From the book
Phaedrus
Plato · Diotimos Editions · 2026
Browse this book’s lexicon →Orientation
At a Glance
- The wordSmall resemblances can carry a hearer unnoticed towards an opposite. The same capacity to discriminate resemblance is needed to expose deception and to explain why an account seems likely.
- In the PhaedrusThe dialogue has already made likeness important before turning it into a rhetorical problem. Socrates’ first speech says friendship follows similarity in age and pleasures (240c). The palinode gives a likeness rather than a complete divine account of soul (246a), and describes embodied beauty and other earthly appearances as images or similitudes of what was seen before embodiment (250a–d). Lovers also attempt to make the beloved resemble themselves and the god they honour (253a–c). These uses need not deceive: a likeness can disclose a relation while remaining less than its original.
- In this editionAt 262b the English “this experience has flowed in through certain similarities” follows the passive situation of those deceived; the victims are not thereby described as expert manipulators. At 262d the note reports uncertainty about which “two speeches” the dual denotes. The article does not make a disputed identification carry the argument.
- A place to readFriendship, soul’s likeness, earthly images and divine imitation.
Meaning
Similarity can help people recognize something, but it can also conceal a change. Socrates explains that small steps between similar things can carry a listener unnoticed towards an opposite conclusion (261e–262b). Someone who means to control this movement, or detect it in another’s speech, must understand the things being compared. The same discussion therefore joins the power to mislead with the knowledge needed to expose misleading speech.
Use in the book
The dialogue has already made likeness important before turning it into a rhetorical problem. Socrates’ first speech says friendship follows similarity in age and pleasures (240c). The palinode gives a likeness rather than a complete divine account of soul (246a), and describes embodied beauty and other earthly appearances as images or similitudes of what was seen before embodiment (250a–d). Lovers also attempt to make the beloved resemble themselves and the god they honour (253a–c). These uses need not deceive: a likeness can disclose a relation while remaining less than its original.
At 261c–e Socrates considers speakers who make the same subject appear under opposed descriptions. The “Eleatic Palamedes” extends the example beyond politics to like and unlike, one and many, staying and moving. The proposed general craft is conditional. Its double capacity would include both making allowable likenesses and bringing another person’s concealed manipulation to light.
The crucial contrast is between a large jump and a series of small transitions. Phaedrus agrees that deception is easier among things differing little. One who wishes to lead another astray without being misled himself must therefore know similarities and dissimilarities precisely (261e–262a). Socrates then argues that one cannot recognize a thing’s similarities while ignorant of its truth. The conclusion is that an opinion-hunter’s alleged craft is laughable and craftless (262c). The argument establishes a dependence on knowledge; it does not instruct the reader to make deception the goal of philosophical rhetoric.
The earlier speeches provide concrete examples of how someone who knows the truth might playfully lead hearers astray (262d). Socrates attributes their useful features to the local gods and cicadas and disclaims a share in speaking-craft. That self-presentation belongs to the drama and does not settle which details of either speech are true. The subsequent analysis isolates collection and division rather than canonizing the entire performance.
Tisias’ alternative route through likelihood returns to the same relation (273d). What appears likely to the many owes its persuasive appearance to resemblance to truth, and the person who knows truth best discovers the resemblances. Finally, writing’s likeness to painting shows an apparent life without the corresponding power to answer (275d). Similarity can reveal a limitation as well as obscure one.
Places to read
- 240cFriendship, soul’s likeness, earthly images and divine imitation.
- 246aFriendship, soul’s likeness, earthly images and divine imitation.
- 250a–d2Friendship, soul’s likeness, earthly images and divine imitation.
- 253a–cFriendship, soul’s likeness, earthly images and divine imitation.
- 261c–262d23Opposites, gradual transitions and knowledge of likeness.
- 265b–266b2The speeches’ provisional truth and analysis by division.
- 273dLikelihood and truth; written speech as an image.
- 275d–276aLikelihood and truth; written speech as an image.
Translation in this edition
At 262b the English “this experience has flowed in through certain similarities” follows the passive situation of those deceived; the victims are not thereby described as expert manipulators. At 262d the note reports uncertainty about which “two speeches” the dual denotes. The article does not make a disputed identification carry the argument.
Lexical detail
Ὁμοιότης is likeness or similarity; ἀνομοιότης is dissimilarity. The associated verb ὁμοιοῦν means to make or show things alike, depending on context. Ἀπάτη names deception, while ἀπατᾶν is to deceive. The rhetoric argument concerns discernible relations between things, not a claim that everything is really the same as everything else. Its scope is expressly limited to things capable of being likened and to the things to which they can be likened (261e).
Attested forms
ὁμοιότητα (262a · Burnet p. 48) — “similarity”. Knowledge of similarity and dissimilarity is required of the controlled deceiver.
ὁμοιότητα (273d · Burnet p. 65) — “similarity”. Likelihood arises in the many through similarity to truth.
ἀπάτη (261e · Burnet p. 48) — “deception”. Asked whether deception occurs more with small or great differences.
Research and interpretation
McCoy’s summary links philosophical rhetoric with intelligible structure. The particular analysis here is native: 261e restricts comparison to things capable of being likened, and 262a–b makes precision necessary for avoiding deception. It does not announce deception as the aim of every philosophical speech.
ἀντιλέγω
To contradict is to speak against another person’s claim. Socrates begins with opposing litigants disputing what is just or unjust, then asks what knowledge would let someone control such appearances. The familiar courtroom practice opens a larger question about persuasion and truth.
Read: 261c.
antilegō · Contradict · dictionary headword
Speak against another party’s assertion.
Opposing litigants provide the initial example. The issue is not simply that they exchange words but that they contest the just and unjust. Socrates uses this familiar activity to ask what knowledge a controlled alteration of appearances would require.
Attested: ἀντιλέγουσιν (261c · Burnet p. 48) — “contradict”.
ἀντιλογική
Contradiction names a proposed art of setting accounts against one another. Socrates considers whether one art might make things appear like or unlike across public and private speech, while adding the reservation if such an art exists. Its possible reach is investigated, rather than simply asserted as an established science.
Read: 261d–e.
antilogikē · Contradiction · dictionary headword
The proposed craft of opposing accounts or arguments.
Socrates extends its possible range beyond lawsuits and public assemblies to everything said, but calls it one craft only conditionally, “if indeed it exists”. Its supposed capacities include exposing another’s concealed likeness-making as well as making likenesses oneself.
Attested: ἀντιλογικὴ (261d–e · Burnet p. 48) — “craft of contradiction”.
ἄργυρος
Silver is a familiar material whose name illustrates agreement. Socrates asks whether people have the same thing in mind when they hear silver or iron, then contrasts their disagreements about justice and goodness. The example concerns shared meaning, rather than silver’s monetary value or a chemical classification.
Read: 263a.
argyros · Silver · dictionary headword
Silver, paired with iron as a name the interlocutors treat as agreed.
The contrast concerns shared conception, not the value of silver as money. Agreement about a familiar material illustrates why rhetoric has greater room to mislead where meanings and evaluations are unsettled.
Attested: ἀργύρου (263a · Burnet p. 50) — “silver”.
διαγιγνώσκω
To discern is to recognize a difference or relation accurately. Socrates asks whether someone ignorant of a thing’s truth could discern its likeness in other things, and Phaedrus denies it. Later, discernment includes judging when a particular kind of speech is suitable, joining knowledge to practical recognition.
diagignōskō · Discern · dictionary headword
Distinguish or recognize something by discriminating its character.
Socrates asks whether someone ignorant of a thing’s truth can discern its lesser or greater similarities in other things. Phaedrus answers that he cannot. At 272a the same family of discernment concerns timely and untimely use of speech, joining recognition of relations to practical judgement.
Attested: διαγιγνώσκειν (262a · Burnet p. 49) — “discern”.
εἰκονολογία
Image-speech is the use of images or comparisons as a rhetorical resource. Socrates names it in Polus’ collection and later asks what accomplished speakers would make of such techniques. A useful image remains a part requiring judgement, rather than a guarantee that its likeness is truthful.
eikonologia · Image-speech · dictionary headword
Speech employing images or comparisons.
Named among Polus’ accomplishments and recalled among the devices that the imagined great orators would judge as preliminary. The presence of an image does not make it a truthful likeness: the larger dialogue requires knowledge to discriminate its relations and effects.
Attested: εἰκονολογίαν (267c · Burnet p. 56) — “image-speech”.
Attested: εἰκονολογιῶν (269a · Burnet p. 58) — “image-speeches”. Included among the techniques to be examined in the light.
μεταβιβάζω
To lead across is to move a hearer from one position to another. Here the movement occurs gradually through similarities and can enable deception.
At 262b Socrates asks how someone ignorant of reality could lead another from what is to its opposite.
metabibazō · Lead across by stages · dictionary headword
Move someone from one position to another.
The relevant motion is argumentative: the operator leads a hearer little by little through similarities from what is to its opposite. The infinitive’s complement gives the deception its direction; “deceive” is not the unrestricted dictionary meaning of the verb.
Attested: μεταβιβάζειν (262b · Burnet p. 49) — “leading over”.
Παλαμήδης
The Eleatic Palamedes is Socrates’ playful name for someone skilled at making the same things appear under opposing descriptions.
At 261d his hearers are shown the same things as like and unlike, one and many, still and moving.
Palamēdēs · The Eleatic Palamedes · proper name used as an epithet
A playful designation for a speaker who makes the same things appear under contrary descriptions.
The epithet “Eleatic” distinguishes this figure from the heroic names first used in the banter. The edition reports the usual identification as Zeno, but labels it an interpretation. The argument needs only the stated capacity to present like and unlike, one and many, staying and moving, broadening the field beyond public rhetoric.
Attested: Παλαμήδην (261d · Burnet p. 48) — “Palamedes”. Qualified in the text by “Eleatic”.
φαίνομαι
To appear means to be presented in a certain way to a hearer or observer. Here opposing appearances are produced by skilled argument.
At 261d the Eleatic Palamedes makes the same things appear like and unlike, one and many, still and moving.
phainomai · Appear · dictionary headword
Come to appear or be presented in a particular way to hearers.
The Eleatic Palamedes makes the same things appear like and unlike, one and many, staying and moving. The appearance is grammatically relative to those hearing; the wording does not assert that all those contrary properties simply coexist in the same respect. Elsewhere the verb also marks ordinary judgements that seem warranted.
Attested: φαίνεσθαι (261d · Burnet p. 48) — “appear”.