From the book
Hipparchus
Plato · Diotimos Editions · 2026
Browse this book’s lexicon →Deception and sincerity
ἐξαπατᾶν (exapatan); ἀληθῶς (alēthōs); ἀληθής (alēthēs); ἐπίτηδες (epitēdes)
Exapatan means to deceive, delude or mislead; its prefixed form need not be translated with a separate intensifier every time.
Orientation
At a Glance
- The wordExapatan means to deceive, delude or mislead; its prefixed form need not be translated with a separate intensifier every time.
- In HipparchusThe first accusation comes from Socrates at 225d–226a.
- In this editionThe edition keeps “deceive” for the recurring verb so the first accusation, reversal, inscription and renewed complaint remain connected.
- A place to readΜὴ τοίνυν με ἐπιχείρει ἐξαπατᾶν — The first prohibition concerns answers contrary to the respondent’s own thought.
Meaning
Exapatan means to deceive, delude or mislead; its prefixed form need not be translated with a separate intensifier every time. Alēthōs means truly or in truth, while alēthēs means true. Epitēdes means deliberately or on purpose. The cluster distinguishes false appearance, truthful answering and intentional misconduct. The dialogue does not assume that every false statement or unsuccessful argument is a deliberate deception.
Sincerity is the demand that a respondent say what he actually thinks. It is not sufficient for truth: a sincere speaker can be mistaken. Equally, a speaker may express a true conclusion by a defective argument. The quarrel depends on keeping these possibilities apart.
Use in the book
The first accusation comes from Socrates at 225d–226a. The younger companion is warned not to deceive an older man by answering what he does not himself think, but to speak truly. Socrates’ claim is thus about the relation between utterance and belief. It also brings age and deference into an inquiry ostensibly governed by reasons. The companion then denies that the knowledgeable farmer expects gain from a worthless plant.
At 228a Socrates again accuses him, this time of deliberately saying things contrary to their recent agreements. A changed or inconsistent answer is being construed as a purposeful attempt to mislead. The companion reverses the accusation: Socrates is deceiving him, though he cannot tell how the arguments are being twisted. His admission of diagnostic uncertainty does not concede that his unease is groundless. The strengthened recollection at 227d and the passage between kinds of value give the reader concrete places to test the complaint.
Socrates’ defence invokes Hipparchus, a good and wise man whose inscription forbids deceiving a friend. The defence is ethical and personal: he regards the companion as a friend and would not dare disobey. It is not a repair of any particular inference. The companion therefore answers that either the friendship or the obedience is failing, since he remains unconvinced. The historical narrative has enlarged the question of trustworthy authority without settling the charge.
The offer to take back a move provides a procedural answer: the companion may retract whichever premise troubles him. That is meaningful fairness, yet it does not guarantee that later reasoning will be sound. The ending’s distinction between compulsion and persuasion leaves sincerity and argumentative success imperfectly aligned. The text does not conclusively adjudicate whether Socrates knowingly deceives, deliberately trains the companion through traps, or sincerely presents a faulty proof. A lexicon should describe the accusations and evidence rather than pronounce an unsupported verdict on his intention.
Places to read
- 225dΜὴ τοίνυν με ἐπιχείρει ἐξαπατᾶν — The first prohibition concerns answers contrary to the respondent’s own thought.
- 226aἀλλ’ ὡς ἀληθῶς εἰπέ — Truthful answering is requested before the farmer’s case is repeated.
- 228aἐπίτηδες ἐναντία — The second accusation expressly attributes purpose.
- 229bμὴ φίλον ἐξαπάτα — Hipparchus’ maxim turns the argument toward the ethics of friendship.
Translation in this edition
The edition keeps “deceive” for the recurring verb so the first accusation, reversal, inscription and renewed complaint remain connected. Note 5 explains the printed correction “tell me: is there” at 226a; the appeal to true speech belongs to the edition’s constituted text. The article’s title “sincerity” is an interpretive grouping, not a claim that a separate Greek noun for sincerity occurs here.
From the book
Lysis
Plato · Diotimos Editions · 2026
Browse this book’s lexicon →Deception
ἐξαπατάω
exapataōExapataō means deceive; lead into a false impression.
Orientation
At a Glance
- The wordExapataō means deceive; lead into a false impression.
- In LysisThe passive at 215c raises the possibility that the speakers have been deceived about the whole question.
- Reading contextIn the regress passage the danger is to mistake a derivative object of concern for what is genuinely and finally valued.
- A place to readThe Greek example means “So that what is now being said may not deceive us.”
- English renderings
- Deceive; lead into a false impression
Meaning
Deceive; lead into a false impression.
Grammatical category: verb.
Use in the book
The passive at 215c raises the possibility that the speakers have been deceived about the whole question. At 219b–d they are warned that the present formulation, and the things called friends for another’s sake, may deceive them.
The deceptive agents need not be dishonest persons: an argument or an image-like secondary object can misdirect judgment. In the regress passage the danger is to mistake a derivative object of concern for what is genuinely and finally valued.