Belief and opinion

Use in the book

Charmides arrives with a reputation. Critias calls him "the one who is thought the most beautiful" (154a) and, "in other people's opinion as well as his own, quite the poet" (155a), and says that "he is thought far and away the most temperate of anyone nowadays" (157d). Asked whether he agrees, Charmides can answer neither way (158c–d2; see Adequacy and deficiency). A denial would be an odd thing to say against oneself, and would show up as liars Critias and the many others who, by Critias' account, think he is temperate; to affirm it "will probably seem obnoxious" (158d).

Socrates turns from what others think to what Charmides thinks: "For surely, if it really is in you, it must give rise to some sense, from which you would have some opinion about it: what it is, and what sort of thing temperance is" (158e–159a). He goes on: "Then, so that we can make a guess whether it is in you or not, tell me, … what you say temperance is, in your opinion" (159a). His answers come as opinions: "in his view" temperance was doing everything in an orderly way and quietly (159b), and at the second attempt he thinks it "makes a person feel shame" (160e). Asked by Critias for his own view, Socrates sets it aside: "Let's not look yet at what I think, but at what you are saying now" (163e).

The danger is the conceit of knowledge. Socrates says he refutes Critias for the reason for which he would scrutinize even himself: "for fear that I might ever, without noticing, think I know something when I don't" (166c–d). The temperate man of Critias' account would alone see what a person knows, and "what he thinks he knows but does not" (167a); but a knowledge only of knowledge could not tell "a doctor who knows the things of his craft from one who does not know them but pretends or thinks he does" (171c; see Art and craft).

Opinion also serves Socrates as a parallel to knowledge of knowledge. Asked about "an opinion which is an opinion of opinions and of itself, but has no opinion about any of the things the other opinions are opinions about", Critias answers, "Not at all" (168a). Yet such, it seems, is the knowledge Socrates and Critias are positing, and Socrates will not "yet insist that there isn't" (168a). Hearing that hears itself, or heat that burns itself, "would raise disbelief in some people, though perhaps not in others"; Socrates does not trust himself to decide, and so cannot say with confidence whether there can be knowledge of knowledge (168e–169b2; see Being and substance; Adequacy and deficiency).

When the argument has made temperance of no benefit, Socrates blames himself, not temperance: "Well, I don't at all think it is so; rather, I am a poor inquirer. For I do think that temperance is a great good" (175e; see Babbling and self-deprecation). Charmides says, "I don't know whether I have it or whether I don't" (176a), and yet "I think I very much need the charm" (176b). The dialogue that asked the boy for his opinion ends with two opinions the argument could not turn into knowledge, held by speakers who do not claim to know: what can be read as the opposite of the conceit Socrates feared at 166d.

Places to read

1. 157d–158d23Charmides is thought the most temperate of anyone nowadays; he can neither affirm it nor deny it: denial would be odd and would show up those who think so, and affirmation would seem obnoxious.
2. 158e–159bIf temperance is present, it gives rise to a sense and so to an opinion; Socrates asks for Charmides' opinion in order to make a guess from it, and Charmides gives his view.
3. 163eSocrates sets aside what he thinks, to look at what Critias says.
4. 166c–167a2Socrates examines arguments for fear of thinking he knows what he does not; the temperate man would see what others know and what they only think they know.
5. 168aCritias denies that there is an opinion of opinions and of itself with no opinion about anything else; yet knowledge is said to be of that kind.
6. 168e–169b2Some powers turned on themselves raise disbelief; Socrates does not trust himself to decide, and so cannot say with confidence whether knowledge of knowledge is possible.
7. 171cA temperance that is only knowledge of knowledge could not tell a doctor who knows from one who pretends or thinks he knows.
8. 175e–176b2Socrates thinks temperance a great good though the argument has failed; Charmides does not know whether he has it, but thinks he needs the charm.

Translation in this edition

At 159a "opinion" renders three Greek words: δόξα, δοξάζειν ("you have some opinion") and οἴεσθαι, in Socrates' ὃ οἴει, "what you think", which is "this opinion of yours"; Charmides' οἶμαι there is "I do". Δόξα is "opinion" also at 168a, where δοξάζειν is "has no opinion about" and "are opinions about". Of reputation δοκεῖν is "is thought" (154a, 157d twice, 158a, 160a, 162b), "in other people's opinion" (155a) and, with the thinkers as subject, "who think I am temperate" (158d); of a speaker's view it is mostly "think" (159b, 160e, 161b, 163e), once "in his view" (159b) and, with παντὸς μᾶλλον, "I am quite certain" (162b); and it is "seem" when Charmides may seem to lack temperance (158c). Οἴεσθαι is "think" at the places listed under its lemma below, except at 159a and in "to imagine" (156c) and "we must suppose" (163c); elsewhere it is also "suppose" (157e, 163b), "imagine" (160a, 167e) and "I should think" (154b). The edition does not use "belief" for any of these words; its one "believe" among them is πιστεύειν (161a). The neighbouring verbs keep their ordinary English, given under each lemma below.

δοκέω

Attested: δοκοῦντος (dokountos; 154a), δοκεῖ (dokei; 155a, 157d twice, 159b, 160a, 160e, 161b twice, 163e), δόξαι (doxai; 158a), δοκεῖς (dokeis; 158c), δοκῶ (dokō; 158d), δοκοῖ (dokoi; 159b), ἐδόκει (edokei; 162b), δοκοῦν (dokoun; 163e). To seem, to be thought; to think. The verb occurs in forty sections, most often in asides and in assent; listed are the places where it says what someone is thought to be by people generally (154a, 155a, 157d, 158a, 158d, 160a, 162b) or whether Charmides seems to lack temperance (158c), and where Charmides gives his definitions as what he thinks or one speaker asks another's view of a definition (159b, 160e, 161b, 163e). Charmides is thought the most beautiful and the most temperate (154a, 157d); it is said that no man on the continent was ever thought handsomer or bigger than his uncle Pyrilampes (158a); and many, by Critias' account, think Charmides temperate (158d). His first two answers are what he thinks (159b, 160e); in offering the third he asks Socrates what he thinks of it (161b); and at 163e Socrates sets his own opinion aside for what Critias says. Lemma: δοκέω.

δόξα

Attested: δόξα (doxa; 159a), δόξαν (doxan; 159a, 168a twice), δοξῶν (doxōn; 168a). Opinion. If temperance is in Charmides it must give rise to a sense from which he would have some opinion about it, and he is to say what temperance is in his opinion (159a); at 168a Critias denies that there is an opinion of opinions and of itself that has no opinion about the things other opinions are about. Lemma: δόξα.

δοξάζω

Attested: δοξάζειν (doxazein; 159a), δοξάζουσιν (doxazousin; 168a), δοξάζουσαν (doxazousan; 168a). To have an opinion. If temperance is present in Charmides, he has some opinion about it (159a); the opinion of opinions of 168a "has no opinion about any of the things the other opinions are opinions about". Lemma: δοξάζω.

οἴομαι

Attested: οἴει (oiei; 159a twice, 162d), οἶμαι (oimai; 159a, 176b), οἴεσθαι (oiesthai; 156c, 163c), οἰηθείη (oiētheiē; 165a), ᾠήθησαν (ōiēthēsan; 165a), οἰόμενος (oiomenos; 166d), οἴεται (oietai; 167a twice), οἰόμενον (oiomenon; 171c), οἴομαι (oiomai; 175e). To think, to suppose. The verb occurs in twenty-three sections, often as a parenthetic "I think"; listed are the places where thinking is set against knowing or against what is so, and where an opinion about temperance is asked for or held. The doctors say it is folly to imagine one could treat the head apart from the whole body (156c); Charmides thinks that temperance, if present, gives rise to an opinion (159a); Critias asks whether Charmides thinks that if he does not know what the man meant who said it, the man does not know either (162d), holds that "we must suppose" Hesiod calls the man who does his own business temperate (163c), and says the later dedicators at Apollo's temple at Delphi thought "Know thyself" a piece of advice (165a; see Advice and greeting); Socrates fears that he might think he knows something when he does not (166d); the temperate man of Critias' account would see what a person "thinks he knows but does not" (167a), yet if temperance is only knowledge of knowledge he could not tell a doctor who knows from one who "pretends or thinks he does" (171c); and at the end Socrates does not think temperance worthless and Charmides thinks he needs the charm (175e, 176b). Lemma: οἴομαι.

πιστεύω

Attested: πιστεύεις (pisteueis; 161a), πιστεύω (pisteuō; 169a); and the related negative verb and noun, ἀπιστεῖται (apisteitai; 168e), "are … doubted", and ἀπιστίαν (apistian; 169a), "disbelief". To trust, to believe. Charmides believes Homer right that modesty is no good thing for a man in need (161a); Socrates says, "I, for my part, don't trust myself to be capable of making these distinctions" (169a), just after saying that some cases "are very strongly doubted ever to have their own power in relation to themselves" and would "raise disbelief in some people, though perhaps not in others" (168e–169a). Lemma: πιστεύω.

τοπάζω

Attested: τοπάσωμεν (topasōmen; 159a). To guess. Socrates asks for Charmides' opinion of temperance so that they can make a guess whether it is in him (159a): whether he has temperance is to be guessed from what he thinks it is. Lemma: τοπάζω.

ὑπολαμβάνω

Attested: ὑπέλαβον (hypelabon; 162c). To take up, and so to suppose or suspect. Socrates, narrating, says, "For I think it was entirely true, as I had suspected, that Charmides had heard this answer about temperance from Critias" (162c), though Critias had denied it (161c). Lemma: ὑπολαμβάνω.

φαίνομαι

Attested: φανεῖται (phaneitai; 158d), φαίνῃ (phainēi; 158d), φαίνεται (phainetai; 159a, 160e, 166d). To appear, to seem. The verb occurs in twenty-five sections, most often in the answer "So it appears"; listed are the places where an answer is to be given as it seems to the answerer, or weighed by how it seems to others. Charmides fears that calling himself temperate "will probably seem obnoxious", and Socrates answers, "You seem to me to be talking sense" (158d); Socrates asks Charmides what temperance seems to him to be (159a, 160e), and tells Critias to answer the question as it seems to him (166d). Lemma: φαίνομαι.

ἐνόμισα (enomisa)

Attested: ἐνόμισα (enomisa; 155d), ἐνόμιζεν (enomizen; 163b). To hold, to think. Socrates, narrating, "thought Cydias the wisest of men in the ways of love" (155d; see Advice and greeting), Cydias being a lyric poet otherwise almost unknown; and Critias says that the poet Hesiod "held making to be something other than doing and working" (163b). Lemma: νομίζω.

ἡγῇ (hēgēi)

Attested: ἡγῇ (hēgēi; 161d, 164a), ἡγοῦμαι (hēgoumai; 161d, 164a), ἡγεῖσθαι (hēgeisthai; 163c, 176a), ἡγούμενος (hēgoumenos; 166c), ἡγουμένης (hēgoumenēs; 172a), ἡγουμένη (hēgoumenē; 172d). To lead, and so to hold or think. As "think": "Or do you think the writing-master does nothing when he writes or reads?" (161d); Critias' claim that Hesiod "regarded only such things as appropriate to one" (163c); Socrates' question whether Critias thinks that the temperate do not know that they are temperate, which Critias denies (164a); Critias' supposing that Socrates refutes him for some other reason (166c); Socrates' advice, if Charmides has temperance, to regard him as a babbler (176a). As "lead": "rightness leading" (172a) and temperance "as the guide of the management of household and of city" (172d). Lemma: ἡγέομαι.

Elsewhere in Plato

In the Apology Socrates, having questioned a politician reputed wise, reckons with himself that very likely neither of them knows anything fine and good; but where the politician, without knowing, supposes he knows something, Socrates, just as he does not know, does not suppose so either, and by this one small thing he seems to be the wiser: what he does not know he does not suppose he knows (21d). It is the distinction that the temperate man of Charmides 167a would draw in others, between what a man knows and what he only thinks he knows.

In the Meno Socrates argues that a man with right opinion about the road to Larisa, a city in Thessaly, who has neither travelled it nor knows it, will lead others there no worse than one who knows, for as long as his opinion is right, supposing what is true without understanding it (97a–c). Asked why knowledge is then prized above right opinion, he points to the statues of Daedalus, the legendary craftsman, which run off unless they are tied. True opinions are a fine thing while they stay, but they will not stay long; they slip away out of a man's soul until he binds them by reckoning out the cause, and once bound they become knowledge and stay put (97d–98a). He says this not as one who knows but as one who guesses, though he would count among the few things he knows that right opinion and knowledge are different (98b). The two opinions that close the Charmides (175e–176b2) can be read as opinions of this kind, not yet tied down.

In the Republic Socrates, talking with Plato's brother Glaucon, makes knowledge and opinion two powers, and tells one power from another by what it is concerned with and what it brings about (477c–d): knowledge has to do with what is, ignorance with what is not, and opinion, which unlike knowledge can go wrong, lies between them (477a–478d). One step of the argument can be read beside Charmides 168a. Socrates asks whether a man who holds an opinion does not direct it at something, or whether one can have an opinion that is an opinion of nothing; Glaucon says one cannot (478b).

Use in the book

At 117b Socrates asks whether Alcibiades' opinion wanders about how to ascend to heaven. It does not, because Alcibiades does not suppose that he knows. The practical examples ask whether he forms his own judgment about preparing a dish or steering, or entrusts these matters to the expert. Opinion is here the exercise of judgment under a claim of competence, not a separately defined lower faculty opposed to an intelligible world.

At 120c–d the noun οἴησις refers to Alcibiades' supposition that the foreign kings differ little from other people. Socrates criticizes it in two stages: it discourages care, and it is false when their resources are compared. Harmful effect and falsity are presented as distinct criticisms. The first does not by itself prove the second.

Throughout the dialogue both speakers use “I think,” “it seems,” and similar expressions to qualify answers or inferences. These should not be read as confessions that every proposition is merely subjective. Nor should Alcibiades' assent expressed through seeming be silently strengthened into demonstrative certainty. The language makes the evolving, sometimes hesitant state of agreement audible.

Places to read

1. 117b–117dOpinion and personal judgment are tested against acknowledged ignorance
2. 120c–120e2An opinion about rivals is criticized as harmful and false
3. 130c–130dQualified judgment accompanies an explicitly provisional result

Translation in this edition

The edition distinguishes “opinion” for δόξα and “notion” for οἴησις at 120c–d while usually using “think” for οἴεσθαι and ἡγεῖσθαι. No comprehensive theory of belief is supplied by these translations.

δοκέω

Attested: δοκεῖ (dokei; 116e). At 116e: Something seems one way at one time and another way later, expressing Alcibiades' unstable responses. Lexical identification: lemma: δοκέω. See Belief.

δόξα

Attested: δόξα (doxa; 117b). At 117b: The judgment that could wander, but does not do so about a subject Alcibiades knows he does not know. Lexical identification: lemma: δόξα. See Belief.

δοξάζω

Attested: δοξάζεις (doxazeis; 117c). At 117c: Form one's own judgment about a practical task instead of entrusting it to a person with the requisite knowledge. Lexical identification: lemma: δοξάζω. See Belief.

ἡγέομαι

Attested: ἡγῇ (hēgēi; 115e). At 115e: Consider life and courage best and their opposites worst, an evaluative commitment used in the fine–good argument. Lexical identification: lemma: ἡγέομαι. See Belief.

οἴησις

Attested: οἴησιν (oiēsin; 120c). A supposition or belief; Alcibiades' dismissive estimate of foreign rulers is tested for both its harmful effect and its plausibility. Lexical identification: lemma: οἴησις. See Belief.

ψευδής

Attested: ψευδής (pseudēs; 120d). At 120d: False, a separate criticism of Alcibiades' belief about royal rivals after its harmful effect on preparation has been established. Lexical identification: lemma: ψευδής. See Belief.

Use in the book

At 144a an opinion can occur to someone ignorant of the best, making even the worst seem best. At 144c the benefit of non-recognition is expressly for people disposed in this way and holding such opinions. Opinion is thus not merely a weaker description of technical skill: it can determine the end toward which technical and identifying capacities are directed.

At 146a and 146c the recurrent criticism is trusting opinion “without sense”. The qualification matters. The text does not say that every opinion whatsoever is necessarily harmful, nor provide a full theory classifying true and false belief. It explains the experts’ and the many’s failure through reliance on an inadequately governed seeming, which lets a limited strength masquerade as the best for city and self.

The many occurrences of “it seems” in the conversation also display its provisional character. Alcibiades says the thesis now seems right at 146e, and at 147e his response can be read as another change of view. At 151b, however, Socrates welcomes Alcibiades’ doxa as an omen: in the edition’s reading it is his good opinion of the advice, expressed by the wreath. This is a favourable relational judgment, not a retraction of the earlier warning about senseless reliance.

Places to read

1. 144a; 144cAn opinion of what is best can set a harmful aim.
2. 146a; 146cOpinion without sense is trusted in place of adequate guidance.
3. 146e–147e23What seems right to Alcibiades remains unstable.
4. 151a–bThe wreath expresses the favourable opinion Socrates accepts as an omen.

Translation in this edition

The edition preserves doxa as “opinion” at 151b, while its note records proposed readings meaning “gift”. At 147e it takes palin au moi dokei as renewed reversal but records the possible further assent. The ambivalence should not be converted into certainty about Alcibiades’ settled belief.

Use in the book

The companion starts with “to me they seem”, modestly presenting a proposed description. Socrates then asks what the alleged lovers of gain themselves know and think. The craft sequence repeatedly opposes true knowledge of worthlessness to an incompatible expectation of gain. At 226e mistaken thought supplies the missing link: ignorant people think things worth nothing worth much. The reasoning is therefore not simply that desire tracks objective worth; it also recognises that an agent’s estimate can be wrong.

At 227c the conclusion is that all men “appear” to be lovers of gain in this way, as no one was a lover of gain in the previous account. This language does not make the conclusion a casual guess, since it follows an articulated series of agreements. It does, however, present the result as one produced by a particular route of argument and immediately invites a question about which route avoids error.

Hēgeisthai becomes important when the companion says how one should rightly regard the lover of gain, and in the historical narrative where citizens are to regard Hipparchus’ sayings as wiser than Delphi’s. The same broad act of evaluation may classify a character or rank a cultural authority. Its presence alone does not certify the judgement’s truth. The ruler’s educational plan seeks admiration and belief as well as instruction.

The companion often answers “it seems” even when a stronger question has been put. At the end he explicitly distinguishes being compelled from being persuaded. These short assent formulas are consequently best read as local concessions whose psychological force must be assessed from context. Repeated acceptance is evidence that the conversation has reached a stated position; it is not proof that the speaker possesses a stable conviction or that every inference is valid.

Places to read

1. 225aἘμοὶ μὲν δοκοῦσιν — The first definition is presented as the companion’s judgement.
2. 226eΦαίνεται. — A brief assent follows the explanation by mistaken valuation.
3. 227cτοῦτον τὸν τρόπον — The universal conclusion is qualified by this route of reasoning.
4. 231cτὸ μὲν κέρδος ἀγαθὸν φαίνεται — Goodness reappears as an outcome of the acquisition test.

Translation in this edition

The edition distributes “think”, “seem” and “appear” rather than replacing each with “believe”. That preserves the difference between someone’s expectation and the dialogue’s emerging result, while not claiming a rigid one-to-one philosophical vocabulary. The header uses infinitive citation forms; the common replies contain finite forms such as phainetai and eoiken.

Use in the book

The Phaedo extract describes a proposed sequence from perception through memory and belief to knowledge. In the inquiry into souls’ entry into bodies, one opinion is divided into three forms. Here doxa designates a reported explanation rather than a separate faculty.

Places to read

1. I.51.6Memory and belief are associated with the emergence of stable knowledge.
2. I.49.41.3One opinion about the soul’s entry into a body has three alternatives.
3. I.49.34.3Opinion appears among an enumeration of the soul’s powers.
4. I.49.24.4The power of opinion is differentiated by its relation to imagination and perception.

Translation in this edition

“Belief” often suits an epistemological sequence; “opinion” suits a reported position or list of powers. Neither English word is a standing verdict on the truth of the passage.

The power of opinion

Doxastikon is the capacity for forming opinion. I.49.24.4 distinguishes a course of thought accompanied by imagination or perception from one proceeding without them; another account instead gives a single rational substance different activities. The faculty name therefore belongs to a reported classification, not to an uncontested map of the soul.

Use in the book

His remembered difficulty about Scripture concerns its manner of arrival rather than the excellence of its contents. A heavenly message seemed inadequately authenticated until its historical transmission was understood as better than a private angelic delivery. The movement toward belief accordingly requires examination, not merely stronger desire. IV.6 allows that implicit faith can produce obedience while urging its growth into assurance through knowledge. The dignity of the soul, goodness of the works, and beauty of the laws become intelligible evidence. This is not a substitution of bare inference for faith. Believed truths must become sufficiently real to be enjoyed. The decisive question is whether assent has opened into a lived acknowledgment of the goods it affirms.

Places to read

1. III.32Unbelief arises over how Scripture has been authenticated, despite its excellent matter.
2. III.33The historical mode of revelation is argued to surpass a private angelic message.
3. IV.6Implicit faith is to mature into assurance through understanding divine gifts and laws.

In this edition

Belief and assurance are related but not interchangeable. The doubts in III.32 are narrated stages of inquiry, not Traherne's final dismissal of Scripture.