From the book
Charmides
Plato · Diotimos Editions · November 2026
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At a Glance
- The wordἈπεργάζεσθαι is to work something off to completion: to finish, to produce, to make a thing into what it becomes. Its object is an ἔργον, a work.
- In the CharmidesEight times. Socrates asks the boy what sort of thing temperance “could produce” in a person (160d) and whether anything is good “that does not make men good” (160e); he counts “producing, by any craft whatever, any of the works of craft” as doing something (161e); he says what medicine and house-building “produce” if Critias were to ask him, and asks what fine work temperance produces, “worthy of its name” (165c–e); and he doubts that temperance, as defined, “does us any good” (173a).
- In this edition“Produce” at 160d, 161e and 165c–e; “make” in “make men good” (160e); “does us any good” (173a).
- A place to read165c–166a.
- English renderings
- ἀπεργάζοιτο, apergazoito, “could produce”; ἀπεργάζεται, apergazetai, “produces”, “make”, “does”; ἀπεργάζεσθαι, apergazesthai, “producing”, “produces”
Meaning
Ἀπεργάζεσθαι (apergazesthai) is ἐργάζεσθαι, “to work” (see ἐργάζομαι), with ἀπό, which marks completion: to bring a work to its end. With a double accusative it is to make someone into something, as temperance would make men good. It belongs to the vocabulary of the crafts, in which every art is known by what it turns out: health from medicine, houses from house-building, a cloak from weaving.
Use in the book
The verb carries the craft model of knowledge, and the dialogue tests the model on temperance and finds it wanting.
The model appears first in the boy’s second search. Socrates asks him to consider what sort of person temperance makes him, and what sort of thing it would be “that could produce such a person” (160d; see αἰδώς; ἐμβλέπω; σωφροσύνη παροῦσα). The answer, modesty, falls to the premise that nothing is good “that does not make men good” (160e; see ἀγαθοὺς ποιεῖ). In the argument against “doing one’s own business”, Socrates widens “doing” to cover every production: “healing, my friend, and building houses and weaving, and producing, by any craft whatever, any of the works of craft, are surely doing something” (161e; see ἔργον; τὰ ἑαυτοῦ πράττειν). Critias answers by setting making apart from doing and working (163b–c; see ποιεῖν καὶ πράττειν).
The model is applied directly at 165c–e. Once temperance is a knowledge, Socrates asks what it produces. Medicine, “being knowledge of the healthy”, produces health, “a fine work for us”; house-building produces houses; so Critias ought to be able to answer the question, “Critias, temperance, being knowledge of oneself, what fine work does it produce for us, worthy of its name?” (165c–e; see ἄξιος τοῦ ὀνόματος; καλὸν ἔργον). Critias rejects the question. Calculation and geometry produce nothing one could point to, as a house is the work of house-building (165e–166a; see λογιστική). Socrates grants it, and moves from the work a knowledge produces to the object it is of: calculation is of the even and the odd (166a; see ἄρτιος). The change of question opens the way to a knowledge whose object is knowledge.
The verb returns once more, when the work has been lost. Even if temperance were of the kind they now define, “it does not seem at all clear to me that it does us any good” (172e–173a). The Greek is ἀγαθὸν ἡμᾶς ἀπεργάζεται, “produces good for us”, and the question of the work, set aside at 166a, has come back as the question of benefit. At the end Socrates finds that the work of benefit was assigned to another craft (175a; see ἀποδίδωμι), and temperance is left “the craftsman of no benefit” (see οὐδεμιᾶς ὠφελίας δημιουργός). The dialogue can be read as showing that Critias won the argument about works at 166a and lost it at 175a.
Places to read
Every passage in which the verb occurs.
- 160dSocrates asks the boy what sort of thing temperance could produce in a person.
- 160eCould anything be good that does not make men good?
- 161eHealing, building and weaving, and producing any work of craft, are doing something.
- 165c–eMedicine produces health and house-building houses; what fine work does temperance produce, worthy of its name?
- 173aEven if temperance is of this kind, it is not clear that it does us any good.
Translation in this edition
“Produce” renders the verb wherever the work of a craft is in view (160d8, 161e8, 165c11, 165d2, 165d5, 165e1). At 160e11 ἀγαθοὺς ἀπεργάζεται is “make men good”, and at 173a1 ἀγαθὸν ἡμᾶς ἀπεργάζεται is “does us any good”, where English idiom takes over; on the 160e premise see ἀγαθοὺς ποιεῖ.
Elsewhere in Plato
In the Euthydemus the same question defeats Socrates himself. Telling his old friend Crito of a search for the knowledge that would make us happy, he recalls that they asked what work the kingly art produces: medicine, “ruling all it rules”, provides health, and farming produces food from the earth, but the kingly art, ruling all that it rules, “what does it produce?” Crito cannot say, and Socrates confesses that they could not either; they knew only that it must be beneficial and give us something good (291d–292a). The edition’s note at 174c compares the passage, where the search goes round in a circle.
Other ancient sources
Aristotle opens his ethics with a distinction that can be read as the one Critias appeals to. Every art and every inquiry, and likewise every action and choice, is thought to aim at some good, but ends differ: “some are activities, others are works beyond them”, and where there are ends beyond the actions, the works are by nature better than the activities; the end of medicine is health, of shipbuilding a ship, of generalship victory.1 Critias’ calculation and geometry can be read as belonging, on this distinction, among the arts whose end is their own activity.
Source note
1. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 1.1, 1094a1–9.