From the book
Charmides
Plato · Diotimos Editions · November 2026
Browse this book’s lexicon →Orientation
At a Glance
- The wordΓιγνώσκω, to come to know, to recognize, to discern; in the aorist and perfect, to know.
- In the CharmidesTwenty-five times, from the riddle of “doing one’s own business” (162b) to the end of the argument (175b). Its weight falls on knowing oneself (164c–169e) and on the limit drawn at 170b–d: knowledge of knowledge would let a man know “that the man has some knowledge; but of what, temperance will not make him know” (170d).
- In this edition“Know”, the word the Glossary keeps for εἰδέναι, γιγνώσκειν and ἐπίστασθαι alike.
- A place to read170b–d.
- English renderings
- γνῶναι, gnōnai, “to know”; γιγνώσκειν, gignōskein, “know”, “knowing”; γιγνώσκει, gignōskei, “knows”; γιγνώσκων, gignōskōn, “knowing”; γιγνῶσκον, gignōskon, “what knows”; γιγνώσκοι, gignōskoi, “would know”; γιγνώσκῃ, gignōskēi, “knows”; γνώσεται, gnōsetai, “will know”
Meaning
Greek has three common verbs of knowing, and the dialogue uses all three. Γιγνώσκειν is the act of recognizing or discerning, knowledge by acquaintance with a person or a thing; εἰδέναι is knowing as a settled state, often knowing that; ἐπίστασθαι is knowing how, the knowledge of the expert, whose noun is ἐπιστήμη. Γιγνώσκω gives the family of γνῶσις, “knowledge”, and γνώριμος, “known”, and from the same root ἀγνοεῖν, “not to know”, and with a prefix διαγιγνώσκειν, “to tell apart”.
Use in the book
The verb first names a difficulty: the man who said that temperance is doing one’s own business put it forward as a riddle, “on the view that it is hard to know what on earth doing one’s own business is” (162b; see αἴνιγμα; τὰ ἑαυτοῦ πράττειν). It then names what the doctor may lack: “must a doctor also know when his treatment is beneficial and when it is not?” (164b). From 164c to 169e it carries knowing oneself, and that use is told under γιγνώσκειν ἑαυτόν. At 169e Critias builds his principle on it: whoever has knowledge, γνῶσις, is knowing, γιγνώσκων (see γνῶσις).
Its sharpest work is at 170b–d. A man who knows only knowledge, Socrates argues, “would know that he knows something and that he has some knowledge, both about himself and about others” (170b). “But how will he know, by this knowledge, what it is he knows? For he knows the healthy by medicine and not by temperance, the harmonious by music and not by temperance, what belongs to house-building by house-building and not by temperance, and so on for everything” (170b–c; see ἁρμονικός; οἰκοδομική). Each thing is recognized by the knowledge whose object it is, and a knowledge whose object is knowledge recognizes only that there is knowledge. So the temperate examiner “will know only this much, it seems, that the man has some knowledge; but of what, temperance will not make him know” (170d), and “that the doctor has some knowledge, then, the temperate man will know” (171a), but not whether he is a doctor. The argument has turned Critias’ definition into a knowledge of “that” without “what” (see ὅτι οἶδεν καὶ ὅτι οὐκ οἶδεν). At the end Socrates lists among the concessions that should never have been made “that by this knowledge one knows the works of the other kinds of knowledge too, though the argument did not allow this either” (175b–c; see πολλὰ συγχωρεῖν).
Places to read
Every passage in which the simple verb occurs outside knowing oneself and the maxim, which are listed under γιγνώσκειν ἑαυτόν and Γνῶθι σαυτόν.
- 162bThe formula was put forward as a riddle, since it is hard to know what doing one’s own business is.
- 164bMust a doctor also know when his treatment is beneficial and when it is not?
- 164cThe doctor who has acted beneficially or harmfully does not know himself, how he has acted (see ἀγνοεῖν ἑαυτὸν ὅτι σωφρονεῖ).
- 165cIf temperance is knowing something, it is a knowledge of something.
- 169eWhoever has knowledge is knowing, as whoever has speed is fast.
- 170bWhoever knows only knowledge would know that he knows something; but how will he know what it is he knows?
- 170cHe knows the healthy by medicine, not by temperance; by temperance, how will he know that he knows the healthy?
- 170dTemperance will let him know only that a man has some knowledge, not of what.
- 171aThat the doctor has some knowledge, the temperate man will know.
- 175b–c2They conceded that by knowledge of knowledge one knows the works of the other kinds of knowledge.
Translation in this edition
The Glossary renders εἰδέναι, γιγνώσκειν and ἐπίστασθαι all by “know”, “so that the formula ‘knowing what one knows and what one does not know’ keeps the same verb wherever it recurs”. The policy hides a change of verb at the key place: in “But how will he know, by this knowledge, what it is he knows?” (170b12) the first “know” is εἴσεται and the second γιγνώσκει; and at 170d7–9 “He will know” is γνώσεται and “make him know” renders ποιήσει … γιγνώσκειν. At 165c4 γιγνώσκειν is the reading of T and b, B having γιγνώσκει (apparatus, c4); at 170b7 Burnet prints γιγνώσκῃ from later manuscripts for γιγνώσκει in B, T and W (apparatus, b7).
Elsewhere in Plato
In the Republic Socrates puts the principle of 165c to the lover of sights. He asks, through Glaucon, whether the one who knows knows something or nothing; “something,” Glaucon answers for him, and something that is, “for how could what is not be known?” What fully is, is fully knowable, and what in no way is, is altogether unknowable (476e–477a). The Charmides’ “knowledge of something” is the first step of that argument, and the note at 168b observes that the Republic later makes explicit the principle that a power is defined by what it is set over (477c–d; see δύναμις).