Knowledge and teachability

Use in the book

Alcibiades argues that Pericles became wise through association with recognized wise men. Socrates asks whether Alcibiades has seen a person wise in anything who could not make someone else wise in that very thing. Letters, lyre-playing, and training make the test plausible. The writing teacher both knows and produces knowledgeable pupils; Alcibiades, having learned, should also be able to teach.

The test then reaches Pericles. Alcibiades objects that the sons are simpletons, his brother is mad, and he himself failed to attend. These replies introduce the pupil's contribution: an unsuccessful pupil need not straightforwardly prove an ignorant teacher. Socrates accordingly asks for any Athenian or foreigner, slave or free, who became wiser through Pericles' company. Alcibiades cannot supply one. The conclusion is a failure of the offered evidence, not a demonstration that every failed lesson disproves the teacher's expertise.

The later demand that a statesman first acquire the virtue he will share with citizens resonates with this test. One cannot give what one does not have. Still, the dialogue does not explicitly solve every problem about whether virtue can be taught or guarantee that a virtuous teacher will overcome every student's character and political environment. The final fear about the city's influence is a reminder of precisely such limits.

Places to read

1. 118c–119a2The ability to educate another tests the reputation of Pericles
2. 134b–134cThe person who will share virtue must first possess it
3. 135eThe ending withholds a guarantee that good influence will prevail

Translation in this edition

At 118d “turn out another who knows” renders ἀποδεῖξαι ἐπιστάμενον. The verb here means producing or showing someone as knowledgeable; it is not simply the logical proving of a proposition.

ἀποδείκνυμι

Attested: ἄλλον οἷοί τ’ ὦσιν ἀποδεῖξαι ἐπιστάμενον (allon hoioi t’ ōsin apodeixai epistamenon; 118d); ἀποδεῖξαι (apodeixai; 113e). At 118d: Be able to turn out another knowledgeable person, offered as evidence of the teacher's own knowledge. At 113e: Prove the defect in a claim by an already used argument; demonstration need not be newly invented to remain applicable. Lexical identification: lemma: ἀποδείκνυμι. See Knowledge and teachability.

Use in the book

Theages has heard arguments attributed to Socrates that the sons of statesmen are no better than shoemakers' sons. He adds that this agrees with what he can perceive (126d). He would therefore be senseless, he says, to expect a statesman to hand his wisdom to him while failing to benefit his own son, if he were capable of benefiting anyone in those matters.

The reasoning depends on a plausible expectation of parental concern: a father capable of such benefit would use that capacity for his own child. But the text does not separately investigate willingness, the pupil's aptitude, opportunity or differences among fathers and sons. The objection is forceful within the assumptions of the scene, especially because Demodocus' care is conspicuous. It is not a formally exhaustive proof that no political wisdom can ever be taught.

The statement also has a distinctive evidential status. Theages reports what people say Socrates argues. He does not quote a speech Socrates has just made in this conversation. Socrates answers by asking what he would do with a son who rejected painters while wanting to paint. That reply emphasizes the problem of an alternative; it does not explicitly retract the reported argument or supply evidence that the statesmen's sons are in fact excellent.

The comparison with shoemakers does not declare their sons inferior by nature. Its force is precisely the absence of the improvement that might be expected from a politically distinguished father. Treating it as a biological theory of heredity or a blanket condemnation of craftsmen would obscure the educational issue.

Places to read

1. 126dοὕς σέ φασιν λέγειν τοὺς λόγους — Theages cites arguments attributed to Socrates
2. 126dοἱ ὑεῖς οὐδὲν βελτίους εἰσὶν ἢ οἱ τῶν σκυτοτόμων — The comparison concerns the sons' quality
3. 126dπαραδοῦναι τὴν αὑτοῦ σοφίαν — Wisdom is imagined as something handed over
4. 126dεἴ τι οἷός τ’ ἦν … ὠφελεῖν — The inference turns on the father's capacity to benefit

Translation in this edition

The note points to Protagoras 319e–320b and Meno 93a–94e. Those passages supply parallels, not an unnamed list of particular sons asserted in Theages itself. The printed paradounai is “hand over”; the apparatus reports W's prodounai as a variant. The companion follows the printed transmission language.

Better — βελτίων (beltiōn)

βελτίων (beltiōn)

Better. The comparative denied of the statesmen's sons in relation to shoemakers' sons; the relevant educational advantage is at issue. Attested: βελτίους (126d). Statesmen and their sons.

Hand over — παραδιδόναι (paradidonai)

παραδιδόναι (paradidonai)

Hand over. Transmit one's wisdom to someone else, the ability Theages doubts in statesmen who have not improved their own sons. Attested: παραδοῦναι (126d). Statesmen and their sons.

Have heard — ἀκούειν (akouein)

ἀκούειν (akouein)

Have heard. The evidential introduction to arguments attributed to Socrates, not arguments spoken earlier in this dialogue. Attested: Ἀκήκοα (126d). Statesmen and their sons.

Perceive — αἰσθάνεσθαι (aisthanesthai) · αἰσθέσθαι (126d).

αἰσθάνεσθαι (aisthanesthai)

Perceive. Theages' own limited observation, which he says supports the report about statesmen's sons. Attested: αἰσθέσθαι (126d). Statesmen and their sons.

Senseless — ἀνόητος (anoētos)

ἀνόητος (anoētos)

Senseless. How Theages would judge himself if he expected benefit that the statesmen had not given their sons. Attested: ἀνόητος (126d). Statesmen and their sons.

Shoemakers — σκυτοτόμος (skytotomos)

σκυτοτόμος (skytotomos)

Shoemakers. The fathers whose sons furnish the comparison with the statesmen's sons; not a declaration of inherited inferiority. Attested: σκυτοτόμων (126d). Statesmen and their sons.

Arguments people say Socrates makes (contextual phrase)

126d: οὕς σέ φασιν λέγειν τοὺς λόγους. Theages reports arguments attributed to Socrates. Phasin, “they say”, preserves the mediation of the report. Logos elsewhere can name the peers' memorized arguments (121d), the conversation now addressed to Socrates (127c) and Aristides' performance in discussion (130c). It is neither always a technical proof nor one invariant abstract “Reason”. See Statesmen's sons and Rivalry.

If capable of benefiting anyone (contextual phrase)

126d: εἴ τι οἷός τ’ ἦν εἰς ταῦτα ὠφελεῖν ἄλλον ὁντιναοῦν ἀνθρώπων. The conditional clause makes ability the issue: if a statesman could benefit anyone in these things, why not his own son? Hoios t’ einai is a capacity construction; it does not merely mean being willing. The inference still assumes that opportunity, relationship and pupil do not block the expected benefit. See Statesmen's sons.