Worth and desert

Use in the book

Efficient deliberation is called worthy of praise at 160a–b. In the craft analogy Socrates asks what fine work temperance produces that is worthy of its name (165d–e). A prestigious word creates an expectation that its referent can justify the honour it receives. At 173d Critias protests that if knowledgeable acting is slighted, one will struggle to find anything else that completes doing well. Socrates' reply is not to demean knowledge indiscriminately, but to ask which kind matters.

The final complaint about learning the charm for a thing worth nothing (175e) turns this demand on the whole inquiry. Socrates rejects the conclusion that temperance has no worth. Thus an honorific reputation initiates the test, but neither the name nor the offended sense that it deserves respect can replace a reasoned account of benefit.

Places to read

1. 160a–bThe effective deliberator merits praise
2. 165d–eTemperance is asked to produce a fine work worthy of its name
3. 173dCritias resists slighting knowledgeable action
4. 175eSocrates refuses to believe the charm concerns something worthless

Translation in this edition

“Worthy,” “worth” and “slight” bring out related evaluative roles while preserving different Greek roots. “Worth nothing” at 175e concerns μηδενὸς ἀξίου πράγματος, not a claim that the charm has no market price.

ἄξιος

Attested: ἄξιον / ἄξιος (axion / axios). Worthy or deserving, with the relevant standard supplied by context: praise, attention or benefit. References: 165e, 160a. Lexical identification: lemma: ἄξιος. See Worth and honour.

ἀτιμάζω

Attested: ἀτιμάσῃς (atimasēis). Dishonour or set little value on; Critias objects to Socrates’ apparently dismissive treatment of knowledgeable living. References: 173d. Lexical identification: lemma: ἀτιμάζω. See Worth and honour.

πράγματος (pragmatos)

Thing, affair or matter; Socrates would have studied something of no worth if the charm brought no benefit. References: 175e. Lemma: πρᾶγμα. See Worth and honour.

Use in the book

The opening joins thinking fit to gain with things worth nothing. The common Greek stem makes the juxtaposition audible, but a judgement that an action is fitting and a judgement of an object’s value remain different claims. Socrates turns from the moral suspicion of profit to a practitioner’s knowledge of materials. A plant’s worth depends on when and where it can be planted; food is assessed as nourishment for a horse; sails, rudders and instruments are assessed by their work. This is situated value, not a claim that each object carries an unchanging monetary price.

At 226e a person ignorant of worth can think valueless things highly valuable. That mistaken assessment explains pursuit without requiring knowingly self-defeating calculation. But it does not establish that the pursuit of every low-value object is ignorance. The complaint about excessive attention to trifles remains a different possible criticism.

Worth returns explicitly at 231d after “more” proves insufficient. The companion distinguishes the weight of silver from its value relative to gold. Socrates then moves from the comparative question, which exchange yields more worth, to “of worth” and “worth possessing” without an expressed comparator. This allows the beneficial to enter as the criterion. It also requires caution: silver that is a bad return for a particular gold payment is not thereby worthless in every respect. The edition’s wording “not of worth” preserves the compression rather than explaining it away.

The final conclusion covers valuable things small or great and excludes what is of no worth. On a charitable reading, the gold example teaches that genuine gain requires benefit, not bulk. On a critical reading, comparative exchange value has become unqualified desirability, enabling goodness to re-enter by a shift of standard. Both readings must attend to the recurrence of the same word family.

Places to read

1. 225aἀπὸ τῶν μηδενὸς ἀξίων — The original definition locates the problem in sources alleged to have no worth.
2. 226eτὰ οὐδενὸς ἄξια πολλοῦ ἄξια εἶναι — Ignorance permits a false estimate of value.
3. 231dΟὔτι τῇ ἀξίᾳ γε ἀργύριον χρυσίου. — The companion distinguishes worth from the larger quantity.
4. 231eἄξιον εἶναι ἄλλο τι ἢ κεκτῆσθαι — Worth is reformulated as worth possessing.

Translation in this edition

The edition’s note 22 takes the half-weight of gold as worth six corresponding units of silver, with one unit received; the loss is therefore substantial despite an increase in physical weight. Its English “twice that weight” and the subsequent “double” should be read with that explanatory note, not converted without comment into two full units of silver. Note 23 identifies the printed negative at 231d as W’s reading. The interpretive move from relative worth to “of worth” remains visible whichever practical scale is used.

Use in the book

Hermes addresses sacred books that must remain hidden until heaven produces souls worthy of them. Worthiness concerns fitness to receive sacred knowledge. The passage does not identify it with wealth, social rank, or a numerical measure of achievement.

Places to read

1. I.49.44.8Souls must be worthy of the preserved sacred books.

Translation in this edition

“Worthy” fits the attested adjective; “desert” suits contexts explicitly linking conduct and recompense.

Use in the book

Human worth is disclosed by creation, divine love, and redemption rather than by rank or accumulated possessions. A person can exceed the visible universe in dignity because the universe is an inheritance intended for a knowing and loving enjoyer. That claim should lead to mutual reverence rather than a private superiority over neighbours.

Traherne makes a further distinction: love may find worth, but can also create the worth it seeks. The creature is made worthy of divine love, not discovered already independent and meritorious. In conduct, virtues are worth more than a stock of money because they make life rightly ordered and a person delightful to others. Worth consequently joins gift, fittingness, and ethical excellence; it is not a stable price attached to an isolated thing.

Places to read

1. II.93Redemption and inheritance require every informed person to honour another.
2. IV.74Love finds or makes its object worthy of itself.
3. IV.89A virtue is preferred in worth to worldly money and splendour.
4. III.55Worthlessness follows the imagined severing of things from their beneficial relations.

In this edition

Made worthy in IV.74 is the crucial qualification. It prevents the language of dignity from being read as a claim that creatures possess an antecedent claim upon God independent of his gift.