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whether it is possible

εἰ δυνατόν ἐστιν

The first of Socrates’ two questions about knowledge of knowledge · Charmides

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Charmides

Plato · Diotimos Editions · November 2026

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Orientation

At a Glance

  • The word“Whether it is possible”: the question of possibility, put before the question of benefit.
  • In the CharmidesTwice: in Socrates’ plan, “first whether it is possible or not for this to be … and second, even if it is entirely possible, what benefit there would be” (167b), and in his confession, “I can neither say with confidence whether it is possible for this to come about” (169a–b).
  • In this edition“Whether it is possible”.
  • A place to read167a–169d.
English renderings
εἰ δυνατόν ἐστιν, ei dynaton estin, “whether it is possible”; εἰ δυνατόν ἐστι, ei dynaton esti, “whether it is possible”

Use in the book

Critias has given his final definition, that temperance is knowledge of itself and of the other kinds of knowledge, and of the lack of knowledge, and Socrates sets the inquiry in order: “Then once more … the third time, for the Savior, let us look, as though from the beginning, first whether it is possible or not for this to be, to know what one knows and what one does not know, ⟨that one knows it and⟩ that one does not know it; and second, even if it is entirely possible, what benefit there would be for us in knowing it” (167a–b; see τὸ τρίτον τῷ σωτῆρι; ὠφελία).

The first question is pursued for two pages. The procession of powers makes such a knowledge look impossible by its likeness to a sight that sees no colour and a love that loves nothing beautiful (167c–168a; see αἴσθησις αἰσθήσεων καὶ ἑαυτῆς); the greater and the double make the likeness strict (168b–d); the cases are sorted and the question handed to a great man (168e–169a; see μέγας ἀνήρ). Socrates then states his position: he can neither say with confidence “whether it is possible for this to come about, for there to be knowledge of knowledge”, nor, even if it most certainly exists, accept that it is temperance until he has looked into whether it would benefit us (169a–b).

The order of the questions decides the shape of the dialogue. The first is never answered; it is granted, “for now” (169d; see δυνατός), so that the second can be asked; and the second is answered in the negative: a temperance of this kind would be of no benefit (175a; see ἀνωφελής). At the end Socrates counts the grant among the things conceded that the argument did not allow (175b–c; see πολλὰ συγχωρεῖν). The phrase thus marks a question the dialogue leaves unanswered, and can be read as leaving it so on purpose.

Places to read

The passages in which the phrase occurs, with the grant that sets it aside.

  1. 167bFirst whether it is possible to know what one knows and does not know, and second what benefit there would be.
  2. 169a–b2Socrates cannot say with confidence whether it is possible, nor accept that it is temperance until he has looked into its benefit.
  3. 169dLet us grant for now that it is possible, and look into it again another time.

Translation in this edition

Εἰ δυνατόν ἐστιν τοῦτ’ εἶναι ἢ οὔ (167b1–2) is “whether it is possible or not for this to be”, the English bringing “or not” forward; εἰ δυνατόν ἐστι τοῦτο γενέσθαι (169a8) “whether it is possible for this to come about”. The companion phrase εἰ ὅτι μάλιστα δυνατόν (167b3) is “even if it is entirely possible”. The words in angle brackets, the edition’s note at 167b says, are supplied from later manuscripts.

Elsewhere in Plato

The Republic puts the same two questions in the same order and answers both. Socrates hesitates before the community of wives and children because it will be doubted both that it is possible and that, even if it came about, it would be best (450c; see ἀπιστία). On women guardians he says that the inquiry was whether what they proposed was possible and best; that it is possible has been agreed, and next it must be agreed that it is best (456c); and he concludes that the law they laid down is not only possible but best for the city (457a), and asks whether the argument agrees with itself that what it says is possible and beneficial (457c). The Republic’s pair, possible and best, and at 457c possible and beneficial, is the Charmides’ pair, and the difference between the dialogues is that the Charmides leaves the first open and gives the second a negative answer.