Δ Delta

opinion

δόξα

The opinion temperance would give, and the opinion of opinions · Charmides

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Charmides

Plato · Diotimos Editions · November 2026

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Orientation

At a Glance

  • The wordΔόξα, what seems: an opinion, belief, judgement; and what others think of one, repute, glory.
  • In the CharmidesFive times, at two moments: twice at 159a, and three times in one phrase at 168a. Socrates tells the boy that if temperance is present in him, it must give rise to a sense “from which you would have some opinion about it” (159a), and asks him to say what temperance is “in your opinion” (159a). In the procession of powers, “an opinion which is an opinion of opinions and of itself” (168a).
  • In this edition“Opinion”.
  • A place to read158e–159b.
English renderings
δόξα, doxa, “opinion”; δόξαν, doxan, “opinion”; δοξῶν, doxōn, “of opinions”

Meaning

The noun of δοκέω, “to seem”, δόξα is the seeming as it is held: what seems to me, my view; and what I seem to others, my good name. In Plato the first sense becomes a term of art. Opinion can be true or false, and so differs from knowledge, which cannot be false; and true opinion differs from knowledge in lacking the account that would tie it down.

Use in the book

Socrates founds the inquiry on the boy’s opinion. If temperance is in him, Socrates tells him, it must give rise to some sense, “from which you would have some opinion about it: what it is, and what sort of thing temperance is” (158e–159a; see αἴσθησις; ἔνειμι). The chain runs from presence to perception, from perception to opinion, and from opinion to speech, for the boy knows how to speak Greek and so can say what it seems to him to be (159a; see ἑλληνίζω). The edition’s note at 159a says that on one reading the remark states an assumption the inquiry will lean on, that whatever a person really has in him he can put into words. The boy is not asked for knowledge, only for an opinion, “what you say temperance is, in your opinion” (159a; see κατὰ τὴν σὴν δόξαν), and the three definitions that follow are his opinions examined.

The noun returns at the end of the procession of powers, after sight, hearing, perception, desire, wish, love and fear: “Or an opinion which is an opinion of opinions and of itself, but has no opinion about any of the things the other opinions are opinions about?” “Not at all” (168a; see αἴσθησις αἰσθήσεων καὶ ἑαυτῆς; δοξάζω). Opinion is the last case before knowledge itself, and the nearest to it. Critias will not grant an opinion that opines nothing but opinions, and yet he holds that there is a knowledge of nothing but knowledge. Socrates’ next words are that this is strange, “if there really is such a thing” (168a; see ἄτοπος).

The two uses can be read together. At 159a the boy’s opinion was to be the trace that temperance leaves in him, and so evidence of something other than itself. At 168a an opinion that had no object but opinions would be evidence of nothing, and Critias cannot believe in it. The dialogue’s method depends on the first kind of opinion; its argument tests whether temperance could be a knowledge of the second kind, with no object but knowledge.

Places to read

Every passage in which the noun occurs.

  1. 158e–159aIf temperance is present in the boy, it gives rise to a sense from which he would have an opinion about it.
  2. 159aHe is to say what temperance is, in his opinion.
  3. 168aAn opinion of opinions and of itself, which has no opinion about the things other opinions are about.

Translation in this edition

Δόξα (159a2) is “opinion” in “some opinion about it”, and κατὰ τὴν σὴν δόξαν (159a10) “in your opinion”. At 168a3 δόξαν δοξῶν δόξαν καὶ αὑτῆς is “an opinion which is an opinion of opinions and of itself”, the relative clause supplying the verb the Greek leaves out. The verb of the family, δοξάζειν, is “have some opinion” at 159a1 and “have an opinion about”, “be opinions about” at 168a (see δοξάζω).

Elsewhere in Plato

In the Meno Socrates compares true opinions to the statues of Daedalus, the legendary craftsman, which run away unless they are tied down. True opinions, for as long as they remain, are a fine thing to have and accomplish nothing but good; but they are unwilling to remain for long and slip out of a person’s soul, so they are worth little until someone binds them with a reckoning of the cause. Once bound they turn first into knowledge and then into something lasting; this is why knowledge is valued above right opinion, and it is the binding that sets the two apart (97d–98a).

In the Republic Glaucon agrees that opinion is a power, since it is that by which we are able to opine, and that it is not the same as knowledge, since knowledge cannot err and opinion can; and since they are different powers, Socrates concludes, each is by nature set over something different: knowledge over what is, to know it as it is, and opinion, they agree, to opine; so what is known and what is opined cannot be the same (477e–478b). On that account an opinion would be defined by its object as the Charmides defines every power (168b; see δύναμις), and an opinion with no object of its own, like the one Critias rejects at 168a, would not be an opinion. In the Symposium Diotima places right opinion between understanding and ignorance (202a; see διδόναι λόγον).

Other ancient sources

Aristotle distinguishes opinion from imagination by its tie to speech. Opinion may be true or false, and conviction follows on it, since one cannot opine without being convinced of what seems so; conviction comes from being persuaded, and persuasion from reasoned speech, which the beasts lack.1 The Charmides’ step from the boy’s opinion to his speaking Greek can be read in the same way: an opinion is something its holder can say.

Source note

1. Aristotle, On the Soul 3.3, 428a18–24.