From the book
Phaedrus
Plato · Diotimos Editions · 2026
Browse this book’s lexicon →Orientation
At a Glance
- The wordThe question “whom should one gratify?” begins as an erotic bargain and ends as a question about the gods whom a speaker should aim to please.
- In the PhaedrusPhaedrus states the whole question with charisteon, “one should gratify”, at 227c. Lysias’ speaker then calculates obligations. The lover adds up expenditure, neglected affairs and toil and concludes that he has already repaid the beloved; the non-lover claims to give willingly and within his means (231a–b). Later the speaker rejects need as the governing criterion: the boy should prefer those most able to return the favour, not simply those most desperate for it (233d–234a). His apparent generosity is tied to the expectation of reciprocity.
- In this editionThe edition’s “gratify” preserves the connection between erotic favours and the later service to gods. “Favour” and “grateful” express different constructions of charis: at 233d those relieved of great evils will know gratitude, whereas at 231b lovers think they have returned the favour due. These constructions should not be collapsed into a single financial sense of debt, although the speeches deliberately use the language of repayment.
- A place to readThe erotic request and the lover’s reckoning.
Meaning
To gratify someone is to please or oblige them by granting a favour. The Phaedrus first asks whether a boy should grant an admirer the favours he seeks; later it asks whom a good speaker should try to please. For example, Socrates says the speaker’s demanding work should chiefly gratify good divine masters, with pleasing other people a secondary task (273e–274a). Giving, receiving and repaying a favour remain different acts.
Use in the book
Phaedrus states the whole question with charisteon, “one should gratify”, at 227c. Lysias’ speaker then calculates obligations. The lover adds up expenditure, neglected affairs and toil and concludes that he has already repaid the beloved; the non-lover claims to give willingly and within his means (231a–b). Later the speaker rejects need as the governing criterion: the boy should prefer those most able to return the favour, not simply those most desperate for it (233d–234a). His apparent generosity is tied to the expectation of reciprocity.
This accounting becomes the crisis in the first Socratic speech. The boy demands the favour due under old promises, while the lover who has regained sense refuses to honour what his former state promised (241a–b). “Becoming another” breaks the imagined continuity of the debtor. The language therefore exposes a weakness in making a changing appetite the guarantor of a lasting exchange.
The palinode does not erase the erotic sense. The bad horse forces an approach to mention the favour of Aphrodite’s pleasures (254a), and the beloved would not refuse to gratify the lover if asked, until the better elements oppose that course (256a). But at the close Socrates addresses Love as a recipient of the palinode, asking pardon for the first speech and favour for the second (257a). The speech itself is now a gift and a discharged obligation.
The conversational uses connect these scenes. Socrates will not concede that Lysias exhausted the subject simply to gratify Phaedrus, since earlier wise speakers would refute him (235b). Agreement offered as a personal favour cannot replace a warranted judgement. At 273e–274a the long labour of the true speaker is directed primarily toward gratifying good divine masters, not human fellow slaves. Pleasing people is allowed as a secondary task, not made the ruling end. The next question, how to gratify a god about speeches, opens the discussion of writing (274b).
Places to read
- 227cThe erotic request and the lover’s reckoning.
- 231a–bThe erotic request and the lover’s reckoning.
- 233d–234c2Need, worthiness, repayment and mutual benefit.
- 235bSocrates refuses a merely gratifying concession.
- 241a–bThe beloved demands the debt.
- 254aSexual favour and the palinode offered to Love.
- 256aSexual favour and the palinode offered to Love.
- 257aSexual favour and the palinode offered to Love.
- 273e–274b2The speaker’s work should gratify the gods.
Translation in this edition
The edition’s “gratify” preserves the connection between erotic favours and the later service to gods. “Favour” and “grateful” express different constructions of charis: at 233d those relieved of great evils will know gratitude, whereas at 231b lovers think they have returned the favour due. These constructions should not be collapsed into a single financial sense of debt, although the speeches deliberately use the language of repayment.
Lexical detail
Charizesthai means to do what pleases someone, to oblige him or grant him a favour. In the erotic speeches the boy’s gratifying an admirer means granting the favour for which that admirer is asking. Charis can name the favour itself, the gratitude felt for it or the favourable reception one seeks. Context and grammatical direction decide who gives, who receives and who owes.
This vocabulary lets the dialogue test generosity against exchange. A favour can be freely offered, calculated as a debt, demanded as repayment, or directed towards a good beyond the approval of the immediate audience. The same family also appears in gracious conversational concessions.
Attested forms
χαριστέον (227c · Burnet p. 2) — “one should gratify”. The question posed by Lysias’ speech.
χαρίζεσθαι (273e–274a · Burnet p. 65) — “gratifying”. The proper principal recipients become the gods.
χάριν (231b · Burnet p. 6) — “favour”. What lovers count as already repaid.
χάριν (257a · Burnet p. 41) — “favour”. Socrates asks Love to receive the palinode favourably.
Research and interpretation
The indexed LSJ entry for charizō confirms the family’s scope of obliging or gratifying someone. The erotic bargain and the service to gods are distinct native contexts. Neither every favour nor every occurrence of charis is a financial debt.
ἡγέομαι
The verb can mean believing something or leading someone, according to its construction. In Lysias’ speech, lovers believe that they have already repaid their beloved’s favour. In the heavenly procession, the ruling gods lead their assigned ranks. Reading the first use as governing a soul would confuse two different local meanings.
hēgeomai · Believe and lead · lemma
To take something to be the case; elsewhere, to lead.
In Lysias’ speech lovers believe they have already repaid the favour. In the heavenly procession the ruling gods act as leaders. These are distinct established constructions of the verb; the occurrence expressing belief should not automatically be glossed as governance of the soul.
Attested: ἡγοῦνται (231b · Burnet p. 6) — “they believe”. Takes an infinitive concerning the favour repaid.
Attested: ἡγοῦνται (247a · Burnet p. 28) — “act as leaders”. The ruling gods lead in their assigned ranks.
See: Divine following and imitation; Gratifying and gratitude; Opinion and seeming
λανθάνω
To escape notice is to remain unrecognized, including by the person undergoing an experience. The dialogue repeatedly separates having an experience from understanding it.
At 255d the beloved sees himself reflected in the lover but does not recognize what is happening.
lanthanō · Escape notice · lemma
To be unobserved or fail to be recognized, sometimes by oneself.
Those beginning inquiry can fail to notice their own ignorance. The boy fails to notice that the recovered lover has changed; the beloved later fails to recognize himself in the lover’s mirror. With a supplementary participle the Greek often says that someone does something without noticing it, not that the action is unreal.
Attested: λέληθεν (237c · Burnet p. 15) — “it escapes the notice”. The many do not recognize their ignorance.
Attested: λέληθεν (241a · Burnet p. 20) — “has escaped his darling’s notice”. The lover’s change remains unrecognized.
Attested: λέληθεν (255d · Burnet p. 39) — “it escapes his notice”. The beloved sees himself without recognizing it.
Attested: ἔλαθον (259c · Burnet p. 44) — “escaped their own notice”. The singers died without noticing.
See: Counter-love and mirror; Gratifying and gratitude; Knowledge and ignorance; Self-knowledge
μεταγιγνώσκω
Changing one’s mind means revising a decision. Lysias’ speaker denies that non-lovers will need to reverse their freely chosen benefactions.
At 231a he contrasts the lover’s later regret with the non-lover’s supposed stability.
metagignōskō · Change one’s mind · lemma
To revise an earlier judgement or decision.
Lysias contrasts lovers’ regret with the non-lovers, for whom he says there is no fitting occasion to change their minds. The claim supports his promise of stability because their benefactions were deliberate. It does not establish that revising a judgement is always a vice: Socrates’ later recantation makes correction necessary.
Attested: μεταγνῶναι (231a · Burnet p. 6) — “change their minds”. Aorist infinitive in the denial about non-lovers.
See: Gratifying and gratitude; Palinode and purification
Fowler confirms the interested comparison. It does not condemn every revision: Socrates’ later recantation corrects a mistaken speech.
Plato, Phaedrus 231a — H. N. Fowler’s Loeb translation (Perseus/ToposText).
μεταμέλει
This impersonal verb expresses regret for an earlier action. Lysias’ speaker applies it to lovers after their desire has ended.
At 231a lovers are said to regret the good they previously did for the beloved.
metamelei · Regret · impersonal citation form
An impersonal construction for regretting an earlier act.
The opening charge against lovers says that they regret the good they have done once desire ceases. The construction puts the regret in relation to its experiencers and the past benefactions. The assertion belongs to Lysias’ interested comparison and is later answered by the possibility of love that produces enduring friendship.
Attested: μεταμέλει (231a · Burnet p. 6) — “regret”. Impersonal verb with the lovers as experiencers.
See: Friendship; Gratifying and gratitude; Love and the lover
ὅρκος
An oath is a sworn commitment. The dialogue shows both its power to pressure a hearer and its inability to guarantee that a changing lover will keep a promise.
At 236d–e Phaedrus swears to withhold future speeches unless Socrates speaks; at 240e the lover has made many sworn promises.
horkos · Oath · lemma
A sworn commitment that binds the speaker to a stated course.
Phaedrus turns his threat into an oath, hesitating playfully over the divine witness before choosing the plane tree. The first speech later exposes a darker instability: a lover’s many oaths cannot make him keep promises once his state changes. Swearing can intensify a commitment without ensuring wise or durable conduct.
Attested: ὅρκος (236d · Burnet p. 14) — “oath”. Phaedrus declares what his speech will be.
Attested: ὅρκων (240e · Burnet p. 19) — “oaths”. The lover’s promises are accompanied by many oaths.
See: Gratifying and gratitude; Persuasion and compulsion
Fowler preserves the contrast between effective immediate pressure and later default. Swearing intensifies a commitment without proving its wisdom or durability.
Plato, Phaedrus 236d, 236e, 240e — H. N. Fowler’s Loeb translation (Perseus/ToposText).
ὄστρακον
The shell pictures a reversal of roles: the lover who pursued now runs away, while the beloved pursues repayment.
At 241b the change is compared to a shell falling the other way.
ostrakon · Shell that changes the chase · lemma
A shell used to picture the reversal of pursuer and pursued.
The recovered lover now flees while the boy pursues his promised repayment. Socrates compares the change to a shell falling the other way. The edition explains a children’s chase game decided by the fall of a two-coloured shell; the immediate argumentative point is the reversal of positions.
Attested: ὀστράκου (241b · Burnet p. 20) — “shell”. Genitive absolute: the shell has fallen the other way.
See: Gratifying and gratitude; Love and the lover
Fowler retains the reversed shell. The children’s chase-game explanation comes from the edition’s note, which cites Pollux; it is not explained in Socrates’ sentence.
Plato, Phaedrus 241b — H. N. Fowler’s Loeb translation (Perseus/ToposText).
πόνος
Toil means costly effort or distress. Its value varies with the activity and the speaker’s purpose.
At 231a the lover counts his toil among what the beloved owes; at 252b the beloved is called the healer of the lover’s greatest toils.
ponos · Toil · lemma
Costly effort or suffering, whose value depends on its purpose.
Lysias’ lover adds past toil to his account of what the beloved owes. The first speech contrasts soft living with vigorous toils, while the palinode calls the beautiful one the doctor of the lover’s greatest toils. The term can therefore be a burden invoked for repayment, a discipline neglected, or distress awaiting relief.
Attested: πόνον (231a · Burnet p. 6) — “toil”. What the lover adds into his reckoning.
Attested: πόνων (239c · Burnet p. 18) — “toils”. Vigorous training lacking in the soft beloved.
Attested: πόνων (252b · Burnet p. 34) — “toils”. The distress for which the beloved is called the only doctor.
See: Benefit and harm; Gratifying and gratitude; Pleasure and pain
συγγνώμη
Pardon is allowance for a fault, with its cause and correction taken into account.
At 233c the non-lover promises to pardon involuntary wrongs; at 257a Socrates asks Love to pardon his earlier speech.
syngnōmē · Pardon · lemma
Allowance for an error or fault, with attention to its cause.
Lysias’ speaker promises pardon for involuntary acts while trying to prevent voluntary wrongs. Socrates asks Love for pardon of the earlier speech. Later imagined experts urge the men to pardon confused teachers rather than insult them. Pardon thus accompanies discrimination and correction, not an assertion that nothing was wrong.
Attested: συγγνώμην (233c · Burnet p. 9) — “pardon”. For involuntary actions.
Attested: συγγνώμην (257a · Burnet p. 41) — “pardon”. Socrates petitions Love about the first speech.
See: Craft and expertise; Gratifying and gratitude; Palinode and purification
ὑπόσχεσις
Promises are undertakings about future conduct. The first speech asks what happens to them when the lover’s governing desire changes.
At 241a–b the former lover cannot fulfil the sworn promises made under his previous senseless rule.
hyposchesis · Promises · lemma
Undertakings about future action.
The former lover cannot make good his sworn pledges and promises once he has another ruling state. The boy expects continuity because the earlier acts and words were addressed to him by apparently the same person. The passage tests whether a commitment governed by appetite can survive that appetite’s end.
Attested: ὑποσχέσεις (241a–b · Burnet p. 20) — “promises”. Plural joined to sworn pledges.
See: Gratifying and gratitude; Temperance and self-control
Fowler preserves the mismatch between earlier commitment and present disposition. The boy’s demand assumes continuity in the person who made those promises.
Plato, Phaedrus 241a, 241b — H. N. Fowler’s Loeb translation (Perseus/ToposText).