Benefit

Use in the book

Benefit enters with Critias: Hesiod, the early epic poet, called works only "things made finely and beneficially", he says, and regarded "everything harmful as belonging to others" (163b–c; see Action). A doctor, Critias grants, "in making someone healthy, makes something beneficial both for himself and for the patient he is treating", and so does what he ought and is temperate. But must he "also know when his treatment is beneficial and when it is not"? "Perhaps not," says Critias. Then, Socrates concludes, the doctor sometimes acts beneficially or harmfully without knowing how he has acted, and, having acted beneficially, has by Critias' account acted temperately (164a–c2). Rather than allow that a man who does not know himself is temperate, Critias makes temperance knowing oneself (164c–d; see Agreement and concession).

If he were asked what use medicine is to us, Socrates says, he would answer, "No small benefit: it produces health, a fine work for us"; what, then, does temperance produce (165c–e)? Critias objects that calculation and geometry have no such work, and Socrates asks instead what temperance is knowledge of (165e–166b2; see Art and craft), and Critias makes it knowledge of itself and of the other kinds of knowledge (166c). Socrates sets two questions: whether such a knowledge is possible, and "what benefit there would be for us in knowing it" (167b). He will not accept it as temperance until he has looked into whether it would benefit us: "For I have a prophetic hunch that temperance is something beneficial and good" (169b). Possibility is granted for now (169d), but even so the knowledge knows only that one knows, not what (170a–171c23; see Knowledge of knowledge).

"Then what benefit, Critias," Socrates asks, "would we still get from temperance, if it is like this?" (171d). Had the temperate man known, as first supposed, what he knew and what he did not, "it would be of enormous benefit to us to be temperate": we would not attempt what we did not know, nor let those we ruled do anything but what they knew, households and cities would be run well, and "those who do well must be happy" (171d–172a). But no such knowledge has turned up (172a). Socrates offers a smaller good, as a question: perhaps whoever has it "will learn more easily whatever else he learns" and "will examine others better about the things he himself has learned". "Is it some such things as these, my friend, that we shall get out of temperance, while we have been looking at something greater …?" "Perhaps that is how it is," Critias answers. "Perhaps," says Socrates. "And perhaps our search has been to no useful purpose" (172b–c). The smaller good is not taken up again.

Instead Socrates grants everything, to see "whether, if it is of that kind, it will benefit us at all" (172c–d), and withdraws the agreement that it would be a great good if each did what he knew (172d–e2; see Agreement and concession): "even if temperance is entirely of this kind," he says, "it does not seem at all clear to me that it does us any good" (172e–173a). In his dream men would "act and live knowledgeably", but "that by acting knowledgeably we would do well and be happy, this, my dear Critias, we cannot yet learn" (173a–d2; see The dream hypothesis). The knowledge that makes a man happy, Critias says at last, is the one "by which he knows good … and bad" (174b).

Without that knowledge, Critias grants, medicine and the pilot's art would keep us no less healthy and safe at sea; but, Socrates replies, "each of these things being done well and beneficially: that will be gone from us, if this is absent" (174c–d; see Art and craft). That knowledge, then, not temperance, is "the knowledge whose work is to benefit us" (174d). Critias would have temperance, presiding over the other kinds of knowledge, rule this one too, and so "it would benefit us" (174d–e2). But as knowledge only of knowledge temperance is the craftsman neither of health nor of benefit, each of which belongs to another craft. "How then will temperance be beneficial," Socrates asks, "when it is the craftsman of no benefit?" "It seems it can't be, Socrates, in any way" (174e–175a).

The argument has found where benefit belongs and refused it to Critias' temperance: if temperance is beneficial, as Socrates still holds, it cannot be knowledge only of knowledge, and what is refuted is the definition, not temperance. Socrates lays the failure on himself: "For surely what is agreed to be the finest of all things would not have turned out to be of no use to us, if I were of any use at inquiring well" (175a–b), a play on ἀνωφελές, "of no use", and ὄφελος, "use". Despite the concessions made beyond what the argument allowed (175b–c2; see Agreement and concession), the inquiry has shown what they laid down as temperance "to be of no benefit" (175d). Grieved for Charmides if temperance is to be of no benefit to him in life, Socrates refuses the conclusion: "Well, I don't at all think it is so; rather, I am a poor inquirer. For I do think that temperance is a great good" (175d–e). The ending can be read as pointing to a temperance that would include the knowledge of good and bad.

Places to read

1. 163cCritias, after Hesiod: things made finely and beneficially are works, and everything harmful belongs to others.
2. 164a–c2The doctor makes something beneficial for himself and his patient; on Critias' "Perhaps not", he may act beneficially, and so temperately, without knowing how he has acted.
3. 165c–dIf he were asked what use medicine is, Socrates would answer that it brings no small benefit, health.
4. 167bThe two questions: whether knowledge of knowledge is possible, and what benefit it would bring us.
5. 169b–cSocrates' prophetic hunch that temperance is beneficial and good; Critias must show his knowledge both possible and beneficial.
6. 171d–172aHad temperance been as first supposed, it would have been of enormous benefit: a life without error, households and cities run well, doing well and happiness.
7. 172b–cSocrates asks whether the good of temperance is only a smaller one, easier learning and better examining; Critias: "Perhaps that is how it is."
8. 172c–173a2Socrates grants everything to ask whether it would benefit us at all, and withdraws the agreement that each doing what he knew would be a great good.
9. 173a–d2The dream: a life lived knowledgeably, though it cannot yet be learned that this would make us do well and be happy.
10. 174b–dOnly the knowledge of good and bad makes things come about well and beneficially; its work is to benefit us, and it is not temperance.
11. 174d–175a2Critias sets temperance over that knowledge; Socrates answers that it is the craftsman neither of health nor of benefit.
12. 175a–bSocrates blames himself: the finest of things would not have proved of no use if he were of any use at inquiring.
13. 175d–eThe inquiry has shown the definition of no benefit; Socrates will not believe that temperance is of no benefit to Charmides, and calls it a great good.

Translation in this edition

The edition keeps one English family for the ōphel- words, so that the verdict answers the question in its own terms. Ὠφέλιμος is "beneficial" (164b, 169b–c, 175a), ὠφελεῖν "benefit" (169b, 174d–e2, and "of no benefit to you" at 175e), ὠφελία "benefit" (165d, 167b, 171d, 175a), and ὠφελίμως "beneficially" (163c, 164b–c, 174d). Three times the English changes the part of speech and keeps the word: ὅταν ὠφελίμως ἰᾶται is "when his treatment is beneficial" (164b), μεγαλωστὶ … ὠφέλιμον "of enormous benefit" (171d), and εἰ αὕτη ἐστὶν ὠφέλιμος "if this is what benefits us" (174d). Ἀνωφελής is "of no benefit" at 175d but "of no use" at 175b, where Socrates sets it against ὄφελος: "of no use to us, if I were of any use at inquiring well". Except for "of no use" at 175b, "use" and "useful" render other words: chiefly ὄφελος ("no use at all", 155e; "of any use", 175b), χρήσιμος ("useful advice", 165a; "what use is it to us", 165c), χρηστός ("to no useful purpose", 172c, 175a) and the verb χρῆσθαι, "use" (173c). At 165c–d the two families meet: if he were asked what use (χρησίμη) medicine is to us, Socrates says, he would answer "No small benefit" (ὠφελίαν). Ὀνινάναι is "profit" at 164b and 175e and "benefit" at 172d; ἀπολαύειν is "get out of" (172c); βλαβερός and βλαβερῶς are "harmful" and "harmfully" (163c, 164b).

ἀνωφελής

Attested: ἀνωφελές (anōpheles; 175b, 175d). Of no benefit, unavailing. Socrates says, "For surely what is agreed to be the finest of all things would not have turned out to be of no use to us, if I were of any use at inquiring well" (175a–b), where the word plays on ὄφελος, "use"; and the inquiry has shown what they laid down as temperance "to be of no benefit" (175d). Lemma: ἀνωφελής.

ἀπολαύω

Attested: ἀπολαυσόμεθα (apolausometha; 172c). To get the fruit or enjoyment of something, to get something out of it. Socrates asks whether easier learning and better examining are what "we shall get out of temperance, while we have been looking at something greater" (172b–c). Lemma: ἀπολαύω.

βλαβερός

Attested: βλαβερά (blabera; 163c). Harmful. Critias says that Hesiod regarded only things made finely and beneficially "as appropriate to one, and everything harmful as belonging to others" (163c). Lemma: βλαβερός.

βλαβερῶς

Attested: βλαβερῶς (blaberōs; 164b). Harmfully. On Critias' "Perhaps not", Socrates concludes that "sometimes … the doctor, having acted beneficially or harmfully, does not know himself — how he has acted" (164b–c). Lemma: βλαβερῶς.

ὀνίνημι

Attested: ὀνήσεσθαι (onēsesthai; 164b), ὀνήσει (onēsei; 172d), ὀνήσῃ (onēsēi; 175e). To benefit someone, and in the middle to get benefit, to profit. Socrates asks whether each craftsman must know "when he is going to profit from the work he is doing" (164b); granting the definition, he proposes to look into "whether, if it is of that kind, it will benefit us at all" (172d); and he is aggrieved if Charmides is "to get no profit from this temperance" (175e). Lemma: ὀνίνημι.

ὠφελέω

Attested: ὠφελοῖ (ōpheloi; 169b, 174d, 174e), ὠφελεῖν (ōphelein; 174d), ὠφελήσει (ōphelēsei; 175e). To benefit, to do good to. Socrates will not accept knowledge of knowledge as temperance until he has looked into "whether a thing of that kind would benefit us or not" (169b); the knowledge of good and bad is "the knowledge whose work is to benefit us" (174d); Critias asks of temperance, "Why couldn't it benefit us?", since, ruling over that knowledge too, it "would benefit us" (174d–e2); Socrates is aggrieved if temperance is to be of no benefit to Charmides in life (175e). Lemma: ὠφελέω.

ὠφελία

Attested: ὠφελίαν (ōphelian; 165d), ὠφελία (ōphelia; 167b, 171d), ὠφελίας (ōphelias; 175a twice). Benefit, help. Medicine brings "No small benefit", health (165d); the second question is "what benefit there would be for us in knowing it" (167b); "Then what benefit, Critias, … would we still get from temperance, if it is like this?" (171d); temperance is not the craftsman of health, "Nor of benefit either", and so is "the craftsman of no benefit" (175a). Lemma: ὠφελία.

ὠφελίμη

Attested: ὠφέλιμα (ōphelima; 164b), ὠφέλιμον (ōphelimon; 169b, 169c, 171d), ὠφέλιμος (ōphelimos; 174d, 175a). Beneficial, doing good. The doctor makes "something beneficial both for himself and for the patient he is treating" (164b); Socrates' hunch is that temperance is "something beneficial and good", and Critias must show his knowledge beneficial as well as possible (169b–c); had temperance been as first supposed, it would have been "of enormous benefit" (171d); if the knowledge of good and bad is "what benefits us", temperance would be something else (174d); and Socrates asks, "How then will temperance be beneficial, when it is the craftsman of no benefit?" (175a). At 174d Burnet, following the Danish scholar Madvig, deletes the words ἡ ὠφελίμη, "the beneficial one", which stand after "something else" in the manuscript B (T has ὠφελίμη without the article); they are not part of his text, and the edition does not translate them. Lemma: ὠφέλιμος.

ὠφέλιμος

Attested: ὠφέλιμα (ōphelima; 164b), ὠφέλιμον (ōphelimon; 169b, 169c, 171d), ὠφέλιμος (ōphelimos; 174d, 175a). Beneficial, doing good. The doctor makes "something beneficial both for himself and for the patient he is treating" (164b); Socrates' hunch is that temperance is "something beneficial and good", and Critias must show his knowledge beneficial as well as possible (169b–c); had temperance been as first supposed, it would have been "of enormous benefit" (171d); if the knowledge of good and bad is "what benefits us", temperance would be something else (174d); and Socrates asks, "How then will temperance be beneficial, when it is the craftsman of no benefit?" (175a). At 174d Burnet, following the Danish scholar Madvig, deletes the words ἡ ὠφελίμη, "the beneficial one", which stand after "something else" in the manuscript B (T has ὠφελίμη without the article); they are not part of his text, and the edition does not translate them. Lemma: ὠφέλιμος.

ὠφελίμως

Attested: ὠφελίμως (ōphelimōs; 163c, 164b twice, 164c twice, 174d). Beneficially, so as to do good. Critias' "things made finely and beneficially" (163c); the doctor who need not, perhaps, know "when his treatment is beneficial", and who, "having acted beneficially", acts temperately by Critias' account without knowing himself (164b–c); and the crafts without the knowledge of good and bad, which still make us healthy, but without "each of these things being done well and beneficially" (174c–d). Lemma: ὠφελίμως.

μεγαλωστὶ (megalōsti)

Attested: μεγαλωστί (megalōsti; 171d). Greatly, on a grand scale; a rare epic and Ionic adverb, here a conjecture of Stephanus, the sixteenth-century printer whose Plato of 1578 gives the section numbers, for the manuscripts' μεγάλως τι, "greatly, in a way". Had the temperate man known what he knew and what he did not, "it would be of enormous benefit to us to be temperate" (171d). Lemma: μεγαλωστί.

ὠφελίμη (ōphelimē)

Attested: ὠφέλιμα (ōphelima; 164b), ὠφέλιμον (ōphelimon; 169b, 169c, 171d), ὠφέλιμος (ōphelimos; 174d, 175a). Beneficial, doing good. The doctor makes "something beneficial both for himself and for the patient he is treating" (164b); Socrates' hunch is that temperance is "something beneficial and good", and Critias must show his knowledge beneficial as well as possible (169b–c); had temperance been as first supposed, it would have been "of enormous benefit" (171d); if the knowledge of good and bad is "what benefits us", temperance would be something else (174d); and Socrates asks, "How then will temperance be beneficial, when it is the craftsman of no benefit?" (175a). At 174d Burnet, following the Danish scholar Madvig, deletes the words ἡ ὠφελίμη, "the beneficial one", which stand after "something else" in the manuscript B (T has ὠφελίμη without the article); they are not part of his text, and the edition does not translate them. Lemma: ὠφέλιμος.

Elsewhere in Plato

The Meno turns the link between the good and the beneficial into an argument that virtue is knowledge. Socrates has Meno, the young Thessalian nobleman, agree that we are good by virtue, and "if good, beneficial; for all good things are beneficial", so that virtue too is beneficial (87d–e). Health, strength, beauty and wealth sometimes benefit and sometimes harm, and they benefit when right use guides them (87e–88a). Of the qualities of the soul that are not knowledge, courage without sense harms the man who has it, and temperance and quickness at learning, learned and trained with intelligence, are beneficial, without it harmful (88b). So if virtue is something in the soul and must be beneficial, it must be wisdom, φρόνησις (phronēsis), which by this argument "would be the beneficial" (88c–89a). The Meno makes temperance, taken as something other than knowledge, need wisdom in order to benefit, which can be read beside the Charmides' finding that the work of benefiting belongs to the knowledge of good and bad (174d).

In the Euthydemus Socrates tells his old friend Crito how he questioned the young Cleinias, a cousin of Alcibiades. The goods they had listed would make them happy only if they benefited them, and they would benefit only if used: a carpenter with all his tools and enough timber who never does any carpentry gets no benefit from owning them (280b–d). They must be used rightly, and what makes for right use is knowledge, as carpentry does in working wood (280e–281b). Is there any use, Socrates asks, in other possessions without good sense and wisdom, and would a man profit by having much and doing much without sense? The question is put in the Charmides' own words: ὄφελος, the "use" of 155e and 175b, and ὄναιτο, "would profit", from the verb of 164b, 172d and 175e (281b). A man without sense errs less the less he does, and he does less if he is poor rather than rich, weak rather than strong, cowardly rather than brave and temperate (281b–c). So the things they first called goods are greater evils than their opposites when ignorance leads them, and greater goods when wisdom leads them, but in themselves they are worth nothing; and Cleinias agrees that wisdom alone is good and ignorance alone bad (281d–e). In the Republic Socrates tells Adeimantus, Plato's brother, that the Form of the good is the greatest thing to learn, by which just things and everything else, when they make use of it as well, become useful and beneficial; without it, even if we knew everything else as well as could be, that knowledge would be no use to us, any more than there is use in possessing anything without the good (505a–b). Those who say the good is wisdom, he adds, cannot show which wisdom they mean, and in the end are forced to say that it is wisdom "of the good" (505b–c), which can be read beside Critias' answer, when Socrates asks which knowledge makes a man happy, that it is the one "by which he knows good … and bad" (Charmides 174b).

Later readings

The Stoics, named from the Painted Stoa at Athens where their founder Zeno of Citium taught, made benefit the definition of the good. Diogenes Laertius, the biographer of the Greek philosophers, reports that in the strict sense the good is "the same as benefit, or not other than benefit". As heating, not chilling, is the property of the hot, so benefiting, not harming, is the property of the good; wealth and health benefit no more than they harm, and what can be used both well and badly is not good, so neither is a good (Posidonius, Diogenes adds, counted them among the goods). Only the fine is good, that is, virtue and what shares in it; the goods are the virtues, wisdom, justice, courage and temperance among them, while life, health, beauty, strength and wealth, which neither benefit nor harm, are indifferent.¹ Their argument from use can be read as the Meno's and the Euthydemus' made into doctrine, and their counting of temperance among the goods, the things that benefit, as Socrates' hunch at Charmides 169b made true by definition.

Use in the book

Alcibiades says at 114e that answering Socrates will do him no harm. Socrates' reply that he is a prophet plays with the consequence of the ensuing refutation: his confident opinions will be unsettled. The edition’s note offers the Socratic interpretation that refutation can cure rather than injure. The dialogue's explicit words are the assurance of no harm and the ironic response, not a developed medical theory of argument.

At 120d the same assurance is made practical. If Alcibiades judged his rivals formidable he would care for himself more; that care would not harm him, he agrees, but benefit him greatly. His dismissive estimate is therefore already bad in one respect, independently of the further question whether it is false: it discourages preparation that would help him.

The final medicine and ship cases clarify what can go wrong when effective power is mistaken for benefit. Unchecked action without understanding can ruin the agent and those dependent on him (134e–135a2). Benefit is therefore not measured simply by getting to do what one wishes. Equally, losing a conceited opinion or accepting guidance need not count as harm. The important question is the actual improvement or deterioration of the person and the people affected.

Places to read

1. 114e–115aAlcibiades expects no harm from answering; Socrates calls him a prophet
2. 118aIgnorance about the greatest matters is described as most harmful
3. 120c–120dSelf-care is acknowledged to benefit rather than harm
4. 134e–135a2Unchecked incompetence causes bodily or collective destruction

Translation in this edition

“Gain a great deal” at 120d renders ὀνήσεσθαι rather than συμφέρειν. The note at 115a labels its curative reading as an interpretation. “Corrupted” at 132a and “ruined” of the body at 135a share the φθείρειν family but have different immediate objects.

βλάπτω

Attested: βλαβήσεσθαι (blabēsesthai; 114e, 120d). To harm or injure. At 114e: To be harmed, a result Alcibiades does not expect from answering. At 120d: To be harmed by caring for oneself, a possibility Alcibiades rejects. Lexical identification: lemma: βλάπτω. See Benefit and harm.

διαφθείρω

Attested: διαφθαρῆναι (diaphtharēnai; 135a). At 135a: The body’s being ruined by an ignorant patient’s unrestricted choices. Lexical identification: lemma: διαφθείρω. See Benefit and harm.

κακοῦργος

Attested: κακουργοτάτη (kakourgotatē; 118a). Harmful or capable of the worst mischief; the superlative marks ignorance as most damaging when it concerns the greatest practical matters. Lexical identification: lemma: κακοῦργος. See Benefit and harm.

ὀνίνημι

Attested: ὀνήσεσθαι (onēsesthai; 120d). To benefit or receive advantage; Alcibiades agrees that caring for himself would benefit him rather than harm him. Lexical identification: lemma: ὀνίνημι. See Benefit and harm.

Use in the book

Alcibiades’ apparent willingness to accept unlimited rule is restricted at 141c: he would not want it if unable to use it or if he would use it badly and harmfully. Generalships and children then show how coveted outcomes can bring suffering. At 142b Socrates allows that danger and labour would have some reason if they led to benefit; at 142d the issue is specifically things whose presence harms more than it benefits. The argument permits comparison rather than classifying every such object as invariably harmful.

The assessment is extended to knowledge at 144d and 146e. Its possession without the best seldom benefits and mostly harms. At 145c the knowledge of the best is equated with knowledge of the beneficial, but no further account of benefit is established. In particular, the parallel concern for city and self does not itself demonstrate that their interests can never conflict. The dialogue asserts the same requirement of guidance for both.

At 146b Socrates strikingly requires that “the beneficially” accompany what one does from knowledge or apparent knowledge. An adverb is treated as an additional requirement: successful execution is not enough; the action must be beneficial in its actual conduct and application. This prepares the inference that increasing readiness to act may increase harm. The practical orientation is clear even where the reasoning passes quickly over what would substantiate its broad claims.

Places to read

1. 141c–dThe value of rule depends on its use and possible damage.
2. 142b; 142dBenefit can justify burdens, while coveted possessions may harm more than they help.
3. 144d; 146eOther knowledge is said usually to harm without the best.
4. 145cKnowledge of the best is identified with knowledge of the beneficial.
5. 146b–d2Beneficial action, rather than knowledge alone, is the condition of profit.

Translation in this edition

The translation keeps “benefit” distinct from “profit” and consistently renders blaptein by “harm”. Its conspicuous “the beneficially” preserves to ōphelimōs rather than smoothing the adverb into a different noun or silently identifying it with the possession of knowledge.

Use in the book

At 227a Socrates says people are harmed by loss, and the companion agrees. This licenses the badness of loss in the argument. Gain is then pronounced good through opposition, without a separately worded agreement equating gaining with being benefited. At 227d Socrates nevertheless announces that they agreed just now that to gain is to be benefited. This is a strengthened retrospective formulation, as the edition’s note 8 expressly recognises. It may be intended as a compressed consequence of the earlier exchange, but it is not an exact recollection of its wording.

The companion does not simply accept that every apparent profit benefits him. He excludes gains from which one will be harmed. Socrates checks that by harm he means suffering loss, then asks whether loss comes from gain or from loss. The companion answers both. His distinction is intelligible if an acquisition that is a gain under one measure has damaging consequences under another. Socrates’ reformulation presses toward an all-things-considered sense in which genuine gain already includes benefit.

The bodily example at 231b makes the issue concrete. Someone acquires disease while feasting at no expense; the companion denies that this is gain. Acquiring health, by contrast, is accepted as gain. Material acquisition and benefit are therefore not coextensive. The case does not require a doctrine that every costly pleasure is bad; the decisive element is the stipulated harmful result.

At the end, worth leads to worth possessing, worth possessing to the beneficial rather than the useless, and benefit to goodness. This supplies a different route from the earlier opposition argument. The chain may clarify what genuine gain should mean, but it must not be represented as having settled all ordinary uses of profit. A profitable sale can benefit one party and harm another; the dialogue has not conducted a separate inquiry into distributive justice or external costs.

Places to read

1. 227aΒλάπτονται ὑπὸ τῆς ζημίας ἄρα ἄνθρωποι. — Harm is the reason loss is classified as bad.
2. 227dεἶναι ὠφελεῖσθαι — The retrospective formulation identifies gaining with being benefited.
3. 227eβλαβήσεσθαι — The companion points to future harm from certain gains.
4. 231eτὸ ἀνωφελὲς ἢ τὸ ὠφέλιμον — The last argument contrasts what is useless with what benefits.

Translation in this edition

The edition retains “be benefited”, “beneficial”, “of no benefit” and “be harmed”. These somewhat formal renderings keep the verbal and adjectival relations visible. Note 8 warns against treating the 227d recollection as a verbatim agreement. The later chain should not be projected backward so that the initial inference looks more fully argued than the dialogue presents it.

Use in the book

Socrates initially says he will question the man who claims to be wiser so that he too might benefit from him. This makes questioning potentially educative rather than solely adversarial. It may have an ironic edge in light of the result, but the narrative does not require us to assume that the wish to learn is insincere. The speaker’s claim should be tested by whether it offers something of value.

At 133d the addition “good as well” to “fine” opens the route toward consequences. The body becomes well through appropriately measured exercise, and food and other bodily inputs are judged by benefit. When the same question is asked about the soul, learning is no longer an unqualified accumulation of honors. It is something that can be apportioned well or badly for the person receiving it.

The passage is stronger as an inquiry into criteria than as a completed educational theory. It secures agreement that measured inputs benefit, then asks who can recognize the measure. Neither the cultured lover’s prestige nor the athlete’s physical expertise supplies that answer. The initial promise of being benefited by a wiser man therefore becomes the very issue under examination: what would establish that someone can actually help another person learn well?

A useful distinction follows. An activity may look fine before spectators, feel competitive, and still fail the test of benefit. Conversely, a correction from an unfashionable or verbally unassuming source may be beneficial. The athlete’s contribution dramatizes that possibility.

Places to read

1. 132dἵνα καὶ εἴ τι δυναίμην παρ’ αὐτοῦ ὠφεληθείην — Socrates presents benefit as a reason to question the professedly wiser man.
2. 134dὠφελιμώτατα εἶναι τὰ μέτρια — The bodily argument names moderate amounts as most beneficial.
3. 134dΚαὶ τούτων ἄρα τὰ μέτρια ὠφελεῖ ἀλλ’ οὐ τὰ πολλά; — Benefit becomes the criterion for learning-subjects as well.

Translation in this edition

The edition preserves “benefited” at 132d and “benefit” or “beneficial” in the body-soul argument, rather than using “useful” indiscriminately. At 134d the supplied apparatus attributes the printed finite ōphelei to Stephanus against an infinitive in B and T, and records Schanz’s adjustment in the preceding statement about what is most beneficial. These notes concern the edited wording; they do not by themselves invalidate the conceptual distinction between benefit and quantity.

Use in the book

Theages first uses the benefit test against the suggested statesman-teachers: anyone capable of helping another would not have left his own son wholly unbenefited. Socrates later asks why Demodocus expects him to benefit the boy towards becoming a good citizen more than the politically experienced father could. At this point the desired benefit has an explicitly civic direction. Demodocus’ request that Socrates “do him whatever good you can” leaves its practical extent open.

Charmides supplies a second and distinct measure of benefit. Even without winning at Nemea, he expects benefit from exercise. The argument separates an activity’s general usefulness from success in a contest. Yet it also attempts to override a warning whose full significance Charmides does not know. The story does not establish that bodily exercise is unbeneficial generally.

At 129e benefit becomes the organising term of Socrates’ account of association. Some cannot benefit because the power opposes the association; others are allowed to associate but gain nothing. Where the power takes a hand, companions make progress. Even then benefit may either last or disappear after separation. Assistance, access, improvement and retention are therefore four distinguishable matters. The verb syllabētai identifies help without explaining its mechanism.

The final reference to teachers who are masters of the benefit they confer returns to the original search for an effective educator. Socrates presents his own association as less controllable. The resulting advantage is not made measurable in money, instructional units or a demonstrated moral transformation. Aristides’ testimony is principally about his former standing in argument.

Places to read

1. 126dμηδὲν ὠφελῆσαι; ὠφελεῖν ἄλλον — Theages tests teaching by benefit to one’s son and to others
2. 127c–d2εὐεργετῇς; ὠφεληθῆναι; ὠφελῆσαι — the father’s request and Socrates’ civic-benefit question
3. 128eὠφεληθήσομαι — Charmides expects exercise itself to benefit him
4. 129eὠφελοῦνται δὲ οὐδέν; συλλάβηται τῆς συνουσίας — permission without benefit contrasts with active assistance
5. 130aβέβαιον … καὶ παραμόνιμον τὴν ὠφελίαν — some retain a stable benefit
6. 130eτῆς ὠφελίας ἣν ὠφελοῦσιν — the final recommendation foregrounds control over benefit

Translation in this edition

The repeated “benefit” preserves the argument’s continuity. “Takes a hand” renders the middle verb without adding a theory of divine transmission. “Do him whatever good you can” at 127d corresponds to euergetein, not an otherwise unmarked repetition of ōphelein.

Benefit — ὠφελεῖν

Benefit. To confer an advantage; Theages questions an educator’s ability through the failure to benefit his own son. Attested: ὠφελῆσαι (126d). Benefit and taking a hand.

Be benefited — ὠφελεῖν

Be benefited. To receive an advantage; these allowed companions receive none, so admission alone is insufficient. Attested: ὠφελοῦνται (129e). Benefit and taking a hand.

Benefit — ὠφελία

Benefit. The favourable result of association; some possess it firmly and lastingly, unlike companions whose advantage fades. Attested: ὠφελίαν (130a). Benefit and taking a hand.

Do good to — εὐεργετεῖν

Do good to. To confer a good on someone; Demodocus asks Socrates to do Theages whatever good he can. Attested: εὐεργετῇς (127d). Benefit and taking a hand.

Take a hand; help — συλλαμβάνεσθαι

Take a hand; help. The middle verb for helping an association; it marks active daimonic assistance beyond merely withholding a prohibition. Attested: συλλάβηται (129e). Benefit and taking a hand.

Use in the book

The plural ἀνωφελεῖς describes people in the respects in which they do not provide benefit. Socrates asks whether anyone will love them or be their friend in those matters, after the contrast between activities entrusted to the knowledgeable and activities withheld from the uncomprehending.

The limiting phrase ἐν οἷς, “in the things in which,” matters: the sentence begins with a domain-specific failure to help. The following generalizations about usefulness and affection are argumentative steps, not all contained in the adjective itself. The privative word belongs with the benefit vocabulary and should be distinguished lexically from ἄχρηστος, “useless,” even though their local roles are closely connected.

Places to read

1. 210cἐν οἷς ἂν ὦμεν ἀνωφελεῖς — In the things in which we are of no benefit.

Use in the book

At 221a a person who is hungry may be harmed or benefited. This separates appetite from its outcome: desiring is not automatically harmful. The related adjective ἀνωφελής, “of no benefit”, figures in the friendship question at 210c, and the adverb ὠφελίμως, “beneficially”, qualifies desire at 221b.

The passive ὠφελεῖσθαι means receive benefit; the active does not in itself specify whether the help is material, bodily, or intellectual.

Places to read

1. 221aἔστιν δὲ καὶ ὠφελεῖσθαι — it is also possible to be benefited.
2. 210c
3. 221a–b

Use in the book

At 214e Socrates asks what benefit a like thing can give another that the latter could not give itself. At 220c–d2, if nothing harmed us, the proposed remedial model would leave no need of benefit. The noun is paired with harm, not restricted to financial profit.

Burnet prints ὠφελία here; retain the edition’s spelling rather than silently replacing it with the familiar alternative ὠφέλεια. The distinct noun ὄφελος appears earlier at 208e.

Places to read

1. 214eτίνα ὠφελίαν — what benefit.
2. 220c–d2

Use in the book

Medicine is ὠφέλιμον καὶ ἀγαθόν, beneficial and good, at 217a–b. The related adverb ὠφελίμως at 221b describes desiring beneficially, in contrast with harmfully or neither.

The adjective emphasizes the benefit produced, while χρήσιμος emphasizes service or use; they overlap without being mechanically interchangeable. Its local application should not be expanded into a claim that every possible medical intervention is good.

Places to read

1. 221bὠφελίμως ἐπιθυμεῖν — to desire beneficially.
2. 217a–b

Use in the book

The opening argument insists that love intends benefits as well as magnificent gifts. A whole world would not satisfy friendship unless its use could advance the recipient's happiness. Benefit is therefore a relational and practical term: the world's value becomes effective through the soul's recognition and enjoyment. The relation then turns back toward the giver. Praises are benefits transformed and returned, not an independent payment capable of balancing the account. The return also extends laterally, since seeing others receive good becomes a benefit to the one who loves them. This vocabulary makes use inseparable from gratitude without reducing creation to disposable instruments.

Places to read

1. I.6Love seeks the benefits and uses of its gifts, not magnificence alone.
2. I.27Delight in the benefits given to all becomes a heavenly mode of enjoyment.
3. II.94Benefits received and understood return as praise.

In this edition

“Benefit” need not mean financial advantage. Its scope includes the knowledge, love, dignity, and enjoyment made possible by a gift.