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knowledge of the healthy and the diseased

ἐπιστήμη ὑγιεινοῦ καὶ νοσώδους

Medicine defined by its objects · Charmides

From the book

Charmides

Plato · Diotimos Editions · November 2026

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Orientation

At a Glance

  • The wordMedicine as defined by its objects: the knowledge of what is healthy and what is diseased.
  • In the CharmidesMedicine is “knowledge of the healthy” when Socrates first sets it beside temperance (165c); the doctor “understands nothing but the healthy and the diseased” (170e); and “medicine was defined as different from the other kinds of knowledge by being knowledge of the healthy and the diseased” (171a).
  • In this edition“Knowledge of the healthy and the diseased”.
  • A place to read170e–171c.
English renderings
ἐπιστήμη … τοῦ ὑγιεινοῦ, epistēmē … tou hygieinou, “knowledge of the healthy”; ὑγιεινοῦ ἐπιστήμη, hygieinou epistēmē, “knowledge of the healthy”; τῷ τοῦ ὑγιεινοῦ εἶναι καὶ νοσώδους ἐπιστήμη, tōi tou hygieinou einai kai nosōdous epistēmē, “by being knowledge of the healthy and the diseased”

Meaning

The healthy, τὸ ὑγιεινόν, and the diseased, τὸ νοσῶδες, are neuter adjectives: whatever makes or marks health or disease, foods and regimens and bodies and signs. They are medicine’s objects, as health, ὑγίεια, is its product (see δημιουργὸς ὑγιείας; τὸ ὑγιεινόν). The pair joins contraries in one knowledge, as the Charmides assumes a knowledge always does (see ἐπιστήμη ἀνεπιστημοσύνης).

Use in the book

The phrase is medicine’s definition, and the dialogue uses it twice. First as the model of a knowledge with an object: “And medicine … is knowledge of the healthy?” “Certainly” (165c), which lets Socrates ask what temperance is knowledge of (see ἐπιστήμη τινός). Then as the boundary that the knowledge of knowledge cannot cross. The doctor “understands nothing but the healthy and the diseased” (170e; see ἐπαΐω), so the temperate man who would test him must test him there: “Or isn’t each kind of knowledge defined, not just as being knowledge, but as being a particular knowledge, by its being of particular things?” “By that, yes.” “And medicine was defined as different from the other kinds of knowledge by being knowledge of the healthy and the diseased.” “Yes” (171a; see ὁρίζω; τῷ τινῶν εἶναι). Whoever would examine the doctor must examine him “in what is healthy and diseased” (171b; see ἐπισκέπτομαι), and that only a doctor can do (171b–c; see ἀληθινός; ὁμότεχνος).

The phrase gains a word between its first use and its second. At 165c medicine is knowledge “of the healthy”; at 170e and 171a it is “of the healthy and the diseased”. The addition can be read as what makes the test possible: a knowledge bounded by contraries can tell where its field ends and recognise a fellow practitioner and a pretender inside it. Knowledge of knowledge has no such contraries of its own except knowledge and its lack, and those, the argument shows, tell nothing about any field.

Places to read

The passages in which medicine is defined by its objects, and the one in which the knowledge of the healthy is weighed for happiness.

  1. 165cMedicine is knowledge of the healthy, and produces health.
  2. 170a–c2Knowledge and lack of knowledge of the healthy is medicine; the healthy is known by medicine, not by temperance.
  3. 170eThe doctor understands nothing but the healthy and the diseased.
  4. 171a–bMedicine was defined by being knowledge of the healthy and the diseased; the doctor must be examined in these.
  5. 174bOf the all-knowing man’s knowledges, the one by which he knows what is healthy comes nearer to making him happy than calculation.

Translation in this edition

“Knowledge of the healthy” at 165c8 and 165c10, “knowledge of the healthy and the diseased” for τῷ τοῦ ὑγιεινοῦ εἶναι καὶ νοσώδους ἐπιστήμη at 171a9. The Note on this Edition records a correction: “Medicine was ‘knowledge of health’ at 165c but ‘of the healthy’ from 170a, although 171a refers back to the definition at 165c.” The English now keeps “the healthy” throughout, so that 171a can be heard to recall 165c; on the distinction between the healthy and health see δημιουργὸς ὑγιείας. At 171a9 τῷ τοῦ is B’s reading; T has τῷ τό.

Elsewhere in Plato

In the Symposium the doctor Eryximachus gives medicine another object. Medicine, in sum, he says, is knowledge of the body’s loves with respect to filling and emptying; the one who can tell in these the fine love from the shameful is the most medical, and the one who can make the body change one love for the other, and implant love where it is lacking and remove it where it is present, is a good craftsman (186c–d). The Charmides’ medicine knows the healthy and the diseased, Eryximachus’ the loves and hatreds of opposites in the body; both make medicine a knowledge of contraries that can tell them apart.

Other ancient sources

Aristotle uses “healthy” as his example of a word said in many ways but with reference to one thing. Everything healthy is called so in relation to health: one thing because it preserves health, another because it produces it, another because it is a sign of it, another because it is capable of receiving it; and “medical” likewise is said in relation to medicine.1 The Charmides’ “the healthy” can be read as covering all these, so that its knowledge of the healthy is a knowledge of everything that bears on health.

Source note

1. Aristotle, Metaphysics 4.2, 1003a34–b4.