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power in relation to itself

δύναμις πρὸς ἑαυτό

Whether anything can have its power in relation to itself · Charmides

From the book

Charmides

Plato · Diotimos Editions · November 2026

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Orientation

At a Glance

  • The wordTo have one’s own power towards oneself: to act on, perceive or stand in relation to oneself by the very capacity one has towards other things.
  • In the CharmidesThree times: in the principle (168d), in the sorting of cases (168e), and in the question left to a great man (169a).
  • In this edition“Its own power in relation to itself”.
  • A place to read168b–169a.
English renderings
τὴν ἑαυτοῦ δύναμιν πρὸς ἑαυτό, tēn heautou dynamin pros heauto, “its own power in relation to itself”; τὴν ἑαυτῶν δύναμιν πρὸς ἑαυτά, tēn heautōn dynamin pros heauta, “their own power in relation to themselves”; τὴν αὑτοῦ δύναμιν αὐτὸ πρὸς ἑαυτό, tēn hautou dynamin auto pros heauto, “its own power in relation to itself”

Use in the book

The principle comes after the greater and the double. “Whatever has its own power in relation to itself, will it not also have the character toward which its power was directed?” (168d). The edition’s note at 168d explains: “‘Character’ renders ousia, being or nature. The principle: if a thing’s power is to be exercised on itself, the thing must itself have the property that power is directed at.” Hearing, then, if it heard itself, would have to have a sound (168d; see ἀκοή), and sight, if it saw itself, would have to have some colour, since sight never sees what has none (168d–e; see ἄχρως; ὄψις).

The principle sorts the cases. Magnitudes and numbers cannot have their power in relation to themselves, since a greater than itself would be smaller than itself, and hearing, sight, self-moving motion and self-burning heat are doubted (168e–169a; see ἀδύνατος; ἑαυτοῦ μεῖζον καὶ ἔλαττον; θερμότης; κίνησις). Then the question that the dialogue leaves open, for a great man to determine: “whether none of the things that are is by nature able to have its own power in relation to itself, but only in relation to something else; or whether some are and some are not”, and whether knowledge is among those that relate to themselves (169a; see διαιρέω; μέγας ἀνήρ).

The principle can be read as having two strengths. For relatives like the greater and the double it yields a contradiction, since the thing would be both of two opposites to itself. For perceptions it yields only a condition, that a sight which saw itself be coloured, and the condition is strange rather than impossible: hence the doubt. For knowledge the condition would be that knowledge be itself a thing to be known, and that is no contradiction at all. The dialogue’s refusal to decide is therefore exact. What it decides instead is that even a possible knowledge of knowledge would not know what the doctor knows (170a–171c; see ἀληθινός).

Places to read

The passages in which the phrase occurs, with the cases they sum up.

  1. 168dWhatever has its own power in relation to itself must have the character its power is directed at; hearing would have a sound.
  2. 168d–eSight, if it is to see itself, must have some colour.
  3. 168e–169aMagnitudes and numbers cannot; hearing, sight, self-moving motion and self-burning heat are doubted.
  4. 169aA great man is needed to decide whether anything, and whether knowledge, has its own power in relation to itself.

Translation in this edition

The phrase is “its own power in relation to itself” at 168d1 and 169a3–4, and “their own power in relation to themselves” at 168e5. At 168d2 τὴν οὐσίαν, πρὸς ἣν ἡ δύναμις αὐτοῦ ἦν is “the character toward which its power was directed”. At 169a3 B and T have αὑτοῦ, a later hand in T αὐτήν. Πέφυκεν (169a4) is “is by nature able”. After “in relation to itself” the manuscripts add πλὴν ἐπιστήμης, “except knowledge”, which Burnet deletes after Schleiermacher; the edition’s note at 169a says that “the words would assume the answer to the question Socrates goes on to ask”.

Elsewhere in Plato

Two of the doubted cases are taken up elsewhere. Self-motion becomes the definition of soul in the Phaedrus and the Laws (Phaedrus 245c–e; Laws 895e–896a; see ἀδύνατος). Sight can be read as answered in the First Alcibiades. If an eye were told “see yourself”, Socrates says, it would have to look at something in which it could see itself; and in the eye opposite, in the part called the pupil, the face of the one looking in appears as in a mirror. So an eye that would see itself must look into an eye, and at the part of it in which the eye’s excellence, sight, comes to be; and a soul that would know itself must look into a soul, and at the part where wisdom comes to be (132d–133b; see γιγνώσκειν ἑαυτόν). The eye there does not see itself by its own power turned on itself, as the Charmides imagines, but by looking at another eye.

Other ancient sources

Aristotle defines power as a source of change in another, or in the thing itself as other: the builder’s art is not in the house being built, but the doctor’s art may be in the man being healed, though not in him as healed.1 The doctor who heals himself has his power in relation to himself only as to another, which can be read as Aristotle’s way through the Charmides’ doubt. On sight he asks whether we perceive that we see by sight itself, and concludes that it must be so (On the Soul 3.2; see αἴσθησις αἰσθήσεων καὶ ἑαυτῆς); on thought, that the divine mind thinks itself (Metaphysics 12.9; see αὐτὴ αὑτὴν γιγνώσκει).

Source note

1. Aristotle, Metaphysics 5.12, 1019a15–18.