From the book
Charmides
Plato · Diotimos Editions · November 2026
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At a Glance
- The wordA relative clause, “which itself knows itself”: αὐτή, “itself”, is the subject, and the reflexive αὑτήν the object; both are feminine because their noun is ἐπιστήμη, “knowledge”.
- In the CharmidesOnce, in Critias’ argument that whoever has a knowledge which knows itself will know himself (169e). Socrates grants it and asks the question it does not answer.
- In this edition“Knowledge which knows itself”; “what knows itself”.
- A place to read169d–170a.
- English renderings
- ἐπιστήμην ἣ αὐτὴ αὑτὴν γιγνώσκει, epistēmēn hē autē hautēn gignōskei, “knowledge which knows itself”; τὸ αὑτὸ γιγνῶσκον, to hauto gignōskon, “what knows itself”
Meaning
The phrase gives knowledge the grammar of a person. Critias’ definition had stated the object with a genitive, a knowledge “of itself and of the other kinds of knowledge” (166e, and in the other order at 166c; see ἐπιστήμη αὑτῆς καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἐπιστημῶν); here knowledge is the subject of the verb “know” and its own object. The edition’s Key Words observe that from 166c the argument passes, without comment, from a man’s knowledge of himself to a knowledge’s knowledge of itself, and that the dialogue never quite resolves the difference (see γιγνώσκειν ἑαυτόν). At 169e Critias tries to close the gap in one step.
Use in the book
Socrates has granted knowledge of knowledge for the sake of argument and asks what it adds: “how does it make one any more able to know what one knows and what one does not? For this, surely, is what we said knowing oneself and being temperate is, isn’t it?” (169d; see γιγνώσκειν ἑαυτόν). Critias answers: “Certainly … and it does follow, Socrates. For if someone has knowledge which knows itself, he himself would be of the same kind as what he has. Just as when someone has speed he is fast, and when he has beauty, beautiful, and when he has knowledge, knowing, so when he has knowledge that is knowledge of itself, then surely he will be knowing himself” (169d–e; see γνῶσις; ταχύς). The edition’s note at 169e states the principle, “that whoever has a thing becomes such as the thing he has”, and points out that each pair shares a root (see γνῶσις).
Socrates does not dispute it: “That isn’t what I’m disputing … that when someone has what knows itself, he will know himself. But what necessity is there that someone who has it should know what he knows and what he does not know?” Critias replies, “Because, Socrates, this is the same as that” (169e–170a; see ἀμφισβητέω; ἀνάγκη; ταὐτόν). The concession costs Socrates nothing, and the next step shows why. Speed makes its owner fast because speed is a quality; a knowledge that knows itself makes its owner a knower of knowledge, and what such a knower can tell is only which of the things before him is knowledge and which is not (170a; see διαιρέω). By 170c–d he will know “only that he knows”. The self known through a self-knowing knowledge can be read as a knower in general, with nothing in particular known: the man has become such as the thing he has, and the thing is empty.
Places to read
The passage in which the phrase occurs, with its answer.
Translation in this edition
Ἐπιστήμην ἣ αὐτὴ αὑτὴν γιγνώσκει (169e1) is “knowledge which knows itself”, and τὸ αὑτὸ γιγνῶσκον (169e6–7) “what knows itself”. The English keeps “itself” for the knowledge and “himself” for the man (αὐτὸς αὑτὸν γνώσεται, “he will know himself”), so that the step Critias takes from one to the other stays visible. Γνῶσιν αὐτὴν αὑτῆς (169e4) is “knowledge that is knowledge of itself” (see γνῶσις).
Elsewhere in Plato
Self-motion, which Socrates leaves among the doubted cases (168e–169a), becomes in the Phaedrus the definition of soul (245c–e; see ἀδύνατος; κίνησις). Self-motion found a place in Plato’s philosophy; a knowledge that knows itself and nothing else did not.
Other ancient sources
Aristotle makes the divine intellect think itself: if it is the most excellent thing, its thinking is a thinking of thinking. He then meets a difficulty, “but knowledge and perception and opinion and thought appear always to be of something else, and of themselves only on the side”, and answers that in some cases the knowledge is the thing known: where the objects have no matter, what thinks and what is thought are not different but one.1 The difficulty’s list, knowledge, perception and opinion, can be read as the Charmides’ list; the question Socrates does not trust himself to settle (169a), Aristotle settles. In On the Soul he asks whether the intellect is itself an object of thought, and answers that it is, as its objects are, for in things without matter what thinks and what is thought are the same.2
Plotinus, the Platonist philosopher of the third century AD, opens a treatise on the knowing natures with the question whether what thinks itself must be complex, and goes on to ask whether the intellect would know itself merely by knowing its objects, knowing of what is its own that it knows it, but no longer who it is that knows, or would know both its own things and itself.3 The question can be read as the difficulty of 170c–d, a knower who knows that he knows and no more, pressed further; the answer, that in the intellect knower and known are one, is Plotinus’ own.
Source note
1. Aristotle, Metaphysics 12.9, 1074b33–1075a5.
2. Aristotle, On the Soul 3.4, 429b26–430a5.
3. Plotinus, Enneads 5.3.1; the answer at 5.3.5.