From the book
Charmides
Plato · Diotimos Editions · November 2026
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At a Glance
- The wordA knowledge whose objects are the other kinds of knowledge, as medicine’s object is the healthy.
- In the CharmidesCritias’ answer (166c) to Socrates’ question “what is temperance knowledge of” (166b), restated in the formula (166e, 167c, 168a); stripped of its other half at 170c, “if it is only knowledge of kinds of knowledge”; and Critias’ last claim, that temperance is “knowledge of kinds of knowledge” and presides over the others (174d).
- In this edition“Knowledge … of the other kinds of knowledge”, “knowledge of kinds of knowledge”.
- A place to read170a–c.
- English renderings
- τῶν τε ἄλλων ἐπιστημῶν ἐπιστήμη, tōn te allōn epistēmōn epistēmē, “knowledge … of the other kinds of knowledge”; ἐπιστημῶν ἐπιστήμη, epistēmōn epistēmē, “knowledge of kinds of knowledge”
Meaning
The phrase gives knowledge a second-order object. Each of the crafts is of something, health or houses or the odd and the even; this one is of the crafts themselves, as knowledges. Critias joins it to a knowledge “of itself” (see ἐπιστήμη ἑαυτῆς), and the dialogue examines the two halves apart: what is said of a knowledge’s knowing itself is left to a great man (169a; see μέγας ἀνήρ), and the argument from 170a is about this half.
Use in the book
Critias introduces it at 166c to escape the question of an object, what temperance is knowledge of other than itself (166b–c; see διαφέρω; ἐπιστήμη ἑαυτῆς; ἐπιστήμη τινός). Its objects are other than itself, as the question required, and yet they are knowledges, as it is.
The argument then asks what such a knowledge can tell, and Critias grants that it can distinguish only what is knowledge from what is not (170a; see ἐπιστήμη ἐπιστήμης). The healthy is known by medicine, the harmonious by music, what belongs to house-building by house-building; “But by temperance, if it is only knowledge of kinds of knowledge, how will he know that he knows the healthy, or what belongs to house-building?” “In no way” (170c; see γιγνώσκω). The knowledge of knowledges knows the knowledges only as knowledges, not as of health or of houses, and so it cannot judge any claim to a particular knowledge (170d–171c; see ἀληθινός).
At the end Critias returns to the phrase with a new verb: temperance, being knowledge of kinds of knowledge, presides over them, and so would rule the knowledge of the good (174d–e; see ἐπιστατέω). The phrase that was to give temperance its object now gives it authority. Socrates answers that to rule over the crafts is not to do their work (see ἄλλου δὲ οὐδενός).
The phrase can be read as coherent and empty. A knowledge whose objects are knowledges is no contradiction, and it can say of anything that it is or is not a knowledge. What it cannot do is the one thing the definition promised, to tell who knows what.
Places to read
The passages in which the phrase occurs.
- 166cCritias: all other knowledges are of something else; temperance alone is of the other kinds of knowledge and of itself.
- 166eCritias restates it: of itself and of the other kinds of knowledge.
- 167cSocrates: one single knowledge of nothing else but itself and the other kinds of knowledge.
- 168aKnowledge of no subject of learning, but of itself and the other kinds of knowledge.
- 170cIf temperance is only knowledge of kinds of knowledge, the temperate man will not know that he knows the healthy.
- 174dCritias: temperance is knowledge of kinds of knowledge and presides over the others.
Translation in this edition
“Knowledge … of the other kinds of knowledge” for τῶν τε ἄλλων ἐπιστημῶν ἐπιστήμη (166c2–3) and its returns, “knowledge of kinds of knowledge” for ἐπιστημῶν ἐπιστήμη without “the others” (170c6, 174d9). At 174d4–5 the plural object is joined to its lack, “knowledge not of kinds of knowledge and lacks of knowledge”, where the English coins the plural “lacks” to keep the pair (see ἀνεπιστημοσύνη).
Elsewhere in Plato
The Statesman gives the knowledge of knowledges an object of its own. The visitor from Elea asks whether, besides music and the handicrafts, there is a knowledge whether one ought to learn any of them or not, and whether it should rule them; the young Socrates, Socrates’ namesake who answers him, agrees that the knowledge of whether one must learn should rule the knowledge that is learned and taught, and the knowledge of whether one must persuade should rule the one that can persuade. Rhetoric, generalship and judging are found to be servants, and the truly kingly art is the one that does not itself act but rules those able to act, knowing the beginning and impulse of the greatest things in cities, when the time is right and when it is not; the others, ruling neither one another nor themselves, each concerned with some action of its own, have rightly taken their names from it (304b–305d). The Statesman’s ruling knowledge knows when and whether each craft should be used, which can be read as the knowledge of good and bad in another form (see ἐπιστήμη ἀγαθοῦ καὶ κακοῦ). The Euthydemus looks for the same kingly art and goes round in a circle (291b–292e; see ἄλλου δὲ οὐδενός), and Aristotle makes politics the master art, which settles what kinds of knowledge a city must have (Nicomachean Ethics 1.2, 1094a26–b7; see δημιουργὸς ὑγιείας).