From the book
Charmides
Plato · Diotimos Editions · November 2026
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At a Glance
- English renderings
- ζητητήν, zētētēn, “inquirer”
Meaning
The agent noun of ζητεῖν, “to inquire” (see ζητέω), names the person whose business is seeking. It is a rare word in Plato, and its rarity gives it weight when Socrates applies it to himself.
Use in the book
The word comes in Socrates’ lament at the end. He is aggrieved on Charmides’ account, if the boy is to get no benefit from his temperance, and still more on account of the charm, if he took pains to learn it for a thing worth nothing (175d–e; see ἀγανακτέω; ἀνωφελής; ἐπῳδή). “Well, I don’t at all think it is so; rather, I am a poor inquirer. For I do think that temperance is a great good, and that if you have it you are blessed” (175e–176a; see φαῦλος). The argument has shown temperance, as defined, to be of no benefit; Socrates refuses the conclusion and blames the inquirer instead of the thing inquired into.
The self-blame has a tone and a content. Its tone can be read as Socrates’ usual irony, as when, a moment later, he says that if the boy has temperance he would sooner advise him to regard Socrates as a babbler, unable to inquire by argument (176a; see ζητέω; λῆρος). Its content is a judgement about method: the conclusion follows from premises they should not have granted (175b–c; see ἄλογος), so the fault lies in the conduct of the inquiry, not in temperance. The noun can be read as Socrates’ way of keeping his conviction that temperance is a great good while admitting that he cannot prove it.
Places to read
The passage in which the noun occurs.
- 175eSocrates thinks it is not that the charm was for a worthless thing, but that he is a poor inquirer.
Translation in this edition
“A poor inquirer” for φαῦλον εἶναι ζητητήν (175e6): φαῦλος, “poor, of no account”, is the word Socrates used of the boy at the start, who “was nothing to sniff at”, οὐ … φαῦλος, even as a child (154b).
Elsewhere in Plato
In the myth of Er, at the end of the Republic, Socrates tells Glaucon that the moment of choice is the whole danger for a man, and that each of us should neglect other studies and be a seeker and student, ζητητὴς καὶ μαθητής, of this one study: to learn and discover, if he can, who will make him able and knowledgeable to distinguish a good life from a bad, and always to choose the better among those possible (618b–c; see ἐπιστήμων). The inquirer of the Republic seeks the knowledge that the Charmides names at 174b, the knowledge of good and bad (see ἐπιστήμη ἀγαθοῦ καὶ κακοῦ). In the fourth book Socrates and Glaucon, standing like hunters round the thicket where justice is hidden, find that it has been rolling at their feet from the start, and that they have been like people looking for what they hold in their hands (432b–e); the failure can be read, like Socrates’ at 175e, as the inquirers’ and not the thing’s.