Assent

Use in the book

The Stoic report at I.50.14 calls every perception both assent and apprehension. Porphyry’s discussion of Numenius compares the power of assent with the imaginative power and then turns to the Stoics. This is an account of competing relations among powers, not a single undifferentiated psychology.

Places to read

1. I.50.14Perception, assent, and apprehension are brought together.
2. I.49.25.1Numenius distinguishes an accompaniment of assent from its work or product; the Stoic account follows.

Translation in this edition

Synkatathesis is “assent.” Keeping this rendering visible allows the reader to distinguish acceptance from phantasia, the presentation, and from hormē, impulse.

Use in the book

The political and ethical fragment opposes a spirit of contradiction to a spirit of assent formed by study, experience and knowledge. The latter demands more examination and work; it is praised as preserving and repairing, not as effortless conformity. A later list assigns different grounds for assent to logic, physics, morals, religion and metaphysics according to their ends. Its wording does not make proof and probability identical, even though both occur in its account of logic. Finally metaphysics seeks clarity and assent through a mode in which the soul participates, whereas logic aims at conviction and employs calculation. These local distinctions make assent more than a generic yes while leaving their tensions intact.

Places to read

1. II, p. 657–658, entry 10, ¶1Assent is described as the demanding result of study and examination.
2. II, p. 737, entry 2, ¶1Different disciplines offer different grounds and ends for assent.
3. II, p. 778–779, entry 8, ¶1Metaphysical assent differs from logic’s conviction.

Translation in this edition

The English translation retains assent and translates communis omnium consensus as the shared agreement of all. Preserving and repairing state effects without assigning a modern party label. The long disciplinary list contains disclosed contextual completions at damaged margins; its proved/probable contrast and opinion/knowledge alternatives are preserved.

Use in the book

After arguing against production by bare nature, Ficino announces that intelligence alone is insufficient for external effects unless the assent of will is added. Intellect anticipates the best end, distinguishes paths, and measures their proportion to it; will approves the end and chooses one path rather than another. This is an explanatory analysis of directed action. Applied to God, it cannot be a temporal committee meeting of independent faculties, since the surrounding argument identifies divine being, intelligence, and will. The later account of human judgment retains genuine deliberation among proposed alternatives. Thus approval and choice should neither be collapsed into mere awareness nor always be given the same temporal mode in God and a human soul.

Selected annotated passages.

Places to read

1. II.11.24The new stage requires the assent of will for external effects.
2. II.11.25Intellectual anticipation and measurement precede approval in the exposition.
3. II.11.26Choice selects the fitting route.
4. II.13.30Human judgment deliberates and chooses among alternatives.

Translation in this edition

“Assent” here is practical willing rather than simply agreeing that a proposition is true. The English “then by will” follows rursus in II.11.25 but should not alone establish elapsed time within divine action.

anticipare / discernere / metiri

anticipare / discernere / metiri. Printed forms: anticipet; discernat; metiatur.

Anticipate / distinguish / measure. Intellect anticipates an end, distinguishes routes, and measures their proportion before will approves the end in the exposition. References: II.11.25. See Assent of will.

approbare / eligere

approbare / eligere. Printed forms: approbet; eligat.

Approve / choose. Approval concerns the end; choice prefers one path among alternatives. These functions are not identical with merely knowing the end. References: II.11.25, II.11.26. See Assent of will.

assensus

assensus. Printed forms: assensus.

Assent or approval. The assent of will is required for external production, so knowledge alone does not select the effect to be made. References: II.11.24. See Assent of will.

Use in the book

Ficino envisages readers who do not readily yield to the authority of divine law but may assent to Platonic reasons supporting religion. The distinction is between routes to acceptance within his religious project; he does not say that a reader’s assent by itself demonstrates the reasons’ truth. His confident reor and nec vana fides introduce what he believes providence has decreed. At the close of the Proem, his wish that divine law approve whatever he approves makes the theological constraint explicit. The following exhortation presents distrust of the soul’s divinity as a consequence of confinement to bodily darkness. That diagnosis belongs to Ficino’s address to the reader, not to a neutral classification of every possible objection.

Places to read

1. Proem.8Yielding to law, assenting to reasons, and reasons supporting religion have different grammatical subjects and objects
2. Proem.10Human approval is subordinated to divine law’s approval
3. I.1.2Diffidere identifies the distrust the opening exhortation seeks to overcome

Translation in this edition

“Assent,” “yield,” “support,” “believe,” and “approve” retain useful distinctions. Probatum in the Proem should not automatically be translated mentally as “formally proved” just because later probare introduces philosophical demonstrations.

aberro

aberro. Printed forms: aberrare.

To go astray or err. The error charged to those severing philosophy and religion is an evaluative claim within Ficino’s programme. References: Proem.8. See Assent, approval and belief.

acquiesco

acquiesco. Printed forms: acquiescant.

To rest satisfied or assent to something. Ficino expects Platonic reasons to secure assent from readers not readily persuaded by divine law alone; assent is an audience response, not itself a proof. References: Proem.8. See Assent, approval and belief.

cedo

cedo. Printed forms: cedunt.

To yield, here to an authority. The minds described as perverse do not readily yield to divine law’s authority; the description and religious judgement are Ficino’s. References: Proem.8. See Assent, approval and belief.

diffido

diffido. Printed forms: diffidere.

To distrust or lack confidence in. Bodily darkness is said to make minds distrust their own divinity; this is Ficino’s diagnosis of a spiritual impediment. References: I.1.2. See Assent, approval and belief.

lex divina

lex divina. Printed forms: divina lex; divinae legis.

Divine law as an authority and standard of approval. Ficino distinguishes resistance to its authority from assent through supporting philosophical reasons, then subjects his own approval to it. References: Proem.8, Proem.10. See Assent, approval and belief.

probo / comprobo

probo / comprobo. Printed forms: comprobet; probatum.

To approve or establish, with the force fixed by the object. Ficino wishes to approve nothing except as divine law approves it; this is an authorial theological condition, not merely the vocabulary of formal proof. References: Proem.10. See Assent, approval and belief.

reor / fides

reor / fides. Printed forms: fides; reor.

A judgement of belief, accompanied here by confidence or faith. Ficino’s “I believe” and “this faith is not vain” assert confidence in a providential purpose rather than introduce an independently demonstrated decree. References: Proem.8. See Assent, approval and belief.

sine controversia

sine controversia. Printed forms: sine controversia.

Without dispute, as an assertion of confidence. Ficino says Plato was called divine beyond dispute; the phrase intensifies his encomium and does not independently establish universal historical agreement. References: Proem.3. See Assent, approval and belief.

suffragor

suffragor. Printed forms: suffragantibus.

To support or favour a cause. The Platonic reasons are said to support religion; they do not receive the support in this grammatical construction. References: Proem.8. See Assent, approval and belief.