Perplexity and lack of resources

Use in the book

Socrates first describes himself as at a loss when Charmides sits beside him and his confidence collapses (155c), and again when explaining how he had struggled to introduce the charm (156b). These uses are social and erotic before they are technical. They show that a confession of incapacity is not confined to the formal closing of a philosophical argument.

At 167b Socrates announces a determinate intellectual difficulty and offers to state where it lies: whether a knowledge could know knowledge and ignorance while excluding ordinary objects. He asks whether Critias can find a better route. At 169c perplexity spreads like a yawn. Socrates is visibly at a loss; Critias, accustomed to esteem, will not confess his inability and conceals it with unclear speech. The episode distinguishes undergoing perplexity from acknowledging it honestly.

The final failure is often called the dialogue's aporia, but it is more exact to say that no adequate definition has been secured. Socrates still believes temperance a great good, and Charmides wants continued conversation. Interpretively, acknowledged perplexity may prepare renewed inquiry, whereas concealed perplexity protects reputation at the expense of clarity. The narrative strongly supports that contrast without proving that every experience of aporia automatically improves its subject.

Places to read

1. 155c–156b2Socrates’ social and erotic loss of resource
2. 167b–c2Explicitly stated philosophical difficulty
3. 169c–dPerplexity as contagious yawning; Critias conceals it
4. 175b–176b23Unresolved definition followed by continued need for the charm

Translation in this edition

At 167b the edition expands the shared poros imagery into “way through”. At 169c it keeps Burnet's ἀναγκασθῆναι, “to be forced”; the apparatus records a proposed deletion and Burnet's alternative suggestion, “infected”. The latter is not the printed text.

ἀπορέω

Attested: ἠπόρουν / ἀποροῦντος (ēporoun / aporountos). Be at a loss or without a way forward; applies both to Socrates’ erotic embarrassment and to philosophical perplexity. References: 155c, 156b, 169c. Lexical identification: lemma: ἀπορέω. See Perplexity.

ἀπορία

Attested: ἀπορίας / ἀπορίαν (aporias / aporian). Perplexity or lack of a way forward; spreads between the interlocutors and motivates a renewed attempt. References: 169c, 169d. Lexical identification: lemma: ἀπορία. See Perplexity.

ἐπικαλύπτω

Attested: ἐπικαλύπτων (epikalyptōn). Covering up; Critias speaks unclearly to conceal his perplexity. References: 169d. Lexical identification: lemma: ἐπικαλύπτω. See Perplexity.

εὔπορος

Attested: εὐπορώτερος (euporōteros). Better provided with a way through a difficulty; Socrates asks whether Critias can find a solution where he himself is at a loss. References: 167b. Lexical identification: lemma: εὔπορος. See Perplexity.

Use in the book

Alcibiades' childhood certainty provides the initial contrast. He protested injustice loudly, not as someone puzzled about its nature. Only after his claims have been tested does he experience the destabilization that might initiate inquiry. At 116e his answers no longer cohere; he feels strangely disposed and cannot identify his condition. Socrates explains it through wandering and conceit of knowledge.

At 127d the confession recurs after the unsuccessful account of friendship and concord. This time Alcibiades adds that his shameful condition may have escaped him for a long time. Socrates answers with encouragement rather than a fresh insult: recognition has arrived at an age when care is possible. The next step is to continue answering and examine what caring for oneself means.

The dialogue therefore uses perplexity as an educational turning point, not simply as a terminal defeat. Yet the positive movement does not erase every unresolved issue. The self itself remains unexamined with precision, and the final promise of ethical care is shadowed by fear of political corruption. One should distinguish that continuing openness from the two local moments of confusion and from the claim that the entire dialogue ends in complete ignorance.

Places to read

1. 110bChildhood accusation is contrasted with being at a loss
2. 116e–117aContrary answers produce the first explicit confession of confusion
3. 127d–127eRenewed perplexity becomes recognition and an invitation to care
4. 130c–130dThe larger question of the self remains unresolved with precision

Translation in this edition

The edition repeats “I don't even know what I am saying” at 116e and 127d. Replacing the second with “what I mean” would weaken the deliberate verbal recurrence. “Aporia” is not inserted as an attested noun into the forms list.

ἀπορέω

Attested: ἀποροῦντος (aporountos; 110b). At 110b: Being puzzled about justice, expressly denied of the confident child Alcibiades during games. Lexical identification: lemma: ἀπορέω. See Perplexity.

ἄτοπος

Attested: ἀτόπως (atopōs; 116e); ἀτοπώτερος (atopōteros; 106a). At 116e: Strangely disposed: Alcibiades describes the disturbing condition in which his answers keep changing. Strange or unusual: Socrates becomes stranger by speaking, and Alcibiades later calls his own condition strange. Lexical identification: lemma: ἄτοπος. See Perplexity; Wonder and strangeness.

λέγω

Attested: ὅτι λέγω (hoti legō; 116e). At 116e: What one is saying, the content Alcibiades confesses he no longer understands amid changing answers. Lexical identification: lemma: λέγω. See Perplexity.

πάθημα

Attested: τὸ πάθημα (to pathēma; 116e). At 116e: The condition of instability Alcibiades experiences but cannot yet identify, distinct from the grievance sense earlier in the dialogue. Lexical identification: lemma: πάθημα. See Perplexity.

Use in the book

Following the examination of ignorance and knowledge, Alcibiades initially accepts the reading of the Margites. His next very short reply, palin au moi dokei, is difficult to fix in isolation. Palin can mean again or back; this edition reads it as a fresh turn in the opposite direction. Socrates immediately says that Alcibiades changes up and down, giving that reading contextual support. The alternative of renewed assent remains possible and is recorded in the note.

Socrates describes the extent and character of the perplexity and includes himself in it. This self-inclusion prevents the exchange from becoming a simple exhibition of another person’s stupidity. Yet it does not erase the difference between Socrates’ guidance and Alcibiades’ uncertainty. The imagined divine offer is repeated to show whether Alcibiades can now choose responsibly, and he says that he cannot answer in that fashion.

At 150b Socrates asks whether Alcibiades remembers saying he was in much perplexity about praying. A careful reader notices that the noun has been supplied by Socrates in the earlier exchange. Alcibiades has displayed and acknowledged the difficulty, but the text need not be rewritten as though he independently formulated every term Socrates uses to characterize it.

The recommendation to wait is a response to this practical condition. Perplexity is not celebrated as an indefinitely sufficient end in itself. It opens an educational need that is accepted but not fulfilled before the conversation closes.

Places to read

1. 147eThe ambiguous reply is followed by Socrates’ description of repeated change and shared perplexity.
2. 148a–b2Alcibiades cannot responsibly select the object of the divine grant.
3. 150b–d2Socrates recalls the difficulty and recommends postponement until learning has occurred.

Translation in this edition

Note 28 explicitly records both readings of the short reply. The lexicon follows the printed English’s reversal while retaining the alternative; the edition’s final record also observes that the word perplexity at 150b is Socrates’ characterization.

Be at a loss

ἀπορῶ (aporō); ἀπορουμένους (aporoumenous)

To be unable to find a way through a difficulty. Alcibiades is at a loss over the relation between a disease and disease in general; Socrates wonders whether human blame of the gods is really misplaced; the Athenians are baffled by repeated military defeat despite their religious expenditure. These logical, theological and civic instances prepare the more sustained perplexity of the ending without making every occurrence the same experience.

Attestations. 139e: Alcibiades acknowledges difficulty in what he is saying about disease and ophthalmia; 142d: Socrates introduces his doubt about mortals blaming the gods; 148d–e: The Athenians are at a loss what means could avert their continuing defeats.

See also. Perplexity and reversal

Use in the book

After the health-and-disease example Socrates says that the companion is “running round back again to the same place” (231c). The initial unrestricted acquisition definition has been tested, and bad acquisition has again been assigned to loss, good acquisition to gain. The companion had retracted the proposition that all gain is good, but the new route appears to recover it.

The answer “I am at a loss what to say” is a confession about answering. It does not amount to a considered declaration that Socrates’ reasoning is sound. Socrates replies that the perplexity is “not unjustly” experienced and immediately continues with the second branch, acquiring more for less. Perplexity becomes the occasion for another test rather than the dialogue’s stopping point.

At 232a the return is counted: goodness of the gainful has been agreed “for the third or fourth time.” The deliberately loose tally refers to repeated formulations rather than a precise proof inventory. Gain was agreed good at 227a, recalled at 227c and 228a, and recovered through the feast at 231c. The metals and worth sequence now brings it back once more.

The circular language admits different evaluations. Repeated return could mean that the same truth survives each attempt to escape it. It could also indicate that the inquiry keeps reinstating an equivocal premise under changed language. Neither the running metaphor nor the count settles which reading is correct. The end’s distinction between being compelled and persuaded confirms that repetition has not simply dissolved the companion’s unease.

The article therefore separates a return to a conclusion from circular reasoning in the technical sense. The speakers explicitly recognize recurrence, but do not formally diagnose an argument that assumes its conclusion. The reader must inspect the actual transitions through benefit, opposition, acquisition and worth, rather than infer validity or invalidity from the image of a circle alone.

Places to read

1. 231cπάλιν αὖ περιτρέχεις εἰς τὸ αὐτό — Socrates names the return to the same result.
2. 231cἈπορῶ ἔγωγε ὅτι εἴπω — The companion cannot find what to say.
3. 231cΟὐκ ἀδίκως γε σὺ ἀπορῶν — Socrates acknowledges the intelligibility of the impasse.
4. 232aαὖ πάλιν τρίτον ἢ τέταρτον — The repeated conclusion is counted approximately.

Translation in this edition

The edition explicitly notes that “at a loss” renders ἀπορεῖν, not the noun for loss. Its note 24 identifies the earlier conclusions behind the “third or fourth” phrase. Those supplied references are useful for following the recurrence; they should not be turned into a more exact numerical count than Socrates himself gives.

Use in the book

The group reaches perplexity when asked who can judge how many and what sort of learning-subjects should be planted in a soul. Earlier examples have established that one should consult doctor, trainer, or farmer in the appropriate domain. The failure is thus specific: they cannot identify the corresponding educational authority. It is not simply that they have forgotten the topic or run out of quotations.

Socrates includes himself among those at a loss and teasingly proposes asking the lads. The joke tests whether a concern for status might prevent them from seeking help. The Homeric analogy to suitors and bow makes that possibility vivid, but no actual answer from the boys follows. Perplexity opens a question about how to continue, not merely about what proposition to believe.

Seeing the lovers lose heart over the argument, Socrates tries to examine the issue another way. He asks which subjects the philosopher must learn. The revised inquiry retains the problem of education while shifting from maximal amount to selection. The cultured lover then proposes reputation as a criterion, giving the conversation a fresh thesis to test.

This is not a dialogue that simply ends in aporia. It moves on to a lengthy critique of the generalist and then to self-knowledge and judgment. Conversely, its later movement does not erase the honesty of the earlier impasse or supply a detailed retrospective answer about curricula. The shared uncertainty remains an important check on interpreting Socrates’ dramatic authority as omniscience.

Places to read

1. 135aἀπορίας μεστοὶ ἦμεν ἅπαντες — The entire group, including the narrator, is full of perplexity.
2. 135aἐπειδὴ ἡμεῖς ἐν ἀπορίᾳ ἐσμέν — Socrates names their shared condition before proposing help.
3. 135aἄλλῃ ἐπειρώμην σκοπεῖν — He responds by trying to examine the problem another way.

Translation in this edition

The edition uses “perplexity” twice at 135a and keeps skopein as “look into,” its regular method verb. The introduction highlights “we were all of us” in its account of the first argument. At 135a7 the apparatus and Editorial Note also draw attention to the reconstructed wording of the new curricular question. That textual detail should not distract from the clear narrative transition: recognized difficulty is followed by another attempt at inquiry.

Use in the book

The related verb ἀπορέω first describes Lysis hesitating to approach alone (207a). The noun occurs explicitly at 216c: Socrates is made dizzy by the argument’s difficulty. It names an experience of inquiry, not a theory that nothing can be known. At 213c the printed text gives Menexenus’ οὐ πάνυ εὐπορῶ, “I do not find much of a way through”; ἀπορῶ is an apparatus variant, not Burnet’s adopted wording.

The ending is aptly called aporetic as an interpretative description. Socrates says at 222e that he no longer has anything to say, and at 223b that they have not yet managed to discover what the friend is. Neither sentence uses the noun ἀπορία. The “not yet” leaves the inquiry unfinished; it does not erase the friendship the speakers believe they share.

The related adjective ἄπορος at 223b describes the tutors as impossible to deal with. Its practical sense gives the closing scene an ironic echo of the argumentative impasse without proving that the tutors symbolize a philosophical doctrine.

Places to read

1. 216cτῆς τοῦ λόγου ἀπορίας — the difficulty of the argument.
2. 207a
3. 213c
4. 222e–223b2

Use in the book

Porphyry describes soul’s inclination toward matter as a lack of all things and an emptying of its own power. Its ascent to intellect is contrasted as fullness. The immediate sense is privation of resources or fulfillment, not merely being puzzled by a difficult question.

Places to read

1. I.49.23.7The soul’s material inclination is characterized by lack and depletion.

Translation in this edition

“Lack” conveys this use; “perplexity” suits a specifically intellectual impasse when the context supplies one.