built his own definition on at 163e. The test shows what kind of knowledge it is. It adds nothing to any craft’s product and everything to its use, so its object is the good of what the crafts make and do. Temperance, defined as knowledge of knowledge, cannot be it, because Critias accepted that temperance was a knowledge “of nothing else” (167b–c, 174e). Nothing in the argument forbids temperance to be the knowledge of good and bad, if the definition is given up. The dialogue does not draw that conclusion; it can be read as leaving it for the reader to draw.

Places to read

Every passage in which the knowledge is named.

  1. 174bAsked which knowledge makes the all-knowing man happy, Critias names the one by which he knows good and bad.
  2. 174b–cSocrates: it was not living knowledgeably that made us happy, but only this one knowledge.
  3. 174c–dTake it away, and the crafts still do their work, but nothing is done well and beneficially; so this knowledge, not temperance, is the one that benefits.
  4. 174d–e2Critias: if temperance presides over the other kinds of knowledge, it would rule over this knowledge of the good as well.

Translation in this edition

“By which he knows good,” he said, “and bad” renders ᾗ τὸ ἀγαθόν, ἔφη, καὶ τὸ κακόν (174b10), with Critias’ “he said” between the two words as in the Greek; “the knowledge of good and bad” renders τῆς περὶ τὸ ἀγαθόν τε καὶ κακόν (174c2–3) and ἀγαθοῦ τε καὶ κακοῦ (174d5–6); “this knowledge of the good” renders τῆς περὶ τἀγαθὸν ἐπιστήμης (174e2), with τἀγαθόν joined by crasis. The Note on this Edition records a correction: “The knowledge that makes us happy was ‘of good and evil’ at 174b–d, while the same Greek pair was ‘good and bad’ at 156e and in Critias’ definition at 163e.” The edition now says “good and bad” throughout. At 174d7 Burnet brackets, after Madvig, ἡ ὠφελίμη, which B has after “something else” (T has ὠφελίμη, and Schleiermacher proposed ἢ ὠφελίμη, “something other than the beneficial one”); the English follows his text.

Elsewhere in Plato

The knowledge of good and bad ends the Laches as it ends the Charmides (199c–e; see ἀγαθός; ἀρετή). In the Protagoras Socrates asks whether knowledge is, as most people think, something without strength or authority, dragged about by anger, pleasure, pain, love or fear like a slave, or something fine and able to rule a man, so that if someone knows what is good and bad nothing will overpower him into doing other than knowledge bids (352b–c); knowledge dragged about like a slave, περιελκομένης, is dragged by the verb Socrates uses of Critias at 174b, περιέλκεις. In the Republic the argument runs the same circle. Those who say that the good is wisdom cannot show which wisdom, and are forced in the end to say that it is wisdom of the good; Glaucon calls this ridiculous, and Socrates agrees, since they reproach us for not knowing the good and then speak to us as if we knew it (505b–c; for 505a–b see ἀγαθός).

Other ancient sources

Aristotle argues that prudence is neither science nor craft, since what is done can be otherwise and doing is not making, and concludes that it is a true state, accompanied by reasoning, concerned with action about what is good and bad for a human being.1 The Stoics, as Diogenes Laertius reports, made prudence the knowledge of what is bad and good and neither, and set it first among the virtues, with courage, justice and temperance beside it.2 Both can be read as keeping the Charmides’ distinction: the knowledge of good and bad is prudence, not temperance. Xenophon’s Socrates, by contrast, did not separate wisdom and temperance at all (Memorabilia 3.9.4; see ἃ οἶδεν καὶ ἃ μὴ οἶδεν).

Source note

1. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 6.5, 1140b1–6.

2. Diogenes Laertius 7.92.