Socrates

Use in the book

Socrates arrives as a survivor before he appears as an examiner. He returned from the army at Potidaea on the previous evening, finds his accustomed associates, answers questions about the fighting, and then asks about philosophy and promising young men. The move from military experience to conversation is quick, but the opening's report of acquaintances killed in battle is real within the fiction. It gives bodily survival a place before the final argument asks whether expertise that preserves life necessarily benefits its possessor.

His narration is deliberately compromising. He denies that he can reliably discriminate among beautiful youths, joins the scramble to seat Charmides nearby, and confesses that a glimpse inside the boy's cloak leaves him burning and beside himself. His recovery is also narrated: approval of the medical analogy restores his confidence. Reading this as an enacted victory of self-control is plausible, but the dialogue never declares that it has thereby exhibited a correct definition of temperance. The confession is more exact than an idealized picture of a philosopher immune to desire.

Socrates accepts Critias' proposal to pose as a doctor. He then transforms the pretext into a requirement that the soul receive treatment before the head. This role makes his authority unstable in productive ways. He is ostensibly the expert who has learned a remedy, but his actual procedure is to investigate whether the patient needs it. He does not independently certify Charmides' temperance from his appearance or reputation. At 158e–159a he asks the youth to formulate what the virtue is; at 165b–c2 he tells Critias that his questions arise from not knowing, and that agreement must follow examination rather than willingness to gratify an interlocutor.

The fullest statement of his purpose comes at 166c–e2. Even if he refutes Critias, he says, the aim is the same as when he examines himself: to avoid unawares thinking that he knows what he does not know. Personal victory should therefore give way to attention to the argument. This declaration is relevant to, but not identical with, the definition of temperance as knowledge of knowledge. The definition proposes a special cognitive capacity whose possibility and usefulness must be established; the narrated practice displays an examiner's motives and conduct. Treating the latter as already proving the former would prejudge the central inquiry.

Socrates repeatedly allows provisional concessions in order to continue. At the end he acknowledges their cost, describes the inquiry as defeated, and calls himself a poor investigator rather than announcing that temperance is worthless. Charmides nevertheless wants his continuing company. The final agreement to submit to the youth's and guardian's threatened force completes the reversal of the initially confident adult approaching an admired boy. It can be read simultaneously as comic courtship, renewed philosophical attachment, and an ominous exchange for readers who know the two aristocrats' later careers. The last of these is historical dramatic irony, not an explicit prediction by the narrator.

Places to read

1. 153a–d2The returned soldier narrates his welcome and asks about philosophy and the young
2. 154b–156d2345Self-deprecating erotic narration, medical impersonation, and recovery of confidence
3. 158d–159aJoint investigation replaces self-praise or reputational certification
4. 165b–c2He disclaims prior knowledge of the answers he requests
5. 166c–e2Refutation is defended as examination for his own and others’ benefit
6. 175b–176d23He admits argumentative failure, maintains the value of temperance, and accepts continued association

Translation in this edition

The edition preserves direct addresses to an unnamed listener, including “my friend” and “my noble friend.” These are part of Socrates' retrospective telling, not additional spoken contributions by a fifth interlocutor. At 153a Burnet prints the plural ἥκομεν, “we had got back”; it should not be silently changed into a solitary return.

ἀμήχανος

Attested: ἀμήχανόν (amēchanon). Extraordinary or impossible to deal with; intensifies the description of Charmides' look. References: 155d. Lexical identification: lemma: ἀμήχανος. See Socrates.

διατριβή

Attested: διατριβάς (diatribas). Accustomed haunts or places where Socrates spends his time; he returns to these familiar activities and meeting places after the campaign. References: 153a. Lexical identification: lemma: διατριβή. See Socrates.

συνήθης

Attested: συνήθεις (synētheis). Customary or familiar; qualifies the haunts to which Socrates returns. References: 153a. Lexical identification: lemma: συνήθης. See Socrates.

ἀνεζωπυρούμην (anezōpyroumēn)

I was being rekindled; Socrates regains conversational boldness after the boy accepts the medical analogy. References: 156d. Lemma: ἀναζωπυρέω. See Socrates.

ἁσμένως (hasmenōs)

Gladly; Socrates is pleased to return to his accustomed haunts after the campaign. References: 153a. Lemma: ἁσμένως. See Socrates.

ἀφιγμένος (aphigmenos)

Having arrived; Socrates returns after a period away, before visiting his usual haunts. References: 153a. Lemma: ἀφικνέομαι. See Socrates.

διατριβάς (diatribas)

Familiar places or occupations in which Socrates spends his time; his accustomed haunts, not necessarily formal philosophical schools. References: 153a. Lemma: διατριβή. See Socrates.

εἰσιόντα (eisionta)

Entering or coming in; the participle describes Socrates as the company first sees him. References: 153b. Lemma: εἴσειμι. See Socrates.

ᾖα (ēia)

I was going; the imperfect describes Socrates’ movement toward his accustomed places. References: 153a. Lemma: εἶμι (go). See Socrates.

λῆρον (lēron)

A babbler or worthless talker, applied by Socrates to himself if Charmides already possesses the virtue. References: 176a. Lemma: λῆρος. See Socrates.

Use in the book

Socrates begins with an apparent incongruity: he has remained an attentive lover for years without speaking. His account of a divine impediment explains the delay, while his exact knowledge of Alcibiades’ schooling and ambitions demonstrates the attention that silence concealed. Once he speaks, his immediate proposal is modest, to answer questions; his wider claim is extraordinarily large, that Alcibiades cannot fulfil his aspirations without him and the god.

His dramatic methods include praise, mock outrage, hypothetical conversations with a god or royal women, quotations from poetry, and jokes drawn from clothes, games and animals. He can describe Alcibiades’ advantages as genuine while denying that they authorize political advice. He also repeatedly makes the respondent responsible for the agreed answers. The teasing intimacy permits an unusually direct diagnosis of shameful ignorance: at 118b he stresses that only the two of them are present.

The claim to guide is qualified in two ways. At 124b–d2 Socrates insists that he too needs education and care; his advantage is a better guardian, the god, rather than an assertion that he already possesses every virtue. At 130c–d he accepts a sufficient but imprecise account of the person and explicitly leaves a larger investigation unfinished. These qualifications should not be erased by presenting him as a lecturer delivering an unqualified philosophical system.

The account of the lover at 131c–132a2 explains why he remains when others depart. Their interest was in what belongs to Alcibiades; his is directed to Alcibiades himself. This persistence is conditional on improvement and avoidance of corruption, rather than an unconditional endorsement of whatever the beloved becomes. At the end he welcomes reciprocal attendance, yet corrects “if you wish” to “if god wills” and fears the power of the city. His presence establishes a possibility of education, not a narrated guarantee of success.

Places to read

1. 103a–104e2Silence, divine restraint and the difficult beginning of the lover’s speech.
2. 105d–106b2A sweeping claim of indispensability leads to the request for answers.
3. 118bThe privacy of the two-person encounter permits the diagnosis.
4. 124b–124d2Socrates includes himself in the need for care.
5. 129b–129c2Socrates speaking by means of speech illustrates user and instrument.
6. 131c–132a2He identifies himself as the persistent lover.
7. 135d–135eDivine willing, reciprocal love and fear qualify the ending.

Translation in this edition

The edition’s Greek speaker abbreviation is ΣΩ.; it is editorial identification, not an additional spoken name. Socrates’ historical trial and execution belong to the supplied notes and reception of the ending, not to events narrated here.

σκώπτω

Attested: Σκώπτεις (skōpteis; 109d). To tease or mock, Alcibiades’ response to the request for his teacher of justice. Lexical identification: lemma: σκώπτω. See Socrates.

Σωκράτης

Attested: Σωκράτης (sōkratēs; 129b); Σώκρατες (sōkrates; 104c). Socrates, Alcibiades’ persistent lover and questioner. Lexical identification: lemma: Σωκράτης. See Socrates.

ὕβρις

Attested: ὕβρεως (hybreōs; 114d). Insolence, the word Socrates playfully takes up for his attempt to persuade the opposite. Lexical identification: lemma: ὕβρις. See Socrates.

ὑβριστής

Attested: Ὑβριστὴς (hybristēs; 114d). Insolent or outrageous person, Alcibiades’ accusation when challenged to practise persuading Socrates. Lexical identification: lemma: ὑβριστής. See Socrates.

Use in the book

He interrupts the errand by treating prayer as something requiring the greatest thought. His method includes distinctions, analogies, counterexamples, imagined divine offers and poetic interpretation. He also allows a faulty early conclusion to be abandoned: if all unintelligent people were mad in the ordinary sense, civic life would be intolerable. The replacement analysis is offered through comparison rather than announced as a final doctrine.

Socrates’ authority is carefully staged. He claims firsthand knowledge of the generals’ fortunes, but says he heard the story of Ammon from certain people. He introduces a hypothetical man wiser than both interlocutors when qualifying the condemnation of ignorance. He interprets the oracle and the poets, sometimes explicitly saying I think. None of these different evidential positions should be turned into a uniform omniscient narration.

The concluding educator is only described as the man who cares about Alcibiades. The surrounding action invites identification with Socrates: he has been giving the advice, says the man is eager, receives the wreath and wishes to triumph over Alcibiades’ lovers. Yet he does not explicitly name himself in response to the question. The educational promise remains indirect, and the knowledge of the best has not been demonstrated as his possessed curriculum.

The final erotic competition gives the advising relationship a personal stake. Socrates accepts the wreath as an omen of Alcibiades’ favourable opinion while comparing his predicament to Creon’s rough sea. His wish to win is prospective. The conversation ends with hope for a continuing relation, not with a narrated victory or a guarantee about Alcibiades’ future.

Places to read

1. 138a–138bSocrates interrupts the errand and reframes its practical demands.
2. 139c–140a2He corrects an overbroad inference and invites joint inquiry.
3. 141e–142aHe claims direct acquaintance with civic examples.
4. 143b–143c2A wiser imagined critic qualifies the general attack on ignorance.
5. 148d–149b2The oracle story is explicitly reported and then interpreted.
6. 150d–151c2Care, the wreath and erotic rivalry frame the prospective education.

Translation in this edition

The source’s Introduction treats authorship as doubtful and notes that the dramatic dates cannot be reconciled. This Socrates is the dialogue’s represented speaker, not a documentary transcript of a historically possible meeting. Note 39 marks identification with the unnamed educator as a reading, not an explicit statement.

Use in the book

Socrates directs both the inquiry into gain and the episode that lends the dialogue its title. He asks for the love of gain to be defined, subjects successive answers to counterexamples, and repeatedly draws the companion toward a universal conclusion: everyone loves gain if gain is good. His authority is expressed less through a declaration of doctrine than through the sequence of questions he selects and the agreements he recalls.

That direction is not invisible to the companion. At 228a the companion accuses Socrates of turning things up and down in the arguments. Socrates answers with the story of Hipparchus, not with an immediate formal defence of every inference. He presents himself as obedient to a good and wise fellow citizen, whose injunction against deceiving a friend should guarantee his conduct. The companion refuses that guarantee, applying its terms back to the speaker.

Socrates then offers to take back an argumentative move, as in draughts. This makes his conduct more flexible than a simple exercise of authority: the interlocutor can nominate an agreement for revision. Yet the menu of alternatives and the ensuing comparisons remain Socrates’ construction. The companion eventually describes the result as compulsion rather than persuasion. A reader must therefore attend to the distinction between allowing a reply and securing genuine conviction.

The final formulation includes Socrates within the human love of good things, while the reproach against love of gain recoils on anyone who makes it. This does not erase the possibility of greed or dishonest acquisition; it shows how the conclusion follows when gain is treated as benefit. Whether Socrates deliberately exposes equivocation, strategically provokes the companion, or simply advances an imperfect argument remains a question of interpretation. His status as the familiar philosophical character is not a substitute for checking each step.

Places to read

1. 228aὦ Σώκρατες — The direct address occurs in the companion’s explicit accusation.
2. 228bοὐ πειθόμενος — Socrates explains himself through obedience to an admired authority.
3. 229eὥσπερ πεττεύων — He offers the limited analogy of taking back a move in draughts.
4. 229eἵνα μὴ οἴῃ — The stated purpose is that the companion should not think himself deceived.

Translation in this edition

The speaker abbreviation ΣΩ. and the translation label “Soc.” identify dialogue turns, not separate narrative layers. The edition leaves the setting and occasion unspecified. Its Introduction explicitly cautions against assuming that every argument is sound or that every Socratic assertion records Plato’s own doctrine.

Use in the book

His opening action is bodily and unceremonious: he nudges a lover with his elbow and asks what deserves the lads’ earnestness. That man’s contempt turns an overheard discussion about astronomy into a discussion about philosophy. Socrates first lets the athlete go because the latter claims experience in deeds rather than words, then recalls him as an ally once physical training supplies a relevant counterexample. This is a redistribution of authority within the scene: verbal confidence does not make one the best witness on every subject.

Socrates never places himself wholly outside the competitive and erotic setting. He is vulnerable to beautiful youths, makes the rivals answer before their audience, and teases them with the prospect that the lads might solve what their lovers cannot. His narrative “we” includes himself among those at a loss at 135a. Readers need not choose between a sincere inquiry and dramatic management: the written scene supplies evidence of both, without giving access to a hidden intention.

The final argument is likewise conducted through questions and agreements rather than an uninterrupted lecture. Socrates rejects the conclusion that philosophers are base and useless at 137b, then brings philosophy into proximity with self-knowledge and right judgment. He does not finish with a new formal definition. His last explicit result is that philosophy is far from much learning and preoccupation with the crafts. The authority of the protagonist should not erase the compressed steps by which that result is reached.

Places to read

1. 132cὦ Σώκρατες — The cultured lover addresses the first-person narrator by name.
2. 133aκαὶ ὅτι μὲν οἱ ἐρασταὶ ἔπαθον οὐκ οἶδα — Socrates marks a limit to his knowledge of the lovers’ response.
3. 135aἀπορίας μεστοὶ ἦμεν ἅπαντες — His narration includes everyone in the perplexity.

Translation in this edition

The edition’s introduction stresses that Socrates narrates to no named listener. Burnet supplies neither a cast list nor speaker labels, so an English quotation mark or paragraph break is a reading aid, not an ancient stage direction. The note at 133a compares Socrates’ susceptibility to beauty with the “white line” image in the Charmides, a builder’s marking line invisible on white stone that suggests an inability to discriminate among beautiful youths; this is an editorial parallel, not a reference made by the speaker here. The edition also treats the dialogue’s attribution to Plato as disputed. Its Socrates should therefore be read first as this work’s represented speaker, without assuming that every statement establishes either the historical Socrates’ doctrine or Plato’s settled position.

Use in the book

Socrates begins as the adviser Demodocus most wants to consult. He questions the desired wisdom before recommending a teacher, and tests the boy's political ambition through specialized crafts, rulers and poetry. When the discussion reaches the limits of the statesmen as teachers, Theages identifies Socrates as the companion he wants (127a). The adviser has become the proposed educational solution.

Socrates does not simply accept that role on the terms offered. He questions why his benefit should exceed the father's, points to the sophists who profess to educate, and disclaims their subjects while excepting the things of love (127d–128b). Theages counters with observed changes in acquaintances. Socrates then corrects the boy's assumption that his wish alone can produce an equivalent result. The daimonic power governs the association, and the range of outcomes prevents a guarantee (128c–130e234).

This progression makes Socrates both indispensable to the dramatic inquiry and resistant to the status of an ordinary supplier of lessons. The last agreement is to make a trial, not to announce that Theages has been educated. No curriculum, fee or definite outcome is settled. A reading that treats the ending as the straightforward formation of a school contract misses the qualifications Socrates has just given.

The lexicon describes the Socrates portrayed in this transmitted work. Its disputed authorship and the differences among ancient accounts prevent this characterization from being treated as transparent historical testimony about every aspect of the historical Socrates. Comparisons with Apology or Theaetetus may clarify specific affinities, but they must not erase the expanded functions of the sign here.

Places to read

1. 127aεἰ γὰρ σύ μοι ἐθέλοις συνεῖναι, ἐξαρκεῖ — Theages says Socrates' willing association would suffice
2. 127dὠφελῆσαι πρὸς τὸ πολίτην ἀγαθὸν γενέσθαι — Socrates asks about the capacity to produce civic benefit
3. 128bὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν οὐδὲν ἐπιστάμενος — His “so to speak” lack of knowledge is immediately qualified by an exception
4. 128dἀλλά σε λέληθεν οἷον τοῦτ’ ἔστιν — Socrates says the nature of the phenomenon has escaped Theages

Translation in this edition

The translation preserves the qualification “so to speak”, the love exception and the distinction between wishing and being able. The source's introductory statement that Socrates “holds no office” goes beyond the narrower wording at 127e; this companion follows the latter and does not repeat the stronger inference.

Able — οἷός τε (hoios te) · οἷός τ’ (127d).

οἷός τε (hoios te)

Able. Expresses capacity to benefit the boy; willingness alone is not the same claim. Attested: οἷός τ’ (127d). Socrates and the qualification of his competence.

Reasonable — εἰκός (eikos)

εἰκός (eikos)

Reasonable. What Socrates calls the choice of professed educators rather than himself, given the advertised qualifications. Attested: εἰκὸς (128a). Socrates and the qualification of his competence.

Socrates — Σωκράτης (Sōkratēs)

Σωκράτης (Sōkratēs)

Socrates. The addressee approached for a private consultation and later selected as the desired companion. Attested: Σώκρατες (121a). Socrates and the qualification of his competence.

So to speak nothing except (contextual phrase)

128b: ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν οὐδὲν ἐπιστάμενος. “Knowing, so to speak, nothing” is immediately followed by the love exception. The idiomatic hedge and the exception both qualify the claim. Treating it as an unqualified denial of every competence makes the speaker contradict a proposition stronger than he states. The extraordinary boast in the excepted subject remains part of the same speech. See Socrates and Love.

Use in the book

Socrates initiates the inquiry and usually directs the short questions. The companion nevertheless makes contributions that structure the entire argument. He asks which law Socrates means, proposes accepted usages and civic resolutions, objects to the definition from the actual variety of customs, offers concrete cases, and explicitly says that he cannot be persuaded when legal change remains before his mind. Later he supplies Rhadamanthys' favorable reputation, Minos' unfavorable one, and the question of why that unfavorable report arose. He is neither a named historical authority nor a merely silent recipient of a finished doctrine.

His relation to his own community is significant. He contrasts “with us” and Carthaginian sacrifice, remembers earlier Athenian burial practices through reports, and voices a picture of Minos that Socrates identifies as Attic. Socrates, for his part, eventually says that “we” take vengeance on Minos in tragedy. This shared civic position gives the conversation a self-critical possibility: Athenians can be both interpreters of law and inheritors of a retaliatory story about a lawgiver. It does not warrant assuming that every Athenian held a single belief about Minos.

At 315d–e Socrates says that separate long speeches will not bring them to agreement and proposes a common inquiry. The companion can either question him or answer him. The option matters: common inquiry is initially offered as a relation of participation, not simply as submission to questioning. The companion chooses to answer. Even after the resulting agreement on just, heavy, and fine things, he preserves his objection about change. Agreement to individual propositions and persuasion by their use are therefore distinguished by the dramatic exchange itself.

The later account of Minos is much longer than the short-question sequence. That is a change in manner, but not a reason to declare Socrates guilty of exactly the procedure he criticized. His criticism concerns each man speaking separately what seems true to him without putting the inquiry in common. The Minos account responds to questions, cites purported evidence, and receives an assessment from the companion. Whether those features are sufficient to answer the earlier methodological concern is a legitimate interpretive question. The lexicon need not settle it by equating every long speech with an illicit monologue.

The force of the companion's answers varies. “Yes,” “necessarily,” “it appears so,” “a reasonable argument,” and “I can no longer say” are not interchangeable. Socrates' own qualifications also vary, from “perhaps” to a pointed “say so” at 318a. The latter makes the transition to kingly care of souls conspicuously assertive. At 321b Socrates himself makes the continuation conditional on the truth of what he has said. The dialogue allows a reader to follow degrees of confidence rather than treating its sequence of assents as one unbroken proof.

The final shame is shared. Socrates says “for the soul of each of us,” including himself in the failure to identify the soul's improving distributions. That inclusion does not make all earlier speeches identical in status, but it prevents attributing the closing ignorance exclusively to the companion. The two speakers can name what improves a body and still be unable to name the corresponding psychic provision. Their conversation ends at that precise demand.

Places to read

1. 313aὉ νόμος ἡμῖν τί ἐστιν; — Socrates starts with the shared “for us,” while the companion asks which of the laws he means
2. 315d–eἐὰν δὲ κοινὸν τεθῇ τὸ σκέμμα, τάχ’ ἂν ὁμολογήσαιμεν — putting the inquiry in common is presented as a possible route to agreement
3. 315eεἰ δ’ αὖ βούλει, ἀποκρινόμενος — answering is offered as an alternative to the companion's questioning Socrates
4. 316cοὐ δύναμαι πεισθῆναι — the companion says he cannot be persuaded by the argument as it stands before his continuing experience of change
5. 318aοὐχ οἱ τοῦ βασιλέως; φάθι — Socrates presses the assignment of the best laws for souls to the king
6. 321bεἰκότα τὸν λόγον εἰρηκέναι — the companion calls Socrates' account reasonable, before the conditional continuation
7. 321dτῇ ψυχῇ ἡμῶν ἐστιν ἑκατέρου — the closing reproach concerns the soul of each speaker

Translation in this edition

“Comp.” preserves the lack of a personal name. The introduction's identification of an Athenian companion is an inference from the first-person customs and the Attic account, not information from an otherwise missing narrator. The edition reproduces Burnet's run-in exchanges from 314c onward: a dash and a fresh speaker abbreviation can change the voice within the same printed paragraph. A reader should track those abbreviations before attributing a sentence to Socrates. The small-cap labels, title, and abbreviated names belong to the printed apparatus of reading; they do not all supply spoken lexical attestations.

I say so — φημί (phēmi)

φημί (phēmi)

I say so. The companion explicitly assents after Socrates prompts him to say that the king’s laws are best for human souls; the form expresses a conversational commitment, not an independent proof. Attested: Φημὶ (318a). Companion and the conduct of Socrates.

Socrates — Σωκράτης (Sōkratēs)

Σωκράτης (Sōkratēs)

Socrates. The named speaker who initiates the definition of law, directs most of the questioning, defends Minos, and includes himself in the final shame at not knowing the soul's improving provisions; here addressed by his companion. Attested: Σώκρατες (313b). Companion and the conduct of Socrates.

Asking or answering (contextual phrase)

315e: πυνθανόμενός τι παρ’ ἐμοῦ … εἰ δ’ αὖ βούλει, ἀποκρινόμενος. Socrates explicitly offers the companion two roles, asking something of him or answering him. The companion chooses the latter. This matters when evaluating the method: the proposal is not worded as a demand that only Socrates may ask questions. The subsequent distribution of speech results from the choice made in the conversation. See Companion and Socrates.

Use in the book

He recounts the entire encounter to an unnamed listener. His reported questions move between Hippothales, Lysis, and Menexenus. His final inclusion of himself among the boys’ friends is compatible with his admission that their definition has failed; dramatic participation and theoretical success are distinct.

Places to read

1. 203aὦ Σώκρατες — Socrates, as a form of address.
2. 203a–b
3. 204b–c
4. 211d–212a2
5. 223b

Use in the book

The market scene exposes the gap between an abundance of merchandise and genuine need. Traherne accepts freedom from dependency on trivial additions, yet refuses to make absolute needlessness the final ideal. We need the freely given heavens, earth, souls, bodies, and riches of divine likeness. Right enjoyment can therefore make us independent of pomp while fully receptive to creation. The closing qualification about what the pagan philosopher may not have known is important: goods proceed from God and return through human enjoyment and acknowledgment. Socrates becomes both a useful witness against luxury and a point beyond which Christian understanding must move.

Places to read

1. I.40The market anecdote moves from needing few artificial goods to receiving all true gifts.

In this edition

The 2026 note identifies parallels in Xenophon and Diogenes Laertius and explains the London colouring of the Exchange and shopkeepers’ cry. Traherne’s scene is a retelling, not a transcript of ancient Athens.

Use in the book

On page 29 Khunrath tells the doubter that he does not yet know everything and must learn with wise Socrates until the grave. The neighbouring maxim denies that one person's ignorance forbids knowledge to others. Nature's world-book is inexhaustible, and the son of doctrine is someone willing to be instructed and to reconsider. Socrates thus helps distinguish modest uncertainty from the presumption that an unfamiliar claim must be false.

The page does not make Socrates a possessor of the Stone or cite a particular dialogue. A later saying on page 157, asking a person to speak so that his character may be heard, is identified as Socratic in the modern note, but the primary text there does not name him.

Places to read

1. 1599 p. 29Socrates exemplifies continued learning alongside the son of doctrine.
2. 1599 p. 157The speak-and-be-heard maxim offers a related judgement of character, though Socrates is not named on this page.

Translation in this edition

The distinction between named presence and editorially identified echo is important: only page 29 explicitly gives the name.