From the book
Charmides
Plato · Diotimos Editions · November 2026
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At a Glance
- The wordA comparative with the reflexive as its genitive of comparison: “greater than itself”, “smaller than itself”.
- In the CharmidesIn the first of the relatives that follow the procession of powers: “if it were greater than itself, it would also be smaller than itself” (168c), with “what is more than itself will also be less” after the double (168c).
- In this edition“Greater than itself”, “smaller than itself”, “more than itself”.
- A place to read168b–d.
- English renderings
- ἑαυτοῦ μεῖζον, heautou meizon, “greater than itself”; ἔλαττον ἑαυτοῦ, elatton heautou, “smaller than itself”; πλέον … αὑτοῦ, pleon … hautou, “more than itself”
Meaning
Μεῖζον, “greater”, and ἔλαττον, “smaller”, take a genitive of what they are compared with. A comparison needs two terms, and the phrase puts the same thing in both places.
Use in the book
After the procession, Socrates makes knowledge one of a class: it is knowledge of something, and has a power such that it is of something (168b; see δύναμις). Then: “For we say that the greater, too, has a certain power such that it is greater than something?” “It has.” “Than something smaller, that is, if it is to be greater.” “Necessarily.” “So if we were to find something greater which is greater than the greater things and than itself, but greater than none of the things than which the others are greater, then surely this would certainly be true of it: if it were greater than itself, it would also be smaller than itself. Wouldn’t it?” “Absolutely necessary, Socrates,” he said (168b–c). The double follows (168c; see διπλάσιος), then the more and the less, the heavier and the lighter, the older and the younger (168c–d; see βαρύς), and the principle that whatever has its power in relation to itself must have the character its power is directed at (168d; see δύναμις πρὸς ἑαυτό).
The greater is built to match Critias’ knowledge exactly. His temperance is knowledge of itself and of the other kinds of knowledge, and of none of the things the others are of (166e–167c); Socrates’ greater is greater than itself and the other greaters, and than none of the things the others are greater than. With magnitudes the result is “altogether impossible” (168e; see ἀδύνατος; μέγεθος), because nothing can be both greater and smaller than the same thing.
The analogy is the argument’s strongest, and its weakness is its likeness. If knowledge were related to its object as the greater to the smaller, a knowledge of itself would be as impossible as a greater than itself. But Critias had already denied that temperance is like the other kinds of knowledge (166b–c; see διαφέρω), and Socrates himself leaves knowledge undecided (169a). The greater can be read as showing what a knowledge of knowledge would have to be if it were a relation of this kind, without showing that it is.
Places to read
The passage in which the phrase occurs, from the greater to the impossibility it shows.
- 168bThe greater has a power such that it is greater than something, a smaller.
- 168b–cA greater that is greater than itself would also be smaller than itself.
- 168c–d2What is more than itself will be less; so with heavier and lighter, older and younger.
- 168eWith magnitudes and numbers it is altogether impossible.
Translation in this edition
Εἴπερ ἑαυτοῦ μεῖζον εἴη, καὶ ἔλαττον ἑαυτοῦ εἶναι (168c1–2) is “if it were greater than itself, it would also be smaller than itself”. At 168c9 πλέον δὲ αὑτοῦ ὂν οὐ καὶ ἔλαττον ἔσται is “what is more than itself will also be less, will it not”: the English uses “smaller” for ἔλαττον beside “greater”, and “less” beside “more”.
Elsewhere in Plato
In the Republic Socrates states the class to which the greater belongs. Of things that are of something, he says, those of a certain kind are of something of a certain kind, and those that are themselves are only of something itself: the greater is such as to be greater than something, the smaller, and the much greater than the much smaller; so the more relate to the fewer, the doubles to the halves, the heavier to the lighter, the quicker to the slower, the hot to the cold; and so with knowledge, which itself is of learning itself, while a particular kind of knowledge is of a particular kind of thing (438b–d). The list repeats the Charmides’ greater, double and heavier, and counts knowledge among the relatives, as the Charmides does at 168b; but the Republic’s knowledge itself is of learning itself, and the question the Charmides left undecided, whether a knowledge can be of itself, is not raised.
In the Theaetetus the greater makes a puzzle of another kind. Six knucklebones set beside four are more, half as many again; beside twelve, fewer, half as many; can anything become greater or more except by being increased? Socrates, without growing or shrinking, is now bigger than the young Theaetetus and within a year will be smaller, though nothing of his bulk is taken away, because Theaetetus has grown. Theaetetus says he wonders at such things until he is dizzy (154c–155c). The Theaetetus’ greater is greater and smaller than different things, or than the same person at different times, which raises a puzzle but no contradiction; the Charmides’ greater would be greater and smaller than the same thing, itself.