Knowledge

Use in the book

The dialogue places knowledge inside ordinary life before making it a philosophical problem. Socrates knows Charmides from earlier years (154a–b); the boy knows Socrates' name (156a); knowing how to speak Greek is enough to be asked for an intelligible statement of one's opinion (159a). None of these usages implies infallible philosophical understanding of an essence. Equally, epistasthai can introduce practical competence: Critias asks Socrates to pretend to know a headache remedy (155b). A lexicon must preserve this ordinary range alongside the later technical concentration.

At 165c the argument becomes explicit. If temperance is a knowing, it must be a knowledge, and a knowledge of something. Critias says its object is oneself. Socrates first compares medicine and house-building, which have identifiable products; when mathematical counterexamples defeat that requirement, he asks instead for an identifiable subject matter different from the knowledge itself. Object and product are distinct tests. Calculation has the even and odd as its objects although it does not produce them as a builder produces houses.

Critias' answer makes knowledge itself the object of the proposed temperance (166c–e2). This is not yet an assertion that every ordinary knowledge knows itself. Quite the reverse: Critias distinguishes ordinary fields, which know something other than themselves, from the unique knowledge that knows both itself and the others. The subsequent inquiry depends on retaining that exclusivity, and several surprising consequences result from it. The doctor knows the healthy and diseased but, under the agreed restriction, does not know medicine as knowledge (170e–171a2). The point is not that doctors lack medical competence. It exposes the strain produced by assigning all cognition of cognition to a separate faculty.

At 170a–171c23 a knowledge is individuated by its field: to determine whether someone possesses medicine rather than some knowledge or other requires examination of medical claims and performances. The proposed knowledge of knowledge has no automatic access to these. At 172b, however, Socrates tentatively allows that second-order awareness might improve learning and scrutiny when combined with first-order learning. This modest possibility should not disappear under a blanket claim that all epistemic reflection is useless.

The final movement distinguishes knowledgeable performance from beneficial life. Even an imagined person knowing past, present and future must be asked which knowledge makes that life good (173d–174b2). No ranking of knowledge solely by extent answers the question. The dialogue neither supplies a general definition of epistēmē nor concludes that knowledge is worthless: it interrogates what a particular reflective knowledge could know, do and contribute.

Places to read

1. 154a–bOrdinary knowledge of Charmides as a person
2. 159aKnowing how to speak Greek and articulating an opinion
3. 165c–166c2Knowledge, its product, and its object distinguished
4. 169e–171c23Knowing verbs and gnōsis in the self-knowledge argument
5. 173d–174d2Knowledgeable activity distinguished from benefit

Translation in this edition

The edition consistently translates epistēmē as “knowledge” and its plural as “kinds of knowledge”; “science” would suggest a narrower modern category. It also translates all three main knowing verbs as “know” where the recurring formula requires continuity. Gnōsis is not a hidden fourth technical faculty merely because it is a different noun.

γιγνώσκω

Attested: γνῶναι / γιγνώσκειν / γιγνώσκει / γιγνώσκων / γιγνῶσκόν / γνώσεται / γιγνώσκῃ / γιγνώσκοι (gnōnai / gignōskein / gignōskei / gignōskōn / gignōskon / gnōsetai / gignōskēi / gignōskoi). To know or recognize; ranges from understanding what a phrase means to recognizing one’s action, oneself, or another’s knowledge. The later argument distinguishes recognizing that knowledge exists from knowing its particular subject matter. References: 162b, 164b, 169e, 170b, 170d, 175b. Lexical identification: lemma: γιγνώσκω. See Knowledge.

γνῶσις

Attested: γνῶσιν (gnōsin). Knowledge or knowing; Critias argues that possessing knowledge makes its possessor knowing, and extends this pattern to self-knowing knowledge and the person who possesses it. References: 169e. Lexical identification: lemma: γνῶσις. See Knowledge.

ἐπαΐω

Attested: ἐπαΐει (epaiei). Understands or has expertise in; restricts the doctor's competence to health and disease. References: 170e. Lexical identification: lemma: ἐπαΐω. See Knowledge.

ἐπίσταμαι

Attested: ἐπίστασθαι / ἐπισταίμην / ἐπίσταται (epistasthai / epistaimēn / epistatai). Know or possess expertise; its subject matter must be supplied rather than inferred from the verb alone. References: 170d, 155e. Lexical identification: lemma: ἐπίσταμαι. See Knowledge.

ἐπιστήμη

Attested: ἐπιστήμη / ἐπιστήμης / ἐπιστήμας (epistēmē / epistēmēs / epistēmas). Knowledge or a determinate expertise; its object and benefit are recurrent questions rather than fixed by the noun. References: 165c, 166a, 166e, 167b, 167c, 168a, 168b, 169a, 170a, 170b, 171a, 171c, 172a, 174e, 173b. Lexical identification: lemma: ἐπιστήμη. See Knowledge.

ἐπιστημόνως

Attested: ἐπιστημόνως (epistēmonōs). Knowledgeably or with expertise; a manner of living that is not yet shown sufficient for happiness. References: 173d, 173e, 174b. Lexical identification: lemma: ἐπιστημόνως. See Knowledge.

ἐπιστήμων

Attested: ἐπιστήμων / ἐπιστημόνων (epistēmōn / epistēmonōn). Knowledgeable or expert; says that a person possesses knowledge without by itself identifying the content. References: 175c, 170e. Lexical identification: lemma: ἐπιστήμων. See Knowledge.

οἶδα

Attested: οἶδα / εἰδέναι / οἶσθα / εἰδὼς / οἶδεν / οἶδε / εἰδόσιν / εἴσεται / οἶδέν / εἰδείην (oida / eidenai / oistha / eidōs / oiden / oide / eidosin / eisetai / oiden / eideiēn). To know; the argument distinguishes actual and supposed knowledge, knowing that one knows, and knowing the particular things known. The forms also express personal ignorance or familiarity. At 167b οἶδε stands in supplied text; εἰδέναι in deleted text at 172c is excluded from the displayed attestations. References: 162b, 162d, 165b, 166d, 167a, 167b, 169e, 170a, 170b, 170c, 170d, 172a, 172c, 175c, 176a. Lexical identification: lemma: οἶδα. οἶδε at 167b occurs in the supplied words ⟨ὅτι οἶδε καὶ⟩. The deleted εἰδέναι at 172c is not listed as an accepted attestation; accepted εἰδέναι also occurs in that section. See Knowledge.

προσεπίσταμαι

Attested: προσεπίστηταί (prosepistētai). Knows in addition; knowledge of the healthy or the just must be added to knowledge of knowledge if one is to identify those particular domains. References: 170b. Lexical identification: lemma: προσεπίσταμαι. See Knowledge.

τυγχάνω

Attested: τυγχάνει (tynchanei). With οὖσα, medicine is in fact a knowledge; not necessarily an accidental or chance classification. References: 171a. Lexical identification: lemma: τυγχάνω. See Knowledge.

Use in the book

Knowing first appears as the qualification for giving advice. Alcibiades agrees at 106c–d that he should advise the Athenians about what he knows better than they. Socrates then asks how that knowledge was acquired: from someone else or through personal discovery. The inquiry's demand is not satisfied by Alcibiades' confidence, ancestry, or association with a famous guardian. It requires an accountable relation to the subject matter.

The scope of knowing is repeatedly tested. Ordinary speakers know which objects are stones or pieces of wood and can teach Greek usage; they need not know which horses run well or which people are healthy. A shoemaker can be intelligent and good in shoes while lacking competence in cloaks. These examples distinguish identification from expert discrimination and one field of expertise from another. It is misleading to summarize all of them as a single contrast between theoretical “knowing that” and practical “knowing how.” The Greek asks which subject is understood and to what extent.

At 117b–118a2 the distinction becomes reflexive. Knowledge of a topic, acknowledged ignorance of it, and ignorance mistaken for knowledge are separated. The second state has a practical advantage over the third because it allows reliance on a competent person. The text expressly says that one can know that one does not know. It does not follow that such a person has acquired the missing craft, or that self-awareness alone gives expertise.

The later self-inquiry raises a different question: what must one know in order to identify the care appropriate to oneself? An adequate account identifies the person with soul, but Socrates postpones precise knowledge of the self itself. The eye analogy then directs the soul toward its knowing excellence. At 133d–e knowledge of what belongs to a person as belonging to that person requires knowledge of the owner. Knowing a bodily condition as a doctor and understanding its place in one's own good are therefore not simply identical achievements.

The political conclusion follows this richer sense of knowledge. A ruler ignorant of self and good will not know what he is doing and will err. Knowing is a condition of competent action, not merely a set of true verbal responses. Yet the conversation does not supply a general definition of knowledge, distinguish every epistemic state systematically, or prove that all apparent expertise depends on a completed metaphysics of the self. Its local arguments should be read at the level each actually establishes.

Places to read

1. 106c–106eKnowledge qualifies advice and prompts the acquisition dilemma
2. 111a–111e23Naming ordinary things is distinguished from expert discrimination
3. 117b–118a2Knowledge, acknowledged ignorance, and false confidence are separated
4. 125a–125e23Knowledge and intelligence are specified by domain
5. 128e–133e2345678910Self-knowledge grounds the discernment of appropriate care and one’s own good

Translation in this edition

The shared English “know” is deliberate. It preserves continuity where the argument shifts among εἰδέναι, ἐπίστασθαι, and γιγνώσκειν. Translating each by a fixed modern epistemological category would add a distinction the dialogue has not consistently drawn.

γνωρίζω

Attested: γνωρίσαι (gnōrisai; 130e). At 130e: Come to know soul: the object demanded by the Delphic injunction after the self is provisionally identified. Lexical identification: lemma: γνωρίζω. See Knowing.

διαγιγνώσκω

Attested: διαγιγνώσκειν (diagignōskein; 109d). At 109d: Tell the more just from the more unjust, the discriminatory competence that Alcibiades' supposed teacher should have taught. Lexical identification: lemma: διαγιγνώσκω. See Knowing.

εἰκάζω

Attested: εἰκάζω (eikazō; 105c). To conjecture or guess; Socrates insists that his diagnosis of Alcibiades' hope is knowledge rather than mere guessing. Lexical identification: lemma: εἰκάζω. See Knowing.

ἐπίσταμαι

Attested: ἐπίστασθαι (epistasthai; 106d). At 106d: Know what one would otherwise need to seek or learn; the verb overlaps with εἰδέναι rather than naming a separate faculty. Lexical identification: lemma: ἐπίσταμαι. See Knowing.

ἐπιστήμη

Attested: ἐπιστήμη (epistēmē; 125e). At 125e: The knowledge by which a shared activity is governed; political knowledge requires specification just as chorus-training does. Lexical identification: lemma: ἐπιστήμη. See Knowing.

οἶδα

Attested: εἰδέναι (eidenai; 106e). At 106e: Possess knowledge of a subject, distinguished from merely supposing one has it in the acquisition argument. Lexical identification: lemma: οἶδα. See Knowing.

Use in the book

Socrates’ first division gives the companion a difficult choice: those who pursue worthless things either know their worthlessness or do not. The ignorant would be senseless, a description the companion rejects in favour of calculated baseness. Socrates therefore asks who is expert about the plant’s value at a particular season and place. The answer, the farmer, makes the alleged lover of gain answerable to the very practical knowledge the companion attributes to him.

The succeeding cases require the knowledgeable rider not to be ignorant that bad food ruins his horse, and the pilot to foresee loss from bad equipment. The inference connects knowledge of resources with knowledge of consequences. It is persuasive within the specified practice, but cannot automatically establish what every knowledgeable person might do for another purpose, such as selling rather than using the defective object. The dialogue also leaves little room at this stage for knowingly accepting one loss to secure some separate good.

At 226e the second account is pushed into the ignorant branch. If people crave valueless objects, they must suppose those objects worth much. Ignorance now operates as a mistaken estimate, not bare absence of thought. This explains why someone may seek what is actually harmful while remaining oriented toward apparent gain. The generalisation that everyone loves good things later depends on how appearance and reality are related; the text does not pause to supply a formal account of that relation.

There is a different ignorance in the companion’s accusation at 228a and 229e: he cannot say how Socrates deceives him. This admission need not concede that the reasoning is trustworthy. He distinguishes a felt argumentative difficulty from the ability to diagnose its mechanism. The ending confirms the distinction when agreement is compelled without persuasion. The dialogue therefore gives both practical knowledge of objects and reflective uncertainty about argument a role.

Places to read

1. 225aἢ ἀγνοοῦντες; — The knowledge dilemma makes ignorance an explicit alternative.
2. 225cἐπιστήμονα εἶναι περὶ τῆς ἀξίας — The relevant expertise concerns worth.
3. 226eοἰόμενοι δὲ τὰ οὐδενὸς ἄξια πολλοῦ ἄξια εἶναι — Ignorance is accompanied by an affirmative but mistaken estimate.
4. 228aοὐκ οἶδα ὅπῃ — The companion admits that he cannot identify how the arguments are being twisted.

Translation in this edition

The edition normally renders gignōskein “know” and agnoein “be ignorant”, preserving their explicit opposition. It does not translate them as technical terms from a later theory of knowledge. “Has knowledge” renders the adjectival epistēmōn at 225c. The quoted finite forms should be distinguished from the dictionary-style infinitives in the header.

Use in the book

At 135c–d the lover distinguishes knowing each craft precisely from knowing enough to follow its possessor. He therefore already allows degrees and forms of competence. The later attack on usefulness operates within that proposed hierarchy, not between total knowledge and total ignorance.

The restart at 137b–d2 asks who knows how to punish animals rightly and whether the same craft knows their quality. The shift from knowing how to acting correctly, and from acting to recognizing subjects, is presented as a unity of competence. When the case becomes human, the civic knowledge that punishes rightly is identified as judicial knowledge and justice.

The argument then states that whoever knows one will know many, and that whoever is ignorant of many is ignorant of one. Its plausibility depends on “knowing” meaning possession of general criteria of quality rather than merely being acquainted with an individual. The text does not explicitly spell out that restriction. Without it, knowing one person plainly need not imply knowing many people; even with it, the transition to self-knowledge requires further work.

A horse or human who cannot discriminate quality in others is said not to know himself. This is not ignorance of every fact about oneself. The text specifies ignorance of “what sort” one is and, for the human case, whether one is decent or base. The conclusion is consequently evaluative and limited in content, even though it leads to the large identification of self-knowledge with temperance.

Socrates’ own language provides a counterpoint to the lover’s confidence. He says he is keen to know clearly what is meant, repeatedly asks questions and restarts after perplexity. The dialogue dramatizes inquiry as a way of testing claims to knowledge, while leaving some of its own late identifications compressed and contestable.

Places to read

1. 135cἑκάστην τῶν τεχνῶν τὸν φιλοσοφοῦντα ἐπίστασθαι — The proposed degree of knowing each craft requires clarification.
2. 137dΤίς οὖν ἐστιν ἡ ἐπιστήμη — Judicial knowledge is sought as a determinate competence.
3. 137eὍστις δὲ ἕνα γιγνώσκει, καὶ πολλοὺς γνώσεται — Knowledge of one is extended to many.
4. 138aαὑτὸν ἀγνοεῖ πότερον χρηστός ἐστιν ἢ πονηρός — The relevant self-ignorance is ignorance of evaluative quality.

Translation in this edition

The edition uses ordinary “know,” “knowledge” and “ignorant” rather than assigning a separate English technical vocabulary to each Greek verb. That keeps the dialogue readable but makes it especially important to inspect objects and complements. The article’s differentiation is contextual, not a claim that these verbs always carry sharply separated philosophical meanings.

Use in the book

Socrates asks whether Theages calls wise those who have knowledge, whatever its field; the boy agrees (122e). The qualification about subject matter is central. It prevents “wise” from being initially reserved for a single prestigious profession and permits the ensuing crafts to count as genuine knowledge. Socrates then asks which knowledge the already educated boy still lacks (123a).

The repeated phrase “by which we know how to rule” gives knowledge an operational specification (123d–124b23). A pilot knows how to rule ships, a charioteer a team of horses, and medicine, music, and gymnastics direct distinct groups of human beings. This identifies expertise through a field and activity. It does not prove that ruling ships and ruling citizens employ one identical causal or ethical structure.

Theages' claims to know what he wants are tested alongside these examples. He says he knows the desired wisdom and its name (123c), but his generic answer requires further clarification. Later he admits not knowing what tyrants' wise companions must know (125d). These admissions concern the content and source of his aspiration; they are not an announcement that he knows nothing whatsoever.

Socrates' own profession at 128b is carefully qualified. He says he knows none of the sophists' fine subjects and, “so to speak,” nothing except the small subject of love. The exception and qualification belong to the statement. A blanket entry asserting absolute Socratic ignorance would suppress both. Theages responds with observed improvement among companions, but Socrates tells him that its character has escaped him (128c–d). Familiarity with an outcome is not yet knowledge of its conditions.

A distinct use in the Timarchus story confirms that the verb is not confined to morally admirable skill: Timarchus and Philemon alone knew their murderous plot (129b). Knowing can take an ordinary factual object. The whole dialogue therefore requires contextual definitions instead of imposing a universal technical sense on every member of the family.

Places to read

1. 122eτοὺς ἐπιστήμονας — Those possessing knowledge are provisionally called wise
2. 123aτινὸς ἐπιστήμης ἐλλείπειν — A possible remaining deficit in knowledge
3. 123dπλοίων ἐπιστάμεθα ἄρχειν — Knowing how to rule ships
4. 123cαὐτὴν μὲν οἶσθα — Socrates distinguishes knowing a thing from knowing its name
5. 128bοὐδὲν ἐπιστάμενος; τῶν ἐρωτικῶν — Socrates' qualified denial and retained exception
6. 129bἠπιστάσθην μὲν αὐτὼ μόνω τὴν ἐπιβουλήν — Only the two plotters know the plan

Translation in this edition

The Key Words specify “knowledge,” “one who has knowledge,” and “know how” with an infinitive. The plural ἐπιστήμονες is an attested adjective used substantivally, not an occurrence of the noun epistēmē. Registering both under one explanatory family must preserve their actual forms.

Know how — ἐπίστασθαι (epistasthai)

ἐπίστασθαι (epistasthai)

Know how. Practical competence is expressed through knowing how to rule its object. Attested: ἐπιστάμεθα (123d). Knowledge and knowing how.

Knowledge — ἐπιστήμη (epistēmē)

ἐπιστήμη (epistēmē)

Knowledge. The kind of additional attainment the boy still thinks he lacks. Attested: ἐπιστήμης (123a). Knowledge and knowing how.

Knows — εἰδέναι (eidenai)

εἰδέναι (eidenai)

Knows. Theages insists his father already understands his request. Attested: Οἶδεν (123a). Knowledge and knowing how.

You know — εἰδέναι (eidenai)

εἰδέναι (eidenai)

You know. Knowing the desired thing is distinguished from knowing its name. Attested: οἶσθα (123c). Knowledge and knowing how.

Lack — ἐλλείπειν (elleipein)

ἐλλείπειν (elleipein)

Lack. The proposed deficit remaining after conventional schooling. Attested: ἐλλείπειν (123a). Knowledge and knowing how.

Lacking — ἐνδεής (endeēs)

ἐνδεής (endeēs)

Lacking. The hypothetical educational deficit that would ground blame of the father. Attested: ἐνδεὴς (123b). Knowledge and knowing how.

Those with knowledge — ἐπιστήμων (epistēmōn)

ἐπιστήμων (epistēmōn)

Those with knowledge. The class Theages accepts as wise, whatever their subject. Attested: ἐπιστήμονας (122e). Knowledge and knowing how.

Use in the book

Socrates begins with people knowledgeable “about these things,” the health of the sick, and names them doctors (316c). His next question is whether knowledgeable people accept the same things about the same things. The domain restriction is explicit again when he asks about Greeks and barbarians: “about whatever they know” (316d). The argument does not make all people who bear a professional name infallible about everything. Its claim concerns actual knowledge of the matter in question.

The companion accepts a strong necessity: knowers must agree with one another, whether Greek or barbarian, and at all times. Agreement is not established by surveying conflicting medical authorities. It follows from the accepted conception of knowing the same reality. The force of “always” matters when Socrates later identifies changes about the same subjects as evidence of lack of knowledge (317b). That conclusion relies on the same-subject qualification; the dialogue does not work through changing circumstances, newly available evidence, or justified correction of earlier ignorance.

Epistasthai becomes especially prominent in the passage from gardens and cooking to cities. Gardeners know how to rule gardens; cooks know how to rule the preparation of dishes; statesmen and kingly men know how to rule cities. Naming a field and the corresponding practitioners secures quick answers, but the dialogue has not yet demonstrated an individual's civic competence. The subsequent turn to Minos will seek a bearer for the role established abstractly here.

The close prevents the reader from casually attributing the requisite knowledge to the speakers. They can identify the bodily provisions of a good distributor, yet cannot say what he distributes to improve the soul (321c–d2). The language of knowing returns as an acknowledged lack concerning what matters within themselves. The ideal of knowledgeable rule has been articulated more fully than its human possession has been demonstrated.

Places to read

1. 314bδηλούσῃ τῇ ἐπιστήμῃ — Knowledge is introduced as revealing the things learned
2. 316cτοὺς ἐπιστήμονας περὶ τούτων — Medical competence is bounded by its subject
3. 316dπερὶ ὧν ἂν εἰδῶσι — The agreement of Greeks and barbarians concerns what they know
4. 316eΤῶν ἐπισταμένων κήπων ἄρχειν — Knowing how is specified by an activity and its object
5. 317bἐπιστήμονας εἶναι ἢ ἀνεπιστήμονας — Socrates makes competence and its absence the alternatives for assessing inconsistent rule-makers
6. 317cτοῖς μὴ εἰδόσιν — Apparent law can deceive those who do not know
7. 317dτίς ἐπιστήμων διανεῖμαι — The question about the farmer concerns competence to distribute seeds
8. 321dφαίνεσθαι μὴ εἰδυίας — The final charge concerns the souls' apparent ignorance of what is within them

Translation in this edition

The translation keeps “one who has knowledge” for epistēmōn, “without knowledge” for anepistēmōn, “know how” for epistasthai, and “know” for eidenai. “Know how” also appears where its infinitive is understood from the previous turn. These choices help the reader hear the practical construction without turning every use of “know” into a separate philosophical faculty.

Accept in common — συννομίζειν (synnomizein)

συννομίζειν (synnomizein)

Accept in common. To share an acceptance or judgment. The compound describes agreement among genuine knowers across Greek and non-Greek communities. Attested: συννομίζειν (316d). Knowledge and knowing how.

Call or name — καλεῖν (kalein)

καλεῖν (kalein)

Call or name. Assign the occupational name doctors to people knowledgeable about the relevant matters. Attested: καλεῖς (316c). Knowledge and knowing how.

I know — εἰδέναι (eidenai)

εἰδέναι (eidenai)

I know. The companion identifies medicine as the craft to which the writing belongs; his knowledge here is a specific identification. Attested: Οἶδα (316c). Knowledge and knowing how.

Know — εἰδέναι (eidenai) · εἰδῶσι (316d).

εἰδέναι (eidenai)

Know. The ordinary verb for knowing, in the explicit restriction “about whatever they know.” Agreement among Greeks and barbarians is bounded by this condition. Attested: εἰδῶσι (316d). Knowledge and knowing how.

Those who know — εἰδέναι (eidenai)

εἰδέναι (eidenai)

Those who know. People actually knowing the matter, whom the companion says must accept the same things in common. Attested: εἰδότας (316d). Knowledge and knowing how.

Know how — ἐπίστασθαι (epistasthai)

ἐπίστασθαι (epistasthai)

Know how. To possess the practical understanding required to direct a field or activity, here the ruling of gardens. Attested: ἐπισταμένων (316e). Knowledge and knowing how.

Those who know how — ἐπίστασθαι (epistasthai)

ἐπίστασθαι (epistasthai)

Those who know how. Competent practitioners, with the relevant activity understood from the preceding discussion. Their writings are expected to be consistent about the same subjects. Attested: ἐπιστάμενοι (317b). Knowledge and knowing how.

Knowledge — ἐπιστήμη (epistēmē)

ἐπιστήμη (epistēmē)

Knowledge. Knowledge conceived here as revealing what is learned; an early candidate model for the activity of law. Attested: ἐπιστήμῃ (314b). Knowledge and knowing how.

Necessity — ἀνάγκη (anankē)

ἀνάγκη (anankē)

Necessity. The necessity asserted for agreement among people who know the same matters. It expresses the force of the accepted premise, not a report of coercion. Attested: ἀνάγκη (316d). Knowledge and knowing how.

Those who have knowledge — ἐπιστήμων (epistēmōn)

ἐπιστήμων (epistēmōn)

Those who have knowledge. People competent about the specified matters, here medical ones. The surrounding phrase limits the scope of their knowledge. Attested: ἐπιστήμονας (316c). Knowledge and knowing how.

Has the knowledge — ἐπιστήμων (epistēmōn)

ἐπιστήμων (epistēmōn)

Has the knowledge. Competent to perform the named action, distributing seeds on soil. The infinitive makes the practical scope explicit. Attested: ἐπιστήμων (317d). Knowledge and knowing how.

Without knowledge — ἀνεπιστήμων (anepistēmōn)

ἀνεπιστήμων (anepistēmōn)

Without knowledge. Lacking the relevant knowledge; the judgment Socrates elicits about those who change their rules about the same matters. Attested: ἀνεπιστήμονας (317b). Knowledge and knowing how.

About what they know (contextual phrase)

316d: περὶ ὧν ἂν εἰδῶσι. The relative clause restricts the asserted agreement of Greek and non-Greek experts to matters they know. It does not say that every practitioner is correct about every subject. The restriction is essential to the move from ethnic variety to common knowledgeable judgment. See Knowledge.

Use in the book

The opening question asks for the learning by which a mortal would become wise. It does not presume that all learning has this effect. At 974d the Athenian first sets aside the kinds of knowledge that fail to make wise the person who takes them up and possesses them. Possession is therefore insufficient unless the object and quality of knowledge are appropriate. Equally, his terminology does not simply revoke their status as knowledge: they are introduced as “called” kinds of knowledge and are assessed for their failure to produce the desired result.

The distinction is sharpened by prophecy and interpretation. Knowing what has been said is separated from having learned whether it is true (975c). The opposition is not between knowing words and learning nothing at all. It concerns the limited object of a competence. The later example of effortless learning is equally specific: someone can learn whatever he encounters easily, retain much securely, and respond fittingly, yet this natural aptitude does not settle the question of wisdom (976b–c2).

The divine pedagogy of counting distinguishes capacity from instruction. The god first establishes in humans the ability to understand what is shown, and then shows it (978c). Repeated days and nights teach until even the slowest learner within the capable class can count. Nature supplies receptivity, the ordered phenomena supply recurrent instruction, and the learner comes to recognize one, two, three, and more. “Even the slowest” must not be detached from the qualification concerning beings given the nature of being able to learn (978e).

This broad account of elementary numerical acquisition differs from the selective final curriculum. The best natures later require good memory, delight in learning, nourishment, and appropriate education; unsuitable teaching is worse than not learning (989b–d2). Ordinary counting is thus widely teachable, while the deepest understanding of the heavenly circuits requires unusual capacity and lengthy preparation. The distinction resolves an apparent conflict between the slow learner of 978d and the exceptional learner of 990b without making either passage say less than it does.

Finally, knowledge of numerical matters remains open to assessment at 979d. Calling someone epistēmōn does not by itself prove that the person is wise and good. The dialogue repeatedly tests the passage from learning an object to becoming a certain kind of person.

Places to read

1. 973bτί ποτε μαθών — What learning would make the mortal wise?
2. 974dἐπιστῆμαι … σοφὸν δὲ οὐκ ἀποτελοῦσιν — Kinds of knowledge are tested by what they fail to accomplish
3. 975cτὸ λεγόμενον γὰρ οἶδεν μόνον — Knowledge of an utterance is limited in object
4. 976b–c2ῥᾳδίως … μανθάνοντα — Ease of learning is a power, not the completed wisdom
5. 978cἔπειτ’ ἔδειξεν καὶ δείκνυσιν — Divine showing follows the provision of receptivity
6. 978dὁ δυσμαθέστατος ἱκανῶς μάθῃ ἀριθμεῖν — Repeated instruction reaches even the slowest learner
7. 979dὁ ταῦτ’ ἐπιστήμων — Knowing these things leaves a further evaluative question

Translation in this edition

“Knowledge” is kept apart from “wisdom” and “intelligence”; “subjects of learning” later renders mathēmata. The English “power” for dynamis in the opening is an ability, whereas the later mathematical use needs its own contextual explanation. A single rendering does not erase this development.

Failure to make wise — ἀποτελεῖν (apotelein)

ἀποτελεῖν (apotelein)

Failure to make wise. The excluded kinds of knowledge fail to accomplish wisdom in the person who acquires and possesses them. The test concerns formation of the possessor. Attested: ἀποτελοῦσιν (974d). Knowledge learning and the difference between possession and completion.

Needed knowledge must emerge — φαίνεσθαι (phainesthai)

φαίνεσθαι (phainesthai)

Needed knowledge must emerge. Some knowledge must appear which makes its possessor genuinely wise rather than merely reputed so. Appearance here introduces a demanded candidate, not a disqualification by itself. Attested: φανῆναί (976c). Knowledge learning and the difference between possession and completion.

Labor of formation — παιδεύεσθαι (paideuesthai)

παιδεύεσθαι (paideuesthai)

Labor of formation. Education enters the dialogue as one of the difficult processes of a living being’s development, before the final curriculum is specified. Attested: παιδεύεσθαι (973d). Knowledge learning and the difference between possession and completion.

Plural competences — ἐπιστήμη (epistēmē)

ἐπιστήμη (epistēmē)

Plural competences. The familiar kinds of knowledge that fail to confer the wisdom under inquiry. Their plurality is part of the survey. Attested: ἐπιστημῶν (974b). Knowledge learning and the difference between possession and completion.

Knowledge insufficient for wisdom — ἐπιστήμη (epistēmē)

ἐπιστήμη (epistēmē)

Knowledge insufficient for wisdom. Called kinds of knowledge can be taken up and possessed without making the recipient wise. Attested: ἐπιστῆμαι (974d). Knowledge learning and the difference between possession and completion.

A knower still to be assessed — ἐπιστήμων (epistēmōn)

ἐπιστήμων (epistēmōn)

A knower still to be assessed. The person who knows the proposed matters is not thereby proven wise and good; the Athenian explicitly demands a further account. Attested: ἐπιστήμων (979d). Knowledge learning and the difference between possession and completion.

Learning that makes wise — μανθάνειν (manthanein)

μανθάνειν (manthanein)

Learning that makes wise. The opening aorist participle asks what someone must have learned in order to be wise. Attested: μαθὼν (973b). Knowledge learning and the difference between possession and completion.

Suitable knowledge to learn — μανθάνειν (manthanein)

μανθάνειν (manthanein)

Suitable knowledge to learn. After putting inadequate candidates aside, the speakers are to set out and learn the kinds of knowledge they need. Attested: μανθάνειν (974d). Knowledge learning and the difference between possession and completion.

Receptivity to number — φύσις (physis)

φύσις (physis)

Receptivity to number. The nature received from the universe allows humans to think of one and two and understand what the god shows. Attested: φύσιν (978b–c). Knowledge learning and the difference between possession and completion.

Understand what is shown — συννοεῖν (synnoein)

συννοεῖν (synnoein)

Understand what is shown. The god establishes human receptivity so people can understand what is demonstrated, then supplies the continuing lesson through visible order. This infinitival use differs from noticing a learner’s aptitude at 976b. Attested: συννοεῖν (978c). Knowledge learning and the difference between possession and completion.

Implanted learning capacity — ἐνοικίζειν (enoikizein)

ἐνοικίζειν (enoikizein)

Implanted learning capacity. The god first settles in humans the ability to understand what is shown, before supplying the demonstrations themselves. Attested: ἐνῴκισεν (978c). Knowledge learning and the difference between possession and completion.

Continuing divine instruction — δεικνύναι (deiknynai)

δεικνύναι (deiknynai)

Continuing divine instruction. The god showed and still shows after first establishing receptivity; the sequence distinguishes capacity from instruction. Attested: ἔδειξεν καὶ δείκνυσιν (978c). Knowledge learning and the difference between possession and completion.

Elementary teaching reaches the slowest — δυσμαθής (dysmathēs)

δυσμαθής (dysmathēs)

Elementary teaching reaches the slowest. The superlative describes the slowest learner within the class naturally capable of learning, not an assertion about every creature without qualification. Attested: δυσμαθέστατος (978d). Knowledge learning and the difference between possession and completion.

Human condition — ἕξις (hexis)

ἕξις (hexis)

Human condition. The human state that the sought understanding should put in its finest condition; the phrase does not provide a technical classification of habits. Attested: ἕξιν (973a). Knowledge learning and the difference between possession and completion.

Receptive capacity — ἱκανός (hikanos)

ἱκανός (hikanos)

Receptive capacity. The plural describes humans as sufficiently able to understand what is shown; it sets a threshold rather than claiming exhaustive knowledge. Attested: ἱκανοῖς (978c). Knowledge learning and the difference between possession and completion.

Adequate elementary learning — ἱκανῶς (hikanōs)

ἱκανῶς (hikanōs)

Adequate elementary learning. The slowest capable learner eventually counts well enough; the adverb specifies adequate achievement, not instant attainment of the entire astronomical wisdom. Attested: ἱκανῶς (978d). Knowledge learning and the difference between possession and completion.

Repetition as instruction — διδάσκειν (didaskein)

διδάσκειν (didaskein)

Repetition as instruction. The participle belongs to the negative construction that Heaven never ceases teaching humans one and two until even a slow learner can count sufficiently. Attested: διδάσκων (978d). Knowledge learning and the difference between possession and completion.

Considered understanding — διανοεῖσθαι (dianoeisthai)

διανοεῖσθαι (dianoeisthai)

Considered understanding. The opening construction makes thinking something through part of what improves the human condition in relation to intelligence. Attested: διανοηθῇ (973a). Knowledge learning and the difference between possession and completion.

Confident divination without determination (contextual phrase)

τίς δέ ἐστιν καὶ πότε καὶ πῶς (974c)

The three questions specify what the soul cannot discover about the power it confidently divines: its identity, when it is realized, and how. The sequence keeps a strong inward conviction distinct from a determinate account. It also anticipates the educational demand for content and method rather than merely natural aptitude. Knowledge learning and the difference between possession and completion.

Taking up and possessing do not ensure wisdom (contextual phrase)

τὸν λαμβάνοντά τε αὐτὰς καὶ ἔχοντα (974d)

The participles jointly identify the person who acquires and possesses the kinds of knowledge under review. Both stages can occur without those knowledges making the possessor wise. The test therefore concerns what the content accomplishes in a person, rather than merely whether knowledge can be received or retained. Knowledge learning and the difference between possession and completion.

Capacity first showing afterward (contextual phrase)

πρῶτον ἐνῴκισεν ὁ θεός … ἔπειτ’ ἔδειξεν καὶ δείκνυσιν (978c)

The temporal sequence distinguishes the god’s establishment of human receptivity from the subsequent and continuing exhibition of what is to be learned. Nature and instruction are complementary here. The present δείκνυσιν makes the lesson ongoing rather than confined to an unrepeatable prehistoric event. Knowledge learning and the difference between possession and completion.

Until even the slowest has learned (contextual phrase)

πρὶν ἂν καὶ ὁ δυσμαθέστατος ἱκανῶς μάθῃ ἀριθμεῖν (978d)

The temporal construction describes the endpoint of repeated instruction. Even the slowest learns sufficiently to count, but the later qualification restricts the claim to beings naturally capable of learning. The statement concerns elementary number, not immediate mastery of the final astronomical curriculum. Knowledge learning and the difference between possession and completion.

Use in the book

Socrates presents his ability to know a lover and a beloved quickly as a god-given exception to his otherwise paltry abilities. The aorist infinitive γνῶναι is a form of γιγνώσκω, as is ἔγνων in his statement that hearing Lysis’ name did not enable him to identify the boy.

The passive γιγνώσκεσθαι then describes the father’s being well known and the boy’s being identifiable by his appearance. These uses concern discernment of persons and social familiarity. They should not be confused with a claim that Socrates already possesses a definition of friendship.

The edition consistently translates this verb as “know”; explaining its identifying force here does not require imposing a universal distinction between it and οἶδα.

Places to read

1. 204cγνῶναι ἐρῶντά τε καὶ ἐρώμενον — To know a lover and a beloved.
2. 204e

Use in the book

Knowledge repeatedly means practical competence. Hippothales’ knowledge of what a lover should say is tested (204e–205a2), and Lysis’ parents allow him to act where he knows how but prevent him where he does not (209a–c2). The contrast is not simply possession of facts versus ignorance; it concerns trustworthy performance in a specific domain.

At 210a, knowledge of medicine would justify control even over another person’s eyes. Do not turn such examples into a claim that technical skill settles every moral question. The argument deliberately pushes the relation between competence, trust, usefulness, and affection.

Places to read

1. 209cταῦτα μὲν ἐπίσταμαι, ἐκεῖνα δ’ οὔ — I know these things, but not those.
2. 204e–205a2
3. 205b
4. 209a–c2
5. 210a

Use in the book

The dictionary form means “I know,” despite its perfect morphology. Forms encountered in the dialogue include infinitival εἰδέναι, participial εἰδότα, plural ἴσμεν and ἴσασιν, and future εἴσομαι. Their difference in appearance does not make them separate vocabulary items.

Socrates knows from Hippothales’ reaction that he is in love (204b), but says he does not know how one person becomes a friend of another (212a). At 218b those capable of loving wisdom still judge that they do not know what they do not know: εἰδέναι and ἴσασιν here belong to this same verb.

At 221a “who knows?” about a world without badness is followed by what “we know” about present hunger. The verb can therefore mark both a limit and a secure starting point for further inquiry. Its uses overlap ordinary expressions of understanding elsewhere in the dialogue; a rigid hierarchy separating οἶδα from every other knowledge verb is not supplied by the text.

Places to read

1. 218bμὴ εἰδέναι ἃ μὴ ἴσασιν — Not to know what they do not know.
2. 204b
3. 205a–b
4. 211d
5. 212a
6. 215d
7. 216c
8. 218e
9. 221a

Use in the book

The Phaedo passage recounts a sequence in which perception yields memory and belief, and stabilized memory and belief are associated with knowledge. In the Timaeus extract, intellect and knowledge result when the soul’s appropriate circle addresses what is accessible to reasoning.

Places to read

1. I.51.6A proposed development from perception through memory and belief leads to knowledge.
2. I.50.41.2Intellect and knowledge arise in the account of the circle of Sameness.
3. I.21.7d.1A restriction on human knowledge still allows an inference about cosmic constituents.

Translation in this edition

“Knowledge” renders epistēmē in these places. Other Greek words also concern knowing, so an English occurrence of “knowledge” is not by itself a complete lexical identification.

Gnōsis: knowledge and cognition

Gnōsis names knowledge or cognition. In I.21.7d.1, the divine being or nature of things is said not to admit human knowledge, except for an inference concerning the prior existence of the world’s constituents. The restriction and its exception belong together. “Knowledge is impossible” would overstate a passage that still allows a particular kind of understanding.

Use in the book

More books and facts burden modern memory in the comparison with the ancients. Knowledge viewed as total accumulation can overload the mind. By contrast, knowing how to enter and leave both other people’s ideas and one’s own is a flexible capacity. The late writing passage gives knowing an explicitly circular relation to composition: some things are known well only by thinking of writing them, yet one cannot think of writing them without already knowing them. Joubert leaves this reciprocal dependence intact. It need not be resolved into a rigid sequence in which all knowledge precedes expression.

Places to read

1. I, p. 405, entry 1, ¶1The ambition to know everything burdens memory.
2. II, p. 512, entry 2, ¶1Know how governs reciprocal entry into and departure from ideas.
3. II, p. 898, entry 4, ¶1Knowing and preparing to write depend upon each other.

Translation in this edition

The English translation distinguishes know from know how and retains the repeated restrictions and “nevertheless” in the writing paradox. The headword normalizes scavoir to savoir for lookup; the manuscript’s historical forms remain unchanged.

Knowing and acquaintance

French: connaissance; connaître.

Connaissance, usually printed connoissance, can concern retained knowledge, familiarity with books or the world, and knowledge directed toward living well. The English translation normally uses knowledge and know in these witnesses. The condition about entry through senses and body gives the soul the work of gathering, retaining and using; it does not establish sensory origin unconditionally. The publication sequence distinguishes having knowledge of a fact from a right to publish it, then paradoxically distinguishes knowing a fact from having knowledge of it. The text does not identify the first with hearsay or the second with personal experience. An idea of some books can also be more useful than acquaintance with them, although the translation keeps knowledge. The final realities/truth distinction concerns practical operation versus living, acting, thinking and willing well. No universal one-to-one contrast with savoir should replace these contextual uses.

Places to read: I, p. 214, entry 4, ¶1; I, p. 415, entry 6, ¶1; II, p. 513, entry 7, ¶3; II, p. 513, entry 7, ¶4; II, p. 621, entry 4, ¶1; II, p. 853, entry 7, ¶1.

Use in the book

The basic test is theological and affective. To know God is to know goodness and the beauty of infinite love. An apprehension that supplies power without delight in its goodness remains, in I.17, superstition. This does not make pleasant feeling a substitute for truth. It insists that a true account of the giver must include the generosity that makes the gift intelligible.

The world is known inadequately if it is treated as alien information. III.37 remembers useful university learning while regretting that no tutor professedly taught felicity. The criticism concerns the end of study: knowledge was collected without understanding why it mattered to the learner. Its seeds remain valuable, and later reflection develops rather than simply discards them. Learning becomes complete when the things studied are understood as enjoyments in which the knower has a share.

II.84 states the metaphysical ambition behind this programme. God is an infinite act of knowledge and wisdom; human capacity should likewise become act. To know is to make objects present to the soul and to receive their forms and excellencies into its life. The divine image is fulfilled through active attention, rather than through a merely potential ability to understand. The world supplies objects that fill and beautify a soul otherwise extended through emptiness.

III.68 brings knowledge beside life and love as the means of enjoyment. The same objects confront many people, yet their apprehensions and affections differ. Intelligence is compared to tasting, knowledge to light, and perfected life to an activity extended through its objects. These figures refuse the picture of a detached intellect accumulating propositions while the person remains unchanged.

The expansiveness nevertheless depends upon exercise. To have powers is not already to use them, and to possess a little instruction is not to have reached enough. IV.7 treats the belief that small knowledge suffices as a rationalization of sloth. Knowing is therefore both a gift of capacity and a sustained labour, ordered toward the good for which the capacity was given.

Places to read

1. I.17Knowledge of God requires delight in goodness rather than an isolated dread of power.
2. II.84The divine act of knowledge models the conversion of human powers into activity.
3. III.37University learning is retained but criticized for lacking felicity as its declared end.
4. III.68Knowledge, life, and love jointly make objects enjoyable.
5. IV.7The claim that little knowledge suffices is exposed as an excuse for neglect.
6. II.67God’s knowledge of a small creature exceeds ours through apprehension of its excellencies and relations.

In this edition

In II.84 prevented with Act means anticipated or already met by act, not obstructed by it. Knowledge here regularly includes appreciative and transformative apprehension.

The divine measure of knowledge

In II.67 a river, an apple or a grain of sand has excellencies known by God beyond those we apprehend. These concern its relations, its giver, its recipient and its place among the best means to the best ends. Divine knowledge supplies a measure for loving the thing more adequately. Omniscience is a useful conceptual lookup term here, not the noun used in that meditation.

Use in the book

In January 1835 Guérin asks whether the smallest thread of certain truth should be preferred to the vague lights in which he feels himself drowning. Mathematical understanding supplies the decisive comparison. Whoever genuinely grasps a mathematical truth owns an inviolable intellectual possession and can inhabit it indefinitely; the poet has no assured dwelling. The contrast is between secure apprehension and perpetual displacement, not between useful numbers and decorative verse.

This passage complicates any account that makes the notebook celebrate imagination without reservation. Guérin recognizes an epistemic advantage in demonstrable truth precisely when poetry appears to be withdrawing. Yet the question remains a self-directed proposal, not evidence that he has abandoned poetic life or entered a new philosophical allegiance.

The subsequent wish to acquire enough ordinary knowledge to teach children lowers the practical ambition further. Knowledge may be a means of subsistence as well as a refuge from uncertainty. Meanwhile his difficulty joining one truth to another shows why the refuge is not easily occupied. He desires possession, continuity, and intellectual shelter, but describes a mind especially responsive to intimations and impressions. Positive knowledge is consequently a powerful counter-ideal within the notebook, made vivid by metaphors of light, property, and home.

Places to read

1. 26 January 1835 · ¶1Certain truth is compared to a luminous thread, and mathematical understanding to inviolable property, against the poet's repeated exile.
2. 27 March 1835 · ¶4A restricted store of ordinary knowledge would supply a teaching livelihood after larger philosophical hopes are renounced.
3. 30 April 1835 · ¶2The inability to fasten one truth to another explains the difficulty of obtaining the desired stable knowledge.

Translation in this edition

The supplied English keeps “connaissances positives” as “positive knowledge,” but “science vulgaire” later becomes “ordinary learning.” “Vulgaire” marks common or elementary learning here; it does not mean indecent or contemptible science.

Use in the book

Theophrastus reports that by each constituent we know its counterpart, using this formulation to explain the relationship between elemental composition and thought. In the account of sight, corresponding fire- and water-passages recognize white and black. The same lexical family therefore traverses what modern readers may separate into sensation and cognition.

The criticism at §15 says Empedocles assigns knowledge to likeness and contact, then argues that commensurability may be doing the real work. At §17 knowledge by the like becomes the premise for the mixed-colour objection. These are not independent proof that the poet himself defined all knowledge as sensation; they are Theophrastus's way of testing the report. Keeping “knowledge” visible alongside “perception” helps readers see the witness's conceptual movement rather than silently imposing either identity or a rigid division.

Places to read

1. A 86 §§ 7–8 (testimony)2Theophrastus, On the Senses 7. Uses recognition language for white and black.
2. A 86 §§ 10–11 (testimony)Theophrastus, On the Senses 10. Reports knowing each thing through a corresponding constituent.
3. A 86 §§ 14–15 (polemical)Theophrastus, On the Senses 15. Analyzes knowledge into likeness and contact.
4. A 86 §§ 16–17 (polemical)Theophrastus, On the Senses 17. Uses knowledge by likeness in the challenge about mixed colours.

Translation in this edition

The repeated English “know” translates a witness's expository vocabulary. The abbreviated verse citation in §10 supplies context but does not make the whole surrounding paragraph an Empedoclean quotation.