Delphi and Apollo

Use in the book

Critias invokes Delphi after refusing to accept that a temperate person could fail to know himself. He equates temperance with knowing oneself and agrees with the person who dedicated the corresponding inscription. He then offers an interpretation of its social function. The god greets each entrant with the equivalent of “Be temperate,” expressed enigmatically as “Know thyself,” instead of the customary human greeting “Rejoice.”

This is explicitly Critias' reading: he repeatedly marks what seems to him to have been the dedicator's intention. It does not follow that the inscription was historically installed for exactly this purpose, or that Socrates accepts its proposed equivalence before inquiry. The speech gives the new definition prestige and a memorable verbal shape; it does not relieve Critias of accounting for it.

Critias also claims that later dedicators misunderstood the first maxim as advice and competed by adding “Nothing too much” and “Pledge, and ruin is near.” Thus the speech distinguishes a divine greeting from human counsel and tells a miniature history of misinterpretation. Its chronological and motivational claims belong to the character's exposition, not to a securely documented sequence of Delphic building inscriptions.

The sanctuary setting has a dramatic echo. Socrates earlier called the formula about doing one's own business a riddle; Critias now makes riddling speech characteristic of the god as prophet. At 166d Socrates' invitation to “say goodbye” to who is refuted reuses the chairein vocabulary the Delphic speech had displaced. Such local correspondences encourage attention to how sacred authority and ordinary conversation are intertwined.

Places to read

1. 164d–165b2Critias interprets the inscription and contrasts divine greeting with human advice
2. 166d–e2Socrates’ “say goodbye to” returns to the greeting’s verbal family

Translation in this edition

The translation “Rejoice!” deliberately exposes the literal force of χαῖρε rather than replacing it with a neutral “Hello.” “Apollo” is explanatory identification, not an attested Greek name in this passage. The Greek singular gramma at first names one inscription; later grammata refers to additional sayings.

Δελφοί

Attested: Δελφοῖς (delphois). Delphi, the sanctuary where the inscription “Know thyself” was dedicated; Critias appeals to its divine authority. References: 164d. Lexical identification: lemma: Δελφοί. See Delphi and Apollo.

θεός

Attested: θεὸς / θεοῦ (theos / theou). A god or the god; Zalmoxis is described as divine by his doctor, while the singular at Delphi denotes the sanctuary’s god as speaker of the greeting. References: 156d, 164d. Lexical identification: lemma: θεός. See Delphi and Apollo.

ἱερόν

Attested: ἱεροῦ / ἱερὸν (hierou / hieron). Shrine or sacred precinct; first Basile’s sanctuary opposite the palaestra, later Apollo’s at Delphi. References: 153a, 164e. Lexical identification: lemma: ἱερόν. See Delphi and Apollo.

ἀνακεῖσθαι (anakeisthai)

Be set up or dedicated; describes the Delphic inscription’s presence as a greeting. References: 164d. Lemma: ἀνάκειμαι. See Delphi and Apollo.

παθεῖν (pathein)

Have undergone or experienced; here the later dedicators supposedly made the mistake of construing a greeting as advice. References: 165a. Lemma: πάσχω. See Delphi and Apollo.

Use in the book

The first appeal comes at the close of the royal comparison. Socrates tells Alcibiades to listen both to him and to the writing at Delphi: know yourself, for these are your real opponents. Self-knowledge initially bears on an accurate recognition of one’s resources and deficiencies. The imperative does not leave the young man in passive modesty; it tells him why care and craft are necessary.

At 129a the inscription is revisited after distinguishing care of a person from care of possessions. Socrates asks whether knowing oneself is easy and whether the dedicator at the temple in Pytho was a person of no account. The question presupposes the importance of the injunction while reopening its difficulty. Alcibiades has found it alternately accessible and extremely hard. No named dedicator is established here.

At 130e the injunction is interpreted as bidding the hearer know the soul; at 132c–d2 Socrates proposes what he suspects the Delphic words mean by recasting their advice to an eye as “see yourself.” The shift from a familiar maxim to a problem requiring an explanatory model is crucial. The authority of the inscription does not deliver a complete answer without investigation. Socrates marks his account as an interpretation, and the earlier inquiry into the person was explicitly only adequate, not precise.

The site therefore unites admonition, inquiry and interpretation. It should not be reduced to a slogan about acknowledging social rank, nor expanded into an independently stated theology that the dialogue never supplies. The wisdom of the saying is treated as something to work out in the conversation.

Places to read

1. 124a–124bThe inscription joins Socrates’ demand to recognize the actual rivals.
2. 129aThe dedication at Pytho introduces the difficulty of self-knowledge.
3. 130eThe command is interpreted in relation to the soul.
4. 132c–132d2Socrates offers a proposed interpretation through the example of sight.

Translation in this edition

The edition prints “know thyself” as Socrates’ command continuous with his speech, not an inserted quotation followed by a second command. Its notes identify the temple as Apollo’s and connect the maxim with other dialogues; Apollo’s personal name is not spoken here.

γράμμα

Attested: γράμματι (grammati; 124a). Inscription or writing, here the Delphic command rather than a single alphabetic letter. Lexical identification: lemma: γράμμα. See Delphi and Pytho.

Δελφοί / Δελφικός

Attested: ἐν Δελφοῖς γράμματι (en delphois grammati; 124a); Δελφικοῦ γράμματος (delphikou grammatos; 132c). Delphi and Delphic: the place and adjective specifying the inscription on self-knowledge. Lexical identification: family label: Δελφοί / Δελφικός. See Delphi and Pytho.

νεώς

Attested: νεών (neōn; 129a). A temple; the Delphic temple contains the dedication whose command directs the inquiry towards the self. Lexical identification: lemma: νεώς. See Delphi and Pytho.

Πυθώ

Attested: ἐν Πυθοῖ νεών (en pythoi neōn; 129a). Pytho, the other name for the place of the temple and inscription. Lexical identification: lemma: Πυθώ. See Delphi and Pytho.

Use in the book

Hipparchus selects and publishes his sayings with an expressly comparative purpose: his citizens are not to admire the wise inscriptions at Delphi but to consider his own words wiser. The competition is therefore not only between particular schools in Athens. It sets an individual ruler’s programme against a widely recognised source of concise wisdom.

The maxims’ content makes the competition especially suggestive. “Know thyself” invites scrutiny of one’s own condition and limits; the narrative attributes wisdom to Hipparchus through his own selection of what he considers wisest. “Nothing too much” enjoins a check on excess; the dialogue elsewhere examines people said to crave small or worthless things without satisfaction. These are connections a reader can test, not interpretations explicitly laid out by Socrates in the story. He never demonstrates that either Delphic maxim is inferior.

The contrast also creates a tension with the statement that Hipparchus begrudges wisdom to no one. Giving people access to wisdom and seeking superior recognition can occur together. The generous distribution of maxims does not eliminate rivalry over their authorship and prestige. Conversely, rivalry alone does not establish that the new injunctions are false: thinking justly and not deceiving friends remain intelligible ethical demands.

In the Charmides, Critias gives a distinctive reading of “Know thyself” as the god’s greeting and contrasts it with other inscribed advice. That parallel, cited by the supplied edition, shows that familiar maxims could be contested and interpreted within Socratic dialogue. It does not authorize transferring Critias’ entire account of self-knowledge into the Hipparchus, which merely names the sayings as rival objects of admiration.

Places to read

1. 228eτὰ ἐν Δελφοῖς γράμματα — Delphi is introduced through its written sayings.
2. 228eΓνῶθι σαυτόν — The first maxim is an injunction to know oneself.
3. 228eΜηδὲν ἄγαν — The second compresses a demand against excess.
4. 228eτὰ Ἱππάρχου ῥήματα — Hipparchus’ sayings are the proposed rivals.

Translation in this edition

The edition preserves Burnet’s initial capitals and quotation marks around the maxims. Its “Nothing too much” is deliberately terse and does not supply a missing verb. “Wiser” renders the comparative judgment Hipparchus wants citizens to make; it is not a judgment independently endorsed by the editor or established in the argument.

Use in the book

The inscription is invoked at 138a after knowing oneself has been identified with being temperate. Socrates says this, it seems, is what the writing at Delphi urges: to practice temperance and justice. The familiar background is “Know thyself,” explained in edition note 27. The dialogue does not itself reproduce that imperative in Greek, so it must not be printed as though it were an exact quotation from this section.

The mention of justice is important. Temperance has just been linked directly with self-knowledge, while justice entered as the knowledge of right punishment. The inscription is now interpreted as urging both, and the following exchange brings the two capacities under the same knowledge. Delphi supplies an authoritative ethical resonance, but the reasoning remains in the argument’s identifications; the inscription alone does not prove them.

Practice also matters. The text does not treat self-knowledge merely as an interesting proposition about the self. The instruction concerns cultivation of virtues which will soon be applied to household and city. The movement toward practical responsibility is thus already present before the philosopher is told to judge and lead.

The episode contrasts with the lover’s earlier quotation of Solon. Both speakers draw on culturally authoritative words, but Socrates does not use Delphi to prescribe an accumulation of learning. He interprets a familiar saying as requiring a kind of knowledge and conduct that resists the runner-up model. This comparison is an interpretive observation about the dialogue’s structure, not an explicit contrast voiced by either speaker.

Places to read

1. 138aτὸ ἐν Δελφοῖς γράμμα παρακελεύεται — The text refers to and interprets an inscription rather than quoting its wording.
2. 138aσωφροσύνην ἀσκεῖν καὶ δικαιοσύνην — Its exhortation is stated as practicing two virtues.

Translation in this edition

Note 27 identifies the inscription at Apollo’s temple and compares Critias’ reading in Charmides 164d–165a, where “Know thyself” is understood as the god’s greeting and as “Be temperate.” The Lovers adds justice to its interpretation. These details are reported from the supplied edition; the dialogue names neither Critias nor the Charmides.