Agreement and concession

Use in the book

The first request for agreement is put to Charmides, the young son of Glaucon, and he cannot meet it. Asked whether he agrees with Critias, his cousin and guardian, that he already has enough temperance, he blushes and says "that it was not easy, in the circumstances, either to agree or to deny what he had been asked" (158c–d2), and Socrates turns the request into an inquiry they will make together (158d–e). Charmides grants at once that temperance is fine (159c), and when he next calls it modesty, Socrates asks, "Weren't you agreeing just now that temperance is fine?" (160e). Critias, once he has taken the argument over (162e; see Acceptance and taking over), protests with heavy irony that Socrates has stretched his agreement: "I suppose I agreed that those who do other people's business are temperate, just because I agreed that those who make other people's things are!" (163a).

Agreements bind, and the dialogue shows what a partner does when an agreement binds too tightly. Asked whether a doctor must know when his treatment benefits, Critias answers, "Perhaps not" (164b), and that guarded concession lets Socrates draw the consequence that a man may sometimes act temperately, and be temperate, without knowing himself (164b–c). Critias would sooner take back some of what he agreed earlier, if Socrates thinks the conclusion necessarily follows from it, than ever concede "that a man who does not know himself is temperate" (164c–d; see Retraction). Offering knowing oneself as temperance (164d), he gives up everything said before, and will give an account of it if Socrates does not agree (165b). Socrates will not be treated as one who claims to know the answers and agrees on demand: "I inquire with you, each time, into whatever is proposed, because I myself do not know. So once I have looked into it I am willing to say whether I agree or not" (165b–c2). Agreement, on this rule, comes at the end of an inquiry, not before it.

In the second half the argument goes forward on concessions, and most are Socrates' own. Critias, ashamed before the company, will not concede that he cannot make the distinctions Socrates asks for (169c–d); so, to keep the argument moving, Socrates proposes, "let us grant for now that it is possible for there to be knowledge of knowledge; we shall look into it again another time, whether it is so or not" (169d). Here the man who would agree only once he had looked grants first and leaves the looking for later; the other time never comes. When the argument has shown that such a knowledge would know only that one knows, not what one knows (170a–d2), Socrates grants again that it is possible to know knowledge, and restores to temperance what was laid down at the start (167a), knowing what one knows and what one does not know: "let us not take that away from it, but grant it", so as to see whether it would benefit us at all (172c–d). In the same breath he withdraws an agreement made a page before (171d–172a): they "too easily agreed" that it would be a great good if each did what he knew and handed over the rest to those who knew it (172d–e2). In his dream he grants that prophecy is knowledge of the future and that men would live knowledgeably, but not that this would make them do well and be happy: "this, my dear Critias, we cannot yet learn" (173c–d2). When Critias tries to set temperance over the knowledge of good, an earlier declaration binds him: "didn't we solemnly declare long ago that it is knowledge only of knowledge and of the lack of knowledge, and of nothing else?" (174e).

At the end Socrates reckons up: "we have conceded many things that did not follow in the argument. For we conceded that there is knowledge of knowledge, though the argument did not allow it or say that there was; and we conceded, again, that by this knowledge one knows the works of the other kinds of knowledge too, though the argument did not allow this either" (175b–c2). The first is the grant of 169d, renewed at 172c, and remembered as stronger than it was: what was granted as possible is now "that there is knowledge of knowledge". The second is the grant of 172c–d, made so that the temperate man "might turn out to know, of what he knows, that he knows it, and of what he does not know, that he does not know it". This "we conceded with the utmost magnificence, without even considering that it is impossible to know, in some way or other, what one does not know at all" (175c). The concessions are now "our agreement" (175c), and the definition "what we long ago agreed on, and made up between us, and laid down as temperance" (175d). Every concession favoured the definition, and still the inquiry, though it "found us so simple-minded and so easy to deal with", "is no more able to find the truth", and has shown the definition to be of no benefit (175c–d). The failure holds in spite of the concessions, not because of them. The agreements of the dialogue, then, are not its doctrine. Socrates lays the blame on himself, "a poor inquirer" (175e).

Places to read

1. 155cThe men on the bench squeeze up to make room for Charmides, the literal sense of the verb of conceding.
2. 158c–e2Charmides finds it not easy either to agree or to deny that he is temperate, and Socrates proposes that they look into it together.
3. 160eSocrates recalls Charmides' agreement that temperance is fine.
4. 163aCritias: to have agreed about making other people's things was not to have agreed about doing other people's business.
5. 164b–165b2Critias' "Perhaps not" leads to the conclusion that a man may be temperate without knowing himself; if Socrates thinks it necessarily follows, Critias would sooner take back some of what he agreed than concede it, and he gives up everything said before.
6. 165b–c2Socrates will not agree on demand, but only once he has looked into the matter.
7. 169c–dAshamed, Critias will not concede that he cannot make the distinctions asked of him; Socrates grants for now that knowledge of knowledge is possible.
8. 172c–e2Socrates grants the definition in order to test its benefit, and withdraws the agreement that each doing what he knew would be a great good.
9. 173c–d2In the dream Socrates grants that prophecy is knowledge of the future and that men would live knowledgeably, but not that they would be happy.
10. 174eSocrates recalls the solemn declaration that temperance is knowledge only of knowledge and of the lack of knowledge, and it binds Critias.
11. 175a–d2The reckoning: what was conceded though the argument did not allow it, and the agreed definition shown to be of no benefit.

Translation in this edition

The edition keeps "agree" for ὁμολογεῖν and "agreement" for ὁμολογία throughout, except "admit" at 173e, where Critias does not admit that the men who live knowledgeably at cutting leather or working bronze are happy; συνομολογεῖν is "agreed on" (175d). Συγχωρεῖν is "grant" where Socrates proposes a step (169d, 172c, 173c), "concede" at 164d, 169c and 175b–c2, "agree" at 162e and 166b, in Socrates' requests for Critias' assent and in Critias' "I agree entirely", and "squeezed up" in its literal sense at 155c. The steps Socrates "grants" at 169d and 172c are the ones he counts as "conceded" at 175b–c2. "Grant" also renders δίδωμι (didōmi) at 172d and ἕπομαι (hepomai), "I follow", at 173d; "agree" renders συμφέρομαι (sympheromai) at 164d; "allow" renders ἐάω (eaō) at 173d and 175b–c2, and δίδωμι at 163d. "Made up between us" gives συμπλάττοντες (symplattontes; 175d) its sense of moulding together, as a figure is shaped from wax or clay.

ἀποστερέω

Attested: ἀποστερήσωμεν (aposterēsōmen; 172d). To take away, to deprive. Socrates proposes not to take away from temperance what was laid down at the start (167a), knowing what one knows and what one does not know: "let us not take that away from it, but grant it" (172c–d). Lemma: ἀποστερέω.

διαμαρτύρομαι

Attested: διεμαρτυρόμεθα (diemartyrometha; 174e). To declare solemnly, as though before witnesses. When Critias would put temperance in charge of the knowledge of good, Socrates asks, "Or didn't we solemnly declare long ago that it is knowledge only of knowledge and of the lack of knowledge, and of nothing else?", and Critias answers, "It seems so" (174e). The declaration binds him: temperance cannot then be the craftsman of health, or of benefit (174e–175a). Lemma: διαμαρτύρομαι.

δίδωμι

Attested: δοτέον (doteon; 158b), δίδωμι (didōmi; 163d), διδόναι (didonai; 165b), δῶμεν (dōmen; 172d), δόντες (dontes; 172d), δώσεις (dōseis; 176c). To give, to grant, to allow. If Charmides is temperate enough, the remedy for the head "should be given" him without the charm (158b); Socrates allows Critias to assign each word as he pleases (163d); Critias is willing to give an account of temperance as knowing oneself (165b); Socrates proposes that they grant the definition and, "having granted all this", look into its benefit (172d); at the end he asks whether Charmides will not even give him a preliminary hearing (176c). The same family gives the noun δόσις (158c) and the compounds παραδίδωμι (157e, 171e, 172d) and ἀποδίδωμι (170e, 175a). Lemma: δίδωμι.

ὁμολογέω

Attested: ὁμολογεῖς (homologeis; 158c, 165b), ὁμολογεῖν (homologein; 158c), ὡμολόγεις (hōmologeis; 160e), ὡμολόγηκα (hōmologēka; 163a), ὡμολόγησα (hōmologēsa; 163a), ὡμολογημένων (hōmologēmenōn; 164c), ὁμολογήσοντος (homologēsontos; 165b), ὁμολογῶ (homologō; 165c), ὡμολογηκέναι (hōmologēkenai; 172d), ὡμολογήσαμεν (hōmologēsamen; 172d, 172e), ὁμολογοῦνται (homologountai; 173e), ὁμολογεῖται (homologeitai; 175b). To agree, to admit. Charmides finds it not easy either to agree or to deny that he is temperate (158c), and Socrates reminds him that he was agreeing just now that temperance is fine (160e); Critias protests that to have agreed about making other people's things was not to have agreed about doing other people's business (163a), and would take back some of what he agreed if Socrates thought the conclusion necessarily followed from it (164c); he offers an account if Socrates does not agree, and Socrates will say whether he agrees only when he has looked (165b–c2); Socrates doubts that they were right to agree so readily that each doing what he knew would be a great good (172d–e2); Critias does not admit that those who live knowledgeably at the crafts are happy (173e); and temperance "is agreed to be the finest of all things" (175a–b). Lemma: ὁμολογέω.

ὁμολογία

Attested: ὁμολογία (homologia; 175c). Agreement, the thing agreed. In the reckoning, "our agreement says" that the temperate man knows, of what he does not know, that he does not know it, than which nothing could appear more absurd (175c). Lemma: ὁμολογία.

συγχωρέω

Attested: συγχωρῶν (synchōrōn; 155c), συγχωρεῖς (synchōreis; 162e twice, 166b), συγχωρῶ (synchōrō; 162e), συγχωρήσαιμ’ (synchōrēsaim’; 164d), συγχωρῆσαι (synchōrēsai; 169c), συγχωρήσωμεν (synchōrēsōmen; 169d, 173c), συγχωρήσαντες (synchōrēsantes; 172c), συγκεχωρήκαμεν (synkechōrēkamen; 175b), συνεχωρήσαμεν (synechōrēsamen; 175b, 175c twice). To move together and make room, and so to give way, to concede, to grant. The men on the bench squeeze up for Charmides (155c); Critias agrees that temperance is what Charmides said, and that all craftsmen make something (162e), and that the heavy and the light, which weighing weighs, are other than weighing itself (166b); he would never concede that a man who does not know himself is temperate (164d), and will not concede that he cannot make the distinctions asked of him (169c); Socrates grants for now that knowledge of knowledge is possible (169d), grants it again together with the definition (172c), and grants that prophecy is knowledge of what is going to be (173c); at the end he counts up what they conceded (175b–c2). Lemma: συγχωρέω.

συμπλάττω

Attested: συμπλάττοντες (symplattontes; 175d). To mould together, to fabricate. The definition of temperance is what "we long ago agreed on, and made up between us" (175d). Lemma: συμπλάττω.

συνομολογέω

Attested: συνομολογοῦντες (synomologountes; 175d). To agree together. Socrates' word for the partners' joint work on the definition, "what we long ago agreed on, and made up between us, and laid down as temperance" (175d). Lemma: συνομολογέω.

ἀφίημι (aphiēmi)

Attested: ἀφίημι (aphiēmi; 165b). To let go, to give up. Critias gives up to Socrates everything said before: perhaps what Socrates said about it was more correct, perhaps what he himself said, but nothing they said was really clear. "Everything before this I give up to you" (165b), he says, and starts again from knowing oneself. Lemma: ἀφίημι.

δῶμεν (dōmen)

Attested: δοτέον (doteon; 158b), δίδωμι (didōmi; 163d), διδόναι (didonai; 165b), δῶμεν (dōmen; 172d), δόντες (dontes; 172d), δώσεις (dōseis; 176c). To give, to grant, to allow. If Charmides is temperate enough, the remedy for the head "should be given" him without the charm (158b); Socrates allows Critias to assign each word as he pleases (163d); Critias is willing to give an account of temperance as knowing oneself (165b); Socrates proposes that they grant the definition and, "having granted all this", look into its benefit (172d); at the end he asks whether Charmides will not even give him a preliminary hearing (176c). The same family gives the noun δόσις (158c) and the compounds παραδίδωμι (157e, 171e, 172d) and ἀποδίδωμι (170e, 175a). Lemma: δίδωμι.

ἐῶντος (eōntos)

Attested: ἐᾶν (ean; 158e), ἔα (ea; 163e, 166d), ἐάσας (easas; 166c), ἐῴη (eōiē; 173d), ἐῶντος (eōntos; 175b, 175c). To let, to allow, to let be. Socrates offers to look into Charmides' temperance with him, or, "if not, let's leave it" (158e); he waves aside Critias' question, "Never mind that" (163e); Critias charges him with "letting go of what the argument is about" (166c), and Socrates tells him to "say goodbye to whether it is Critias or Socrates who is being refuted", in Greek "let it rejoice" (166d–e2); temperance, standing guard, "would not allow" the lack of knowledge to slip in (173d). In the reckoning the participle twice names what the concessions lacked: they were made "though the argument did not allow it" (175b), and "though the argument did not allow this either" (175c). Lemma: ἐάω.

κινδυνεύει (kindyneuei)

Attested: κινδυνεύει (kindyneuei; 160b, 170d), κινδυνεύω (kindyneuō; 170a), κινδυνεύοντας (kindyneuontas; 173b). To run a risk, to be in danger; with an infinitive, to be likely to, and so, as a one-word answer, "it looks that way". Charmides answers so at 160b, when Socrates asks whether quickness and sharpness appear finer in everything than slowness and quietness, and Critias at 170d; the edition renders both "It looks that way". Socrates uses the verb of himself, "I'm afraid I'm my same old self" (170a), and the literal danger comes in the dream, where under temperance men would "come through safe when in danger at sea and in war" (173b). Lemma: κινδυνεύω.

μεγαλοπρεπῶς (megaloprepōs)

Attested: μεγαλοπρεπῶς (megaloprepōs; 175c). Magnificently, on a grand scale. Of the concession that the temperate man might know, of what he does not know, that he does not know it, Socrates says that "we conceded with the utmost magnificence" (175c): they gave away lavishly what the argument did not allow. Lemma: μεγαλοπρεπῶς.

συμφέρομαι (sympheromai)

Attested: συμφέρομαι (sympheromai; 164d). In the middle, to agree with someone. Critias, saying that temperance is knowing oneself, agrees "with the one who dedicated the inscription to that effect at Delphi" (164d). The active, "to be of use", does not occur in the dialogue. Lemma: συμφέρω.

Elsewhere in Plato

The Gorgias makes agreement a test of truth and names its conditions. Socrates counts as a witness only the man he is talking to: unless he can produce Polus himself, the young teacher of rhetoric he is arguing with, as a single witness agreeing with what he says, he thinks he has achieved nothing worth mention (472b–c). Callicles, the young Athenian politician who argues that by nature the stronger should have more, is to be his touchstone, the stone on which gold is tested: whoever is to test a soul adequately needs knowledge, goodwill and frankness, and Callicles has all three (486d–487a). Gorgias of Leontini, the famous teacher of rhetoric, and Polus are wise, and his friends, but short of frankness and more bashful than they should be, so that out of shame each has brought himself to contradict himself in front of many people (487a–b). The dialogue has shown it happening: Polus says that Gorgias was ashamed not to agree that the orator knows what is just, fine and good, and that some contradiction followed, perhaps, from that agreement (461b–c), and Callicles says that Polus in turn conceded that doing injustice is more shameful than suffering it, and was tied up by that agreement, ashamed to say what he thought (482c–e). Callicles would never concede a thing from want of wisdom or from excess of shame, and so whatever the two of them agree on will in fact have reached the goal of truth (487e). In the Charmides shame works the other way: it keeps Critias from conceding what is true (169c). In the Republic Socrates offers Glaucon, Plato's brother, a choice of method against the claim of Thrasymachus the sophist that perfect injustice pays better than perfect justice: to set speech against speech and count up the goods on each side, which would need judges to decide, or to examine it as before, "agreeing with one another", and so be judges and advocates at once. Glaucon chooses the second (348a–b).

Later readings

Aristotle, Plato's pupil, sets out in his rules for dialectic, argument by question and answer, what the answerer should grant in discussions held for testing and inquiry rather than for victory, a matter on which, he says, he had nothing from earlier writers to go on. A point that seems true and is beside the argument is to be granted, with the remark that it seems so; one that does not seem true and is beside the argument is also to be granted, but marked as not seeming so, to avoid looking naive; and of a premise that bears on the argument and is highly implausible, the answerer should say that the conclusion follows if it is granted, but that the premise is far too naive.¹ Socrates' grant at 169d can be read as a step marked in this way, made "for now", with the question "whether it is so or not" left for another time. In the reckoning the mark is gone: what was granted as possible is counted as granted outright, and the inquiry "found us so simple-minded" (175c). Socrates' word there, εὐηθικός (euēthikos), is kin to Aristotle's εὐήθεια (euētheia), naivety or simple-mindedness.

Use in the book

At 109c Alcibiades says that even someone who intended to wage war against people acting justly would not admit it. The verb marks a gap between intention and public acknowledgment. Socrates uses the accepted constraints of what can be said honorably to bring the discussion toward justice. A reader should not confuse the refusal to admit an unjust intention with proof that no such intention exists.

At 113b the things agreed become premises from which Alcibiades must recognize himself as the speaker of the resulting verdict. Admission now concerns accountability for one's own answers. The technique reappears at 116d after the argument about justice and advantage.

At 119b Alcibiades concedes that most politicians are uneducated but initially draws an excuse for his own neglect. This shows why agreement with a criticism is not enough: the practical conclusion drawn from it may still be wrong. At 133d Socrates himself corrects an earlier agreement about specialist knowledge. The dialogue thus treats concessions as revisable commitments within inquiry. They must be followed through and, where necessary, withdrawn rather than protected simply because both speakers once accepted them.

Places to read

1. 109cAdmission is distinguished from a concealed intention
2. 113a–113cAgreed answers make the respondent responsible for the conclusion
3. 119bA conceded criticism is initially used to excuse neglect
4. 133d–133eSocrates expressly corrects an earlier agreement

Translation in this edition

“Admit” at 109c and “agree” elsewhere can render the same ὁμολογ- family. “Concede” at 119b renders συγχωρῶ. Neither should be automatically translated as “confess,” which could add a personal or religious coloring absent from the particular exchange.

ἀνάγκη

Attested: ἀνάγκη (anankē; 106e). At 106e: Necessarily: assent to a conclusion inferred from the acquisition premises, rather than an independent proof of those premises. Lexical identification: lemma: ἀνάγκη. See Admission.

κινδυνεύω

Attested: κινδυνεύει (kindyneuei; 133e). At 133e: It seems or looks like it: Alcibiades' qualified assent to one craft discerning self and belongings. Lexical identification: lemma: κινδυνεύω. See Admission.

ὁμολογέω

Attested: ὁμολογήσειέν (homologēseien; 109c); τῶν ὡμολογημένων (tōn hōmologēmenōn; 113b). At 109c: Admit publicly an intention to wage war against those acting justly, an acknowledgment Alcibiades says would be withheld. At 113b: The things agreed, from which Alcibiades recognizes responsibility for the propositions stated in his answers. Lexical identification: lemma: ὁμολογέω. See Admission.

συγχωρέω

Attested: συγχωρῶ (synchōrō; 119b). To concede or agree; Alcibiades accepts the diagnosis that most politicians are uneducated while drawing the wrong practical inference from it. Lexical identification: lemma: συγχωρέω. See Admission.

φαίνομαι

Attested: φαίνεται (phainetai; 133a). At 133a: It appears so, Alcibiades’ acceptance of the eye’s self-seeing through another eye, rather than a separate demonstration. Lexical identification: lemma: φαίνομαι. See Admission.

Use in the book

At 138d the existence of intelligent, unintelligent and mad people is recorded as agreed before their relationships have been settled. Socrates recalls the admission that madness is opposite to intelligence at 139b, followed by the denial of a third condition. The resulting argument is then challenged by its implications for civic life. Agreement has made the premises explicit, but the partners must still examine what follows from them.

At 140a the repeated formula establishes the asymmetry between disease and ophthalmia. Socrates adds that they have agreed rightly. That additional evaluation would be unnecessary if “agreed” already meant “proved true”. At 140d a return to what was agreed at the beginning restarts the inquiry on who the intelligent and unintelligent actually are, after the failed identification of madness and unintelligence has been set aside.

Later assent is often conveyed by shorter replies rather than homologein. At 146e Socrates asks whether his thesis has really been shown right, while Alcibiades answers that it now seems right to him. At 147e the edition reads his next response as another reversal. These stages prevent the reader from confusing a sequence of affirmative answers with the stable possession of the knowledge the conversation seeks.

Places to read

1. 138dThe existence of the relevant types is admitted before their relation is determined.
2. 139bEarlier admissions are recalled as premises.
3. 140aAgreement on inclusion is separately judged right.
4. 140dThe original inquiry is resumed through an agreed starting point.
5. 146e; 147eAssent and apparent conviction remain distinguishable from a settled result.

Translation in this edition

The edition keeps the tenses of the agreement formulas rather than replacing every one with “yes”. It also preserves the contrast between Socrates’ claim to have been shown right at 146e and Alcibiades’ weaker “now it seems so to me”.

Use in the book

The companion’s short agreements accumulate through the craft examples and the first argument about gain’s goodness. Socrates asks for explicit acknowledgement that the lover of gain is knowledgeable about worth, then cites the goodness of gain after the universal love of good things has been accepted. Those recapitulations turn scattered replies into premises of a single argument.

At 227d the recollection is stronger than its source. Socrates says that they agreed to gain is to be benefited, and additionally that everyone wishes for good things always. The earlier text had agreed that gain is good, as opposite to harmful loss, and that all people love good things. The identity with benefit and the “always” formulation are not verbatim prior agreements. A reader may infer that Socrates treats them as consequences or acceptable paraphrases, but should not present that inference as textual fact. The companion’s present acceptance also does not make the earlier wording retroactively identical.

At 228a Socrates charges him with deliberately saying the opposite of what was agreed. The historical defence fails to persuade, and the offer to take back a move makes the commitments revisable. The companion retains three premises and retracts the universal goodness of gain. Agreement here is not sacred immobility; it is governed by an explicit opportunity to reconsider.

At 232a Socrates asks whether the companion remembers where the argument began and offers to remind him. He recalls the dispute about good people wishing for good gains rather than base ones. This summarises the third definition at 227c–e2 rather than reproducing the dialogue’s first words at 225a. The narrower point of departure suits the final proof. At 232b the companion distinguishes having been compelled from having been persuaded, while continuing to agree. Socrates’ “concur” registers the surviving formal concession without pretending to have secured conviction.

Places to read

1. 227cΤὸ δὲ κέρδος ἀγαθὸν ὡμολογήσαμεν; — A prior conclusion is explicitly recalled as shared.
2. 227dκαὶ τόδε αὐτῷ προσωμολογήσαμεν — The additional agreement is presented as already made.
3. 232aΜνημονεύεις οὖν ὅθεν — Socrates asks the companion to remember the argument’s beginning.
4. 232bσύμφῃς γοῦν ἡμῖν — Concurrence is claimed even after persuasion has been denied.

Translation in this edition

Note 8 is decisive for 227d, and note 25 locates the final recollection at 227e, in the third attempt rather than the initial question. The apparatus also reports an omission in the first state of B across part of 227d; that is a report from the supplied apparatus, not independent manuscript inspection. The edition renders homologein “agree” and symphanai “concur”, preserving the modest distinction at the end.

Use in the book

The cultivated lover repeatedly agrees with Socrates while reserving a very different attitude toward his rival. At 134c he says he need not strive for victory against his own opinion when speaking to Socrates. His willingness to concede is therefore not simply indifference to winning; it is part of how he presents his own intellectual character before the audience.

At 136e he is “compelled to agree” that the proposed philosopher is useless. Socrates then asks whether another question would be “rather boorish” and says he only wants to review the commitments. The recap includes philosophy’s being fine, the philosophers’ goodness, good people’s usefulness, base people’s uselessness and the generalist’s redundancy while craftsmen exist. Putting these side by side exposes the conflict within the lover’s account.

One element deserves special notice: “we ourselves are philosophers” is included in the recap, although it was not explicitly agreed earlier. Edition note 22 marks the discrepancy and reports a scholarly deletion proposal. The printed dialogue retains it. The addition makes the refutation personal, drawing the speakers themselves into the threatened classification as base and useless. A reader should neither silently delete it nor invent an earlier explicit agreement to justify it.

The second half proceeds through another rapid sequence of assents. The same craft improves, punishes and discriminates; knowledge of one extends to many; self-knowledge becomes temperance; justice and temperance become one. These are propositions accepted within the dialogue. Their compressed presentation leaves room to question the transitions, especially where the subject of knowledge changes from animal expert to animal itself.

Agreement is thus indispensable evidence for reconstructing the argument, but not a substitute for analyzing its steps. The ending’s silence and the audience’s praise similarly show how the discussion lands dramatically. They do not provide independent proof of every proposition that preceded them.

Places to read

1. 136eἨναγκάζετο ὁμολογεῖν — The narrator reports an assent as compelled.
2. 136eἀνομολογήσασθαι — The proposed next step is a review of what has been said.
3. 137aκαὶ αὐτοὶ φιλόσοφοι εἶναι — The recap includes a self-identification not explicitly agreed before.

Translation in this edition

Edition note 22 says Schanz, following Forster, deleted the clause about the speakers themselves being philosophers. Burnet’s printed text as reproduced here retains it, and so does the translation. The apparatus is evidence for the editorial disagreement, not permission to treat the retained phrase as absent.

Use in the book

Socrates initially asks Demodocus to agree with him about what they think the deliberation concerns. His reason is strikingly ordinary: two people can continue a conversation while attaching different objects to apparently shared words. Only later may they realize that adviser and advised have been ridiculous. “Wisdom” and “education” are not yet adequate guarantees of a common subject.

The father endorses this as the right procedure. Socrates then qualifies himself: he speaks rightly, but not altogether, and changes the proposal a little. The correction is substantive despite its modest introduction. The adults might agree perfectly with one another and still misidentify the boy's desire. Their first task must therefore be to question Theages himself (122c–d2). Agreement is necessary for coherent counsel but insufficient for accurate understanding of the person whose future is at issue.

The ensuing exchange dramatizes the difficulty. Theages says he knows both the desired wisdom and its name, yet supplies only “wisdom” (123c–d). Socrates then obtains more determinate answers by contrasting named capacities and their fields. The boy's assent advances the argument, but its force remains local. At the apparent conclusion that he desires tyranny, he grants only that it follows from what he said (124e). His later distinction between force and willing subjects reveals what the earlier description omitted.

It would therefore be misleading to describe all these assents as a completed demonstration that political ambition is necessarily tyrannical. The conversation exposes an inadequately specified desire; it also exposes the risk of taking a shared extension, “everyone in the city,” as a sufficient account of a kind of rule. The initial warning about speaking past one another remains relevant inside Socrates' own questioning.

The end preserves this practical modesty. Socrates' consent is conditional on their judgment that they should act so (131a). What is agreed is a trial of association, not an established causal account of its benefits. The dialogue presents agreement as a means of proceeding responsibly while also showing how easily its content needs revision.

Places to read

1. 122bσυνομολογήσωμεν τί ποτε οἰόμεθα — The speakers must jointly identify what they think the subject is
2. 122cσμικρὸν γάρ τι μετατίθεμαι — Socrates revises his own first proposal
3. 122dδιαπυνθανομένους ὅτι καὶ ἔστιν οὗ ἐπιθυμεῖ — The inquiry must reach the boy's own desire
4. 124eἜοικέν γε ἐξ ὧν ἐγὼ εἶπον — Theages qualifies assent by reference to his previous words
5. 125bδιαπυθώμεθα αὐτοῦ πρῶτον ἱκανῶς — Further questioning precedes advice about a teacher

Translation in this edition

“Agree on it together,” “I am changing it a little,” and “finding out thoroughly” preserve the distinctions between joint assent, self-correction, and investigation. The awkwardly emphatic “rightest” at 122d corresponds to ὀρθότατον; it belongs to Socrates' revised ordering of inquiry, not a claim that everything subsequently accepted is beyond criticism.

Agree together — συνομολογεῖν (synomologein)

συνομολογεῖν (synomologein)

Agree together. The adults are first to identify a common object of deliberation. Attested: συνομολογήσωμεν (122b). Agreement and the object of inquiry.

Answer — ἀποκρίνεσθαι (apokrinesthai)

ἀποκρίνεσθαι (apokrinesthai)

Answer. The hypothetical asks what identifying reply the boy would give. Attested: ἀπεκρίνω (123b). Agreement and the object of inquiry.

Asking — ἀνερωτᾶν (anerōtan)

ἀνερωτᾶν (anerōtan)

Asking. Socrates imagines questioning the boy about the specific wisdom lacking. Attested: ἀνερωτῶν (123b). Agreement and the object of inquiry.

Best — βέλτιστος (beltistos) · βέλτιστον (122d).

βέλτιστος (beltistos)

Best. Demodocus agrees to the revised procedure of first asking the boy. Attested: βέλτιστον (122d). Agreement and the object of inquiry.

Do your best — προθυμεῖσθαι (prothymeisthai)

προθυμεῖσθαι (prothymeisthai)

Do your best. Socrates urges Theages to supply a comparably precise description. Attested: προθυμοῦ (123e). Agreement and the object of inquiry.

Finding out thoroughly — διαπυνθάνεσθαι (diapynthanesthai)

διαπυνθάνεσθαι (diapynthanesthai)

Finding out thoroughly. The adults should question the boy rather than rely on their own assumptions. Attested: διαπυνθανομένους (122d). Agreement and the object of inquiry.

Let us find out thoroughly — διαπυνθάνεσθαι (diapynthanesthai)

διαπυνθάνεσθαι (diapynthanesthai)

Let us find out thoroughly. Socrates again postpones choosing an instructor until the boy is adequately questioned. Attested: διαπυθώμεθα (125b). Agreement and the object of inquiry.

From what I said — ἐξ ὧν ἐγὼ εἶπον (ex hōn egō eipon)

ἐξ ὧν ἐγὼ εἶπον (ex hōn egō eipon)

From what I said. The boy expressly qualifies the alleged tyrannical desire by the consequences of his earlier wording. Attested: ἐξ ὧν ἐγὼ εἶπον (124e). Agreement and the object of inquiry.

It appears — φαίνεσθαι (phainesthai)

φαίνεσθαι (phainesthai)

It appears. Theages' assent to the inference is phrased as apparent agreement. Attested: Φαίνεται (124e). Agreement and the object of inquiry.

Perceive — αἰσθάνεσθαι (aisthanesthai) · αἰσθώμεθα (122c).

αἰσθάνεσθαι (aisthanesthai)

Perceive. A belated realization of speaking at cross-purposes. Attested: αἰσθώμεθα (122c). Agreement and the object of inquiry.

Revise — μετατίθεσθαι (metatithesthai)

μετατίθεσθαι (metatithesthai)

Revise. Socrates changes his own initial procedural suggestion. Attested: μετατίθεμαι (122c). Agreement and the object of inquiry.

Ridiculous — γελοῖος (geloios)

γελοῖος (geloios)

Ridiculous. The adults would look foolish if advice proceeded without a shared subject. Attested: γελοῖοι (122c). Agreement and the object of inquiry.

Rightest — ὀρθός (orthos)

ὀρθός (orthos)

Rightest. The revised order of inquiry is judged the most correct course. Attested: ὀρθότατον (122d). Agreement and the object of inquiry.

Rightly — ὀρθῶς (orthōs)

ὀρθῶς (orthōs)

Rightly. Demodocus endorses the procedure, which Socrates then qualifies. Attested: ὀρθῶς (122c). Agreement and the object of inquiry.

Seem good — δοκεῖν (dokein)

δοκεῖν (dokein)

Seem good. Socrates accepts the father's proposal conditionally on his judgment. Attested: δοκεῖ (121a). Agreement and the object of inquiry.

Still more absurd — ἄτοπος (atopos)

ἄτοπος (atopos)

Still more absurd. The adults would compound their error by deliberating about an object foreign to the boy's desire. Attested: ἀτοπώτεροι (122d). Agreement and the object of inquiry.

Sufficiently — ἱκανῶς (hikanōs)

ἱκανῶς (hikanōs)

Sufficiently. The inquiry must reach enough understanding before deliberation proceeds. Attested: ἱκανῶς (125b). Agreement and the object of inquiry.

Take into account — ἐννοεῖν (ennoein)

ἐννοεῖν (ennoein)

Take into account. Socrates notices a further possibility: the boy's desire may differ from their shared assumption. Attested: ἐννοῶ (122c). Agreement and the object of inquiry.

Take to be — ὑπολαμβάνειν (hypolambanein)

ὑπολαμβάνειν (hypolambanein)

Take to be. Socrates raises the possibility that he and the father construe the object differently. Attested: ὑπολαμβάνω (122c). Agreement and the object of inquiry.

Think — οἴεσθαι (oiesthai)

οἴεσθαι (oiesthai)

Think. Their understanding of the subject is explicitly identified as something needing clarification. Attested: οἰόμεθα (122b). Agreement and the object of inquiry.

Thinking — ἡγεῖσθαι (hēgeisthai)

ἡγεῖσθαι (hēgeisthai)

Thinking. The speakers might hold no common understanding despite continuing their exchange. Attested: ἡγούμενοι (122c). Agreement and the object of inquiry.

Understand — μανθάνειν (manthanein)

μανθάνειν (manthanein)

Understand. Socrates asks whether he has now grasped which craft the boy intends. Attested: μανθάνω (124a). Agreement and the object of inquiry.

If it seems good to you (contextual phrase)

121a: Εἰ σοὶ δοκεῖ. Socrates accepts the move into the stoa conditionally on Demodocus' preference. Dokein can mark seeming, judgment or an agreed practical proposal; the context determines which. Its recurrence in the final decision, εἰ δοκεῖ χρῆναι at 131a, frames a course of action without establishing that its hoped-for result has already been proved. See Agreement and Trial.

Not thinking of the same things (contextual phrase)

122c: μηδὲν τῶν αὐτῶν ἡγούμενοι. The imagined adviser and advisee have proceeded while understanding none of the same things. The danger is not simply verbal disagreement; identical language might conceal different intended subjects. Socrates then makes a further correction: even the adults' shared interpretation might miss what the boy wants. Agreement among the advisers is necessary but insufficient. See Agreement and inquiry.

Oaths in assent and denial (contextual phrase)

126a: Νὴ Δία τούτους λέγω. The oath reinforces Theages' identification of the statesmen as his intended models. Similar invocations of Zeus occur with both assent and denial throughout the exchanges, including μὰ Δία οὐκ ἔγωγε at 126b. Their force follows the accompanying assertion or negation. They are conversational emphasis, not separate revelations that establish the truth of every answer. See Agreement.

Use in the book

At 313c the companion says that law and accepted things now appear different to him. His assent registers the effect of Socrates' analogy; it does not establish a permanent willingness to follow every consequence Socrates will draw. After the definition as discovery, he immediately challenges the discrepancy between that definition and changing laws. The work repeatedly gives him both roles: respondent to particular questions and author of a continuing objection.

At 315d–e Socrates proposes a common inquiry as the way they might agree. The possibility is cautiously expressed, and he allows the companion to choose which man asks questions. The companion's willingness to answer authorizes a conversational procedure, not assent to a predetermined result. This matters because the sequence about just things, weights, and fine things secures many short affirmative replies but does not dissolve his dissatisfaction.

His statement at 316b–c is especially exact: things appear lawful “as you put it,” yet when he thinks about ceaseless legal change he cannot be persuaded. The qualification distinguishes the local attractiveness of a formulation from its adequacy to the original phenomenon. It would therefore be misleading to report 316b as a completed refutation of the objection. The subsequent craft argument is needed precisely because assent and persuasion have come apart.

Socrates later declares that they rightly agreed that law is the finding of what is (317d); the companion answers that it appears so. Near the end he calls Socrates' account of Minos reasonable, after which Socrates himself makes the next question conditional upon his having spoken truly (321b). These qualifications do not make every claim insincere or empty. They prevent a summary from silently promoting the interlocutor's conversational concessions into demonstrated knowledge.

The final admission is different again. The companion cannot say what the good lawgiver gives the soul. The dialogue has achieved enough agreement to locate a question, but not enough knowledge to answer it. Its affirmative middle and questioning end belong together.

Places to read

1. 313cἌλλο μοι νῦν ἐφάνη — The things now appear different to the companion
2. 315eοὐδὲν μή ποτε συμβῶμεν; τάχ’ ἂν ὁμολογήσαιμεν — Coming to terms is contrasted with the possibility of agreement through common inquiry
3. 316b–cὡς σὺ λέγεις; οὐ δύναμαι πεισθῆναι — The companion distinguishes how an argument sounds from being persuaded
4. 317dὈρθῶς ἄρα ὡμολογήσαμεν; Φαίνεται — Socrates' retrospective claim receives an appearance-qualified response
5. 321bεἰκότα τὸν λόγον εἰρηκέναι; εἰ ἐγὼ ἀληθῆ λέγω — Reasonableness is followed by a condition concerning truth

Translation in this edition

The short responses are translated individually: “I think so,” “It appears so,” “Yes,” and “I say so” are not silently standardized. Their variation helps readers distinguish a speaker's precise response from the proposition Socrates has put forward.

Appeared — φαίνεσθαι (phainesthai)

φαίνεσθαι (phainesthai)

Appeared. The companion reports that law and accepted things now appear different after the analogy. Attested: ἐφάνη (313c). Agreement, persuasion, and qualified assent.

Appear — φαίνεσθαι (phainesthai)

φαίνεσθαι (phainesthai)

Appear. The companion acknowledges how things appear in Socrates' formulation while withholding full persuasion. Attested: φαίνεται (316b). Agreement, persuasion, and qualified assent.

Be persuaded — πείθεσθαι (peithesthai)

πείθεσθαι (peithesthai)

Be persuaded. The conviction the companion says he cannot attain despite agreeing with the preceding formulations. Attested: πεισθῆναι (316c). Agreement, persuasion, and qualified assent.

Come to terms — συμβαίνειν (symbainein)

συμβαίνειν (symbainein)

Come to terms. The agreement Socrates says alternating separate speeches will not achieve. Attested: συμβῶμεν (315e). Agreement, persuasion, and qualified assent.

It seems — ἔοικα (eoika)

ἔοικα (eoika)

It seems. A qualification attached to Socrates' reformulation of resolution as political opinion. Attested: ἔοικε (314c). Agreement, persuasion, and qualified assent.

Lawful things — τὰ νόμιμα (ta nomima)

τὰ νόμιμα (ta nomima)

Lawful things. What appears lawful to the companion when put in Socrates' terms, despite his unresolved objection about change. Attested: νόμιμα (316b). Agreement, persuasion, and qualified assent.

Might agree — ὁμολογεῖν (homologein)

ὁμολογεῖν (homologein)

Might agree. The possible outcome of shared examination, stated tentatively rather than guaranteed. Attested: ὁμολογήσαιμεν (315e). Agreement, persuasion, and qualified assent.

Seem or be thought — δοκεῖν (dokein)

δοκεῖν (dokein)

Seem or be thought. Socrates asks how the proposed equations appear to the companion; the verb marks his judgment. Attested: δοκεῖ (313b). Agreement, persuasion, and qualified assent.

In the way you put it (contextual phrase)

316b: Οὕτω μέν, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὡς σὺ λέγεις. The companion grants that matters appear lawful under Socrates' formulation, then contrasts this with his inability to be persuaded when he thinks of constant legal change. The μέν anticipates that reservation. An editor who extracts only the assent produces a stronger agreement than the complete response supplies. See Agreement and persuasion.

Use in the book

The speakers begin with a fulfilled agreement to meet, but an unfinished intellectual task. Clinias insists that lawgiving remains incomplete if they fail to discover what learning makes a mortal wise (973a–b). Agreement about procedure thus precedes, and does not replace, agreement about the answer. The Athenian's speeches dominate the work, yet their status remains shaped by Clinias' reminders, assents, and requests.

At 974c the Athenian describes intelligent examination of oneself and others through arguments and asks whether the speakers concur that the situation is “so, or thereabouts.” Clinias answers with “perhaps,” in hope of forming the truest opinion later. His wording is not a flat rejection, but it is more provisional than certainty. The dialogue makes room for agreeing to continue under a tentative assessment.

The exclusions that follow are an ordered inquiry: dispose of inappropriate claimants, seek the knowledge whose absence would make us most deficient, then test whether the proposed knower is wise and good. Number receives substantial advocacy without eliminating the need for the further account expressly requested at 979d. A reader should therefore resist treating every apparent conclusion as the completion of the opening problem.

At 979c–d2 the Athenian contrasts broad agreement that a soul should be just, temperate, brave, and wise with disagreement about which wisdom it must possess. This is agreement about an evaluative title alongside disagreement about its determinate content. Clinias' remark about “great things about great things” recognizes the scale of the undertaking. The Athenian adds the difficulty that his claims are wholly true; that assertion of truth is part of his speech, not a substitute for the account he owes.

The shared commitment is renewed when Clinias promises, for himself and Megillus, not to tire of listening. The dual forms preserve the silent third participant. At 980a the Athenian begins again, seeking one name or an articulated plurality. His “our story” makes the account part of a jointly pursued construction connected with the Laws. It licenses neither dismissing the argument as fiction nor removing its self-conscious status as an account under development. Later questioning and refutation (991c) show that sustained scrutiny, not mere accumulated assent, belongs to the recommended learning.

Places to read

1. 973aΠρὸς μὲν τὸ τῆς ὁμολογίας — The initial agreement concerns their coming together
2. 973bτοῦτο οὔτε εἴπομεν οὔτε ηὕρομεν — The essential answer remains both unsaid and undiscovered
3. 974cἡ περὶ σοφίαν ἀπορία καὶ ζήτησις — Perplexity and search remain paired
4. 974cοὐχ οὕτως ἢ ταύτῃ συμφήσομεν — The invitation to assent allows approximation
5. 979c–d2ἥντινα δὲ σοφίαν … οὐδεὶς οὐδενὶ … συνομολογεῖ — Agreement fails at identifying the required wisdom
6. 979eὑπὲρ ἀμφοῖν — Clinias promises attention on behalf of both listeners
7. 980aκατὰ τὸν ἡμέτερον μῦθον — The inquiry names its own account “our story”

Translation in this edition

“Concur” renders the forms of symphanai, while “agrees” and “agreement” keep related but distinct forms audible. The dual “you two” at 979e is translated explicitly. “Our story” follows mythos without importing a modern opposition between myth and rational argument that the local phrasing does not establish.

Failure of agreement on content — συνομολογεῖν (synhomologein)

συνομολογεῖν (synhomologein)

Failure of agreement on content. No one of the many agrees with another about which wisdom is required, despite agreement that the soul should be wise. Attested: συνομολογεῖ (979c–d2). Inquiry agreement and qualified assent.

Agreement to meet — ὁμολογία (homologia)

ὁμολογία (homologia)

Agreement to meet. The prior arrangement fulfilled when Clinias, the Athenian, and Megillus come together; fulfillment of this agreement leaves their substantive inquiry unfinished. Attested: ὁμολογίας (973a). Inquiry agreement and qualified assent.

The two listeners — ἄμφω (amphō)

ἄμφω (amphō)

The two listeners. The genitive dual includes Clinias and the silent Megillus when Clinias promises their continued attention. Attested: ἀμφοῖν (979e). Inquiry agreement and qualified assent.

Arrival under an agreement — ἥκειν (hēkein)

ἥκειν (hēkein)

Arrival under an agreement. The three have arrived in accordance with their arrangement. The verb establishes the resumed conversation, without supplying a narrated place or date. Attested: ἥκομεν (973a). Inquiry agreement and qualified assent.

Manner of examination — συμφώνως (symphōnōs)

συμφώνως (symphōnōs)

Manner of examination. The adverb qualifies intelligent examination through arguments. Its local use should not be silently replaced by the later technical vocabulary of musical harmony. Attested: συμφώνως (974c). Inquiry agreement and qualified assent.

Provisional assent — συμφάναι (symphanai)

συμφάναι (symphanai)

Provisional assent. Clinias will concur perhaps, in hope of attaining the truest opinion with the Athenian over time; the form does not express unconditional certainty. Attested: Συμφήσομεν (974c). Inquiry agreement and qualified assent.

Life and the difficult search — τεκμήριον (tekmērion)

τεκμήριον (tekmērion)

Life and the difficult search. The Athenian asks what the appraisal of life is evidence of, connecting it to the naturally difficult search for wisdom. Attested: τεκμήριον (974a). Inquiry agreement and qualified assent.

Examination of intelligence — ἐπισκέπτεσθαι (episkeptesthai)

ἐπισκέπτεσθαι (episkeptesthai)

Examination of intelligence. The purpose of the three men’s meeting: looking into what account will put the human condition at its best with respect to attainable intelligence. Attested: ἐπισκεψόμενοι (973a). Inquiry agreement and qualified assent.

Reflexive and interpersonal scrutiny — ἐξετάζειν (exetazein)

ἐξετάζειν (exetazein)

Reflexive and interpersonal scrutiny. Capable persons examine both themselves and others through arguments; the activity is not restricted to inspecting external objects. Attested: ἐξετάσαι (974c). Inquiry agreement and qualified assent.

Unfulfilled discovery — εὑρίσκειν (heuriskein)

εὑρίσκειν (heuriskein)

Unfulfilled discovery. The decisive object, the learning that makes a mortal wise, has neither been found nor said. Attested: ηὕρομεν (973b). Inquiry agreement and qualified assent.

Invitation to assess — ἕπεσθαι (hepesthai)

ἕπεσθαι (hepesthai)

Invitation to assess. The imperative invites Clinias to follow the Athenian’s account and see whether it speaks well; following is not itself blanket assent. Attested: ἕπου (973c). Inquiry agreement and qualified assent.

Hoped-for true judgment — δοξάζειν (doxazein)

δοξάζειν (doxazein)

Hoped-for true judgment. Clinias hopes that continued inquiry with the Athenian will let them form the truest opinion later; his present assent remains qualified. Attested: δοξάσαι (974d). Inquiry agreement and qualified assent.

Common ethical assent — συγχωρεῖν (synchōrein)

συγχωρεῖν (synchōrein)

Common ethical assent. Everyone grants everyone else that the soul should be good, before disagreement appears over the specific wisdom it needs. Attested: συγχωρεῖ (979c). Inquiry agreement and qualified assent.

Scale of the undertaking — μέγας (megas)

μέγας (megas)

Scale of the undertaking. Clinias’ paired accusative and genitive describe the Athenian as attempting to declare great things about great things, acknowledging the scope rather than supplying proof. Attested: μεγάλων μεγάλα (979d). Inquiry agreement and qualified assent.

Sustained speaking and listening — ἀποκάμνειν (apokamnein)

ἀποκάμνειν (apokamnein)

Sustained speaking and listening. Clinias asks the Athenian not to tire of speaking; the reply reciprocally asks the two listeners not to tire of listening. Attested: ἀποκάμῃς (979e). Inquiry agreement and qualified assent.

Hope within inquiry — ἐλπίς (elpis)

ἐλπίς (elpis)

Hope within inquiry. The expectation on which Clinias provisionally concurs, that inquiry with the Athenian may later yield the truest opinion. Attested: ἐλπίδι (974c). Inquiry agreement and qualified assent.

Unfinished lawgiving — νόμος (nomos)

νόμος (nomos)

Unfinished lawgiving. The preceding discussion of setting down laws is treated as incomplete until the learning required for wisdom is found. Attested: νόμων (973b). Inquiry agreement and qualified assent.

Declared aim of clarity — φανερός (phaneros)

φανερός (phaneros)

Declared aim of clarity. The initial shared undertaking was to make matters manifest from beginning to end; the phrase concerns explanatory completion. Attested: φανερὰ (973b). Inquiry agreement and qualified assent.

Required new beginning — ἀνάγκη (anankē)

ἀνάγκη (anankē)

Required new beginning. The dative expresses of necessity in the decision to speak again from the beginning. Burnet adopts this form against the manuscripts’ nominative necessity. Attested: ἀνάγκῃ (980a). Inquiry agreement and qualified assent.

Qualified concurrence — ἴσως (isōs)

ἴσως (isōs)

Qualified concurrence. Clinias includes perhaps when concurring in hope of later forming the truest opinion with the Athenian. The qualification prevents treating his answer as unreserved certainty. Attested: ἴσως (974c). Inquiry agreement and qualified assent.

Difficulty finding a way — ἀπορία (aporia)

ἀπορία (aporia)

Difficulty finding a way. The impasse concerning wisdom is paired with search and is said to exceed the seeker’s hope. Attested: ἀπορία (974c). Inquiry agreement and qualified assent.

Sustained inquiry — ζήτησις (zētēsis)

ζήτησις (zētēsis)

Sustained inquiry. The search concerning wisdom accompanies perplexity; it is not abandoned simply because current candidates fail. Attested: ζήτησις (974c). Inquiry agreement and qualified assent.

Legislative establishment — θέσις (thesis)

θέσις (thesis)

Legislative establishment. The putting down or establishment of laws already discussed; this practical achievement remains short of the educational account sought now. Attested: θέσιν (973b). Inquiry agreement and qualified assent.

The shared account — μῦθος (mythos)

μῦθος (mythos)

The shared account. The Athenian’s designation for the account according to which the identified kind or kinds of knowledge would make someone wise. It does not itself mean falsehood. Attested: μῦθον (980a). Inquiry agreement and qualified assent.

Incomplete lawgiving project — ἀτελής (atelēs)

ἀτελής (atelēs)

Incomplete lawgiving project. What the speakers undertook would remain unfinished if they abandoned the question of wisdom, despite having discussed the other legislative matters. Attested: ἀτελὲς (973b). Inquiry agreement and qualified assent.

Disputed content — σοφία (sophia)

σοφία (sophia)

Disputed content. People agree that a soul should be wise but not which wisdom it needs. Attested: σοφίαν (979c). Inquiry agreement and qualified assent.

A meeting fulfills an agreement not an answer (contextual phrase)

Πρὸς μὲν τὸ τῆς ὁμολογίας ἥκομεν ἅπαντες ὀρθῶς (973a)

The phrase τὸ τῆς ὁμολογίας concerns the matter of their agreement: all three have duly come together. Its fulfillment is contrasted immediately with the uncompleted question of what learning makes a mortal wise. The agreement is procedural and dramatic, not evidence that they already share the intellectual answer. Inquiry agreement and qualified assent.

Neither said nor found (contextual phrase)

τοῦτο οὔτε εἴπομεν οὔτε ηὕρομεν (973b)

The paired negatives distinguish declaring the answer from discovering it and concede that neither has been achieved. The reference is the greatest remaining issue in the legislative project. It prevents the opening continuation of the Laws from being mistaken for the repetition of an answer already secured. Inquiry agreement and qualified assent.

Examination of oneself and others (contextual phrase)

φρονίμως αὑτοὺς ἄλλους τε ἐξετάσαι συμφώνως (974c)

The reflexive and the reference to others make examination both self-directed and interpersonal. The adverbs qualify its intelligent and concordant manner. The speech therefore presupposes some capacity for intelligent inquiry before the highest wisdom is found; it does not classify every current questioner as wholly irrational. Inquiry agreement and qualified assent.

Assent in hope and perhaps (contextual phrase)

Συμφήσομεν ἐπ’ ἐλπίδι σοι ἴσως (974c)

Clinias agrees to concur but qualifies the agreement by hope and perhaps. The following words explain the hope as a later arrival at the truest opinion with the Athenian. This is a commitment to continue under a provisional assessment, not a guarantee that every ensuing assertion has already been established. Inquiry agreement and qualified assent.

Everyone grants that the soul should be good (contextual phrase)

ἀγαθὴν δεῖ, συγχωρεῖ πᾶς παντί (979c)

The feminine adjective takes the soul named immediately before this clause (979c) as its subject. Universal agreement concerns the requirement of goodness, not an agreed account of which wisdom brings it about. Retaining that scope prevents the statement from becoming blanket philosophical assent. Inquiry agreement and qualified assent.

Both listeners are still present (contextual phrase)

μηδὲ σφὼ τοίνυν ἀκούοντε (979e)

The pronoun σφώ and participle ἀκούοντε are dual, addressing Clinias and Megillus together. The omitted verb is supplied from Clinias’ request not to grow weary. Megillus’ silence therefore does not remove him from the dramatic or pedagogical situation. Inquiry agreement and qualified assent.

According to our story (contextual phrase)

κατὰ τὸν ἡμέτερον μῦθον (980a)

The first-person plural places the account within the speakers’ shared undertaking. Mythos here should neither be replaced without notice by a modern technical proof nor dismissed as known falsehood. The edition relates this usage to the Laws’ self-description of the city constructed in words. Inquiry agreement and qualified assent.

Use in the book

The verb gives a statement the status of something jointly accepted in the conversation. Its perfect forms, such as ὡμολόγηται and τὰ ὡμολογημένα, refer to what has already been agreed and can therefore be used in further questioning.

Agreement is not a guarantee of truth. Socrates’ suspicion at 218c is precisely that what they have agreed may be false; later he asks whether it is acceptable to agree that the useless is a friend. Translate the verb as an act of assent rather than as “prove,” and keep track of whose assent has supplied the premise.

Places to read

1. 218cὡς οὐκ ἀληθῆ εἴη τὰ ὡμολογημένα ἡμῖν — That what we had agreed might not be true.
2. 213b
3. 216b
4. 221c
5. 222b–c

Use in the book

At 219c the expression τῇ πρόσθεν ὁμολογίᾳ, “the earlier agreement,” looks back to the acceptance that a friend is a friend for the sake of something friendly or dear. If the next step is to follow that agreement, health must likewise be desired for the sake of another friend.

The noun makes the regress intelligible: each new item inherits a condition already accepted for the previous one. It denotes a commitment within the exchange, not a separately demonstrated philosophical law.

Places to read

1. 219cεἴπερ ἀκολουθήσει τῇ πρόσθεν ὁμολογίᾳ — If it is to follow the earlier agreement.

Use in the book

The boys grant the proposed definition at 218c. At 222c Socrates invites them to grant that the akin differs from the like, while describing their state as drunkenness with the argument.

The later use is especially important: granting a distinction provisionally does not establish that it has been satisfactorily explained. The dialogue proceeds to test the grant and immediately returns to difficulties encountered earlier. Keep the tentative argumentative force of “let us grant” rather than translating it as a completed discovery.

Places to read

1. 222cσυγχωρήσωμεν καὶ φῶμεν — Let us grant and say.
2. 218c
3. 210c

Use in the book

The invitation to posit “twin gods” begins a refutation, not a second theological position. The branches then test complete difference, complete agreement, and partial agreement. The language of granting keeps the reader oriented through this exhaustive division. When Ficino says a first alternative will not be conceded, he has supplied reasons why it cannot serve the opponent’s proposal.

A new imagined interlocutor in II.32345678910 may accept one God above the angel while maintaining an endless sequence of higher gods. That limited concession is precisely what the next chapter contests. Elsewhere the alternatives “from its own necessity” and “from elsewhere” test the angel’s proposed independence. The conditional grammar must survive abridgment: a conclusion within a rejected hypothesis is not a claim Ficino adopts about the actual world.

Places to read

1. II.2.1, II.2.2The provisional two-god hypothesis and its three alternatives
2. II.3.1A supposed concession introduces the infinite hierarchy to be refuted
3. II.7.14Alternative grants test the origin of an angel’s distinguishing property

Translation in this edition

The translation’s “if you please,” “if … is granted,” and “perhaps someone will grant” preserve differences between an invitation, a logical assumption, and an imagined opponent’s position. “We desire” in II.2.2 identifies the desired result of the proof; it does not turn that result into an unsupported premise.

absurdus

absurdus. Printed forms: absurda; absurdum.

Absurd or incompatible with the premises being tested. Ficino marks the consequences of a higher unity-source or finitely bounded divine knowledge as unacceptable. References: II.1.3, II.1.6, II.3.2, II.10.7. See Agreement and hypothetical concession.

cogere / compellere

cogere / compellere. Printed forms: cogantur; cogente; cogeris; cogetur; cogimur; cogitque; cogitur; compelletur.

To force or compel, often a logical consequence rather than physical coercion. An opponent is compelled to admit a consequence; external things depend on divine mind for being. References: II.1.7, II.2.13, II.7.12, II.9.9. See Agreement and hypothetical concession.

To compel, constrain, or require. At IV.1.53 cogimur expresses what the premises compel the argument to admit; at IV.2.11 bodily need compels human reason into laborious administration; at IV.2.20 heaven compels elemental mixing. These inferential, embodied, and causal uses must not all be read as external violence. References: IV.1.8, IV.1.53, IV.1.63, IV.2.11, IV.2.19, IV.2.20. See Freedom and necessity.

concedere / admittere / dare as grant

concedere / admittere / dare as grant. Printed forms: admittimus; concedatur; concedet; concedetur; detur.

To grant or admit a proposition provisionally in a divided argument. Branches of a refutation remain suppositions even when the author describes their consequences assertively. References: II.2.2, II.3.1, II.7.14. See Agreement and hypothetical concession.

confutare / refellere

confutare / refellere. Printed forms: confutatum; refellemus.

To refute or disprove. Ficino announces new arguments against an infinite hierarchy even though he judges earlier reasoning already sufficient. References: II.3.1. See Agreement and hypothetical concession.

existimare / opinari / arbitrari

existimare / opinari / arbitrari. Printed forms: arbitrantur; arbitremur; existimarunt; opinantur.

To judge, suppose, or hold an opinion. These verbs mark interpretations or attributed positions, including the rejected independence of world, matter, and mind. References: II.2.4, II.3.1, II.7.15, II.10.8. See Agreement and hypothetical concession.

fateri / negare / affirmare

fateri / negare / affirmare. Printed forms: affirmet; assentiendum; fatentur; fateri; negas; negentur.

To acknowledge, deny, affirm, or assent. Ficino presses concessions assigned to opponents, including that all things act toward good as an end. References: II.1.6, II.2.13, II.2.14, II.7.16, II.9.21. See Agreement and hypothetical concession.

placere / libenter

placere / libenter. Printed forms: libenter; placet.

To please or be approved; willingly or gladly. “If you please” introduces a hypothetical concession, while “as the natural philosophers hold” attributes an explanatory position. References: II.2.1, II.3.10, II.4.8. See Agreement and hypothetical concession.

ponere / inducere / asserere

ponere / inducere / asserere. Printed forms: asserat; induxeris; poneretur.

To posit, introduce, or assert a proposition. Positing two goodnesses or an eternal world temporarily frames a test; it does not always express authorial commitment. References: II.2.11, II.2.13, II.7.12, II.7.19. See Agreement and hypothetical concession.

vero / verum: connectives

vero / verum: connectives. Printed forms: vero; Verum; verum.

Adversative or emphatic connectives, and the but-also member of non solum…verum etiam. Vero is a discourse connective in the inspected scope. Verum is connective in II.1.3’s opening and II.2.1, but also genuinely means true elsewhere; occurrences require context. References: II.1.3, II.2.1, II.2.2, II.7.15, II.10.1. See Agreement and hypothetical concession.