Discovery

Use in the book

The first refutation praises ready discovery as an example against identifying temperance with slowness. The political picture later supposes that people can locate those who possess the knowledge they lack and entrust work to them. By the end, discovery is what has failed: the inquirers cannot determine what temperance names, the personified inquiry has not found the truth, and Charmides cannot know whether he possesses the virtue when its nature has not been discovered. These objects of finding are importantly different. The inability to find a definition does not entail that no useful observation occurred; nor does a wish to find an expert establish an infallible method of expert selection.

Places to read

1. 160a–160bQuick discovery is praised among mental activities.
2. 171eThe imagined error-free life includes finding knowledgeable agents.
3. 175b–175d2The inquiry has failed to find what temperance is and to discover the truth.
4. 176a–176b2Charmides links his uncertainty about possession to the unsuccessful search for the virtue’s nature.

Translation in this edition

English “find,” “find out” and “discover” translate related verbs across different kinds of object. The repeated family marks an aim of inquiry, not a promised success.

ἀνευρίσκω

Attested: ἀνευρίσκων (aneuriskōn). Find out or discover; the comparison asks whether mental searching is better performed sharply or quietly. References: 160a. Lexical identification: lemma: ἀνευρίσκω. See Discovery.

ἐξευρίσκω

Attested: ἐξευρίσκοντες / ἐξευρεῖν (exeuriskontes / exeurein). Find out or discover; used of identifying competent people and of finding temperance’s nature. References: 171e, 176a. Lexical identification: lemma: ἐξευρίσκω. See Discovery.

εὑρίσκω

Attested: εὑρήσομεν / εὕροιμεν / εὑρεῖν (heurēsomen / heuroimen / heurein). To find or discover; concerns discovering the meaning of a puzzling definition, finding a supposed self-related greater, and the final failure to identify what temperance names. References: 161c, 168b, 175b. Lexical identification: lemma: εὑρίσκω. See Discovery.

Use in the book

When Alcibiades cannot name a teacher of justice, Socrates accepts that he might know through discovering it himself. Discovery is not dismissed as impossible. The next question asks whether he sought, and seeking is tied to thinking that he did not already know. Alcibiades can identify no such period: even his childhood protests in games expressed confident judgment. On the agreed premises he cannot claim justice as a personal discovery.

This argument concerns an absent history of inquiry, not a demonstrated inability of human beings to discover justice. Its conditional form matters. Socrates says Alcibiades could discover if he sought. The refutation removes an unsupported claim of acquisition and opens the need for genuine investigation.

The family returns positively at 129b, where Socrates asks how the self itself might be discovered. This is an object of joint inquiry, not a reminiscence of what either partner has already found. At 130c–d exact knowledge is deferred until the omitted object is discovered. Discovery thus remains possible and necessary even after the practical soul argument has been accepted.

At 116c “whatever we find fine” means whatever the current reasoning identifies as fine will also be found good. That use concerns argumentative recognition, not an independent biographical route of acquiring moral expertise. Keeping both senses prevents the lexicon from making every instance of finding mean solitary invention.

Places to read

1. 106d–106eDiscovery is one alternative to learning from others
2. 109e–110d2Alcibiades cannot establish a prior search and thus cannot justify claimed discovery
3. 116cFinding describes the result reached within an argument
4. 129b–130d234The self itself remains an object to be discovered for precise knowledge

Translation in this edition

“Discover” consistently distinguishes the inquiry verb from “learn.” At 116c the edition appropriately uses “find,” since the sense is finding that a thing has a property. It does not treat the compound ἐξευρίσκειν as naming an entirely different faculty.

ἐξευρίσκω

Attested: ἐξηῦρες (exēures; 106d). At 106d: Discovered for oneself, contrasted with learning from others in the acquisition dilemma. Lexical identification: lemma: ἐξευρίσκω. See Discovery.

εὑρίσκω

Attested: εὑρεῖν (heurein; 109e); εὑρεθείη (heuretheiē; 129b). At 109e: Discover independently, a possible route to knowledge if preceded by an actual search. At 129b: Might be discovered: the self itself is posed as an object still awaiting inquiry. Lexical identification: lemma: εὑρίσκω. See Discovery.

Use in the book

The account of the Herms recognises two sources for Hipparchus’ wisdom. Some has been learned, some found by himself. Calling it “his own wisdom” therefore need not mean that every thought originated with him. What is especially his own is the ensuing selection, versification and public presentation of the material as poems and specimens of wisdom.

The selection is governed by what he judges wisest. That brings assessment between possession and publication: even a wide store of knowledge must be arranged for the intended audience. Yet the dialogue does not identify his teachers, name the discoveries, or show the reasoning by which the best material was chosen. The cultural programme is praised through its structure and supposed aims rather than documented through a curriculum.

This distinction helps interpret the competing claims of authorship. Hipparchus can be said to learn material and still compose his own verses. The narrative does not accuse him of plagiarism, and a modern requirement that every maxim identify an original author should not be imposed on it without argument. At the same time, publishing acquired wisdom under a conspicuous personal memorial formula foregrounds the question of who receives credit from what others can learn.

The route offered to the country people reverses the process. They meet a selected sample, taste its wisdom and are expected to seek further education. Discovery in the ruler’s past becomes material for learning in the citizens’ future. The speakers’ own inquiry is different: instead of receiving a finished selection of wise sayings, the companion tries definitions, is challenged and requests a retraction. The contrast invites reflection on whether education is the transmission of settled conclusions, the discovery of a distinction, or both; the dialogue does not decide this by a formal definition.

Places to read

1. 228dἥν τ’ ἔμαθεν — One part of Hipparchus’ wisdom has been learned.
2. 228dἣν αὐτὸς ἐξηῦρεν — Another part is attributed to his own discovery.
3. 228dἃ ἡγεῖτο σοφώτατα εἶναι — Judgment determines which material is selected.
4. 228eπαιδευθησόμενοι — The sample is intended to lead readers toward further education.

Translation in this edition

The edition renders the distinction directly as “what he had learned and what he had discovered himself.” Its repetition of “his own” and “he himself” preserves the Greek emphasis on agency and attribution, without implying that learned material was never acknowledged as learned. A lexical account should keep this careful difference between originality of thought and authorship of a verse.

Use in the book

Socrates' sensory comparison expands into a set of possible explanations for law (313c–314b2). Sight is perception that reveals things through the eyes; hearing reveals sounds through the ears. Learning brings another model: knowledge reveals what is learned. Finding supplies a further one: medicine finds what is healthy and sickly, and prophecy, according to the prophets, what the gods have in mind. Socrates calls craft “our finding of things.”

The alternatives are tentative explanatory models rather than a completed classification of all cognition. The question is what law is by which accepted things are accepted. The companion does not choose one of the options as stated; he answers with resolutions and decrees. Yet finding returns after the discussion of decent and true opinion, now in the compound exeuresis. The earlier craft-language has prepared the central definition without having by itself established it.

The progression matters in the opposite direction too. At 315a true opinion is called discovery of what is; at 315b fallible humans may fail to discover what law wishes; at 317d the shorter heuresis appears when Socrates restates law as finding. The source does not mark that change as a new theory. The English's two renderings preserve the lexical distinction while the argument's continuity discourages inventing a sharp technical opposition between “finding” and “discovery.”

Near the end Socrates claims Minos discovered well the truth concerning civic administration (321b). The general formula has acquired a domain and a supposed successful agent. Tragedy, meanwhile, is called an old Athenian heurēma, a finding or invention (321a). That noun can concern the origination of a practice, while the central formula concerns getting hold of what is. The common root does not make tragedy a discovery of moral truth.

The disclosure language also persists when Socrates reads Homer and when musical performances reveal those in need of the gods. Those later uses show that revealing need not be a physical sensation. The crucial issue throughout is what is made manifest and with what warrant. The ending acknowledges a limit: the law's discoverable good for the soul has not yet been stated.

Places to read

1. 314aαἰσθήσει ταύτῃ τῇ διὰ τῶν ὀφθαλμῶν δηλούσῃ τὰ πράγματα — Sight as revealing through the eyes
2. 314bπότερον αἰσθήσει τινὶ ἢ δηλώσει — Law considered as perception or revealing
3. 314bἡ γάρ που τέχνη ἡμῖν εὕρεσίς ἐστιν τῶν πραγμάτων — Craft as our finding of things
4. 315aἡ ἀληθὴς δόξα τοῦ ὄντος ἐστὶν ἐξεύρεσις — True opinion as discovery of what is
5. 317dτοῦ ὄντος εὕρεσιν — The unprefixed noun in the restatement
6. 321aτῆσδε τῆς πόλεως εὕρημα — Tragedy as this city's finding
7. 321bἐξευρόντος εὖ τὴν ἀλήθειαν — Successful discovery in the claim about Minos

Translation in this edition

The distinction “find/finding” and “discover/discovery” is deliberate and maintained. At 314a Burnet prints “things,” τὰ πράγματα, rather than the vulgate “colors” reported in the apparatus. A lexicon following this edition should not quietly narrow the object of sight to the alternative reading.

Discovery — ἐξεύρεσις (exeuresis)

ἐξεύρεσις (exeuresis)

Discovery. The compound noun used for true opinion's relation to what is and for what law wishes to be. Attested: ἐξεύρεσις (315a). Revealing, finding, and discovery.

Finding — εὕρεσις (heuresis)

εὕρεσις (heuresis)

Finding. What Socrates calls craft in relation to its objects; the unprefixed noun precedes the central discovery formula. Attested: εὕρεσίς (314b). Revealing, finding, and discovery.

Gods — θεός (theos)

θεός (theos)

Gods. The beings whose intentions the prophets claim their craft discloses. Attested: θεοὶ (314b). Revealing, finding, and discovery.

Have in mind — διανοεῖσθαι (dianoeisthai)

διανοεῖσθαι (dianoeisthai)

Have in mind. What the gods think or intend, as the prophets claim; not Socrates' direct assertion of access to divine intentions. Attested: διανοοῦνται (314b). Revealing, finding, and discovery.

Is found — εὑρίσκειν (heuriskein)

εὑρίσκειν (heuriskein)

Is found. The passive verb of finding, illustrated through medicine and prophecy. Attested: εὑρίσκεται (314b). Revealing, finding, and discovery.

Is learned — μανθάνειν (manthanein)

μανθάνειν (manthanein)

Is learned. Learning is explained through knowledge that reveals the things learned. Attested: μανθάνεται (314b). Revealing, finding, and discovery.

Prophecy — μαντική (mantikē)

μαντική (mantikē)

Prophecy. The craft offered, with the qualification as the prophets say, as another example of finding. Attested: μαντικῇ (314b). Revealing, finding, and discovery.

Prophets — μάντις (mantis)

μάντις (mantis)

Prophets. The claimants cited for prophecy's knowledge of what the gods have in mind. Attested: μάντεις (314b). Revealing, finding, and discovery.

Revealing — δηλοῦν (dēloun)

δηλοῦν (dēloun)

Revealing. The participle describes perception's making its objects manifest. Attested: δηλούσῃ (314a). Revealing, finding, and discovery.

Revealing — δήλωσις (dēlōsis)

δήλωσις (dēlōsis)

Revealing. One proposed model of law's explanatory role, alongside perception and finding. Attested: δηλώσει (314b). Revealing, finding, and discovery.

Take or suppose to be — ὑπολαμβάνειν (hypolambanein)

ὑπολαμβάνειν (hypolambanein)

Take or suppose to be. Socrates asks which explanatory model they should most take law to belong to. Attested: ὑπολάβοιμεν (314b). Revealing, finding, and discovery.

Things — πρᾶγμα (pragma)

πρᾶγμα (pragma)

Things. What sight reveals in Burnet's printed text; the alternative colors belongs to the apparatus. Attested: πράγματα (314a). Revealing, finding, and discovery.

The things learned — τὰ μανθανόμενα (ta manthanomena)

τὰ μανθανόμενα (ta manthanomena)

The things learned. The objects of learning in Socrates' extension of the capacity–object pattern. Attested: τὰ μανθανόμενα (314b). Revealing, finding, and discovery.

As the prophets say (contextual phrase)

314b: ὥς φασιν οἱ μάντεις. This parenthetic qualification attributes the claim about discovering divine intentions to prophets. It does not make the whole analogy ironic or false, but it prevents treating the example as an unqualified guarantee of divinatory access supplied by the narrator. There is no narrator making such a guarantee. The words are Socrates' qualification inside a hypothetical answer. See Revealing and finding.

Use in the book

The perfect ἐξηυρήκαμεν at 218b announces a discovery: the speakers believe they have found what the friend is and is not. That confidence is immediately interrupted by Socrates’ suspicion.

The final infinitive ἐξευρεῖν at 223b returns to the same goal in a negative formulation: they have not yet been able to find out what the friend is. The repeated verb binds the premature success to the final acknowledgment of unfinished inquiry. Neither form denotes merely meeting or obtaining an actual friend.

Places to read

1. 223bοὔπω δὲ ὅτι ἔστιν ὁ φίλος οἷοί τε ἐγενόμεθα ἐξευρεῖν — but we have not yet been able to find out what the friend is.
2. 218b